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This dissertation examines how concepts of life articulate themselves in the writing practices of 
German authors around 1800, with particular focus on the works of the Göttingen experimental 
physicist and writer Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, the humorist and romantic author Jean Paul, 
and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. While much of the research on this topic is limited to theories 
of the novel or to the relationship between German Romanticism and the emergence of the field 
of biology around 1800, I contend that new scientific theories of organic development in the early-
19th century introduced a crucial and as yet largely overlooked element into literary representation 
during this period: that of materiality. In the dissertation, I argue that these author’s works reflect 
and inform a specifically material conception of life – as corporeal, finite and heterogeneous – 
which manifests itself at the level of the surface materiality of the texts themselves: the life of the 
book as “waste” (Chapter I: Georg Christoph Lichtenberg), scholarly life as the contingent com-
binatory of letters (Chapter II: Jean Paul), and morphology as the science of serial aggregates 
(Chapter III: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe). Through a close and sustained engagement with their 
texts, I conclude that these writers’ insistence on a notion of corporeal and linguistic materiality 
does not cohere with the romantic conception of literature as a subjective epistemology of infinite 
reflection; my dissertation therefore seeks to reconstruct an alternative epistemology of the literary 
which examines the specifically material dimension of the contingency of writing and the various 
“forms-of-life” which it comes to embody. 
 To support this argument, I draw on recent scholarship within the growing field of “science 
and literature” which identifies a convergence between the fields of biology, aesthetics, as well as 
rhetoric and poetics around 1800. As scholarship in the history of science has well-established, the 
transformation of “life” into an object of scientific and empirical scrutiny during this period was 
 iv 
closely intertwined with the decline of the older natural-historical enterprise of categorizing living 
beings into primordial types and static taxonomies and subsequent rise of the modern “life sci-
ences,” namely biology. Yet the dissertation departs from previous studies in both the history of 
science and literary criticism, which focus primarily on the interconnection between German Ro-
manticism and the modern natural sciences. Instead, the dissertation examines works of literature 
in which the corporeal materiality of both life and letter intersect and intertwine at the level of the 
“small form.” That is, rather than taking the romantic novel as the object of inquiry, or the related 
opposition between system and fragment, the dissertation foregrounds the relation of form to life 
in terms of different graphematic procedures of writing and their relation to marginal literary 
forms. From this peripheral perspective onto the “discourse network” around 1800, I argue that 
there is in fact a profoundly close connection between the material conceptions of life in the 18th 
century, which foregrounded the elements of contingency, disorder, and death, and the emergence 
of small literary forms – ones which were considered far too heterogeneous and fragmentary to 
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INTRODUCTION: FORMS-OF-LIFE AND THE LIFE OF FORM 
 
Sobald das Leben über das bloß Animalische hinaus zur Stufe des Geistes vorgeschritten 
ist und der Geist seinerseits zur Stufe der Kultur, wird in ihm ein innerer Gegensatz offen-
bar […] [wir] sprechen von Kultur, wenn die schöpferische Bewegung des Lebens gewisse 
Gebilde hervorgebracht hat, an denen sie ihre Äußerung, die Formen ihrer Verwirklichung 
findet, und die ihrerseits die Flutungen des nachkommenden Lebens in sich aufnehmen 
und ihnen Inhalt und Form, Spielraum und Ordnung geben […]. Aber diese Erzeugnisse 
von Lebensprozessen haben das Eigentümliche, daß sie im Augenblick ihres Entstehens 
schon einen eigenen selten Bestand haben, der mit dem ruhelosen Rhythmus des Lebens 
selbst […] nichts mehr zu tun hat. Sie sind Gehäuse des schöpferischen Lebens, das sie 
aber wieder verläßt, und des nachströmenden, das aber schließlich in ihnen nicht mehr 
unterkommt.1 
 
—Georg Simmel, “Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur” 
 
In this remarkable opening passage from Georg Simmel’s 1918 essay “Der Konflikt der modernen 
Kultur,” the concept of life emerges as a new epistemological-philosophical paradigm for under-
standing modern society, the cultural forms which it gives rise to over time, as well as the inner 
contradictions that these forms come to embody.2 Here Simmel alludes to the peculiar fact that the 
ontological tension between subject and object – a tension which for him amounts to nothing less 
than the fundamental paradox of modern culture – can just as well be articulated in terms of the 
conceptual distinction between “life” and “form”; for life can only realize itself as an individual 
life in form, which the productive “vital impulse” gradually outgrows and supersedes. With the 
term “life,” Simmel thereby designates not an abstract idealization, but rather a pre-conceptual, 
unmediated “lived reality” (Erlebnis), which appears as the source of all cultural forms and social 
phenomena. As soon as this lived reality comes into existence, however, a struggle between life 
                                                
1 Georg Simmel, “Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur,” in: idem., Gesamtausgabe, ed. O. Rammstedt, vol. 16 (Frank-
furt a. M. 1999), 181–207, here: 183ff. 
2 This text, along with Lebensanschauung (1918), may be viewed therefore as representative of Georg Simmel’s late 
phase of writing insofar as his “philosophy of life” [Lebensphilosophie] finds its clearest and most decisive articulation 
in them. For more on Simmel’s philosophy of life, and in particular his conception of form, see A. M. Bevers, Dynamik 
der Form bei Georg Simmel (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot Verlag, 1985). 
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and its forms ensues, for while these forms allow life to be grasped conceptually, life in its imme-
diacy always eludes discursive cognition and conceptual mediation (Erkennen). For this reason, 
life is characterized for Simmel by a constitutive surplus – a Mehr-Leben as well as a Mehr-als-
Leben: “Indem es Leben ist, braucht es die Form, und indem es Leben ist, braucht es mehr als die 
Form. Mit diesem Widerspruch ist das Leben behaftet, daß es nur in Formen unterkommen kann 
und doch in Formen nicht unterkommen kann […].”3 
 Simmel’s understanding of life thus leads to a double complication of the notion of form, 
oscillating between foundation and product, restriction and enabling of life. How a living process 
is carried out is, on the one hand, conditioned by the form of life it exemplifies; this very condi-
tioning form, on the other hand, is itself produced and manifested by this living process. Life, in 
other words, “is conditioned by a form it itself produces; it restricts and orders itself by means of 
something it brings into reality.”4 While Simmel’s solution to this fundamental philosophical prob-
lem of the time – that is, the relation of life and form –  thereby entails the positing of an insuperable 
“contradiction” [Widerspruch], the philosopher Ernst Cassirer proposed an alternative answer – 
what he called the philosophy of symbolic forms – meant to resolve and mediate the antinomy 
diagnosed by Simmel: “Für die Philosophie […] kann […] niemals das Leben selbst, vor und 
außerhalb aller Geformtheit, das Ziel und die Sehnsucht der Betrachtung bilden: sondern für sie 
bilden Leben und Form eine untrennbare Einheit.”5 Conversely, this also means for Cassirer that 
no form can be posited as prior or external to all vitality; his philosophy of symbolic forms, which 
seeks to represent the “Urphänomen des Lebens selbst” in “seinem Bestand und in seiner 
                                                
3 Simmel, “Lebensanschauung,” in: idem., Gesamtausgabe, vol. 16, 209–425, here: 230ff. 
4 Thomas Khurana/Christoph Menke, “Form and Formation of Life,” in: Constellations 18.1 (2011), 6–7, here: 7. 
5 Cf. Ernst Cassirer, “Der Begriff der symbolischen Form im Aufbau der Geisteswissenschaften,” in: idem., Aufsätze 
und kleine Schriften. (1922-1926), Gesammelte Werke, vol. 16, ed. Birgit Recki (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
2003), 75–104, here: 104. 
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vollständigen Entfaltung,”6 can also be formulated therefore as a phenomenology of living forms.7 
With this formula, Cassirer, like Simmel, no longer considers form merely statically as a fully 
formed “figure” [Gebilde], but rather conceives it dynamically as a “werdende Form”8 and a “Wer-
den zur Form”9 – or what he refers to, with explicit reference to the scholastic tradition, as a “forma 
formans”: “Wie die scholastische Metaphysik den Gegensatz zwischen dem Begriff der ‘natura 
naturata’ und der ‘natura naturans’ gebildet hat, so muss die Philosophie der symbolischen For-
men zwischen der ‘forma formans’ und der ‘forma formata’ unterscheiden.”10 
 For Simmel and Cassirer, as for other philosophers of life around 1900, the conception of 
form as a process of emergence from life thus marks a decisive break with the classical Aristotelian 
framework that rested upon a hylomorphic dualism between substance (hylē) and form (morphē) 
– a dualism that deeply influenced idealist aesthetics. Now, in accordance with the conception of 
form drawn from the natural sciences as the “becoming of life,” form arises as an emergent phe-
nomenon from unformed (physical, social, and aesthetic) forces, energies, and processes, rather 
than as a principle of enclosure and order that seeks to contain and give shape to unformed matter 
or material. In this way, a conception of form as “living form” not only advanced to a key concept 
in the frame of Lebensphilosophie, but also – to the extent that such philosophical inquiry inter-
sected with the domains of cultural sociology (Simmel), the philosophy of symbolic forms (Cas-
sirer), logic and ethics (Wittgenstein), philosophical anthropology (Plessner), as well as various 
                                                
6 Cf. Cassirer, Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen, in: idem., Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte, vol. 1, ed. 
von J. M. Krois (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1995), 263. 
7 For more on the concept of life in Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy, cf. Christian Möckel, Das Urphänomen des Lebens. 
Ernst Cassirers Lebensbegriff (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2005). 
8 Ibid., 18. 
9 Ibid., 15. 
10 Ibid. For more on Cassirer’s distinction between forma formans and forma formata, cf. Reto Luzius Fetz, “Forma 
format – forma formans. Zur historischen Stellung und systematische Bedeutung von Cassirers Metaphysik des Sym-
bolischen,” in: Lebendige Form. Zur Metaphysik des Symbolischen in Ernst Cassirers “Nachgelassene Manuskripten 
und Texten, eds. Reto Luzius Fetz/Sebastian Ullrich (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2008), 15–34. 
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other newly-emergent discursive fields – became intimately intertwined with the foundations of 
the nascent Kulturwissenschaften of the early-20th century.11 
 As important as these later epistemological reflections on the relation of life and form were 
and continue to be for engaging with questions of vitality, processuality, and autopoesis in the 
human or cultural sciences, it is nevertheless essential to recognize that their groundwork was in 
fact already laid as early as the 18th century. In breaking away from an older epistemological 
paradigm that opposed form and idea to matter and content, “philosophers of life” around 1900 
such as Simmel and Cassirer drew on a conception of form, as largely independent of matter, 
substance, and content, that owed its origins to the aesthetic debates around 1800. During this 
period, nothing less than an epochal transformation of the notion of form took place, which David 
Wellbery has described as the shift from “eidetic” to “endogenous” form-concepts, that is, from 
the scholastic (as well as neo-Platonic) opposition between form and materiality to the notion of 
form as a process of self-formation and self-production.12 Kant’s aesthetics marks in this context 
a decisive turning point insofar it reformulates the old rhetorical-poetic figure of “liveliness” in 
the sense of energeia – the terminus technicus for the lively description of an action, event, person 
or passion – into an aesthetic concept, one which is now charged with endowing the mind with life 
and providing the means by which it affects and feels itself.13 In jettisoning the inherited tradition 
of this rhetorical figure, Kant places art into a new relation with life: “life” is now conceived as an 
                                                
11 Cf. Cassirer, Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften [1942], in: idem., Gesammelte Werke, vol. 22, 357–90. 
12 Cf. David E. Wellbery, “Form und Idee. Skizze eines Begriffsfeldes um 1800,” in: Morphologie und Moderne: 
Goethes ‘anschauliches Denken’ in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften seit 1800, ed. Jonas Maatsch (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2014), 17–42, in particular 19. 
13 For more on Kant’s reformulation of the traditional rhetorical figure of “hypotyposis,” which is synonymous with 
“energeia,” cf. Rodolphe Gasché, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), in particular 202–46. See also Winfried Menninghaus, “‘Ein Gefühl der Beförderung des Lebens.’ Kants 
Reformulierung des Topos ‘lebhafter Vorstellung,’” in: Vita aesthetica. Szenarien ästhetischer Lebendigkeit, eds. Ar-
men Avanessian, Winfried Menninghaus and Jan Völker (Zürich/Berlin: diaphanes, 2009), 77–94. 
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autopoetic form, and this conception of a self-forming, self-preserving force paves the way for the 
(re-)foundation of aesthetics.14 
 The departure from the classical rhetorical topos of “liveliness” and inauguration of a new 
aesthetic conception of life was not, however, a purely isolated development in the history of 
knowledge around 1800. Rather, as the second half of Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft, which deals 
with the problems of teleological judgment, already makes clear, it was in fact the parallel – and 
in many respects interlocking – development of the disciplines of biology and aesthetics that pro-
vided the epistemological foundation for this transformation. The well-studied decline of natural 
history and subsequent rise of the modern life sciences – biology – brought about a radical up-
heaval in the classical understanding of nature and its forms, which introduced into the scientific 
discourse of the time a new conception of independent, self-organizing life-forms under the name 
“organism.”15 Parallel to this development in the natural sciences was the seemingly unrelated rise 
of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline, which in the wake of Alexander Baumgarten’s Aes-
thetica (1750/58) quickly gained traction. Yet whereas Baumgarten’s work still made extensive 
use of the classical rhetorical topoi of “vivid cognition” (cognitio viva) and “vivid representation” 
                                                
14 Coming at this problem from philosophical aesthetics, Rodolphe Gasché argues that Kant’s efforts in the Critique 
of Judgment to separate the beautiful from anything sensible or moral “breaks with the Aristotelian or scholastic 
tradition, according to which form is always the form of some matter and hence is understood in its difference from, 
that is, in relation to, its other” (Gasché, The Idea of Form, 8). For Gasché, this break is most clearly elucidated by 
way of Kant’s notion of “mere form”: “Mere form […] is anything but an empty contentless arrangement. It is the 
form that the cognitive powers achieve in the face of wild objects whose representation suggests purposiveness, not-
withstanding the absence of determinate concepts. Mere form is thus above all a para-epistemic concept” (ibid.). 
15 Cf. Wolf Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte. Wandel kultureller Selbstverständlichkeit in den Wissenschaften 
des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts (München: Hanser Verlag, 1976). For more on the broader philosophical significance 
of this epistemic break around 1800, see also Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life. Teleology and Mechanics in 
Nineteenth Century German Biology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), in particular 156–94, as well as 
Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life. Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 2002), in particular 407–502. 
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(repraesentatio viva),16 Kant formulates in the third Critique – with explicit reference to the con-
temporary (proto-)biological theory of the Bildungstrieb – an emphatic conception of “life” not 
only as a key term of aesthetics, but also one which seeks to unify aesthetic as well as natural-
philosophical desiderata. His substitution of an older rhetorical-poetic figure for an aesthetic-bio-
logical one was not merely a semantic shift; rather, it marked “einen Paradigmenwechsel der Äst-
hetik selbst. Auch in der Ästhetik rückt mit dem Begriff des Lebens – freilich nun als ‘Leben des 
Subjekts’ verstanden – die Eigenständigkeit eines sich selbst erhaltenden Modus von Wahrneh-
mung, Urteil und vor allem ‘Lust’ in den Vordergrund.”17 
 Taking this narrowing of the domains of aesthetics, rhetoric and poetics, and biology in the 
18th century as its point of departure, this dissertation seeks to explore the theories, practices and 
literary phenomena of “life” and its forms of knowledge – its concepts, ordering principles, its 
heterogeneous discursive practices, as well as its systems of notation – around 1800. In order to 
bring methodological cohesion to this project, the dissertation pursues the relation of life and form 
during this period across three interrelated domains of inquiry: (1) rhetorical and representation-
theoretical; (2) natural-scientific and biological; and (3) literary- and media-historical. While I 
have attempted to provide a brief historical sketch of how the rhetorical-poetic figure of “liveli-
ness” suddenly became superimposed onto and largely replaced by an emphatically biological 
conception of life with the rise of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline in the mid- to late-18th 
century, I would like to turn our attention now to the role of literature and media. 
                                                
16 For more on Alexander Baumgarten’s aesthetics and its relation to the older rhetorical tradition, see Rüdiger Campe, 
Christoph Menke, and Anselm Haverkamp (eds.), Baumgarten-Studien. Zur Genealogie der Ästhetik (Berlin: August 
Verlag, 2014). 
17 Cf. Armen Avanessian, Winfried Menninghaus, and Jan Völker, “Einführung,” in: Vita aesthetica, 7–11, here: 10. 
For more on the importance of biological theories of self-organizing organisms for literature and philosophy in the 
18th and 19th centuries, see also Helmut Müller-Sievers, Self-Generation. Biology, Philosophy, and Literature Around 
1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
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 One of the most significant developments with respect to the relation of form and life 
around 1800 concerns the form and theory of the novel. At least since the end of the 17th century, 
theoretical debates on the novel were characterized by its recurring presentation as the ‘form of 
formlessness.’ The novel, as Rüdiger Campe writes, was considered the genre which “keine Form 
hatte im Sinne dessen, was man manchmal auch genauer die äußere Form nennt. […] Der Roman 
war keine poetologisch bestimmte Gattung. Wenn der Roman Form haben sollte, musste sie Form 
dessen sein, was er erzählt.”18 If the novel were to have a form, it would not have been an “exter-
nal” one, but rather an “inner” form – one which, moreover, conforms to a conception of form 
above all as a form of formation: it is, as Campe further elaborates in a separate essay on the theory 
of the novel, “derjenige Formprozess, der einfache Formen in sich aufnimmt und an ihnen die 
eigene Formlosigkeit kompensiert.”19 Starting with Friedrich Blanckenburg’s influential treatise 
Versuch über den Roman (1774), which made Christoph Martin Wieland’s Agathon into the ex-
emplary model of novelistic narration, and later with Friedrich Schlegel’s Gespräch über die 
Poesie (1800), which drew its theory of romantic form, in turn, from Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister, 
post-poetological theories of the novel from the romantics to Walter Benjamin and Georg Lukács 
in the 20th century conceived the “inner” form of the novel as the form and formation of life:20 
                                                
18 Cf. Rüdiger Campe, “Das Bild und die Folter. Robert Musils Törleß und die Form des Romans,” in: Weiterlesen. 
Literatur und Wissen, eds. Ulrike Bergermann and Elisabeth Strowick (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2007), 121–147, 
here: 141f. 
19 Campe, “Form und Leben in der Theorie des Romans,” in: Vita aesthetica, 193–211, here: 198. 
20 Here it is crucial to note the extent to which the term “life” in these various treatises remains undetermined and 
fluid. In Versuch über den Roman, for instance, Friedrich Blanckenburg oscillates between two ostensibly different 
meanings of the term “liveliness”: on the one hand, the novel is said to be ‘vivid,’ because what it makes present is 
the ‘formed life’ of the hero (“The Life of …,” as per many novelistic titles) in all its richness and detail; on the other 
hand, it is ‘lively,’ because it makes ‘life’ present in the actuality of specific features and actions (perceptions, sensa-
tions, and dispositions). By superimposing “die Qualität des Präsentierens am Präsentierten” (ibid., 201), Blancken-
burg collapses the distinction between the rhetorical and representational-theoretical conceptions of “liveliness”; cf. 
Christian Friedrich von Blanckenburg, Versuch über den Roman (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1965), in particular 260, 
264, and 278. Friedrich Schlegel, on the other hand, speaks in his review of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister of “Lebens-
kunst” as both the object and means of representation of Goethe's novel; cf. Friedrich Schlegel, “Über Goethes Meis-
ter,” in: idem., Schriften zur Literature (Munich: dtv, 1972), 260–78. Furthermore, in Benjamin’s essay “Goethes 
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“Nur und erst beim modernen Roman ist es unter allen Gattungen so, dass man über Form nur als 
eine des Lebens sprechen kann. Mit dem modernen Roman wird literarische Form statt zu einer 
Sache der literarischen zu einer der Lebensform.”21 As Campe demonstrates, this superimposing 
of the “form-of-life” [Lebensform] onto the “life of form” re-activates a much older rhetorical 
technique of evidentiary intuition: that of energeia, or what Aristotle calls “putting before the eye” 
– pro-ommaton –, which by way of metaphoric transfer substitutes “Lebendiges an die Stelle von 
Nichtlebendigem (Totem, Abstraktem oder Abwesendem).”22 
 While the dissertation largely follows Campe’s speculative link between the classical Ar-
istotelian relation of life (metaphysics) and representation (rhetoric-poetics) and modern literary 
forms, it inquires less into the epistemological and form-theoretical (pre-)conditions for the emer-
gence of the modern novel as such than into the heterogeneous form-processes23 which it un-
leashes and, relatedly, into the plurality of small or simple forms24 which it enfolds. Central to my 
argument, therefore, is a methodological shift away from the “major form” of the novel and a 
privileging, in turn, of the small, fleeting, and “minor” forms of literature as the primary locus of 
                                                
Wahlverwandtschaften” (1924/25), “life” becomes the decisive value that is realized in the novel, although his use of 
the concept “Lebensform” remains purely polemic, referring to the renunciation of criticism and idolatry of nature as 
the “mythischen Lebensformen” in the artist’s existence; cf. Benjamin, “Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften,” in: idem., 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt a. M.: Surhkamp, 2003), 123–201, here: 149. Finally, 
Lukács, akin to Simmel, recognizes only either life which is already formed, or form which is always-already given, 
namely as works of art; cf. Georg Lukács, Theorie des Romans. Ein geschichtsphilosophischer Versuch über die 
Formen der großen Epik (Neuwied/Berlin: Luchterhand, 1965). 
21 Campe, “Form und Leben in der Theorie des Romans,” 196. 
22 Ibid., 203. 
23 For more on the concept of process, cf. Christoph Hoffmann, “Festhalten, bereitstellen. Verfahren der Aufzeich-
nung,” in: Daten sichern. Schreiben und Zeichnen als Verfahren der Aufzeichnung (Zürich/Berlin: diaphenes, 2008), 
7–20. There Hoffmann points out that writing can manifest itself in different ways as a process: “Teils setzt es sich in 
räumlichen Verteilungen, teils in zeitlichen Abläufen um, teils liegt das Gewicht auf der Anordnung, teils auf einer 
Folge von Schritten und insgesamt variieren diese Verfahrensweise nach der Menge der Konventionen, ihrer ex-
pliziten Formulierung und, darin eingeschlossen, nach der Möglichkeit der Rekonstruierbarkeit” (ibid., 13). 
24 For more on the concept of “small form,” cf. Ulrich Stadler, “Kleines Kunstwerk, kleines Buch und kleine Form. 
Kürze bei Lichtenberg, Novalis und Friedrich Schlegel,” in: Die kleinen Formen in der Moderne (Innsbruck 2001), 
15–36. For the related concept of the “simple form,” see André Jolles, Einfache Formen. Legende, Sage, Mythe, Rät-
sel, Spruch, Kasus, Memorabile, Märchen, Witz (Tübingen 1999); Sonja Hitziger et al., ed., Kleine literarische For-
men in Einzeldarstellungen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2002). 
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“liveliness” and “vitality” – a shift which is grounded, moreover, on the basis of a literary-histor-
ical and mediological understanding of the period in question. For just as soon as the genius aes-
thetics of classicism and Sturm und Drang in the 18th century had elevated the unity of the work 
of art and the individuality of its author into aesthetic as well as social ideals, the manner in which 
fiction was produced, distributed, and consumed underwent a dramatic transformation: the boom 
in newspaper, magazine, and book production around 1800 brought about not only an unprece-
dented abundance of textual material, but it also raised new questions of authorship and readership 
in an era of too much to read and write. In the introduction to Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise; nebst 
einer Auswahl verbesserten Werkchen (1808/22), Jean Paul gave voice to this shift when he wrote: 
“Mit den Taschenkalendern und Zeitschriften müssen die kleinen vermischten Werkchen so 
zunehmen […], daß man am Ende kaum ein Großes mehr schreibt.”25 
 This brief description provides an insightful, albeit parodic, description of the new condi-
tions under which literature is produced in the nineteenth century.26 In his characteristically hu-
morous manner, Jean Paul not only diagnoses the transformation of fiction into the form of an 
archive or compendium in the nineteenth century – as well as the corresponding shift form the 
“great work,” or opus, to the “minor work,” or opusculum – but also realizes this shift at the level 
of literary form by coupling his “minor works” from newspapers and anthologies onto his novel, 
which was itself published in installments.27 As the example of Dr. Katzenberger makes clear, the 
rise of seriality in the nineteenth century thus meant, on the one hand, that the form that literature 
                                                
25 Jean Paul, Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise; nebst einer Auswahl verbesserten Werkchen, in: Jean Pauls Sämtliche 
Werke (henceforth as Werke), ed. Norbert Miller (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1978), I/6, 81. 
26 Cf. Nicolas Pethes, “Serial Individuality: Eighteenth-Century Case Study Collections and Nineteenth-Century Ar-
chival Fiction,” in: Distant Readings: Topologies of German Culture in the Long Nineteenth Century, eds. Matt Erlin 
and Lynne Tatlock (Rochester, NY: Boydell & Brewer, 2014), 115–32. See also: Andrew Piper, Piper, Dreaming in 
Books: The Making of the Bibliographic Imagination in the Romantic Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2009), in particular 19–52. 
27 Cf. Pethes, “Serial Individuality,” in particular 115–17. 
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assumes now had to accord with the commercial exigencies of the book-market and printing press, 
which not only put into question the autonomy of the artwork, but also its aesthetic unity. On the 
other hand, nineteenth-century literature was already aware of its new situation and, like Jean 
Paul’s “novel,” reflected this change in its structure. Arguably more pertinent than questions re-
lated to the discursive conditions of text production around 1800, then, is the way in which the 
form of the series advanced to a privileged form-principle of open-ended composition and narra-
tion during this period. The consequences of this shift are difficult to underestimate: they entail 
nothing less than a thorough-going disarticulation of the novel as a form and the proliferation, in 
turn, of the microscopic “small forms” or “minor works” which it once took up. From this per-
spective, seriality should be understood not simply as an external condition of mass market pro-
duction, but above all as an “inner” form-process in its own right – one which is characterized by 
the serial techniques of juxtaposition, contiguity, enfolding, and concatenation (Verkettung). 
Hence, one can no longer speak here of literary form in analogy with an organic totality, but rather 
as a serialization of the parts, which do not relate to each other as parts to a whole.28 
 But what might “liveliness” and “vitality” mean, then, at the level of the small form? As 
the analogy between the bio-logic of life and literary form might already imply, the blurring of the 
biological and the aesthetic foregrounds the way in which writing itself is subject to the constraints 
of corporeal existence, namely finitude and death. In the case of the small forms – and by these I 
mean not simply static (generic) forms of the small, but heterogeneous form-processes such as 
drafting, collecting, excerpting, list-making, note-taking, and archiving29 – “life” embodies writing 
                                                
28 For more on the concept of seriality and its transformation of the part-whole relation, above all with respect to 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Notes on Morphology, cf. Eva Geulen, “Serialization in Goethe’s Morphology,” in: 
Compar(a)ison 2 (2008), 53–70, in particular 65–66. 
29 For more on this point, see Hoffmann, “Festhalten, bereitstellen. Verfahren der Aufzeichnung,” esp. 7–8. 
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in its finite corporeality and microscopic materiality. For this reason, it is no longer simply a ques-
tion of “vivid representation,” but concerns an emphatic conception of life in terms of the “textual 
body” (Schriftkörper) itself, which serves as the privileged locus of inscription as well as of mor-
tification. This focus on the corporeality of the small positions this study firmly within the frame-
work of what David Wellbery refers to as “post-hermeneutic criticism”30: it shifts away from ques-
tions dealing purely with meaning to the analysis of discursive practices and their medial (pre-
)conditions. The intersection of corporeal life and material form thus manifests itself, for instance, 
in the very “gesture of writing” [Geste des Schreibens], which constitutes a heterogeneous ensem-
ble of linguistic material and bodily movement.31 Such a conception of “material” as the excess of 
form’s potential to become form not only jettisons the scholastic distinction between form and 
matter; it also radically departs with the conception of matter found in German idealism as well as 
German romanticism. Whereas Fichte, for instance, subordinates letter to spirit, the “body” to the 
“soul” of text, in his influential treatise on intellectual property and modern copyright law, Beweis 
der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks (1793), and Friedrich Schlegel, among other Ro-
mantics, programmatically defines “Romantic universal poetry” in transcendental terms as an in-
finite process of self-reflexive becoming – in other words, the epistemic space of the mise en abyme 
                                                
30 “The reason that the concept of corporeality defines the point of reference for post-hermeneutic criticism is clear. 
The body is the site upon which the various technologies of our culture inscribe themselves, the connecting link to 
which and from which our medial means of processing, storage, and transmission run. Indeed, in its nervous system, 
the body itself is a medial apparatus and an elaborate technology. But it is also radically historical in the sense that it 
is shaped and reshaped by the networks to which it is conjoined” (David E. Wellbery, “Foreward,” in: Friedrich A. 
Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, trans. Michael Metteer [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992], vii–
xxxiii, here: xiv). 
31 “Um schreiben zu können, benötigen wir – unter anderen – die folgenden Faktoren: eine Oberfläche (Blatt Papier), 
ein Werkzeug (Füllfeder), Zeichen (Buchstaben), eine Konvention (Bedeutung der Buchstaben), Regeln (Orthogra-
phie), ein System (Grammatik), ein durch das System der Sprache bezeichnetes System (semantische Kenntnis der 
Sprache), eine zu schreibende Botschaft (Ideen) und das Schreiben” (Vilém Flusser, “Die Geste des Schreibens,” in: 
idem., Gesten. Versuch einer Phänomenologie [Düsseldorf; Bensheim 1991], 39–49, here: 40; cited in Martin Stinge-
lin, “Schreiben. Einleitung,” in: “Mir ekelt vor diesem tintenklecksenden Säkulum.” Schreibszenen im Zeitalter der 
Manuskripte [= Zur Genealogie des Schreibens, vol. 1], ed. Martin Stingelin, Davide Giuriato, Sandro Zanetti [Mu-
nich: Wilhelm Fink, 2004], 7–21, here: 13). 
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–, the writers which I have selected for this dissertation foreground, by contrast, not only the fleet-
ingness and material ephemerality of the small forms, but also take as both their object and means 
of representation a seriality towards death. 
 For this reason, I have chosen as the title for the dissertation the phrase “signs of life,” 
which emphasizes just as much the vital as the discursive dimensions of my inquiry. While the 
phrase “signs of life” was first translated into the German Lebenszeichen from the Latin indicium 
vitae by the 17th-century poet and linguist Kaspar von Stieler (1632–1707), Grimm’s Wörterbuch 
traces the use of this word to around 1800,32 citing in particular a letter from Goethe to Bettine von 
Arnim, in which Goethe solicits von Armin for a “sign of life,” and alludes to the possibility of 
death.33 As the use of this term in this context implies, written and received letters can act as proof 
of one’s own life, especially when death is within reach. Thus a letter and, if possible, one featuring 
a hand-written signature, serves to dispel rumors of life-threatening illness or unexpected demise. 
Thus in a letter to Carl Friedrich Zelter written on March 23, 1823 – a period during which Goethe 
was recovering from a severe illness and his correspondence slowly dwindled – he wrote the short-
est letter of their correspondence, a “sign of life” tout court: “Erstes Zeugnis / erneuten Lebens 
und Liebens / Dankbar, anhänglich / J. W. v. Goethe.”34 Put briefly, a “sign of life,” one might 
                                                
32 Cf. “Lebenszeichen,” in: Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, 16 Bde. in 32 Teilbänden, vol. 12, 
[Leipzig 1971], 459; “Lebenszeichen,” Grimm-Wörterbuch, accessed 22 Mar. 2016, <http://www.woerterbuch-
netz.de/DWB?lemma=lebenszeichen>). 
33 “Von Dir, liebe Bettine, habe ich sehr lange nichts gehört und kann meine Reise ins Karlsbad unmöglich antreten, 
ohne Dich nochmals zu begrüßen und Dich zu ersuchen, mir dorthin ein Lebenszeichen zu geben; möge ein guter 
Genius Dir diese Bitte ans Herz legen, da ich nicht weiß, wo Du bist, so muß ich schon meine Zuflucht höheren 
Mächten nehmen. […]” (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe to Bettine von Arnim on March 10, 1810, Goethes Briefwech-
sel mit einem Kinde, in: Bettine von Arnim, Werke und Briefe in vier Bänden, eds. Walter Schmitz and Sibylle von 
Steinsdorff [Frankfurt a. M.: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1992], vol. 2, 335; my emphasis). 
34 Goethe to Zelter on March 23, 1823, in: Goethe, Der Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Zelter, 4 vols. (Leipzig: 
Insel Verlag, 1915), vol. 2, 203. In a letter to Marianne von Willemer dated April 14, 1823, Goethe similarly writes: 
“Nur wenig Worte als Zeichen erneuten Lebens und Liebens” (Goethe, Goethes Briefwechsel mit Marianne von Wil-
lemer, ed. Philipp Stein [Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1908], 101). 
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say, designates a small form – in Goethe’s case, a parergic supplement (“anhänglich”) to an epis-
tolary correspondence – which constitutes both a performative utterance ,insofar as it does not 
simply “re-present” a given reality, but rather seeks to bring a new condition into being through 
its illocutionary force, as well as a form of evidentiary intuition, which draws on the classical 
rhetorical technique of “liveliness” in the sense of energeia by superimposing an emphatically 
biological conception of life – namely the physical body of the writer – onto something which is 
absent, abstract, and – potentially – dead. 
 The dissertation provides three case studies, whose chapters are organized in a roughly 
chronological manner according to specific authors and works, which open up different perspec-
tives onto the nexus of form, life, and the materiality of writing – of signs of life – around 1800: 
Georg Lichtenberg’s Waste Books (Sudelbücher), Jean Paul’s idylls (Leben des vergnügten Schul-
meisterlein Maria Wutz in Auenthal, Leben des Quintus Fixlein, Leben Fibels), and finally Goe-
the’s writings on morphology and his final prose piece, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre oder die 
Entsagenden. While there are arguably many other writers and texts during this period that explore 
the relation of form and life in a manner that accords with the methodological criteria and theoret-
ical aims which I have laid out for myself just as clearly as – if not perhaps better than – those 
which I selected, this should not detract from the fact that, in their works, one encounters poetolog-
ical reflections on the relation of the instruments of material inscription to the concepts of form 
and life in a manner that foregrounds the contingency of writing at the material level. 
 By foregrounding the corporeality and materiality of writing with an eye towards the form-
life relation around 1800, the dissertation seeks to open up an “interstitial perspective,” in Homi 
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K. Bhaba’s words,35 onto the book as a discursive format in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries. The book, on this reading, appears not merely as a vessel for narrative form, but rather as a 
historically-specific communicative medium which undergoes change and transformation in the 
context of evolving discursive practices and hermeneutic operations. Crucial in this respect is that 
each of the aforementioned writers cite different scholarly techniques of writing that, as I will 
argue, contribute in different ways to the dissolution of the book as a unified discursive format. In 
Chapter I, I focus on Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher. Starting with his citation of the 
tradition of commonplace books, a scholarly bookkeeping practice, as his method of writing, I 
approach this ensemble of texts not as a static collection of aphorisms, but as a form-experiment 
in serial methods of text production, such as list-making, note-taking, and scribbling, which bring 
into view the different epistemologies of intuitive knowledge around 1800. In Chapter II, I exam-
ine Jean Paul’s idylls, in which the lives of minor scholarly figures become intertwined with dis-
continuous procedures of writing and reading. Here I seek to show how any engagement with Jean 
Paul’s writing whatsoever – either in spite of or perhaps on account of the fact that it proliferates 
into massive, multi-volume compendia – necessarily leads in the direction of the poetics of the 
small form; for in each of his idylls, he makes the technique of writing in excerpts into both an 
object and means of representation, with major epistemological consequences, as I will demon-
strate, for his own idiosyncratic conception literary form. Finally, in Chapter III, I examine the role 
of contingency, materiality and seriality in Goethe’s Notebooks on Morphology, in which his ob-
servations of nature’s heterogeneous phenomena led him to reject the model of formative devel-
opment – Bildung – as insufficiently dynamic and to rethink in turn his conception of form, and in 
his final “novel” Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre – a genre-designation which Goethe in fact struck 
                                                
35 Homi K. Bhaba, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 2008), 4. 
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from its second edition –, in which this rejection of Bildung gains epistemological significance 
with respect to the transformation of the Bildungsroman into an “archive fiction,” thereby making 









CHAPTER I. GEORG CHRISTOPH LICHTENBERG 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: WASTE (BOOKS) FOR NO ONE 
 
Aber die Lumpen, den Abfall: die will ich nicht inventarisieren sondern sie auf die einzig 
mögliche Weise zu ihrem Recht kommen lassen: sie verwenden.36 
 
—Walter Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk 
 
 
For more than three decades, the Göttingen experimental physicist and writer Georg Christoph 
Lichtenberg (1742–1799) meticulously entered his “remarks” into notebooks, which he used as a 
repository for miscellaneous thoughts, observations and memoranda to himself. Each volume of 
his notebooks – fifteen in total – was accorded a letter of the alphabet (with “I” omitted) from “A,” 
begun in 1765 – which in fact consists of five slim notebooks collected together – to “L,” which 
breaks off at Lichtenberg’s death in 1799.37 He called these notebooks, which consist of approxi-
mately 1,085 individual entries, his Sudelbücher – a translation of the English “waste books,” a 
term employed in the English business house of the time to designate the ledgers in which trans-
actions of all kinds were entered as they occurred before being transferred to the more orderly and 
neatly written account books. 
 While the name “waste book” [Sudelbuch] first appears at the end of Notebook “D” (1773–
75) in an alphabetically-organized list of words and things entitled “Wörter und Redens-Arten,” 
which among other entries includes the items “in seinem Sudelbuch (common place book)” and 
                                                
36 Walter Benjamin, Das Passagen-Werk, in: Gesammelte Schriften (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), vol. V.1, 574. 
37 As will be discussed further on, it is in fact only in what we now call Notebook “D” that the letter appears as a 
classificatory label for the first time. The attribution of letters to Notebooks “A,” “B,” “C,” is an editorial fiction 
imposed upon the notebooks by the editor Wolfgang Promies. For more on the publication and edition history of 
Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher, see the editorial remarks by Wolfgang Promies included at the end of volume one of the 
Sudelbücher, in: Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 950–52. 
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“Sudelei,”38 it was not until Notebook “E” (1775–76) that he developed the “waste book” into a 
potential form-principle for his own notebooks. There he compares the writing of scholars and his 
own way of writing in his notebooks with the form of the “Sudelbuch,” that is, with a practice of 
book-keeping used by merchants: 
Die Kaufleute haben ihr Waste book (Sudelbuch, Klitterbuch glaube ich im Deut-
schen), darin tragen sie von Tag zu Tag alles ein was sie verkaufen und kaufen, 
alles durch einander ohne Ordnung, aus diesem wird es in das Journal getragen, wo 
alles mehr systematisch steht, und endlich kommt es in den Leidger at double ent-
rance nach der italiänischen Art buchzuhalten. In diesem wird mit jedem Mann be-
sonders abgerechnet und zwar erst als Debitor und dann als Creditor gegenüber. 
Dieses verdient von den Gelehrten nachgeahmt zu werden. Erst ein Buch worin ich 
alles einschreibe, so wie ich es sehe oder wie es mir meine Gedanken eingeben, 
alsdann kann dieses wieder in ein anderes getragen werden, wo die Materien mehr 
abgesondert und geordnet sind, und der Leidger könnte dann die Verbindung und 
die daraus fließende Erläuterung der Sache in einem ordentlichen Ausdruck enthal-
ten. vid.[e] p.[aginum] XXVI.39 
 
Here Lichtenberg outlines a two-step process of writing that proceeds from the “waste book,” in 
which everything is to be written down, to a “ledger at double entrance,” in which the disordered 
material in the notebook is to be carried over into a ledger in order to be further ordered and refined. 
The method of text production which Lichtenberg cites in this remark derives on the one hand 
from the economic discourse of double-entry bookkeeping – here he speaks explicitly of the trans-
actions between “credit” and “debtor” – and on the other hand – as suggested by the first mention 
                                                
38 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 341f [from D 668]. The significance of this list of words and phrases at 
the end of Notebook “D” extends further. In a later entry in Notebook “E,” Lichtenberg speaks without comment of 
“allen meinen Hudelbüchern,” in which he has gathered remarks in order to write a historiography. Hudelbuch is here 
a variant of Sudelbuch and likewise means common place book. Hudeln already appears, however, in the list in Note-
book “D,” in which the word “Sudelbuch” is introduced as a “common place book”: “hinhudeln, Hudler” and also in 
a list of words that end with the suffix “-ei”: “Bücherei statt Bibliothek / Eselei / Faselei / Hudelei, Humpelei / Klügelei 
/ Sudelei / Witzelei” (ibid., 342f [from D 668]). 
39 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 352 [E 46]. It should be noted that the material published by the editor 
Wolfgang Promies as “Sudelbücher” in the first two volumes of his edition was not originally conceived by Lichten-
berg to ever be published under this title. Lichtenberg starts using the term “Sudelbuch” on the title page of his note-
books only in Notebook “F,” and then inserts the term for the first time in Notebook “D.” 
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of the term “Sudelbuch,” in which the parenthetical explanation “common place book” is added – 
from the rhetorical discourse of excerpting and collectanea.40 
 As Lichtenberg’s explanation for his use of the term “waste book” might suggest, the con-
tents of these notebooks are extraordinarily heterogeneous: on any given page the reader may en-
counter aphoristic aperçus, lists of the titles of books to be read or purchased, important dates to 
be remembered, philosophical reflections, linguistic experiments of witty combinatories, notes for 
future work, quotations or excerpts from other books or magazines, as well as scientific illustra-
tions and sketches. For this reason, it would be exceedingly difficult to summarize the diverse 
contents of the Sudelbücher. Nonetheless, it can be said with relative certainty what they are not: 
diaries. Lichtenberg also kept private diaries, albeit on an irregular basis compared to his note-
books, and the descriptions of the day-to-day events of his life which they contain bear little con-
nection to the heterogeneous form of entries found in his notebooks.41 
 Admittedly, there is, however, one important way in which Lichtenberg’s diaries, or 
Tagebücher, and his notebooks are similar: although he published much during his lifetime – in 
addition to countless scientific treatises on subjects ranging from physics, astronomy, geology, 
physiognomy, and even drone technology,42 as well as non-scientific texts, such as his Briefe aus 
                                                
40 Cf. Heike Meyer, Lichtenbergs Rhetorik. Beitrag zu einer Geschichte rhetorischer Kollektaneen im 18. Jahrhundert 
(Munich: Liliom, 1999), 109. 
41 A selection of the contents of these diaries can be found in the second volume of Lichtenberg’s Schriften und Briefe. 
See in particular Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 595–859. Unlike his Sudelbücher, Lichtenberg only irreg-
ularly contributed entries to these diaries. Furthermore, the entries found in these diaries concern mostly private, eve-
ryday matters, including his encounters and conversations with friends, colleagues or acquaintances, astronomical 
observations, as well as travelogues, most of which he – again, in contrast to the Sudelbücher – consistently dated. 
More specifically, these diaries contain a travelogue kept from 1770 to 1774, the “Reise-Tagebuch” (ibid., 621–35) 
from his second trip to England, which accompanies the “Reise-Anmerkungen” (ibid., 639–93) from Sudelbuch “E,” 
and finally the calendrical entries dated from 1789 to 1799, which bear the title “Königl. Groß-Britannisch- und Chur-
fürstl. Braunschweig-Lüneburgschen Staats-Kalenders” (ibid., 695–859). 
42 Cf. Lichtenberg, “Vermischte Gedanken über die aërostatischen Maschinen, von G. C. L.,” in: idem., Schriften und 
Briefe, vol. 3, 63–75. There Lichtenberg hypothesizes the invention of a self-piloted “ball,” projected into the atmos-
phere, that could harness the clouds and other weather phenomena for movement and be guided by signals, “also keine 
Luftschiffe mit Segel und Steuer-Ruder,” as Lichtenberg writes, “sondern bloße Bälle, die an einem Leitseil über die 
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England (1776 and 1778) and his book on William Hogarth’s copperplate embossments, G. C. 
Lichtenbergs ausführliche Erklärung der Hogarthischen Kupferstiche (1794–99) – the notebooks 
in which he wrote down his “remarks” were kept private, entirely for his own use, with no thought 
of publication. Hence, just as much as the Sudelbücher are not private diaries, they also cannot be 
easily situated as a precursor to the literary tradition of the autofictional diary, as one finds in the 
work of twentieth-century writers like André Gide and Ernst Jünger. Only posthumously were 
fragments from Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher released to the reading public, first under the title 
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s Vermischte Schriften (first edition: 1800–06; second edition: 
1844–53), as in the literary tradition of the miscellany or collected edition, and later by Albert 
Leitzmann, the editor of the first critical edition of Lichtenberg’s notebooks, who from 1902 to 
1908 published Lichtenberg’s private, unclassifiable notebooks based on hand-written manuscripts 
under the new title Georg Christoph Lichtenbergs Aphorismen.43 
 Since then, Lichtenberg has been credited, if largely by accident, with having introduced 
the aphorism into German literature, despite the fact that he did so posthumously and without any 
deliberate intent. To apply the concept of “aphorism,” as Leitzmann did, or of “Gedankenbuch,” 
as in the case of Franz H. Mautner,44 to Lichtenberg’s notebooks is therefore highly misleading. 
Lichtenberg did not compose aphorisms in the sense of maximes, as in the tradition of the French 
                                                
Wolken hinaus mit und ohne Menschen steigen, und auf gegebene Signale hin und her und auch herabgezogen werden 
können” (ibid., 69). Lichtenberg suggests that such an invention would not only be of great scientific importance, but 
would also have self-evident military applications, namely for the purposes of reconnaissance (see in particular ibid., 
70–71). 
43 The publication of Leitzmann’s edition of Lichtenberg’s notebooks took place between 1902 and 1908 and was 
broken up into five separate volumes in the Deutsche Litteraturdenkmale. Cf. Deutsche Litteraturdenkmale des 18. 
und 19. Jahrhunderts, eds. Bernhard Seuffert and August Seuffert, Nr. 123, 131, 136, 140, 141. 
44 See Lichtenberg, Gedankenbücher, ed. Franz H. Mautner (Heidelberg 1967). The term “Gedankenbuch,” which 
Friedrich Nicolai applied to his diary entries, appears only once in Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher: “Wenn ich zuweilen 
in einem meiner alten Gedankenbücher einen guten Gedanken vor mir lese, so wundere ich mich, wie er mir und 
meinem System so fremd hat werden können, und freue ich mich nun so darüber, wie über einen Gedanken eines 
meiner Vorfahren” (Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 404 [K 44]). 
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moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère, 
Chamfort), nor do his remarks “anticipate” the romantic fragment, as developed by Novalis and 
Friedrich Schlegel, among others, who drew on Kant’s theory of the sublime to transform the 
fragment into a transcendental genre, which gained epistemological significance around 1800 as a 
linguistic critique of systematic philosophy.45 While there is an undeniable proximity between 
Lichtenberg’s remarks and aspects of the contemporaneous concept of the romantic aphorism, 
particularly with respect to their brevity (brevitas) and wit (ingenium, esprit),46 only once does 
Lichtenberg in fact use the term “aphorism” to describe the form of his entries found in the 
Sudelbücher. Instead, he most often speaks of “remarks” [Bemerkungen], as well as occasionally 
of “whims” [Einfälle], “thoughts” [Gedanken] or “ideas” [Ideen]. In contrast to the romantic aph-
orism, which owes its poetic obscurity and potential for infinite reflection precisely to its unique 
formal closure as a “selbständiges Gebilde,”47 Lichtenberg’s remarks are not thought in isolation 
                                                
45 For more on the genre of the fragment, especially with respect to its pre-Romantic forms, cf. Justus Fetscher, “Frag-
ment,” in: Ästhetische Grundbegriffe. Ein Historisches Wörterbuch in sieben Bänden, vol. 2, eds. Karlheinz Barck et 
al. (Stuttgart/Weimar: J. B. Metzler Verlag, 2001), 551–88. 
46 In addition to the countless passages in the Sudelbücher in which Lichtenberg performs witty combinatories, in one 
remark from Notebook “E” he speaks of a hailstorm of epigrams with reference to his own “witty writings”: “Witzige 
Schriften wollten sie. Da regnete blitzte und hagelte es Epigramme” (Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 365 [E 
111]). Furthermore, in Notebook “J,” he links “wit” to both the rhetorical technique of inventio – in the sense of the 
discovery of arguments and their “realia” – and to the techné of observation: “Der Witz ist der Finder (Finder) und 
der Verstand der Beobachter” (ibid., vol. 2, 297 [JII 1620]) and requests “einen Finder zu erfinden für alle Dinge” 
(ibid. [JII 1621]), that is, “[e]in Tubus Heuristicus” (ibid. [JII 1622]), a ‘heuristic telescope.’ While more will be said 
about Lichtenberg’s ‘wit’ in the subsequent chapter, it suffices to note that contemporaneous writers also perceived 
his writings as ‘witty.’ Thus in a passage from the first edition of the Vorschule der Ästhetik (1804), Jean Paul speaks 
of Lichtenberg’s “witty abundance”: “Lichtenberg stand doch mit seinen humoristischen Kräften höher, als er wußte, 
und hätte bei seiner astronomischen Ansicht des Welttreibens und bei seiner witzigen Überfülle vielleicht etwas Hö-
heres der Welt zeigen können als zwei Flügel im Äther, welche sich zwar bewegen, aber mit zusammengeklebten 
Schwungfedern” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 128). Furthermore, Friedrich Schleiermacher’s review of Lichtenberg’s Ver-
mischte Schriften from 1801 speaks of “wizigen Wendungen” with respect to Lichtenberg’s “Bemerkungen,” 
“Selbstbeobachtungen” and “Einfälle” (cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, Schleiermachers Leben. In Briefen, 4 vols., 
1863, 561–67, cited in Spicker, Der Aphorismus, 67). 
47 W. A. Berendsohn, Stil und Form der Aphorismen Lichtenberg. Ein Baustein zur Geschichte des deutschen Apho-
rismus (Kiel 1912), 17, cited in Heinz Krüger, Über den Aphorismus als philosophische Form (Munich 1988), 14. For 
more on this point, see Rudolf Wildbolz, “Über Lichtenbergs Kurzformen,” in: Geschichte. Deutung. Kritik, ed. Maria 
Bindschedler and Paul Zinsli (Bern 1969), 126; Friedemann Spicker, Der Aphorismus: Begriff und Gattung von der 
Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts bis 1912 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997), esp. 60–67. 
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from one another as individual apothegms, nor do they anticipate – in their fragmentary, draft-like 
composition – a future completed work or ‘whole’; rather, in their chaotic disorder and wild pro-
liferation they become entangled within constellations of other remarks. Lichtenberg himself re-
ferred to such semantic clusters as a “Wörter-Welt”48 – “[e]ine ganze Milchstraße von Einfälle,”49 
which secretly proliferate and extend into a myriad of “[g]litzernden Wörtchen.”50 
 Recently, studies of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s writings in the history of science have 
shifted focus away from questions of literary genre – particularly the application of the genre des-
ignation “aphorism,” as found in much of the literary scholarship on Lichtenberg’s writings51 – 
toward the rhetorical tradition of book-keeping and practices of scientific note-taking. This new 
scholarship situates Lichtenberg’s writing within a broader historical context of scientific note-
taking practices in the early modern period. A reference to this tradition can be found in Lichten-
berg’s own notebooks, namely at the end of Notebook “D,” where he uses the word “Sudelbuch” 
as a satirical variant for the “common place book.”52 A tradition of excerpt books is thereby alluded 
to, to which Lichtenberg’s own manner of writing is said to be closely connected. Thus Ann M. 
                                                
48 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 706 [JI 357]. 
49 Ibid., 704 [JI 344]. 
50 Ibid., 798 [JI 1033]. 
51 See, for instance, Franz H. Mautner, Lichtenberg: Bildnis seines Geistes (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1968), Friedemann 
Spicker, Der Aphorismus, Gerhard Neumann, Ideenparadiese, and Thomas Stötzel, Rohe und polierte Gedanken. 
Studien zur Wirkungsweise aphoristischer Texte (Freiburg i. B. 1998). 
52 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 341f [D 668]. While the use of the term “commonplace book,” the loci 
communes of the topical tradition, dates back to the early modern period in Europe, it was not until the 18th century 
that they became a widespread information-management device in which writers entered quotations, observations and 
definitions according to pre-established topoi. Significant in this historical context is the publication of John Locke’s 
A New Method of Making Common-Place-Books (1706), in which scholarly techniques for common placing were first 
programmatically formulated and presented as a model for other scholars to imitate. For more on the history of com-
monplace books and the practice of common-placing in the Renaissance, cf. Ann Moss, Printed Commonplace-Books 
and the Structuring of Renaissance Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). See also Earle Havens, “‘Of Common 
Places, Or Memorial Books’: An Anonymous Manuscript on Commonplace Books and the Art of Memory in Seven-
teenth-Century England,” in: Yale University Library Gazette (April 2002), 136–53. 
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Blair, in her formidable study of information management from antiquity to the early modern pe-
riod, shows how scholars in the early modern period often referred to the merchant practice of 
double-entry bookkeeping as a model for their own note-taking practices – a model which was 
subsequently popularized in the 18th century by William Webster’s influential handbook, An essay 
on book-keeping (1719), whose advocation for a three-layered note-taking method Blair links in 
passing to Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher.53 Along these lines, Lorraine Daston similarly situates 
Lichtenberg’s writing in the context of encyclopedic and scientific excerpting practices, where the 
excerpting of individual sentences or groups of sentences from their original context can be turned 
into a counterpart to observation and thereby a means for producing new knowledge.54 For Daston, 
the “miscellaneous, overflowing, and decontextualized quality of Lichtenberg’s waste-book en-
tries, in which excerpts from books often mix with excerpts from nature on the same page”55 – a 
technique of juxtaposition that bears a striking resemblance to the 18th-century practice of collect-
ing heterogeneous objects in natural history cabinets – can in this way become a technique for 
producing new facts and ideas. 
 In a recent essay on Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher, Rüdiger Campe argues that while the ap-
proaches to the notebooks in recent historical-scientific studies (the excerpting-practice thesis) 
have successfully refuted the anachronistic readings of the notebooks by literary theorists as ro-
mantic aphorisms (the aphorism thesis), both approaches threaten to overlook the process through 
which and in which the “Sudelbuch” itself emerges. As Campe emphasizes in that essay, if one 
examines Lichtenberg’s text production more closely, it becomes clear that only a few examples 
                                                
53 Cf. Ann M. Blair, Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age (New Haven/Lon-
don: Yale University Press, 2010), in particular 68–69. 
54 Cf. Lorraine Daston, “The Disciplines of Attention,” in: A New History of German Literature, ed. David Wellbery 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 434–40; idem., “Taking Note(s),” in: Isis 95 (2004), 443–48. 
55 Daston, “The Disciplines of Attention,” 438. 
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can be found in which Lichtenberg might have developed a “remark” from one of his waste books 
into a finished text. Campe therefore argues that the characteristic element of Lichtenberg’s waste-
book method lies not in the successive development of a thought first in the “waste book” and then 
in the literary equivalent of the businessman’s ledger, but rather that the Sudelbücher show the 
emergence of a process of “prolepsis and analepsis” [Vorgreifen und Zurückgreifen] that, espe-
cially in Notebook “E,” unfolds in the space of the notebook itself.56 As formal practices – pro-
cesses which, according to Campe, concern the “emergence of their repeatability” – their interac-
tion allows for the form of the “Sudelbuch” to emerge in that the flipping back and forth between 
pages furnishes a space of finding and invention [Erfindung].57 
 The following chapter takes up Campe’s thesis insofar as it draws attention to the processes 
of writing immanent to Lichtenberg’s own notebooks, rather than their relation to later textual 
production. Yet whereas Campe examines the emergence of the “Sudelbuch” as an inductive form-
principle with respect to a system of cross-referencing – that is, of prolepsis and analepsis as “sim-
ple forms”58 of note-taking – the focus of this chapter will be on the material contingency of the 
remarks in Lichtenberg’s notebooks: in other words, with the form of the thought-experiment, 
which connects imaginary seeing with the possibility and limits of thinking.59 As is well known, 
Lichtenberg experimented in his notebooks with an entire series of forms – two-columned lists, 
tables, diagrams, litanies of paronomasias, aleatory clusters of words, and other forms of organiz-
                                                
56 Rüdiger Campe. “Vorgreifen und Zurückgreifen. Zur Emergenz des Sudelbuchs in Georg Christoph Lichtenbergs 
‘Heft E,’” in: Notieren, Skizzieren. Schreiben und Zeichnen als Verfahren des Entwurfs, eds. Karin Krautcausen and 
Omar W. Nasim (Zurich: diaphenes, 2010), 61–88, in particular 76 and 78. 
57 Ibid., 82. 
58 For more on the concept “simple forms” [einfache Formen], cf. André Jolles, Einfache Formen: Legende, Sage, 
Mythe, Rätsel, Spruch, Kasus, Memorabile, Märchen, Witz (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1968). 
59 Cf. Sigrid Weigel, “Das Gedankenexperiment: Nagelprobe auf die facultas fingendi in Wissenschaft und Literatur,” 
in: Science & Fiction: über Gedankenexperimente in Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Literatur (Frankfurt a. M.: 
Fischer, 2004), 183–205. 
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ing writing. Unlike the aphorism, such configurations of linguistic material – i.e., evidentiary ta-
bleaux – do not submit themselves to the subordinating rules of syntax; instead, they follow a 
paratactical logic of contiguity, seriality, and juxtaposition. 
 As Campe has meticulously demonstrated, the same could be said for the form of the “note-
book” [Heft] itself; for what we today call Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher A, B, C and so forth are, in 
reality, nothing but a disparate collection of handwritten notebooks – what Hans-Jörg Rheinberger 
calls the Zettelwirtschaft of the laboratory situation.60 Only in what we now call Notebook “D” 
does the letter appear in fact as a classificatory label for the first time, though not at the beginning 
of the notebook, but rather in the middle.61 Not coincidentally, it is precisely at that point where 
the general observations – what the traditional interpretation of the Sudelbücher as a collection of 
aphorisms takes as its point of departure – begin. In the first half of the notebook, one finds instead 
“Annotationes et collectanea philosophica et physica,” after which point follows the first part of 
the travelogue of Lichtenberg’s trip to England from September 29, 1774 to April 15, 1775, fol-
lowed by several entries on the theory of fire. Only then do the entries on physics transition into 
those general or ‘literary’ entries – prefaced by the inserted letter “D” – which subsequent editions 
of Lichtenberg’s notebooks call Sudelbuch D.62 The letter as a label of the notebook appears, how-
ever, first in Notebook “E” on the cover and first page. From that point on, all the notebooks are 
                                                
60 Cf. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, “Zettelwirtschaft,” in: Schreiben als Kulturtechnik, ed. Sandro Zanetti (Berlin: Suhr-
kamp, 2012), 441–52. In that essay, Rheinberger speaks in particular of “notes” [Zettel] and “drafts” [Entwürfe] as 
the written material of the experimental system: “Sie liegen zwischen den Materialitäten der Experimentalsysteme 
einerseits und den begrifflichen und narrativen Gebäuden andererseits, die als sanktionierte Forschungsberichte den 
unmittelbaren Kontext des Labors verlassen” (ibid., 442). 
61 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 227 [D 1]. One must keep in mind that that the entries which the editor 
Wolfgang Promies printed form the second part of the notebook, whose first part forms the “Annotationes et collec-
tanea philosophica et physica.” Hence D 1 is actually in the middle of the notebook. 
62 In his edition of the Sudelbücher, Promies includes the physical “Annotationes,” yet he relegates them – along with 
Lichtenberg’s “Reise-Tagebuch” from 1774–75 – to the second volume of the Sudelbücher. In doing so, his edition 
yields a confusing representation which follows neither the original sequence of text nor leads to a more comprehen-
sible reorganization of the material. 
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marked by letters; notebooks “A,” “B,” and “C,” were in fact never ascribed these labels by 
Lichtenberg, but added by later editors. One can therefore read Notebook “E” as the decisive turn-
ing point in the emergence of the “Sudelbuch”: there Lichtenberg discovers for the first time a new 
form of simultaneous inscription for the separation of entries. Yet in contrast to Notebook “D,” 
which carries out a similar operation – namely, the separation of physical and literary notes – in 
Notebook “E,” it is the travel diary and the remarks, be they scientific or literary, which are sim-
ultaneously separated and related to each other.63 
 Thus when Lichtenberg conceived of the “Sudelbuch” as a form, he did so under the con-
dition that scientific and literary modes of reflection need not be strictly separated. This does not 
mean, however, that Lichtenberg was a pre-modern – or at the very least, a pre-Kantian – thinker, 
who did not acknowledge that literature and science entail different modes and conditions of epis-
temological inquiry. Quite to the contrary, it was precisely on the basis of the scientific method 
that Lichtenberg, who was himself just as much an experimental physicist as he was a satirist, 
vehemently criticized Johann Caspar Lavater’s physiognomy for its naive insistence on an imme-
diate legibility of man.64 Instead, whereas in Notebook “D” scientific and literary inscriptions are 
                                                
63 In Notebook “F,” Lichtenberg returns once more to the one-directional and unseparated practice of inscription which 
he used in the notebooks prior to the turning point in Notebook “E” – those which Promies’s edition calls “A,” “B,” 
and “C.” Starting with Notebook “J,” however, one sees a return to the practice of two-directional inscription from 
Notebook “D” with the allocation of remarks into scientific and literary categories. 
64  Cf. Lichtenberg, “Über Physiognomik; wider die Physiognomen. Zu Beförderung der Menschenliebe und 
Menschenkenntniß,” in: idem., Schriften und Briefe, vol. 3, 256–95. There Lichtenberg observes that it is in fact not 
only the scientific method, but also the creative capacities of the imagination and wit that can be directed against 
physiognomy; for whereas physiognomy obscures its semiotics, imagination and wit can make the mechanics of idea-
association – the basis of all physiognomic thought – conceivable: “Wollten wir die Leute, von denen wir nach dem 
ersten Anblick urteilen, alle durch jahrlangen, genauen Umgang prüfen, ich glaube, es würde der Physiognomik ärger 
ergehen, als der Astrologie. Einbildungskraft und Witz kommen hierbei gefährlich zu statten, daher sind die tiefsten 
Denker gemeiniglich die schlechtesten Physiognomen. Sie sind mit einer flüchtigen Ähnlichkeit nicht so leicht befrie-
digt, da der flüchtige Physiognome in jedem Dintenfleck ein Gesicht und in jedem Gesicht eine Bedeutung findet. 
Alles dieses ist aus Ideen-Assoziation begreiflich” (283f). For more on Lichtenberg’s conflict with Lavater and its 
broader epistemological significance for the 18th and 19th centuries, cf. Wolfram Groddeck and Ulrich Stadler (eds.), 
Physiognomie und Pathognomie. Zur literarischen Darstellung von Individualität (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 
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first separated into two distinct themes – thereby making the basic condition of modern 
knowledge-production into a process of writing – in Notebook “E” he reflects on what it would 
mean to conceive of scholarly writing according to a model of double-entry bookkeeping. In doing 
so, he adopts the division of inverse directions of writing between the natural and the human sci-
ences in the preceding notebook in order to separate travelogue from collectanea, at which point 
this two-directional writing process is now bound instead to individual themes and single motifs 
that, despite their separation, can in fact be shown to relate to each other.65 
 Against this background, the following chapter takes Lichtenberg’s use of the word “re-
mark” [Bemerkung] as significant to the extent that it simultaneously connotes techniques of ob-
servation and inscription – in other words, the foundational praxes of the modern scientific exper-
iment – which, as Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and others have shown, are of epistemological signifi-
cance not only to the natural sciences, but also to the human sciences.66 How observation and 
inscription interact and, moreover, what kinds of heterogeneous life-forms manifest themselves at 
the threshold of writing and observation, will be examined in light of the ‘laboratory conditions’ 
of Lichtenberg’s form experiment: these include evaluation and implementation with the aid of 
criteria such as magnification, reduction, contrast, as well as interactions with written material – 
i.e., the Zettelwirtschaft of the Sudelbücher. As will be argued, it is principally the form of the 
thought-experiment that presents itself in Lichtenberg’s notebooks, namely as a process of writing 
whose contingency manifests itself at the material level. There idea or observation and its written 
                                                
1994). See also: Helmut Pfotenhauer, “Sich selber schreiben. Lichtenbergs fragmentarisches Ich,” in: Um 1800. Kon-
figurationen der Literatur, Kunstliteratur, und Ästhetik, ed. Helmut Pfotenhauer (Tübingen: De Gruyter, 1991), 5–26, 
in particular 7–12, as well as Albrecht Schöne, Aufklärung aus dem Geist der Experimentalphysik: Lichtenbergsche 
Konjunktive (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1993), in particular 1–15. 
65 For more on this point, see Campe, “Vorgreifen und Zurückgreifen,” in particular 86–87. 
66 Cf. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Experimentalsysteme und epistemische Dinge. Eine Geschichte der Proteinsynthese im 
Reagenzglas (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002), in particular 1–34. 
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inscription or linguistic materiality (i.e., its trace-like structure) – the epistemological and the ma-
terial – are not disaggregated or filtered from one another, as literary scholars have traditionally 
approached the Sudelbücher, but intimately intertwined. Such a perspective onto the experimental 
procedures of writing in Lichtenberg’s notebooks reveals how forms disintegrate into a series of 
smaller, microscopic forms, which are characterized not by the fixity of genre, but by the restless, 




2. “DIE KLEINEN INFUSIONS-IDEECHEN.” ON THE MATERIALITY OF 
THE THOUGHT-EXPERIMENT IN THE SUDELBÜCHER 
 
Der Deutsche holt bei Beschreibung psychologischer Dinge vieles vom Fallen, es fällt mir 
ein, es ist mir entfallen, es ist mir aufgefallen. Zufall, casus accidit. Beifall.67 
 
—Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Sudelbücher, Notebook “J” 
 
In his Sudelbücher, Georg Christoph Lichtenberg articulates his remarks from the perspective of 
a modern scientist, namely that of an experimental physicist (in addition to a prolific writer of 
witty remarks, Lichtenberg was employed as a professor of mathematics and physics at the Uni-
versity of Göttingen), by reflecting on the microscopically small objects and experiences encoun-
tered in everyday life and attempting to look at them from awry. For Lichtenberg, the scientific 
perspective unto the quotidian consists not in reducing the complexity of everyday phenomena to 
abstract mathematical formulas – an operation of which Lichtenberg himself was highly skeptical 
– but entails instead a constant reversal of perspective. Although the formal technique of re-per-
spectivization has a well-established history within the genre tradition of the modern aphorism – 
particularly the maximes of the French moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries68 – it 
also belongs to the epistemology of the modern sciences and constitutes in this context a form of 
experimental thinking that means seeing things in a different way. In Notebook “A” (1765–1770) 
of his Sudelbücher, Lichtenberg explicitly links re-perspectivization to the epistemic space of the 
microscope: “Dinge die man täglich vor Augen sieht von einer andern Seite zu betrachten, oder 
vielmehr durch ein Vergrößerungs-Glas anzusehen ist oft ein Mittel die Welt mit Erfolg zu lehren. 
                                                
67 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 679 [JI 180]. 
68 “Wie später der Naturforscher Lichtenberg, so sieht auch Pascal [die Problematik des Verhältnisses von Einzelnem 




Ledermüllerische Belustigungen ließen sich auch in der Moral schreiben. Ein solches Mikroskop 
würde uns unglaubliche Dinge zeigen.”69 
 By putting the objects and experiences of “common life”70 [gemeines Leben] under the 
same epistemic conditions of observation as the physico-scientific phenomena that he studies in 
his laboratory in Göttingen, Lichtenberg’s writing seeks to open up a microscopic perspective onto 
reality itself. Its object is no longer the determination of universal propositions, as it arguably was 
for French moralists like La Rochefoucauld or La Bruyère,71 but rather the minimal differences or 
“deviations” [Abweichungen] from perceived or accepted wisdom (doxa). In Notebook “A,” 
Lichtenberg explicitly stages this epistemological problematic as the starting point for his own 
practice of recording “witty thoughts” [witzige Gedanken] into notebooks. As he writes in the first 
entry found in that notebook: “Der große Kunstgriff kleine Abweichungen von der Wahrheit für 
die Wahrheit selbst zu halten, worauf die ganze Differential-Rechnung gebaut ist, ist auch zugleich 
der Grund unsrer witzigen Gedanken, wo oft das Ganze hinfallen würde, wenn wir die Abwei-
chungen in einer philosophischen Strenge nehmen würden.”72 
 Although Lichtenberg’s skeptical critique of dogmatic reasoning in the above remark 
seems to confirm the widespread impression of him as a quintessential figure of the Enlightenment, 
his reference to differential calculus [Differential-Rechnung] in this passage hints at an idiosyn-
cratic train of thought within his own writing, one which does not in fact seek to oppose reason to 
                                                
69 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 27 [AI 78]. Here Lichtenberg refers to the Enlightenment jurist and natu-
ralist Martin Frobenius Ledermüller’s well-known scientific treatise of microscopic studies, entitled Mikroskopische 
Gemüths- und Augen-Ergötzung (1761–62). 
70 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 11 [from AI 11]. 
71 For a more complex and thorough reading of the maximes of the French moralists (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, and 
La Bruyère, amongst others) and their broader relation to the cultural poetics of a “transcendental moralistic” in the 
18th and 19th centuries, cf. Neumann, Ideenparadiese, in particular 56–68. 
72 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 9 [AI 1]. 
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whimsy but rather to open up the play-space for contingency in thought – and writing – by distin-
guishing between the “truth” (logic) and its “minimal deviations” (i.e., witty thoughts, witzige 
Gedanken). Although Lichtenberg suggests that “philosophical rigor” [philosophischen Strenge] 
would eliminate such deviations from the truth, he nonetheless imbues the latter with a certain 
degree of epistemic productivity, one that is grounded in the art of free association, i.e., the faculty 
of wit. What interests Lichtenberg in the semblance of truth (Schein des Wahren) is not so much 
the moralist distinction between truth (the whole) and (self-)deception (witty thoughts), therefore, 
but rather the cultivation of an epistemic space – and an experimental process of writing – which 
orients itself according to the probabilistic procedures of games of chance, i.e., probability calcu-
lations (Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnungen). 
 
2.1. Dr. Lichtenberg, the Gambler 
In language strikingly similar to the above-cited remark from Notebook “A,” Lichtenberg chose 
to discuss at length in his 1770 inaugural address at the University of Göttingen – it was in that 
year that he was named Professor Extraordinarius of Physics and Mathematics – the limits to elim-
inating minimal deviations in probability calculations according to purely mathematical means.73 
The talk, entitled Betrachtungen über einige Methoden, eine gewisse Schwierigkeit in der Berech-
nung der Wahrscheinlichkeit beim Spiel zu heben, addresses a topic that in Lichtenberg’s life time 
was already well-known as the “St. Petersburg Paradox” and the subject of much controversy 
among mathematicians. There he describes the problem as follows: 
Die Aufgabe […] ist folgende: Zwo Personen A und B werfen eine Münze in die 
Höhe, die z. E. auf der einen Seite mit 1 und auf der andern mit 0 bezeichnet sein 
soll. A, der die erste Münze wirft, verspricht dem B einen Taler, wenn 1 im ersten 
Wurf fällt, 2 Taler wenn es erst im zweiten Wurf, 4 Taler wenn es erst im dritten, 
                                                
73 Cf. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, “Betrachtungen über einige Methoden, eine gewisse Schwierigkeit in der Berech-
nung der Wahrscheinlichkeit beim Spiel zu heben,” in: idem., Schriften und Briefe, vol. 3, 9–23. 
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8 wenn es erst im vierten fällt, kurz, sollte es erst im nten Wurf fallen, so bezahlt A 
an B 2n–1 Taler, und sollte n auch noch so groß sein, sie wollen so lange werfen bis 
1 fällt. Die Frage ist: wieviel Gewinn kann sich B wahrscheinlicher Weise hieraus 
versprechen, oder wieviel muß der dem A voraus bezahlen, daß sich dieser ohne 
Schaden in ein solches Spiel einlassen kann.74 
 
Lichtenberg’s decision to address precisely this topic is far from coincidental – nor, as will soon 
become apparent, is its synchronicity with the end-composition of Notebook “A.” For in the Age 
of Reason, at the zenith of the Enlightenment, the rise, transformation, and diffusion of probabil-
istic and statistical thinking pressed man increasingly into the role of a player – a “gamester,” per 
the eponymously-titled novel by Daniel Defoe75 – who had to assess and conjecture the risks of 
actions using rational and quantifiable criteria, i.e., he or she now had to learn how to orient his or 
her subjective decisions according to objective probabilities of occurrence, either of unwanted or 
hoped for events.76 This Enlightenment program, which in Pierre Simon de Laplace’s words meant 
“nothing more at bottom than good sense reduced to a calculus”77 [n’est, au fond, que le bon sens 
réduit au calcul], can be discerned in countless texts throughout the 18th century, yet with revealing 
shifts and developments nevertheless: at the turn of that century, the particular situation of an in-
dividual, decision-making subject did not yet play a role in mathematical discourse. Rather, the 
prevailing theories of probability at the time, as developed by thinkers such as Laplace and Gott-
fried Wilhelm Leibniz, proscribed in each case only one compulsory, rational course of action for 
all men. However, this fixed criterium of rationality all too often stood in clear contradiction to the 
                                                
74 Ibid., 10f. 
75 Daniel Defoe, The Gamester: A Benefit-Ticket for all that are concern’d in the Lotteries (London 1719). 
76 Cf. Lorenz Krüger, Lorraine Daston, Michael Heidelberger, Gerd Gigerenzer, and Mary Morgan (eds.), The Prob-
abilistic Revolution, 2 vols. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987). See also: Theodore Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 
1820–1900 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986); Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlight-
enment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 
77 Pierre Simon de Laplace, Essai philosophique sur les Probabilités [1814], in: Œuvres complètes de Laplace, tome 
VII (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1878-1912), 220. 
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rational decision-making of concrete individuals. This eventually led to Daniel Bernoulli’s suc-
cessful effort in the 1730s to develop a mathematical formula that made it possible to account for 
risk aversion based on the individual financial situation of participating players.78  Bernoulli 
thereby demonstrated by mathematical means that a specific game could be played rationally by 
different players in different ways. 
 Although this new method, which went on to attain canonical status in the 18th century, 
far more successfully adapted to particular circumstances of decision-making situations, it also 
entailed a simplification through abstraction. As Bernoulli himself conceded, there could be certain 
cases where the mere ascertainment of an individual’s financial situation no longer suffices as the 
criterium for a rational judgment; for the standard of rationality can be modified not only by ex-
ternal circumstances, but also by internal ones. This makes it conceivable that, at least in some 
cases, even seemingly irrational decisions – despite all objective anomalies having been taken into 
account – could nevertheless appear rational. Such a judgment would, however, not be capable of 
being realized by mathematical means, as Lichtenberg argued in his inaugural address, which deals 
explicitly with Bernoulli’s probability problem. What distinguishes Lichtenberg’s 1770 solution 
to this paradox from those of his predecessors and contemporaries is that he not only discusses it 
from the perspective of mathematical-theoretical statistics, but now incorporates empirical expe-
riences from experimentation into his own “observations” [Betrachtungen]. In doing so, he intro-
duces in his treatise the newly discovered techniques of knowledge-production not from the field 
of mathematics, but from the experimental sciences of the eighteenth-century, into a once purely 
                                                
78 Daniel Bernoulli, Specimen Theoriae novae de Mensura Sortis [1738], in: Commentarii Academiae Scientiarum 
Imperialis Petropolitanae, Tomus V [Papers of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in Petersburg, Vol. V], 175–192; 
“Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk,” in: Econometrica, 22.1 (1954), 23–36. 
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theoretical controversy. By relating theoretical-mathematical problems to the seemingly improba-
ble contingencies of natural circumstances from the physical world – during his experiments, for 
instance, the physically unlikely occurrence of a coin landing on its edge is recorded – Lichtenberg 
makes evident the purpose of his treatise as a “Beispiel zur Erläuterung seiner Ansichten über das 
Verhältnis zwischen Natur und Mathematik”: 
Der Meßkünstler findet nicht selten bei der Anwendung seiner Schlüsse auf die 
Natur, merkliche Abweichungen von dem, was er nach seiner Rechnung hätte er-
warten sollen. […] Er abstrahiert sich von dieser Welt eine eigne, von welcher er 
die Gesetzbücher gleichsam selbst in Händen hat; keine Kraft kann in derselben 
würken, ehe er sie selbst hinein legt; er weiß was überall geschieht, und aus seinen 
Formeln liest er Weissagungen ab; ohne ein Wunder hebt er Gesetze auf, verordnet 
andere, und gibt seiner Welt jede Gestalt die er will […] und alles ist so gewiß als 
die ewigen Wahrheiten, worauf sie sich stützet.79 
 
The analogy between empirical experiences in the experiment and nature itself opens up the pos-
sibility that the mathematician would come to relativize his own “laws” [Gesetze] and worldview 
as determined by abstract models and formulas. For despite such proficiency in measuring, as soon 
as the mathematician “den Abstand erwägt von uns bis zu dem, der allein die Gesetztafeln dieses 
Ganzen in seiner allmächtigen Hand hält, der wird erkennen, wie unmöglich es ist, sich ein System 
von Kräften mit allen den unzähligen Beziehungen zu denken, das nicht schon selbst im allgemei-
nen von diesem würklichen abweichen sollte.”80 By incorporating into his treatise not only expe-
riences with seemingly absurd natural phenomena, but also the “countless relations” [unzählige 
Beziehungen] that cannot be accounted for within a “system of forces,” Lichtenberg exceeds the 
boundaries of mathematical thought and makes the case for an experimental form of knowledge, 
which the actual topic of his treatise seeks to represent.81 
                                                
79 Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 3, 9. 
80 Ibid. 
81 From this perspective, Lichtenberg’s thought situates itself within the epistemic field of the “probability revolution” 
around 1700. As Rüdiger Campe has recently argued, theories of probability during this period cannot be divorced 
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 Lichtenberg thus presents in his text not only an “enlightened” inquiry into the limits of 
Enlightenment thought, but also what can arguably be read as an early poetological program; for 
it is not only experimental physics which Lichtenberg proposes as the solution for successfully 
resolving scientific inquiries into mathematical theories of possible worlds (Leibniz), but also an 
early working-out of his conception of contingency – of games of chance. For Lichtenberg, as for 
other scientific thinkers of the time, the crucial phenomenon to be taken into account in this regard 
was that of subjectivity, which only first with the solution to the “St. Petersburg Paradox” appeared 
to have become mathematically accessible. Yet as Lichtenberg decisively demonstrated in his ad-
dress, subjectivity cannot in fact be made discursively comprehensible by means of purely math-
ematical attempts at calculating human behavioral decisions. For in the course of these attempts, 
more and more statistical exceptions to and subjective deviations from the theoretical models be-
came apparent, such that being able to grasp the subject’s behavior through mathematical formulas 
appeared as an increasingly hopeless effort, gradually leading, in turn, to the exorcism of the “dark 
continent” of individual subjectivity from the field of mathematics. Because the individual devia-
tions and distortions that become observable in the context of games of chance were not capable 
of being grasped mathematically, the phenomena of subjectivity – thoughts, sensations, and mental 
presentations – fell increasingly under an entirely different epistemic purview, namely that of psy-
chology and anthropology.82 
                                                
from aesthetic questions, in particular those dealing with the representation of reality (Wirklichkeit). According to 
Campe, because the calculable and construable world can never entirely free itself from perceivable reality, the issues 
of mathematical probability, including the new science of statistics, and problems of representing reality in the novel 
are fundamentally interrelated. For more on theoretical questions pertaining to probability as a mathematical and nar-
rative issue from Pascal to Kleist, cf. Rüdiger Campe, Spiel der Wahrscheinlichkeit. Literatur und Berechnung 
zwischen Pascal und Kleist (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002). 
82 For more on this point as well as its significance for later developments in the field of probabilistic theory, namely 
the application of measuring and calculation techniques through frequency distributions at the macroscopic level of 
society, as opposed to microscopic level of the individual, see Lorraine Daston, “Rational Individuals versus Laws of 




2.2. The Blitz of Witz: Lichtenberg’s “Experimental Thinking” 
Returning to the Sudelbücher, it suffices to say that it is precisely on account of the fact that, for 
Lichtenberg, the acting subject who makes decisions cannot be reduced to a calculable formula 
that contingency attains such a central role with regard to the idiosyncratic procedure of writing 
that unfolds in the space of his notebooks. By opening up the play-space in his note-taking practice 
for the epistemic legitimacy of logically ungrounded “witty thoughts,” he arrives at an iconoclastic 
conception of the subject that departs in crucial respects from his Enlightenment contemporaries. 
Whereas in the context of theoretical mathematics he argued that a single theory of probability 
could not account for the contingencies of subjective decision-making, in the realm of philosoph-
ical anthropology he criticized the anchoring of thoughts onto a substantial, unified subject. In one 
of the most well-known remarks from the Sudelbücher, he expresses in this regard his skepticism 
of the Cartesian subject, the cogito. For Lichtenberg, the phrase “I think” [ich denke] disingenu-
ously posits a subject where there might actually be none. He suggests that it might be better, 
therefore, to say “it thinks” [es denkt], because the cogito may consist in nothing but the accumu-
lation of sensations, presentations, and thoughts that cannot be immediately attributable to any 
fixed or stable “I.” In writing about this “it” [es], Lichtenberg remarks: 
Wir werden uns gewisser Vorstellungen bewußt, die nicht von uns abhängen; an-
dere, glauben, wir wenigstens, hingen von uns ab; wo ist die Grenze? Wir kennen 
nur allein die Existenz unserer Empfindungen, Vorstellungen und Gedanken. Es 
denkt, sollte man sagen, so wie man sagt: es blitzt. Zu sagen cogito, ist schon zu 
viel, so bald man es durch Ich denke übersetzt. Das Ich anzunehmen, zu postulieren, 
ist praktisches Bedürfnis.83 
 
                                                
83 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 412 [K 76]. 
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Lichtenberg’s exegesis of the cogito in this passage formulates the problem of its recovery from 
the “it” as one of lost origins. If the subject is ignorant of the origins of it’s “own” emotions [Emp-
findungen], mental presentations [Vorstellungen], and thoughts [Gedanken], then it must be 
equally uncertain about the status of the “I” that thinks that it thinks about them. For Lichtenberg, 
the “I” is for this reason not a positive, substantial entity, but rather only a postulate assumed out 
of “practical necessity” [praktisches Bedürfnis]. Correspondingly, thoughts do not belong to the 
“I” that thinks them, precisely because the “I” only carries out the process of thinking without ever 
having any certainty as to the ownership of these thoughts. Lichtenberg’s conception of thinking 
contains within it, therefore, an essential moment of not-knowing, insofar as it disperses thoughts 
from any stable point of origin in the “I.” This puts Lichtenberg radically at odds with the Enlight-
enment tradition of autonomous thinking which he is often taken to epitomize; for rather than 
taking the route of Cartesian self-reflexivity to ground ideas in a substantial “I,” he conceives of 
thoughts as impersonal, freely-circulating material that does not originate from a subject, but 
emerge from a network of pre-established topical matrices which at least nominally orient them.84 
The activity of the “I” – not only the purely eidetic operations of cogitation, but also the activities 
of reading and writing – is thus conceived primarily as one of re-appropriation and recombination, 
which actively manipulates and experiments with thoughts as raw material without ever being able 
to claim them as its own.85 
                                                
84 Cf. Stefan Goldmann, “Lesen, Schreiben und das topische Denken bei Georg Christoph Lichtenberg,” in: Lesen und 
Schreiben im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Studien zu ihrer Bewertung in Deutschland, England, Frankreich, ed. Paul 
Goetsch (Tübingen 1994), 79–90. 
85 For more on Lichtenberg’s epistemology of the subject, see Kirk Wetters, The Opinion System: Impasses of the 
Public Sphere from Hobbes to Habermas (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), in particular 188–238. 
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 Lichtenberg’s insistence on the unsystematic character of thoughts is given form in frag-
mentary writing. His own understanding of what it means to write a Sudelbuch confirms this in-
terpretation; for in addition to “waste book,” he also translates this word into the English “com-
monplace book,”86 an apparent reference to the loci communes of the topical tradition. The com-
monplace book is a collection of topical variations, of thoughts and arguments pertaining to pre-
established topoi. In that same remark, he further reflects on what it would mean to conceive of 
scholarly writing according to a model of double-entry bookkeeping. Although this analogy sug-
gests that the purpose of his Sudelbücher is to create order, with the “waste book” as the site where 
the raw material is entered and collected in anticipation of its later working-out and sifting-through, 
the need for such an elaborate method of recording thoughts attests to a fundamental lack of order. 
In describing his way of writing, Lichtenberg avoids for these reasons hackneyed expressions like 
“I record my thoughts.” Instead, he gives the notion of inscription a more adequate formulation by 
characterizing it as follows: “Erst ein Buch worin ich alles einschreibe, so wie ich es sehe oder wie 
es mir meine Gedanken eingeben.”87 In this well-known remark from Notebook “E,” Lichtenberg 
lays out his two step-process of writing: first, the literal transcription of the thoughts as they occur 
to him into the “waste book,” where everything appears “durch einander ohne Ordnung”88; and 
second, their subsequent refinement and reformulation in the “ledger at double entrance.” Yet these 
two steps ultimately prove to be impossible to differentiate, since not only did Lichtenberg never 
employ a ledger in which to further refine his thoughts, but the first thought – the raw, unprocessed 
data that occurs to him – already comes in the form of a “remark.” For this reason, he portrays 
writing and thinking, seeing and remarking, as inseparable within a potentially endless process of 
                                                
86 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 341f [from D 668]. 




transcription and translation. Through this process, the “I” appears not as the one who thinks the 
thoughts (or thinks itself thinking these thoughts), but is rather revealed to be their bookkeeper and 
copyist. 
 In the absence of self-censorship, the endless production and reformulation of thoughts 
produces nothing but byproducts, detritus. Thoughts present themselves in the “waste books” as 
raw material, appearing in an unsystematic fashion as draft-like scribblings, as Sudelei, rather than 
as fully-formed thoughts or ideas – a status which the very idea of “waste” already implies. Despite 
the occasional semblance of order, individual variants of particular topoi are put in a more or less 
arbitrary juxtaposition, or Nebeneinander, that follow a serial chronology, or Nacheinander. As 
Lichtenberg’s analogy to the bookkeeping practice of double-entry accounting further suggests, 
the “waste book” is a balancing of ledgers and a calculation of debts; yet there is no sign of a final 
accounting between creditor and debtor, no indication that the process will come to an end in a 
unified “work.” Rather, he writes down everything without attempting first to sort it out or reflect 
on it further. The “waste book” is for this reason not a pre-work for a later work-to-come, but a 
radical form-experiment that has perpetual recourse to the “material” – the “waste” or “precipitate” 
(Abfall) of “witty ideas” (Einfälle). These are to be recycled into a kind of collage-work, which 
makes the writer of waste into the bricoleur who carries out the rearrangement and recombination 
of the material lying at his or her disposal.89 In this way, Lichtenberg’s writing foregrounds its 
                                                
89 “In its old sense the verb ‘bricolage’ applied to ball games and billiards, to hunting, shooting and riding. It was 
however always used with reference to some extraneous movement: a ball rebounding, a dog straying or a horse 
swerving from its direct course to avoid an obstacle. […] The ‘bricoleur’ is adept at performing a large number of 
diverse tasks; but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the availability of raw materials and 
tools conceived and procured for the purposes of the project. His universe of instruments is closed and and the rules 
of his game are always to make do with ‘whatever is at hand,’ that is to say, with a set of tools and materials which is 
always finite and is also heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or indeed to 
any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or 
to maintain it with the remains of previous constructions or destructions. The set of the ‘bricoleur’s’ means cannot 
therefore be defined in terms of a project […]. It is to be defined only by its potential use or […] because the elements 
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contingency at the material level. In fact, in a remark from Notebook “E,” he explicitly conceives 
of writing as a procedure akin to draft-making: 
Eins der fruchtbarsten Erfindungs-Mittel, wogegen das Quis, quid, ubi pp gar nicht 
aufkommt, ist, daß man, sobald man etwas hört, zu sich selbst sagt: das ist nicht 
wahr? und alsdann die Gründe sucht, warum man so sagt. Die Regel, daß man nicht 
eher reden oder schreiben bis man gedacht habe, zeigt von vielem guten Willen des 
Verfassers, aber von wenigem Nachdenken, und der gute Mann dachte wohl nicht 
daran, daß man, um mich schöppenstädtisch, aber kräftig, auszudrücken, sein Ge-
setzt nicht halten kann ohne es zu übertretten. Denn nicht zu gedenken, daß viele 
Leute gar nicht würden sprechen können, so glaube ich überhaupt das Gegenteil. 
Wie mancher hat endlich aus Desperation etwas Gescheites gesagt, weil er etwas 
Unüberlegtes verteidigen mußte, und Behaupten ist Philosophieren…90 
 
Against the logical-rhetorical schema of knowledge-production, Lichtenberg advocates in this re-
mark for a conception of writing as a draft. Here he makes clear that the discursive practice of 
writing down everything, unconstrained by the limitations imposed upon thought by the traditional 
Aristotelian topoi of rhetorical invention – the who (quis), what (quid), where (ubi), and so forth 
–, is intended to open up the epistemic play-space for the “minimal deviations from the truth,” i.e., 
the contingency of witty thoughts. For if the activity of the “I” is conceived primarily as one of re-
appropriation and recombination, which manipulates and experiments with thoughts without being 
able to claim them as its own, then the question of how the new and the novel arises presents itself 
as a problem which his Sudel way of writing is intended to resolve. 
 As Rüdiger Campe argues, Lichtenberg’s procedure of writing can thus be understood 
above all in relation to the ambiguity inherent in the notion of “evidence” (evidentia), the rhetorical 
figure of the detailed accumulation of features and properties that is central to the epistemé of the 
                                                
are collected or retained on the principle that ‘they may always come in handy’” (Claude Lévi-Strauss, The Savage 
Mind [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966], 16f). 
90 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 371 [E 146]. 
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so-called “classical period” stretching approximately from Descartes to Kant.91 On the one hand, 
“evidence” is that which is produced through sensual immediacy; on the other hand, it must be 
manufactured using experimental and representational techniques. However, precisely because 
much of what is immediately given to intuition is far too fleeting and ephemeral in order to be 
deemed scientifically meaningful, evidence must be newly fabricated through technical means in 
order to be able to fascinate and persuade. Hence, despite the prevalence of economic metaphors 
in the Sudelbücher, in no way should they be read as an economization or fixation of knowledge. 
Just as man, for Lichtenberg, cannot be reduced to homo œconomicus – an entity whose decision-
making processes are wholly calculable according to theoretical-mathematical models – so too do 
his remarks in the Sudelbücher resist fixation and determination within a “closed economy” of 
writing. This manifests itself in Lichtenberg’s repeated emphasis on contingency and experimen-
tation in the Sudelbücher. In remark from Notebook “K,” he explicitly affirms the necessity of 
experimenting with ideas in order to produce new knowledge: 
Wie viel Ideen schweben nicht zerstreut in meinem Kopf, wovon manches Paar, 
wenn sie zusammen kämen, die größte Entdeckung bewirken könnte. Aber sie lie-
gen so getrennt, wie der Goslarische Schwefel vom Ostindischen Salpeter und dem 
Staube in den Kohlenmeilern auf dem Eichsfelde, welche zusammen Schießpulver 
machen würden. Wie lange haben nicht die Ingredienzen des Schießpulvers exis-
tiert vor dem Schießpulver! Ein natürliches aqua regis gibt es nicht. Wenn wir beim 
Nachdenken uns den natürlichen Fügungen der Verstandesformen und der Ver-
nunft überlassen, so kleben die Begriffe oft zu sehr an andern, daß sie sich nicht 
mit denen vereinigen können, denen sie eigentlich zugehören. Wenn es doch da 
etwas gäbe, wie in der Chemie Auflösung, wo die einzelnen Teile leicht suspendiert 
schwimmen und daher jedem Zuge folgen können. Da aber dieses nicht angeht, so 
                                                
91 Rüdiger Campe, “Epoche der Evidenz. Knoten in einem terminologischen Netzwerk zwischen Descartes und Kant,” 
in: Intellektuelle Anschauung. Figurationen von Evidenz zwischen Kunst und Wissen, eds. Sibylle Peters and Martin 
Jörg Schäfer (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2006), 25–43. See also idem., “‘Vor Augen stellen.’ Über den Rahmen 
rhetorischer Bildgebung,” in: Poststrukturalismus. Herausforderung an die Literaturwissenschaft, ed. Gerhard Neu-
mann (Stuttgart 1997), 208–25; idem., “Unwahrscheinliche Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Evidenz im 18. Jahrhundert,” in: 
Diskrete Gebote. Geschichte der Macht um 1800, eds. R. Borgards, J. F. Lehmann (Würzburg 2002), 15–32; idem., 




muß man die Dinge vorsätzlich zusammen bringen. Man muß mit Ideen experimen-
tieren. Ein bequemes Mittel mit Gedanken zu experimentieren ist, über einzelne 
Dinge Fragen aufzusetzen: z.B. Fragen über Trinkgläser, ihre Verbesserung, Nut-
zung zu andern Dingen etc., und so über die größten Kleinigkeiten.92 
 
With his insistence that one must “experiment with ideas” [mit Ideen experimentieren], Lichten-
berg establishes his way of writing, and thinking in writing, which presents itself as an open ex-
perimental arrangement that aims at the production of the new and the novel. In this respect, his 
procedure bears a close proximity to what Hans-Jörg Rheinberger calls “experimental thinking” 
[experimentelles Denken] which – in a further shifting of the balance between thought and exper-
iment – concerns above all a “durch instrumentelle Randbedingungen ausgerichtete Bewegung, in 
der das Räsonnieren gewissermaßen ins Spiel der materiellen Entitäten gerissen wird.”93 Here the 
materiality of ideas – as inscribed and (re-)read in the form of “remarks” [Bemerkungen] – affects 
its permutation within the experiment; in most cases, the Zettelwirtschaft – the heterogeneous 
economy of notes, drafts, scribbles, lists, and diagrams that constitute the material of the laboratory 
situation – is for Lichtenberg the experiment itself. 
 In a subsequent remark from Notebook “J,” Lichtenberg further likens his experimental 
ideas to Infusionstierchen, a class of protozoa also known as infusoria: “So wie Linné im Tierrei-
che könnte man im Reiche der Ideen auch eine Klasse machen die man Chaos nennte. Dahin ge-
hören nicht sowohl die großen Gedanken von allgemeiner Schwere, Fixstern-Staub mit sonnenbe-
puderten Räumen des unermeßlichen Ganzen, sondern die kleinen Infusions-Ideechen, die sich 
mit ihren Schwänzchen an alles anhängen, und oft im Samen der Größten leben, und deren jeder 
Mensch wenn er still sitzt [eine] Million durch seinen Kopf fahren sieht.”94 Here Lichtenberg 
                                                
92 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 453f [K 308]. 
93 Cf. Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Experiment, Differenz, Schrift. Zur Geschichte epistemischer Dinge (Marburg/Lahn: 
Basilisken-Presse, 1992), 22. 
94 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 770f [JII 850]. 
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opens up once more an epistemic play-space within the realm of ideas that cannot be anchored in 
traditional, pre-existing topoi; rather, experimental ideas are situated within a miscellaneous cate-
gory that Lichtenberg – in direct analogy with the Swiss naturalist Carl Linnaeus’s classificatory 
system of animals – calls “chaos.” Yet as Lichtenberg notes, to the realm of “chaotic” ideas be-
longs not “great thoughts” [großen Gedanken] like that of “universal gravity” [allgemeiner 
Schwere], but rather – in a further reversal of perspective from telescopic to microscopic observa-
tion – the microscopically small ones, the “great trivialities” [große Kleinigkeiten] as he writes in 
the previous remark, to which he ascribes the neologism “Infusions-Ideechen.” Here imaginary 
seeing (“deren jeder Mensch […] sieht”) connects with the possibility and limits of thinking 
(“[eine] Million durch seinen Kopf fahren”). In other words, it becomes a thought-experiment – 
“so könnte man…,”95 as Lichtenberg hypothesizes – which inserts along the way a poetological 
code (“Infusions-Ideechen”) that links imaginary and scientific productivity. This juxtaposition of 
form and life – this formation of a life – is noteworthy in that it activates an old rhetorical function 
whereby the bio-logic of life in an emphatic sense overlaps with the vivid actualization of eviden-
tiary intuition: the Aristotelian conception of energeia, the ability to “bring-before-the-eyes” (pro-
ommaton), which, by means of metaphoric transfer, “Lebendiges an die Stelle von Nichtlebendi-
gem (Totem, Abstraktem oder Abwesendem) setzt,” such that “das Wirklichwerden (des Potenti-
ellen)” figures as a process of formation of “eines Sichbewegenden.”96 What is decisive here is 
that such metaphoric visualization does not merely signify living things, but rather “durch die 
                                                
95 “Was Lichtenberg einbringt in das Spiel der Konjunktive, ist eine wahrhaft genialische Einfallskraft, die in solchen 
sprachlichen Formen das ihr angemessene Ausdrucksmittel findet, zugleich aber durch die habitualisierten Suchfor-
meln dieser konjunktivischen Konstruktionen befördert und geleitet wird – auf allen Gebieten, in denen dieser Physi-
ker experimentierte” (Albrecht Schöne, Aufklärung aus dem Geist der Experimentalphysik: Lichtenbergsche Kon-
junktive [Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1993], 79). 
96 Rüdiger Campe, “Form und Leben in der Theorie des Romans,” 203–04. 
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Ersetzung des Lebenden für Nichtlebendes vor- oder nachmacht, wie Sichbewegendes auftaucht, 
wo keines war.”97 Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher, which push this principle of energeia to its limits, 
“steigert diese prozessierende Transformation in einen Exzess des Potentiellen und die darin auf-
scheinende Unform.”98 
 The central question motivating Lichtenberg’s project, then, is how to capture and collect 
this excess of potential, this unform – the contingent ‘flashes of insight’ (Gedankenblitze) or “un-
expected combinations”99 [unverhoffte Kombinationen] that he calls “witty thoughts” [witzige 
Gedanken] or “Infusions-Ideechen”? When Lichtenberg juxtaposes the phrases “es blitzt” and “es 
denkt” in his remark from Notebook “K,” he hints in fact at the foundations of his own experi-
mental procedure of writing. There he foregrounds not only the impersonal character of the 
thoughts themselves – the absence of an “I” which could be determinately affixed to them – but 
by metonymically linking “blitzen” and “denken” he also alludes to the swiftness of thought, which 
may be said to strike like lightning. Since Shakespeare’s famous maxim in Hamlet that “brevity is 
the soul wit,” the only genre or form that is always recognized as the property of wit (Witz) is 
succinctness, which could be summarized according to the witty formula: wit is a flash of lightning 
(Der Witz ist ein Blitz). In Notebook “E,” Lichtenberg draws much the same witty conclusion when 
he writes: “Witzige Schriften wollten sie. Da regnete blitzte und hagelte es Epigramme […].”100 
As Jean-Luc Nancy writes, “[f]lash, lightning, explosion are the forms of the cogito’s double in-
sofar as it is instantaneous.”101 Far more than the mere swiftness of the utterance, the effect of wit 
constitutes the temporality of a productivity that can be emphatically referred to as “lightning”: 
                                                
97 Ibid., 204. 
98 Andrea Krauß, “Sammeln – Exzerpte – Konstellation. Jean Pauls literarische Kombinatorik,” in: Monatshefte 105.2 
(2013), 291–314, here: 298. 
99 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 454 [K 309]. 
100 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 365 [from E 111]. 
101 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Menstruum Universale,” in: The Birth of Presence, trans. Brian Holmes et al. (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), 248–65, here: 263. 
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whereas the sun (en)lightens, lightning blinds – its explosion deafens; the light which wit brings 
forth is thus, to quote Bettine Menke, “die leer resultierende Produktivität statt der metaphorischen 
und metaphorologischen Sonne der Erkenntnis, die sich in ihrem Gegenstand phänomenal 
erfüllte.”102 
 In Notebook “J” of the Sudelbücher, Lichtenberg links wit to both the rhetorical technique 
of inventio – in the sense of the discovery of arguments and their underlying “realia” – and at the 
same time to a technical apparatus of perception: “Der Witz ist der Finder (Finder) und der 
Verstand der Beobachter,”103 he remarks, and goes on to request in the subsequent remark “einen 
Finder zu erfinden für alle Dinge,”104 i.e., “[e]in Tubus Heuristicus,”105 a so-called “heuristic tel-
escope.” In contrast to the later literary tradition which links wit to a specific genre or narrative 
form, namely the “joke” as popularized in the 19th century, Lichtenberg understands wit as the 
rational capacity for invention and discovery for the heuristic purpose of scientific knowledge-
production. This epistemological understanding of wit in the sense of ingenium, which was em-
phasized by the rationalist tradition (Christian Wolff, Alexander Baumgarten, Johann Christoph 
Gottsched), places it in parallel to acumen (Scharfsinn); for without the latter, “mere” wit yields a 
potentially dangerous surplus of idea-associations (i.e., madness), while acumen cannot forgo im-
agination (Einbildungskraft), i.e., evidence in the sense of energeia.106 
                                                
102 Bettine Menke, “Jean Pauls Witz. Kraft und Formel,” in: DVjs 76 (2002), 201–13, here: 204f. 
103 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 297 [JII 1620]. 
104 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 297 [from JII 1621]. 
105 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 297 [from JII 1622]. 
106 Along these lines, Christian Wolff defines wit as “die Leichtigkeit die Ähnlichkeiten wahrzunehmen,” and praises 
it as an inventive faculty (Erkenntisvermögen) by emphasizing that “zum Erfinden,” in addition to “der Kunst zu 
schließen,” also belongs to wit (cf. Christian Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des 
Menschen (Deutsche Metaphysik), §366, in: Gesammelte Werke, ed. Jean École u.a., I. Abt., Bd. 2 [Hildesheim 1983], 
223. The presuppositions of wit are “Scharfsinnigkeit,” presenting something hidden “distinctly” [deutlich], “Einbild-
ungskraft,” and so forth. While Wolff thereby still makes acumen (Scharfsinn) into the condition of wit, his student, 
Alexander Baumgarten, juxtaposes places faculties on equal footing. Accordingly, wit in the stricter sense (“ingenium 
strictius dictum”) is able to detect similarities in differences, whereas acumen detects differences in similarities (cf. 
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Metaphysica [Hildesheim 1963]), §§572f., 203f. 
 
46 
 Thus when Lichtenberg metaphorically relates acumen and wit respectively to a “Ver-
größerungs-Glas” and “Verkleinerungs-Glas,” as he does in Notebook “D” of his Sudelbücher,107 
he not only follows a well-established tradition in the 18th century that sought to connect these 
two capacities, but he also deploys “mathematische und physikalische Termini außerhalb ihrer 
ursprünglichen Geltungssphäre”108 in order to link imaginary and scientific techniques of percep-
tion. He thereby designates his own heuristic procedure, which counts acumen and wit among the 
formal techniques of perspectivization, albeit with a decisive revaluation of wit: “Glaubt ihr denn 
daß sich bloß Entdeckungen mit Vergrößerungs-Gläsern machen ließen? Ich glaube mit Verk-
leinerungs-Gläsern, oder wenigstens durch ähnliche Instrumente in der Intellektual-Welt sind wohl 
mehr Entdeckungen gemacht worden.”109 The ability to discover similarities amongst seemingly 
disparate objects or ideas becomes for Lichtenberg a determining form-principle of wit, which he 
explicitly links to scientific knowledge-production: “Ohne Witz wäre eigentlich der Mensch gar 
nichts, denn Ähnlichkeiten in den Umständen ist ja alles, was uns zur wissenschaftlichen Erkennt-
nis bringt, wir können ja bloß nach Ähnlichkeiten ordnen und behalten.”110 Thus alongside the 
physical instrument of the microscope, the faculty of wit may be said to belong to the experimental 
arrangement of the laboratory situation: “Auch ist Mikroskop und Verkleinerungs-Glas, mit ana-
logischen Schlüssen verbunden, ein Haupt-Mittel zur Erfindung.”111 Here the analogy between wit 
and “Verkleinerungs-Glas” is revealed, in fact, to go in both directions: for Lichtenberg, the “Verk-
leinerungs-Glas” is not simply a metaphor for wit; rather, microscopic and “Verkleinerungs-Glas” 
are themselves conceived by him as witty techniques of inventio, as “Haupt-Mittel zur Erfindung.” 
                                                
107 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 301f [from D 469]. 
108 Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe. Kommentar zu Band I und Band II, 10. 
109 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 301f [from D 469]. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 535 [FI 559] 
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However, in contrast to the traditional meaning of inventio, for which nothing truly new can ever 
appear, Lichtenberg’s wit – as Rheinberger writes of experimental thinking – “produziert Wissen, 
das wir noch nicht haben.”112 
 To the extent that wit presents itself in the Sudelbücher as both a constitutive form-princi-
ple as well as a technique of knowledge-production, it must nevertheless be kept in mind that when 
Lichtenberg analogizes it to an optical-technical instrument of perspectivization, this does not so 
much establish as deform perception and its forms – or unforms – of knowledge. Magnification 
and minimization do not make visible the “truth”; rather, they distort that which is perceived by 
the naked eye (doxa), and in doing so optically juxtapose the most disparate pairs. It is against this 
backdrop that the wordplays and paronomasia in the Sudelbücher make themselves “readable,” 
albeit in their defacement of the relation between word and meaning. There one finds witty word-
plays and seemingly random word-associations such as “Bacchus, Backhaus,”113 “Vellus, Vlies, 
Velies, Veleis, Felleisen,”114 “Polizei, Polzei, Plotzei, Platzei, Platzerei, Plackei, Plackerei,”115 
“protokollieren, prodekollieren,”116 and “Apostel, Apostille, Postille.”117 For seemingly incompre-
hensible series such as these, one might ask whether one ought to read the combinations of letters 
masquerading as words according to their phoneme or grapheme, or perhaps as an overlapping of 
sound and image, of word and thing – or what Lichtenberg refers to elsewhere in his Sudelbücher 
as “Bilderschrift für das Ohr.”118 Whether such remarks consist of only three words, or perhaps 
                                                
112 Rheinberger, Experiment, Differenz, Schrift, 22. 
113 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 88 [BI 156] 
114 Ibid., vol. 1, 102 [BI 202]. 
115 Ibid., vol. 1, 138 [BI 357]. 
116 Ibid. [BI 356]. 
117 Ibid. [BI 358]. 
118 “Es donnert, heult, brüllt, zischt, pfeift, braust, saust, summet, brummet, rumpelt, quäkt, ächzt, singt, rappelt, pras-
selt, knallt, rasselt, knistert, klappert, knurret, poltert, winselt, wimmert, rauscht, murmelt, kracht, gluckset, röcheln, 
klingelt, bläset, schnarcht, klatscht, lispeln, keuchen, es kocht, schreien, weinen, schluchzen, krächzen, stottern, lallen, 
girren, hauchen, klirren, blöken, wiehern, schnarren, scharren, sprudeln. Diese Wörter und noch andere, welche Töne 
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one or two more, what is distinctive about them is that they are not embedded in a determinate 
context or subordinated to the regular rules of grammatical syntax, but hover freely “in der Mög-
lichkeit, sich irgend einem Kontext einzuordnen.”119 
 Lichtenberg’s preferred literary form is thus not so much narration as it is the list or the 
series, albeit ones which could go on potentially indefinitely – a narration (Erzählen) without a 
number (Zahl).120 They form “[c]lusters of ideas Trauben von Ideen. Gruppe. Grape,” as he play-
fully writes.121 In addition to witty word-associations, his Sudelbücher feature seemingly random 
inventories of words and things, such as lists of books to be read or purchased,122 a list of curse 
words in the German language,123 and even a list of words that begin with the prefix “ab,” which 
features neologisms like “abgedacht,” “abdemonstriert,” and “abgeärgert.” 124  “Lichtenberg’s 
lists,” writes Markus Wilczek, “show an inventory that is never static; rather, his lists always point 
beyond or transcend their own contents. They display the emergence of inventio from inventario: 
the transformation from inventory to invention.”125 As in the case of his list of words that begin 
with the prefix “ab,” Lichtenberg does not simply list a series of entries from the lexicon, but 
composes an idiosyncratic series of words that brings them into relations that hitherto did not exist. 
In order to think them, one must “think awry” – abdenken126 – in order to transform that which 
appears as nonsensical trash (Abfall) into a potentially fruitful idea (Einfall). 
                                                
ausdrücken, sind nicht bloße Zeichen, sondern eine Art von Bilderschrift für das Ohr” (Lichtenberg, Schriften und 
Briefe, vol. 1, 39 [AI 134]). 
119 Eleonore Frey, “Lichtenbergs Einfälle,” in: MLN 110.3 (1995), 508–17, here: 509. 
120 For more on the poetics of the list, cf. Sabine Mainberger, Die Kunst des Aufzählens. Elemente einer Poetik des 
Enumerativen (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2003). See also: Jack Goody, “What’s in a list?,” in: The Domestication 
of the Savage Mind (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 74–111. 
121 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 444 [E 475]. 
122 Cf. Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 344. 
123 Cf. Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 338f [D 667]. 
124 Cf. Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 340 [D 668]. 
125 Markus Wilczek, “Ab. Lichtenberg’s Waste,” in: The Germanic Review 87.4 (2012), 305–24, here: 307. 
126 For more on “ab” and “abdenken” as a modern figure of thought in the writings of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg 
and beyond, see Wilczek, “Ab. Lichtenberg’s Waste,” in particular 321–24. 
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 For Lichtenberg, thoughts and the word-particles that constitute them stand in inverse re-
lation as sense to nonsense: “Die Gedanken dicht und die Partikeln dünne,” he writes.127 The fleet-
ing and restless character of his remarks present the particles of words, such as the prefix, as the 
combinatory material which allows for the formation of new ideas. His fascination with linguistic 
materiality, and with the prefix in particular, presents itself throughout his Sudelbücher, as when 
he remarks in an entry from Notebook “D”: “Entsprechen, entsagen. versprechen, versagen.”128 
Here Lichtenberg draws attention to the specific way in which certain prefixes, for instance “ent-
” and “ver-,” bear no obvious relation to the actual “meaning” of the words themselves or their 
physiognomic appearance. One might say that for Lichtenberg, speaking and saying, as commu-
nicative acts, do not simply “correspond” [entsprechen] or “promise” [versprechen], but – once 
paired with the signifiers “renouncing” [entsagen] and “withholding” or “malfunctioning” [ver-
sagen] – reveal the differential signification inherent to all word-particles, putting into question 
any notion of linguistic correspondence or coherence. 
 This interplay between sense and nonsense, thought and (word-)particle, breaks words 
down into their constitutive elements, i.e., the meaningless letters of the alphabet. No where is this 
more apparent than in Lichtenberg’s lists of words which begin with the prefix “ab,” whose inclu-
sion of “Aberglaube” shows that his approach is in fact oriented less around the semantic aspect 
of the words than around the letters themselves. This a-semantic procedure of writing, which takes 
the alphabet as its point of departure, thus proceeds letter by letter: first “Wörter mit a,” then 
“Wörter mit b,” followed naturally by “Wörter mit a-b.” The chaos of Lichtenberg’s lists thereby 
demonstrates how his “thinking awry,” abdenken, accords – to speak anachronistically – with the 
dream-logic of the unconscious, which treats the letters of the alphabet as Bilderschrift. As Freud 
                                                
127 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 346 [E 16]. 
128 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 314 [D 552] 
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would write more than a century later apropos the dyad “a-b”: “So oft [der Traum] zwei Elemente 
nahe bei einander zeigt, bürgt er für einen besonders innigen Zusammenhang zwischen ihren Ent-
sprechenden in den Traumgedanken. Es ist wie in unserem Schriftsystem: ab bedeutet, daß die 
beiden Buchstaben in einer Silbe ausgesprochen werden sollen, a und b nach einer freien Lücke, 
läßt a als den letzten Buchstaben des einen Worts und b als den ersten eines anderen Worts erken-
nen.”129 In Freud’s simile, as Jan Mieszkowski notes apropos this passage, “a and b (and by im-
plication the rest of the alphabet) are a mini-field of differential signification. The difference be-
tween, for instance, Thema behandeln and abgemacht becomes emblematic of a graphematic field 
in which position and spacing are the crucial forms of articulation, and thus of sense in general, 
and in which there are no positive terms, only differences.”130 
 In Lichtenberg’s remarks, words are thus placed in relation to one another in such a way 
that they are not confined to this or that meaning, but are rather put in play in the plurality of their 
possibilities. They are, as he writes, “[g]litzernde Wörtchen.”131 According to this cosmic meta-
phor, the “wordlets” [Wörtchen] which make up his remarks are microscopically small, astral-like 
formations that “twinkle” or “glisten” [glitzern] – “Infusions-Tierchen” that shoot by in a flash of 
light like a comet. As in the Blitz of Witz, their swift eruption simultaneously illuminates and ob-
scures, dissolving every form into unform, every word into a “glistening wordlet” that makes the 
                                                
129 Sigmund Freud, “Jenseits des Lustprinzips,” in: Gesammelte Werke (henceforth as GW), ed. Anna Freud et al. 
(Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer Verlag, 1967), II/III, 319. In its other instantiations, the second half of the simile is very 
similar: “[…] genau so wie in der Schrift a und b nebeneinander gesetzt bedeutet, daß daraus die Silbe ab gebildet 
werden soll”; “[…] ebenso wie ein a und ein b, die ich neben einander hinschreibe, als eine Silbe: ab ausgesprochen 
werden sollen” (GW V, 198; GW II/III, 253). In his notes to the English translation of the Traumdeutung, James 
Strachey suggests that Freud probably adopted this simile from a Goethe poem: “Schwer, in Waldes Busch und 
Wuchse / Füchsen auf die Spur gelangen; / Hält’s der Jäger mit dem Fuchse, / Ist’s unmöglich, ihn zu fangen. // Und 
so wäre manches Wunder / Wie A B, Ab auszusprechen, / Über welches wir jetzunder / Kopf und Hirn im Kopf 
zerbrechen.” See The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, 24 volumes, ed. by James Strachey 
et al. (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1960), 4–5: 330; and for the German version 
of Goethe’s text: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Berliner Ausgabe, Poetische Werke, 16 Bände (Berlin: Aufbau Ver-
lag, 1960), 1: 603. 
130 Jan Mieszkowski, “The Next Word (or something like it),” in: MLN 129.3 (2014), 606–20, here: 608. 
131 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 798 [JI 1033]. 
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meaningless literality of the letters of the alphabet blindingly shine through. They exert their lively 
energy – their vital force, or energeia – in an unconstrained and untethered manner, falling out or 
even exploding the frame which was attributed to them as a syntactical unity between words within 
a continuous (con)text. Just like the Sudelbücher themselves, the remarks present themselves as a 
form without a form, as an eruption from the prevailing order of things. In this eruption from the 
given order, they open up an epistemic play-space which has its own order, or rather disorder – 
one in which words and things criss-cross and intersect according to the logic of wit, which pairs 
together disparate similarities like aleatory games of chance. 
 
2.3. Lichtenberg’s Polyps: Form and Life at the Limits of Knowledge 
In Notebook “F” (1776–79) – the first notebook to be accorded the genre designation “Sudel-
Buch” – Lichtenberg writes the following enigmatic remark: “Er sah in jeden drei Worten einen 
Einfall und in jeden drei Punkten ein Gesicht.”132 Eleonore Frey suggests that this remark can be 
read as having been composed in the third person, serving the purpose of self-representation.133 
Yet Lichtenberg’s reference here to the (mis-)reading of an ellipsis as a “face” [Gesicht] suggests 
an alternative reading, namely that his remark – like so many others in the Sudelbücher, and espe-
cially in Notebook “F” – is implicitly directed against the Swiss writer Johann Caspar Lavater, 
who is most well known for his work in the field of physiognomy, Physiognomische Fragmente 
zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebe (1775–78). In that same notebook, one 
finds frequent mention of Lavater by name, as for instance in remarks that begin with phrases such 
as “(Über Lavaters Physiognomik.)” (F 593), “An Herrn Lavater” (F 1051), “Für Herrn Lavater” 
                                                
132 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 475 [FI 98]. 
133 Frey, “Lichtenbergs Einfälle,” 508. 
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(F 1080), and “Gegen Lavater” (F 1114), as well as lengthy critiques of his theory of physiognomy 
from a variety of different scientific perspectives, including that of probability calculations.134 To 
be sure, Lichtenberg’s disagreements with Lavater’s work precede the entries from Notebook “F” 
by a number of years; however, the composition of Notebook “F” coincided not only with the 
publication of Lavater’s Physiognomische Fragmente, but also relatedly with the events surround-
ing the so-called “Physiognomik-Streit”135 (Spring 1778), which embroiled Lichtenberg in a pub-
lic conflict with Lavater that ultimately led to the publication of his essay “Über Physiognomik; 
wider die Physiognomen,” in which he vehemently criticizes Lavater’s naive insistence on the 
immediate legibility of man.136 
 In simplified terms, Lichtenberg’s fervid criticism of Lavater stems from his broader dis-
trust of the classical concept of the idea, which found its refuge in a deified human nature.137 From 
Lichtenberg’s perspective, this manifested itself above all in Lavater’s idealization of drawing in 
the Physiognomische Fragmente, which favorably adopted the Renaissance concept of disegno 
insofar as Lavater understood sketch, line, outline, and silhouette as guarantors of transcendent 
                                                
134 Cf. Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 561 [F 730]. 
135 For more on the importance of these debates for Lichtenberg’s thought and way of writing, see Helmut Pfotenhauer, 
“Sich selber schreiben. Lichtenbergs fragmentarisches Ich,” in: Um 1800. Konfigurationen der Literatur, Kunstliter-
atur, und Ästhetik, ed. Helmut Pfotenhauer (Tübingen: De Gruyter, 1991), 5–26, in particular 7–12, as well as Albrecht 
Schöne, Aufklärung aus dem Geist der Experimentalphysik: Lichtenbergsche Konjunktive (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 
1993), in particular 1–15. 
136  Cf. Lichtenberg, “Über Physiognomik; wider die Physiognomen. Zu Beförderung der Menschenliebe und 
Menschenkenntniß,” in: idem., Schriften und Briefe, vol. 3, 256–95. 
137 See, for instance, Lichtenberg’s lengthy remark in Sudelbuch E, in which he refers ironically to the prevailing tastes 
of his time: “Es ist die Pflicht jedes rechtschaffenen modernen Mannes, die wir hoffentlich alle sind, gegen die alten 
Bildhauer nichts einzuwenden. Ich bin zuweilen nicht ungeneigt zu glaube, daß Winkelmann entweder Eingebungen 
von irgend einem guten Geist gehabt, oder daß ihm der Drache seine Bemerkungen gebracht oder der Kobolt diktiert 
hat. Es ist zwar wahr, wenn man feine Nerven hat und bis zur Wollust gesund und ruhig im Gewissen ist, so fängt 
man leicht Feuer, und ein eigner Gedanke den man unvermutet bestätigt findet breitet sich aus, berauscht und erhitzt 
uns, so könnte in Sh[aftes]bury, in dem Manne der in dem Nachmittag seines Lebens noch katholisch werden konnte 
eine Hochachtung für alten Marmor entstehen, die von Anbetung nicht unterschieden ist. Man kann sich Rom und 
klassisches Land nicht ohne wollüstige Beklemmung denken, und wenn man dann selbst der heiligen Stelle nahe 
kommt, wo die Denkmäler stehen, auf die ehmals unser Lob und unsere Schläge hinausliefen, da scheint die Erde 
zittern, keiner unsrer Kollegen hat das je gesehen. Da zittert, schaudert und ahndet der Geist und betet an, wo urteilten 
sollte. […]” (Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 382 [from E 165]). 
 
53 
truth.138 Lichtenberg skeptically interpreted this aesthetic preference as an inclination toward reli-
gious fanaticism and overhasty judgment and, as is well-known, subsequently turned to a different 
paradigm of the fine arts, namely the copperplate engravings of William Hogarth. Lichtenberg’s 
lengthy descriptions of Hogarth’s copperplate engravings, published between 1794 and 1799 under 
the title Ausführliche Erklärung der Hogarthischen Kupferstiche, reproduces the smallest elements 
of Hogarth’s illustrations, immersing itself in a satirical manner in the most unremarkable, most 
salacious, and ugliest details. Lichtenberg’s disfiguring, dismembering manner of representation, 
which makes no effort to produce an overall aesthetic impression, points to a characteristic feature 
of his own way of thinking: the distrust of “große Gedanken” – claims to genius – and the inter-
polation of the tiniest, most fleeting, and experimental, which resists the synthesis of thought and 
writing into a whole. 
 With his emphasis on contingency and experimentation, on the materiality of thoughts as 
combinatories of letters, as well as his privileging of the small, fragmentary and fleeting at the 
level of (literary) form, Lichtenberg positioned himself as the great antipode to the classicist and 
genius literature of his time, of which Lavater and Goethe (amongst other members of the Sturm 
und Drang movement) figured as the most prominent exponents. From the perspective of his 
trenchant critique of Lavater’s theory of physiognomy, his decision to appropriate the form of the 
“Sudelbuch” no longer appears as a coincidence. In fact, Lichtenberg himself drew an explicit 
connection between his Sudel way of writing and his critique of physiognomy: in remark E 46, in 
which he first relates the form of the “Sudelbuch” to the practice of double-entry bookkeeping, the 
                                                
138  Cf. Johann Caspar Lavater, Physiognomische Fragmente, zur Beförderung der Menschenkenntniß und 
Menschenliebe, 4 vols. (Leipzig/Winterthur 1775–1778), vol. 1, in particular 61 and 91. For more on the reception of 
disegno, see Gerhard Wolff and Georg Traska: “Povero Pastore – Die Unerreichbarkeit der Physiognomie Christi,” 




retroactive pagination (“vid.[e] p.[aginam] XXVI”139) cross-references another remark in which 
the word “Sudelbuch” once again appears. There Lichtenberg writes: 
ad p. VI In dem Sudel-Buch können die Einfälle die man hat, mit all der Umständ-
lichkeit ausgeführt werden, in die man gewöhnlich verfällt so lang einem die Sache 
noch neu ist. Nachdem man bekannter mit der Sache wird, so sieht man das Un-
nötige ein und faßt es kürzer. Es ist mir so gegangen als ich meinen Timorus 
schrieb. Ich [habe] oft mit dem, was ein Aufsatz im Sudelbuch war, einen Ausdruck 
schattiert.140 
 
Here Lichtenberg abbreviates the comparison of scholarly or literary writing into a relation be-
tween “waste book” and the further elaboration of thoughts without further distinguishing between 
notebook and ledger. More importantly, however, he refers in this passage to one of his own texts, 
namely his essay “Timorus” (1771/73), which in addition to addressing the problems of conversion 
in general – with particular critical attention devoted to the case of two Jewish converts to Chris-
tianity in Göttingen – contains a polemic against Lavater. According to Lichtenberg, it is not the 
case that he begins to follow his own suggestion and orients his writing towards the model of 
double-entry bookkeeping, but rather that this technique was in fact already being utilized at the 
time that he composed his essay. In other words, in the case of his critique of Lavater, as Lichten-
berg declares, he was already working with the Sudelbuch. 
 Here it is important to recall that the name “Sudelbuch” figures as a satirical variant of the 
English word “commonplace book.” Elsewhere in the Sudelbücher, Lichtenberg likewise satirizes 
the scholarly practice of excerpting, which is often said to characterize his way of writing: “Er 
exzerpierte beständig,” remarks Lichtenberg in the third-person, “und alles, was er las, ging aus 
einem Buche neben seinem Kopfe vorbei in ein anderes.”141 Lichtenberg’s decision to make use of 
                                                
139 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 352 [from E 46]. 
140 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 373 [from E 150]. 
141 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 166 [GII 181]. 
 
55 
this satirical naming-convention, whose privileged form – the “remark” [Bemerkung] – is identi-
fied with wit, is thereby directed above all against the cult of genius aesthetics insofar as it is meant 
to unveil the secret basis of all physiognomic thinking, which, in its fanatical insistence on a met-
aphysical form of “evidence” grounded in immediate intuition, it misrecognizes as transcendent 
truth: “Ideen-Assoziation ist der Grund der Physiognomik.”142 Vivid imagination and wit, i.e., the 
ability to (quickly) draw similarities between disparate objects or ideas, are said to bring about the 
associations of ideas, which emerge when one person observers another and attempts to elicit 
physiognomic meaning from the configuration of facial features. With his insistence on the inva-
lidity of an immediate relation between body and soul, outer and inner, Lichtenberg has recourse 
to psychological-anthropological knowledge, from which standpoint he views the false conclu-
sions drawn by Lavater’s physiognomy as readily explainable. What physiognomy fails to account 
for, Lichtenberg argues, is precisely the deviations and distortions of the phenomenon of subjec-
tivity, which already played a pivotal role in his intervention into the mathematical controversy 
surrounding the “St. Petersburg Paradox.” Here, however, Lichtenberg makes clear that he does 
not disavow the possibility of an intuitive knowledge – of an immediate observation (“remark”). 
Rather, he rejects the positing of a mythical origin that does not exist. 
 One might say that, in and through his Sudelbücher, Lichtenberg carries out a procedure of 
writing that attempts to critically reflect on the limits of knowledge with an eye towards their 
transgression, i.e., the naive affirmation of immediate intuition, as embodied in Lavater’s physi-
ognomy. This is particularly the case in Notebook “D,” where Lichtenberg first began to system-
atically distinguish his (physico-scientific) “annotations” from his (literary) “remarks.” In the first 
                                                
142 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 493 [from F 216]. In his essay “Über Physiognomik,” Lichtenberg simi-
larly remarks: “Ideen-Assoziation erklärt eine Menge von Erscheinungen in der Physiognomik, ohne daß man nötig 
hätte, zu Schmälerung der Rechte der Vernunft, neue Sinnen anzunehmen, […]” (Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, 
vol. 3, 272). 
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part of Notebook “D,” that is, in the section entitled “Annotationes et collectanea philosophica et 
physica,” one encounters a series of curious remarks which, I want to argue, are crucial for under-
standing not only his conceptions of form and life, but also his related critique of physiognomic 
science. These remarks form a narrative account of his own experimental studies of polyps. Based 
on the studies contained in Abraham Tremblay’s 1744 treatise, Naturgeschichte des Süßwasser-
polypen, Lichtenberg occupied himself intensely with this peculiar creature. In several remarks in 
Notebook “D,” grouped under the heading “Von Polypen,” he attempts to represent not only the 
transition from plant to animal, but also from the fleeting to the fixed, while simultaneously 
demonstrating his familiarity with the extant scientific literature dealing with polyps, as for exam-
ple texts by Trembley, Baker, and Leeuwenhoeck.143 In the second part of Notebook “D” – pre-
cisely at that point, in other words, where the general observations, or what the traditional inter-
pretation of the Sudelbücher as a collection of aphorisms takes as its point of departure, begin – 
he crosses the threshold between scientific experimentation and philosophical observation, be-
tween “annotation” and “remark,” by recording the following witty remark based on his study of 
polyps: “Der Mensch ist vielleicht halb Geist und halb Materie, so wie der Polype halb Pflanze 
und halb Tier. Auf der Grenze liegen immer die seltsamsten Geschöpfe.”144 
 Lichtenberg’s fascination with the polyp concerns its resemblance to man insofar as it is a 
uniquely threshold creature: whereas man is “perhaps half spirit and half matter,” the polyp is “half 
plant and half animal.” While he does not further elaborate on this striking analogy between polyps 
and humans as “strange” [seltsam], “threshold” [auf der Grenze] creatures within the confines of 
Notebook “D,” he returns to this liminal entity in Notebook “F” – precisely at the point, in other 
                                                
143 Cf. Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 93–102. 
144 Ibid., vol. 1, 254 [D 161]. 
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words, when he was was most intensely engaged in his public fight with Lavater and the formula-
tion of his critique of the latter’s physiognomic system. In an astonishing remark from Notebook 
“F,” Lichtenberg refers to polyps in order to explicate the functions of the human mind as well as 
to implicitly furnish his critique of Lavater’s physiognomy: 
Es gibt auf der Oberfläche dieser Erde eine Menge rundlicher Körper mit einer 
dicken Wurzel aus der mehrere kleine herausgehen, und verschiedne kleinere Wur-
zeln, sie leben so im Äther wie die Polypen im Wasser (Gehirn, Nerven, Rücken-
mark) und hängen ihre Wurzeln aus, wie jene ihre Arme. Sie sitzen in einem be-
sondern Futteral, das ihnen zur Decke dient, das sie fortbewegen können, und so 
eingerichtet ist, daß sie ihre zarten Wurzeln nicht selbst brauchen auf andre Körper 
zu setzen, durch dieses Futteral wird die Materie durchgeseigt und gereinigt, die 
ihren Abgang wieder ersetzt. Diese Körper werden auch so wie alle andere verän-
dert, und sind wie alle andere eine mit natürlichen Zeichen geschriebene Geschichte 
aller Veränderungen die sie erfahren haben. So gut als ein zinnerner Teller, dessen 
empfangene Schnitte Stiche und Quetschungen alle die Mahlzeiten erzählen, denen 
er beigewohnt hat. Die Materie woraus sie bestehen ist von einer besondern Be-
schaffenheit, von Anfang sehr weich und fast flüssig, doch nicht aller Eindrücke 
fähig wie das Wasser, sondern mehr zum Behalten, und weil es nicht allein Simul-
tanea, sondern auch Successiva erzählen soll, so wird jeden Augenblick etwas da-
von fest, der Körper wird immer zäher, so daß er auf die letzt nur ausspricht aber 
nicht aufzeichnet. Ich der ich dieses schreibe, habe das Glück ein solcher Körper 
zu sein. […]145 
 
Here he describes a supple entity (“sehr weich und fast flüssig”) which is capable of numerous 
forms of appearance, of which only a few solidify to the point where they make themselves legible: 
“der Körper wird immer zäher, so daß er auf die letzt nur ausspricht aber nicht aufzeichnet.” In the 
final sentence, Lichtenberg even goes so far as to identify himself, as a writer, with the polyp: “Ich 
der ich dieses schreibe habe das Glück, ein solcher Körper zu sein.” For Lichtenberg, polyps con-
stitute a complex of cells in which the individual is not at all easily discerned. They reveal in turn 
a netlike complex of living beings as well as a socialization of the body (“Er ist gesellig doch hat 
                                                
145 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 464f [from F 34]. 
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jeder seine eigne Zelle”146) which thereby, on the one hand, are capable of recording various de-
tectable traces and, on the other hand, are occasionally able to solidify into a cohesive, self-legis-
lating “opinion system” (Meinungssystem). 
 In this extended analogy between man – and more broadly, forms of human social organi-
zation – and polyp, Lichtenberg arrives at a new figure of thought that is at once immediately 
intuitable as well as fashioned through (scientific) experimentation. In a further move, the polyp, 
as a modern figure of thought, is intended to draw a clear and polemical distinction between his 
own way of thinking, as well as his own way of writing, and that of Lavater’s. Whereas Lavater 
insists on the rigid anchoring of body to soul, of letter to spirit, Lichtenberg elevates this microor-
ganism into a dynamic, scientifically-grounded symbol of metempsychosis, i.e., the transmigration 
of souls. Decisive for Lichtenberg is that the polyp cannot be pinned down, for it is in a constant 
state of morphological transformation, change, and flux. In this sense, it coheres not only with 
Lichtenberg’s rejection of the Cartesian cogito and Lavater’s physiognomy, but also with his own 
Sudel way of writing, which seeks to carry out a discursive practice that, starting with the refusal 
to affix a determinate “I” to the thought which it thinks, would allow for the emergence of new 
knowledge in writing. For Lichtenberg, writing in Sudelbücher is, from this perspective, not an 
economization or fixation of knowledge, but an uncoupling of thoughts from any “closed econ-
omy” of writing. Thus as he contends at the outset of Notebook “A”: 
Die Erfindung der wichtigsten Wahrheiten hängt von einer feinen Abstraktion ab, 
und unser gemeines Leben ist eine beständige Bestrebung uns zu derselben unfähig 
zu machen, alle Fertigkeiten, Angewohnheiten, Routine, bei einem mehr, als bei 
dem andern, und die Beschäftigung der Philosophen ist es, diese kleinen blinden 
Fertigkeiten, die wir durch Beobachtungen von Kindheit an uns erworben haben, 
wieder zu verlernen. Ein Philosoph sollte also billig als ein Kind schon besonders 
erzogen werden.147 
 
                                                
146 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 2, 95 [D 676]. 
147 Lichtenberg, Schriften und Briefe, vol. 1, 11 [AI 11]. 
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As a writer, Lichtenberg situates himself within a process of writing which, beginning with 
“kleinen blinden Fertigkeiten,” subsequently seeks to unlearn these in order to arrive at fixed “Fer-
tigkeiten, Angewohnheit, Routine.” This he never does. Instead, he privileges an experimental 
form of writing which elevates contingency and materiality to the fore. In attempting to preserve 
the restless and fleeting character of thoughts, which strike like lightning, zip across the night’s 
sky like comets, or proliferate under the microscope like infusoria, he not only presents a concep-
tion of writing that produces new forms of knowledge, but also presents himself in the form of a 








CHAPTER II. JEAN PAUL 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE CROOKED LIFE OF HUMOR 
 
Der Mensch ist der große Gedankenstrich im Buch der Natur.148 
 
—Jean Paul, Die unsichtbare Loge 
 
The following chapter takes as its point of departure the extremely heterogeneous text-constella-
tions in which the books of Jean Paul Friedrich Richter (1763–1825) appear. They take the form 
of appendices, such as Leben des vergnügten Schulmeisterlein Wutz, “a kind of idyll” [eine Art 
Idylle] which he inserted into his first novel Die unsichtbare Loge (1793); or serve as repositories 
for desultory short texts, such as a “Mustheil für Mädchen” and “einigen Jus de tablette für 
Mannspersonen” which frame the novel Leben des Quintus Fixlein (1796, 1801); or feature selec-
tions of “minor works” [Werkchen] collected from newspapers and paperbacks, which he then 
grafted onto books like Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise (1807, 1822). And they consist of the most 
heterogeneous types of text: prefaces, prefaces to prefaces, prefaces to the history of prefaces, pre-
chapters, post-chapters, satirical reviews, errant footnotes, and even “extra scraps of paper” [Ex-
trablättchen]. To use a popular medial metaphor, his books are structured like hypertexts: far from 
being standalone, unified literary works, they are perpetually caught up in a system of associative 
chains and intertextual references which continually flow beyond the boundaries of one text and 
into the production of another.149 “The frontiers of a book are never clear cut,” writes Foucault. 
“Beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its 
                                                
148 Jean Paul, Die unsichtbare Loge, in: Werke, I/1. 
149 For further readings of Jean Paul’s books as hypertexts, cf. Armin Schäfer, “Jean Pauls monströses Schreiben,” in 
Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft 37 (2002): 216–234, in particular 220–21 and 233. See also: Annina Klappert, 
Die Perspektiven von Link und Lücke: Sichtweisen auf Jean Pauls Texte und Hypertexte (Aisthesis 2006). 
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autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sen-
tences: it is a node within a network.”150 
 Jean Paul’s notoriously condensed, associative manner of writing represented a major 
provocation to the aesthetic norms and reading culture around 1800. Contemporary readers fre-
quently complained of the unreadability of his texts. Amongst his earliest and most prominent 
critics was the young Goethe, who in a 1795 letter to Friedrich Schiller mocked Jean Paul’s first 
major publication, Hesperus oder 45 Hundposttage (1795), as an exemplary case of a literary 
monstrosity: “Hierbei ein Tragelaph von der ersten Sorte.”151 Goethe’s negative assessment of 
Hesperus as a “Tragelaph” – a mythological hybrid between a goat and a stag, but which around 
1800 also referred to literary compositions of mixed and unbalanced character152 – was grounded 
in his impression of the novel as lacking organic unity, and hence as at odds with the formal con-
ventions of Weimar classicism and the discourse of genius aesthetics.153 Reading Jean Paul – 
known for the countless encyclopedic allusions to a dizzying array of disparate facts, authors, and 
                                                
150 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 
23. 
151 In a subsequent letter to Schiller dated June 12, 1795, Goethe writes: “Es ist mir angenehm, daß Ihnen der neue 
Tragelaph nicht ganz zuwider ist; es ist wirklich schade für den Menschen, er scheint sehr isoliert zu leben und kann 
deswegen bei manchen guten Partien seiner Individualität nicht zur Reinigung seines Geschmacks kommen. Es scheint 
leider, daß er selbst die beste Gesellschaft ist, mit der er umgeht” (cited in Emil Staiger, ed., Der Briefwechsel zwischen 
Goethe und Schiller [Frankfurt a. M. 1966], 110). 
152 According to Duden, the word “Tragelaph” possesses a double meaning which connotes an “uneinheitliches lite-
rarisches Werk, das man mehreren Gattungen zuordnen kann.” Cf. “Tragelaph,” Duden, accessed 17 Nov. 2015, 
<http://www.duden.de/node/800210/revisions/1091222/view>. 
153 Goethe later came to re-evaluate the merits of Jean Paul’s work, as suggested by his positive remarks in the Noten 
und Abhandlungen zum besseren Verständnis which he added to the first edition of the West-östlichen Divan (1819). 
(Cf. Hendrik Birus, Vergleichung. Goethes Einführung in die Schreibweise Jean Pauls [Stuttgart 1986].) Jean Paul’s 
impression of Goethe, however, always remained that of an ardent classicist. As Helmut Pfotenhauer argues, “Jean 
Paul verstand Goethe als einen Klassizisten, welcher sich als Klassiker inszeniert. Er unterstellte ihm antikisierenden 
Formenkult; Kunstsachen interessierten ihn mehr als Menschen, als schlagende Herzen. Das überzeitlich Geltende 
verdränge das gegenwärtige Leben. Als Jean Paul zum ersten Mal in Weimar ist und im Begriff Goethe gegenüberzu-
treten, erwägt er in einem Brief an den Freund Christian Otto spaßeshalber, ob er sich nicht durch einen Mineralbrun-
nen petrifizieren und inkrustieren lassen solle, um sich Goethe „etwan im vorteilhaften Lichte einer Statue“ zeigen zu 
können” (Helmut Pfotenhauer, “Das Leben schreiben – Das Schreiben leben. Jean Paul als Klassiker der Zeitver-
fallenheit,” in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft 35/36 [2000/2001], 46–58, here: 46). 
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scientific disciplines in his writing – allegedly once gave Goethe a severe case of “Gehirnkrämpfe 
von dem Werfen aus einer Wissenshaft in die andere.”154 
 Another prominent critic was Hegel, who likewise complained of the excessive accumula-
tion of scholarly references, analogies, and metaphors in Jean Paul’s texts. In his Vorlesungen über 
die Ästhetik, Hegel formulated the exemplary critique of Jean Paul’s writing from this perspective 
as the “barocke Zusammenstellungen von Gegenständen, welche zusammenhangslos auseinander-
liegen und deren Beziehungen, zu welchen der Humor sie kombiniert, sich kaum entziffern las-
sen.”155 In contrast to Goethe, who rejected the disturbing heterogeneity of Jean Paul’s writing on 
moral and aesthetic grounds, Hegel dismissed in particular the indecipherability of Jean Paul’s 
texts from the standpoint of reception aesthetics. For Hegel, Jean Paul’s “baroque” combinatory 
method of writing, which privileged the processing of heterogeneous information over and against 
the reader’s understanding, was seen as antithetical to the interpretative strategies of the herme-
neutic method, which dominated the reading culture of the “discourse network”156 around 1800. 
Especially problematic for Hegel in this regard was the so-called “exterior” [äußerlich] character 
of Jean Paul’s texts: 
Jean Paul hat deshalb auch, urn immer neues Material zu haben, in alle Bücher der 
verschiedensten Art, botanische, juristische, Reisebeschreibungen, philosophi-
sche, hineingesehen, was ihn frappierte, sogleich notiert, augenblickliche Einfälle 
dazugeschrieben und wenn es nun darauf ankam, selber ans Erfinden zu gehen, 
äußerlich das Heterogenste – brasilianische Pflanzen und das alte Reichskammer-
gericht – zueinandergebracht.157 
                                                
154 Cited in Gerhard Fiegurth, Jean Paul. Begegnungen mit Zeitgenossen (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel Verlag, 1964), 37. 
Jean Paul himself reports Goethe’s remark in a letter to Christian Otto dated January 17, 1798. 
155 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, in: Werke in zwanzig Bänden, eds. Eva Muldenhauer and Karl 
Markus Michel (Frankfurt a. M. 1970), vol. 13, 382. For a further analysis of this passage with respect to Jean Paul’s 
writing, cf. Bettine Menke, “Ein-Fälle – aus ‘Exzerpten.’ Die inventio des Jean Paul,” in: Rhetorik als kulturelle 
Praxis, eds. Renate Lachmann et al. (München 2008), 291–307, in particular 294–96. See also: Hans-Walter Schmidt-
Hannisa, “Lesarten. Autorschaft und Leserschaft bei Jean Paul,” in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft 37 (2002), 
35–52, in particular 42. 
156 Cf. Friedrich A. Kittler, Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900 (Munich: W. Fink, 1995). 




Jean Paul’s texts, as texts which refer in turn to other texts through the principle of witty combi-
nation, went against the prevailing conception of aesthetics around 1800; for “[d]ieser Zufolge 
sollte das Werk in sich selbst […] begründet sein, nicht aber in einem diesem vorausgehenden 
Wissen und dessen Formen.”158 The latter – the construction of a work on the basis of (forms of) 
knowledge that lie beyond the boundaries of a single book – would, instead, constitute a method 
of contingency, which combines all different forms of knowledge in one place at one time. As one 
contemporary reviewer noted, Jean Paul’s texts would thus appear to readers “wie eine Sammlung 
aus allen Trümmern Babylons, Persepolis’, Roms und Nürnbergs, auf einem Platz auf gut Glück 
untereinander zusammengehäuft.”159 
 Hence in the eyes of his critics, Jean Paul’s texts were largely perceived as being not only 
radically at odds with classical theories of the beautiful, which emphasized the aesthetic virtues of 
proportion, precision, and organic unity, but also as grounded in an outmoded, so-called “baroque” 
production aesthetics, whose ostensible “exteriority” and “incoherent juxtaposition of objects,” as 
Hegel put it, were no longer accessible to contemporary readers steeped in the hermeneutic 
method; as “obscure” works, they were thus deemed inaccessible and unreadable. In the place of 
a timeless form of beauty, Jean Paul offers instead works of “immoderate construction, form, and 
manner,”160 and in the place of a hermeneutically-reconstructible meaning and subject-centered 
poetology, he carries out instead an epistemological experiment in contingency. His texts 
“treib[en] eklektisch Informationen und Lehrmeinungen aus allen Ecken der Welt zusammen, um 
                                                
158 Menke, “Die Geburt des Gelehrten aus den Exzerpten. Die Gelehrtenleben und die wissenschaftliche Praxis des 
Jean Paul,” in: Gelehrtenleben: Wissenschaftspraxis in der Neuzeit, eds. Alf Lüdtke, Reiner Pass (Köln/Weimar/Wien: 
Böhlau Verlag, 2008), 113–30, here: 121. 
159 Quoted in Peter Sprengel, ed., Jean Paul im Urteil seiner Kritiker (Munich: 1980), xxxiv. 
160 Paul Fleming, The Pleasures of Abandonment: Jean Paul and the Life of Humor (Würzburg: Königshausen & 
Neumann, 2006), 18. 
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sie unter einem neuen Gesichtspunkt oder in einer neuen Färbung zu vereinigen,”161 and they do 
this through the technique of excerpting. 
 As is well known, over the course of his life Jean Paul amassed a collection of approxi-
mately 12,000 pages and over 100,000 individual entries worth of excerpts, which cover practi-
cally every field of knowledge around 1800. However, in contrast to the “polyhistoric” excerpting 
practices of Enlightenment scholars like Daniel Georg Morhof, who sought in their excerpts to 
discover the underlying “realia” of pre-existing objects of knowledge, which they subsequently 
sought to systematically organize according to a pre-codified, well-ordered loci communes, Jean 
Paul’s method of excerpting concerns the discovery of the new through the recombination and re-
contextualization of information. The keyword for this technique is play. Thus in the Vorschule 
der Ästhetik (1804/1813), Jean Paul ascribes to his distinct method of text production through 
excerpting a striking degree of contingency, in which 
Ideen aus allen Wissenschaften ohne bestimmtes gerades Ziel – weder künstler-
isches noch wissenschaftliches – sich nicht wie Gifte, sondern wie Karten mischten 
und folglich, ähnlich dem Lessingschen geistigen Würfeln, dem etwas eintrügen, 
der durch Spiele zu gewinnen wüßte, was aber die Sammlung anbelangt, so habe 
ich sie und vermehre sie täglich.162 
 
Here he refers to an anecdote from Moses Mendelssohn regarding G. E. Lessing’s habit of “in 
seiner Laune die allerfremdesten Ideen zusammen zu paaren, um zu sehen, was für Geburten sie 
erzeugen würden.”163 The importance of Lessing’s manner of thought here is that, for Jean Paul, 
writing in excerpts does not concern the subject’s understanding, but is instead conceived in ludic 
                                                
161 Götz Müller, “Jean Pauls Privatenzyklopädie. Eine Untersuchung der Exzerpte und Register aus Jean Pauls un-
veröffentlichtem Nachlaß,” in: Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur, ed. Wolfgang 
Frühwald et al., 11 (1986), 73–114, here: 75. 
162 Jean Paul, Vorschule der Ästhetik, in: Werke, I/5, 202f, note 1. 
163 Letter from Moses Mendelssohn dated August 1, 1784, in: F. H. Jacobi: “Über die Lehre des Spinoza,” cited in 




terms as a contingent game of chance, like the aleatory throw of the dice.164 In this respect, it 
follows the same principle as the combinatory machinery of his own poetics of “wit” [Witz], which 
in the Vorschule he famously likens to a “verkleidete[r] Priester, der jedes Paar kopuliert.”165 By 
“copulating every pair” – scouting out so-called “distant similarities” [entfernte Ähnlichkeiten]166 
– witty association, or what in the classical teachings of rhetoric goes under the terminus technicus 
of inventio, no longer concerns the discovery of pre-existing knowledge, an objective tertium com-
parationis, but instead the discovery of the new through the pairing together of the most disparate 
objects, ideas, or even literary genres.167 
 Far from being a mere stylistic idiosyncrasy, the seemingly capricious manner in which 
Jean Paul’s texts are composed concerns a poetology of contingency. Against both a subject-cen-
tered poetology oriented toward the mediation of the reader’s understanding, as well as a concep-
tion of the work as an aesthetic unity, his texts present themselves as collage-works of excerpted, 
glued-on, and grafted material. And they do so, curiously, by citing different forms and techniques 
of scholarly knowledge, such as slip boxes, academic footnotes, post-scripts, and prefaces. Not 
                                                
164 For more on the epistemological and poetological significance of Jean Paul’s method of excerpting, cf. Müller, 
“Jean Pauls Privatenzyklopädie.” See also: Menke, “Ein-Fälle – aus ‘Exzerpten’”; Andrea Krauß, “Sammeln – 
Exzerpte – Konstellation. Jean Pauls literarische Kombinatorik,” in: Monatshefte 105.2 (2013), 291–314; Schmidt-
Hannisa, “Lesarten,” in particular 37–42. 
165 “Der ästhetische Witz, oder der Witz im engsten Sinne, der verkleidete Priester, der jedes Paar kopuliert, tut es mit 
verschiedenen Trauformeln” (Jean Paul, Werke I/5, 159). For more on Jean Paul’s concept of wit, cf. Menke, “Jean 
Pauls Witz. Kraft und Formel.” See also: Waltraud Wiethölter, Witzige Illumination. Studien zur Ästhetik Jean Pauls 
(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979), in particular 9–32. 
166 “Was ist nun Witz? Wenigstens keine Kraft, die ihre eigne Beschreibung zustande bringt. Einiges ist gegen die alte 
zu sagen, daß er nämlich ein Vermögen sei, entfernte Ähnlichkeiten zu finden” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 170). He goes 
on several pages later to clarify: “Außer der Kürze erfreuet daran noch, daß der Geist, der ewig fortschreiten muß, 
dieselbe Idee […] zum zweiten Mal, aber als ihre eigne Widersacherin vor sich stehen und sich durch die Gleichheit 
genötigt sieht, einige Ähnlichkeiten zwischen ihr selber auszukundschaften” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 179). 
167 In the section of the Vorschule on “Witz” which deals with wordplay, entitled “Das Wortspiel,” Jean Paul uses the 
verb “gatten” in the place of “kopulieren,” which suggests a paronomastic reference to genre [Gattung]: “Der zweite 
wahre Reiz des Wortspiels ist das Erstaunen über den Zufall, der durch die Welt zieht, spielend mit Klängen und 
Weltteilen. Jeder Zufall, als eine wilde Paarung ohne Priester, gefällt uns vielleicht, weil darin der Satz der Ursach-
lichkeit (Kausalität) selber, wie der Witz, Unähnliches zu gatten scheinend, sich halb versteckt und halb bekennt” 
(Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 193). As will be seen, the implicit allusion to the mixing of genres is of significance for Jean 
Paul’s poetics of the miscellaneous, which occupies the primary focus of the fourth chapter of this section. 
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coincidentally, in each of his three major idylls – Leben des vergnügten Schulmeisterlein Maria 
Wutz in Auenthal (1793), Leben des Quintus Fixlein, aus fünfzehn Zettelkästen gezogen (1796), 
and Leben Fibels, des Verfassers der Bienrodischen Fibel (1811) – Jean Paul presents the lives of 
scholars. Far from constituting biographies in any conventional sense, however, these three texts, 
which Jean Paul took to be a trio,168 present the life stories of highly idiosyncratic figures who 
distinguish themselves above all through their unusual scholarly practices: in Schulmeisterlein 
Wutz, the little schoolmaster Maria Wutz cannot afford to buy books and so composes his own 
hand-written pocket library based solely on his knowledge of the titles, which are published in the 
yearly “Meßkatalog”; in Leben des Quintus Fixlein, the novel’s eponymous protagonist collects 
scholarly errata as well as makes use of “slip boxes” [Zettelkästen], an elaborate archival system 
devised by the eighteenth-century jurist and librarian Johann Jacob Moser, in order to record his 
own autobiography; and lastly in Leben Fibels, which begins by presenting the life story of the 
supposed “inventor” of the first primer or ABC book from whose name the German word for 
“primer,” Fibel, is said to be derived, yet which eventually gives way to an increasingly metaleptic 
tale about the impossibility of the fictional biographical project which the novel itself stages. To 
this list of unusual scholars would also undoubtedly belong the “pageant dancing master” 
[Pagentanzmeister] Aubin from the short fiction “Die Taschenbibiliothek” (1796).169 Just like 
Wutz, Fixlein, and Fibel, Aubin also demonstrates polyhistoric ambitions – in his case, through 
the prodigious collecting of excerpts: “Bloß Exzerpten. Ich fing mir anfangs aus jedem Buche 
                                                
168 “Das Schulmeisterlein Wutz des uns bekannten Verfassers ist eine Idylle, aus welcher ich mehr machen würde als 
andere Kunstrichter, wenn es sonst die Verhältnisse mit dem Verfasser erlaubten; dahin gehört unstreitig auch dessel-
ben Mannes Fixlein und Fibel” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 259). 
169 Jean Paul, “Die Taschenbibliothek,” in: Werke, II/3, 769–73. 
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zwei, drei Sonderbarkeiten wie Schmetterlinge aus und machte sie durch Dinte in meinem Ex-
zerptenbuche fest […] Diese Exzerpten zieh’ ich wie Riechwasser überall aus der Tasche, auf der 
Straße, im Vorzimmer, auf dem Tanzboden, und erquicke mich mit einigen Lebens-tropfen.”170 
 In these texts, life and writing stand in close, if ambiguous, proximity. They mutually pre-
suppose one another, yet neither appears as the more “original” term from which the other would 
figure as the mimetic copy. The relation of life to writing in Jean Paul’s texts is not an Urbild/Ab-
bild relation. Instead, life and writing are chiastically intertwined, such that the writing of life – 
the (auto)biography – and the life of writing – the life of the scholar – become the writing of the 
life of writing. Writing life is to be understood, therefore, “nicht nur im konventionellen Sinne der 
rückblickenden Verschriftlichung und der Formung des einst Gelebten zum abgeschlossenen 
Werk, sondern mehr noch im Sinne der Verwandlung des gegenwärtigen Lebens in Schrift. Alles 
Leben, gerade auch das jetzige, das todnahe, nicht nur das verklärbare vergangene oder künftige, 
will in die Dauer der schriftlichen Fixierung gerettet werden.”171 It is from the perspective of the 
transformation of present life into writing, and not merely the retrospective formation of already-
lived life, that Jean Paul went so far as to consider all of his writing as “inner autobiography” 
[innere Selbstbiographie].172 This deceptive formula does not mean that his writing is based on a 
de-scription – a Be-schreibung – of lived life; rather, in his texts, writing attains a performative 
dimension which defaces and disperses the (auto)biographical subject, who becomes his own 
“Doppelgänger.” 
                                                
170 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 771. 
171 Pfotenhauer, “Das Leben schreiben,” 52. 
172 “Alle meine Schreiberei ist eigentlich innere Selbstbiographie; und alle Dichtwerke sind Selberlebensbeschreibun-
gen, denn man kennt und lebt eben kein anderes Leben als das eigne” (Jean Paul, Ideen-Gewimmel. Texte und 
Aufzeichnungen aus dem unveröffentlichten Nachlaß, eds. Kurt Wölfel and Thomas Wirtz [Frankfurt a.M. 1996], 33). 
 
69 
 Thus in his fictional autobiographies, Konjektural-Biographie (1799, 1811) and Selberle-
bensbeschreibung (1818–19, 1826), Jean Paul experimented with the boundary between life and 
its self-textualization. In Konjektural-Biographie, the narrator and protagonist “Jean Paul” reveals 
that his “künftiger Lebenslauf”173 is to be excerpted – “cut out” [auszuschneiden] – from fragments 
of his previous literary works to form a kind of autobiographical collage of the self: “Was mich 
am meisten beruhigt ist der neckende Hang […] immer nach dem Szenenplan meiner fremden 
Geschichten meine eigne auszuschneiden und so, wenn andre mit der Wirklichkeit ihre Dichtkunst 
wässern, schöner jene mit dieser bei mir abzusüßen.”174 If autobiography is said to forego fictional 
flights of fancy by tempering fantasy with the “reality” of lived life, the writer of Konjektural-
Biographie proposes to do the exact opposite: rather than “watering down poetry with reality,” it 
would be better, he writes, to “sweeten reality with poetry.” The production of an imaginary self 
out of the aporia of antecedent fictional texts fills the (spatial-temporal) gap of the hypothetical 
near-future, which lies between the idyllic past of childhood “arcadia” and death as the horizon of 
human finitude – the end of life and the book –, resulting in a mosaic of multiple interwoven stories 
pieced together from fictional material to form the “conjectural” biography. 
 Like the autobiographical protagonist of Konjektural-Biographie, the lives of scholarly fig-
ures like Wutz, Fixlein, and Fibel are just as much forms of auto-bio-graphy – “des Schreibens 
und Lesens und als solche des Lesens als Schreiben, des Schreibens als Lesen”175 – in the sense 
that their lives are quite literally born from the texts that they read and write: they come from 
pocket libraries and slip boxes, from primers and libraries of waste-paper, as well as from excerpts, 
from which they extract their vital “life drops.” In each case, such scholarly technologies no longer 
                                                
173 Jean Paul, Briefe und bevorstehender Lebenslauf, in: Werke, I/4, 925–1080, here: 1028. 
174 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 1028. 
175 Menke, “Die Geburt des Gelehrten aus den Exzerpten,” 116. 
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serve their traditional function of archiving and organizing scholarly knowledge or public infor-
mation, but are instead repurposed toward private, idiosyncratic ends, such as recording one’s own 
childhood memories onto index cards or collecting scholarly errata. As “inner autobiographies” 
about the writing of (auto)biographies, Jean Paul’s idylls stage the birth of the scholar from writing. 
It is no coincidence that, as was the case for the “real author” Jean Paul, Wutz, Fixlein, Fibel, as 
well as Aubin are all revealed to be avid excerpters, that is, collectors and producers of text. For 
Jean Paul, the life of the scholar epitomizes man as a textualized entity, as a “fold in knowledge” 
(Foucault) that foregrounds their finitude: they are, in the words of Moses Mendelssohn, “literatti, 
Buchstabenmenschen”176 as well as “der große Gedankenstrich” – the literal gap or caesura – “im 
Buch der Natur,” according to the motto which prefaces Die unsichtbare Loge.177 Their (auto)bi-
ographies, which chronicle their bibliographic fantasies, present their lives – and deaths – in their 
irreducibly medial and textual composition.178 
                                                
176 “Wir brauchen des erfahrenen Mannes nicht, wir brauchen nur seine Schriften. Mit einem Worte, wir sind literatti, 
Buchstabenmenschen. Vom Buchstaben hängt unser ganzes Wesen ab, und wir können kaum begreifen, wie ein Er-
densohn sich bilden, und vervollkommnen kann, ohne Buch” (Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem oder über religiöse 
Macht und Judentum, vol. 2 [Berlin: Maurer, 1783], 60ff, cited in Annette Keck, Buchstäbliche Anatomien: Vom 
Lesen und Schreiben des Menschen [Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2007], 17). As Annette Keck argues with 
reference to Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem and the “analytic of finitude” in Foucault’s The Order of Things, “[i]n diesem 
Denken der Endlichkeit entsteht in Biologie, Ökonomie und Philologie der Mensch als Subjekt und Objekt des Wis-
sens, als eine – wie Foucault das formulierte – ‘einfache Falte in unserem Wissen.’ Anders als Foucault betont Men-
delssohn dessen mediale und d.h. in diesem Fall schriftliche Verfasstheit. Denn gerade diese distanziert den Menschen 
von der grauen Vorwelt, vom ‘ursprünglichen’ Judentum, das mit der Moderne ‘zerschrieben’ erscheint” (ibid., 22). 
177 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1. The hyphen, as a typographic character outside the standard alphanumeric set which no 
scholar can do without, proliferates in Jean Paul’s texts. In his early satirical writings, he likens them to “Gebeine 
verstorbener Gedanken” as well as to “Brükken, über die Klüfte unähnlicher Materien geschlagen”: “Alle Schriften 
strozen iezt stat der Gedanken von Gedankenstrichen […] Gedankenstriche sind Furchen ohne Samen – sind Linien, 
die der Chiromantist zu lesen gedenkt, und für deren Bedeutung der Zufal nicht gesorgt – sind das algebraische Zei-
chen der Subtrakzion – sind die Gebeine verstorbener Gedanken – sind die Schleppen oder Schwänze der Perioden, 
welche Schwänze auch oft den Kopf der Perioden, wie die Schwänze bekanter Vögel den Kopf der Damen zieren – 
sind Brükken, über die Klüfte unähnlicher Materien geschlagen – sind Mittel, unsere Bewunderung vom Genus ihres 
Gegenstandes zu trennen, wie iener zwischen sich und seine schöne Schlafgenossin einen Degen legte. – ” (Jean Paul, 
Grönländische Prozesse, in: Werke, II/1, 424). As he similarly announces in the preface to the second edition of 
Hesperus, “[i]n einem solchen Entwürfe halt’ ich die unähnlichsten und feindlichsten Dinge bloß durch Gedanken-
striche auseinander” (Jean Paul, Hesperus, in: Werke, I/1, 480). For more on Jean Paul’s use of hyphens, cf. Frederike 
Frei, “Auf dem Gedankenstrich,” in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft 26/27 (1991–92), 326–31. 
178 “Das Lesen im Buch liest, mehr und weniger, auf Leben und Tod. Im Buch, das den Entscheid zwischen lebendigem 
und totem Buch, zwischen Lebendig und Tot, Leben und Tod suspendiert” (Thomas Schestag, “Bibliographie für Jean 
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 By undermining the aesthetic distance between life and writing, the scholar appears as a 
satirical figure in Jean Paul’s texts whose life is imbued with subversive potential. In contrast to 
Fichte, who conceived of the scholar’s task to be “die oberste Aufsicht über den wirklichen Fort-
gang des Menschengeschlechtes im allgemeinen, und die stete Beförderung dieses Fortganges,”179 
Jean Paul’s scholars are small and diminutive, and their lives revolve around the the world of 
marginal secondary texts. Rather than being tasked with carrying out the (idealist) Enlightenment 
project of realizing man’s progressive perfectibility through universal Bildung, as Fichte proposed, 
it is frequently the material remnants of the Republic of Scholars – “waste-paper” [Makulatur], 
scribblings, paper shavings, and other bits of text collected from the book printer’s “junk shop” 
[Kramladen] – which serve as substitute or subversive sources of scholarship and knowledge for 
scholarly figures like Wutz, Fixlein, and Fibel. For them, the trivial secondary texts of the dis-
course network around 1800 come to serve as a replacement for the official channels of knowledge 
distribution – the book market, the university, and the encyclopedia – to which they are denied 
access for financial or imaginary reasons; and out of this world of forgotten and disposed-of texts, 
                                                
Paul,” in: MLN 113.3 (1998), 465–523, here 470). See also: Sabine Straub and Monika Vince, “‘Wetterleuchtende 
Demant- und Zaubergrube.’ Zur Produktivität des Todes in Jean Pauls Exzerpten und literarischen Schriften,” in: 
Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft 39 (2004), 27–58; Gerhard Neumann, “Der Anfang vom Ende. Jean Pauls 
Poetologie der letzten Dinge im Siebenkäs,” in: Das Ende. Figuren einer Denkform, ed. Karlheinz Stiefel and Rainer 
Warning (Munich: W. Fink, 1996), 476–94. 
179 J. G. Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, in: idem., Fichte-Gesamtausgabe (= GA), 
I/3, 23–68, here 54. Fichte further remarks: “Also der Gelehrte in der letzten Rücksicht betrachtet, soll der sittlich 
beste Mensch seines Zeitalters seyn er soll die höchste Stufe der bis auf ihn möglichen sittlichen Ausbildung in sich 
darstellen” (ibid., 58), in order to advance the “Veredlung des ganzen Menschen,” and relatedly humanity as a whole 
– understood by Fichte as an individual approximation of the homogeneous conception of an “ideal” man – in his 
capacity as “der Lehrer des Menschengeschlechtes” (ibid., 56f). Whereas Fichte idealizes the figure of the scholar 
from the perspective of a homogeneous conception of humanity, for Jean Paul – and this is the major insight he takes 
from natural science – nature provides no ready-made generic templates, but produces instead only individuals and 
exceptions, and for him monstrosities are the exemplary singularities: “Wer kann denn aber eine Mißgeburt, die sich 
so wenig als ein Genie fortpflanzt – denn sie ist selber ein körperliches, eine Einzig-Perle – nicht einmal ein 
Sonntagkind, sondern ein Schalttagkind –, ersetzen, ich bitte jemanden?” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 128). For more on 
Jean Paul’s notion of monstrosities, and relatedly of the unity of the human race as lying in the possibility of differ-
entiation, cf. Armin Schäfer, “Jean Pauls monströses Schreiben,” in particular 231–33. 
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which hover precariously in a suspended state between life and death, they craft their own micro-
logical “scholarly republic” in the form of idiosyncratic pocket libraries and “private encyclope-
dias,” through which they come to attribute new value to old scraps of paper material previously 
deemed to be valueless waste and rubbish. 
 In brief, it is under the signs of contingency and play that Jean Paul’s texts present the lives 
of scholars, and they do so above all through the exposition of their own fragmentariness and 
material contingency. In order to expose this specifically corporeal-material dimension of textual-
ity, Jean Paul introduces an entirely new concept into his “monstrous” order of aesthetics: that of 
humor. Whereas wit serves as the combinatory machinery underlying Jean Paul’s excerpting prac-
tice and method of text production, it is humor which brings into view the materiality of writing, 
from which the lives of scholarly figures like Wutz, Fixlein, and Fibel are shown to be quite liter-
ally “born.” The concept of humor, which lies at the core of Jean Paul’s aesthetic program, serves 
as the privileged form-theoretical instrument in his texts for pivoting between the the infinite and 
the finite, the infinitely big and the infinitesimally small. He therefore defines humor as the form 
of “the inverted sublime” [das umgekehrte Erhabene],180 which in part follows Kant’s definition 
of the sublime as the negative representation of the infinite due to the inadequacy of the faculty of 
presentation to give form to the formlessness of the sublime object. 
 Yet in contrast to the Kantian sublime, which by abandoning sensibility and employing 
ideas to fill the void of representation ends in the higher contemplation of the ideas of reason, 
humor as “the inverted sublime” “does not lead to elevated heights but into the depths of finitude 
– into the particular, the sensuous, the marginal, and the small.”181 By taking sides with the small 
and marginal, humor debases the great and elevates the small, placing them on the same level: 
                                                
180 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 125. 
181 Fleming, The Pleasures of Abandonment, 47. 
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Der Humor, als das umgekehrte Erhabene, vernichtet nicht das Einzelne, sondern 
das Endliche durch den Kontrast mit der Idee. Es gibt für ihn keine einzelne Torheit, 
keine Toren, sondern nur Torheit und eine tolle Welt; er hebt—ungleich dem ge-
meinen Spaßmacher mit seinen Seitenhieben—keine einzelne Narrheit heraus, son-
dern er erniedrigt das Große, aber—ungleich der Parodie—um ihm das Kleine, und 
erhöhet das Kleine, aber—ungleich der Ironie—um ihm das Große an sie die Seite 
zu setzen und so beide zu vernichten, weil vor der Unendlichkeit alles gleich ist 
und nichts.182 
 
Here one finds the technique of double perspectivization at work in Jean Paul’s concept of humor, 
which proceeds according to a paradoxical logic of continuous inversion and reversal. Humor, as 
Jean Paul writes, thus resembles Luther’s definition of the human will as a lex inversa, except here 
in a positive sense, for its descent into hell paves its way for an ascent to heaven: “Wie Luther im 
schlimmen Sinn unsern Willen eine lex inversa nennt: so ist es der Humor im guten; und seine 
Höllenfahrt bahnet ihm die Himmelfahrt.”183 Through this inversion of perspective, humor is able 
to elevate the small and demean the great, thereby making it impossible to distinguish between the 
“microscopic” or “macroscopic” points of view, between the pathway to hell or heaven. Hence, in 
addition to Luther’s notion of the lex inversa, Jean Paul goes on to compare humor to the mytho-
logical bird Merops, which “zwar dem Himmel den Schwanz zukehrt, aber doch in dieser Richtung 
in den Himmel auffliegt. Dieser Gaukler trinkt, auf dem Kopfe tanzend, den Nektar 
hinaufwärts.”184 As Jean Paul’s reference to the figure of Merops suggests, humor does not simply 
invert the perspectives of the big and the small, the infinite and the finite, but presents a perspective 
of impossibility; for just as Merops is said to drink upwards while “dancing upside-down,” humor 
inverts the sublime heights of the heavens and the microscopic frivolities of everyday life to pro-
duce nonsense, such that “alles gleich ist und nichts.” 
                                                
182 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 125. 
183 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 129. 
184 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 129. 
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 By foregrounding the sensuous materiality of finite existence from the perspective of the 
infinite, humor explodes the form of the sublime from within. The concept of humor thereby dis-
tinguishes Jean Paul’s aesthetics from the philosophical theories of the sublime and the subject in 
Kantian and post-Kantian German Idealism as well as from those of the Romantics, who drew 
heavily on Kant and Fichte in order to think art, language, and representation in terms of self-
reflexive processes, rather than as static products. Jean Paul was neither “vor Fichte ein geborener 
Fichteaner,”185 nor a Romantic in the vein of Friedrich Schlegel. He shuns what he refers to in his 
satirical text Clavis Fichtiana seu Leibgeberiana (1800) as the “Höchste Höhe der Reflexion.”186 
In contrast to Friedrich Schlegel’s notion of “romantic universal poetry,” which prescribes an in-
finite process of becoming so as to achieve a progressive approximation of the absolute, Jean Paul 
rejects the route of infinite reflection; instead, he asserts an insuperable gap between the finite and 
the infinite, the real and the ideal. This marks a crucial distinction between Jean Paul’s concept of 
humor from Schlegel’s concept of irony, for whereas romantic irony takes the form of an infinite 
mise en abyme,187 humor, to quote Deleuze, is “the art of the surfaces and of the doubles, of no-
madic singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point; it is the art of the static genesis, the 
                                                
185 “Als Humorist ist Jean Paul in gewisser Weise vor Fichte ein geborener Fichtianer, so wie er als Mensch und 
Gestalter ein Gegen-Fichte ist. Sogar als Denker: denn sein Denken ist fülliger als das seiner Humoristen. Was aber 
die Verwandtschaft stiftet, ist dies: der Humorist verflüchtigt mit der Welt zugleich auch sein (erfahrungsmäßiges) 
Ich vor einer in ihm selbst wirkenden, aber nicht mehr persönlich faßbaren geistigen Kraft” (Max Kommerell, Jean 
Paul [Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 1966], 344). For further analysis of the relationship between Jean Paul and Fichte, 
cf. Till Dembeck, “Fichte dem Buchstaben nach auslegen. Selbst-Lektüre bei Jean Paul,” in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-
Gesellschaft 44 (2009), 113–40. 
186 Jean Paul, Clavis Fichtiana seu Leibgeberiana, in: Werke, I/3, 1011–56, here: 1033. 
187 Arguably the most famous formula of infinite reflection can be found in Friedrich Schlegel’s Athenäum-Fragmente, 
where Schlegel formulates the following programatic statement: “Und doch kann auch sie am meisten zwischen dem 
Dargestellten und dem Darstellenden, frei von allem realen und idealen Interesse auf den Flügeln der poetischen Re-
flexion in der Mitte schweben, diese Reflexion immer wieder potenzieren und wie in einer endlosen Reihe von Spie-
geln vervielfachen” (Friedrich Schlegel, Athenäums-Fragment Nr. 116, in: Kritische Ausgabe, I/2, 182f). For more on 
the poetics and epistemology of Schlegel’s concept of irony, cf. Paul de Man, “The Concept of Irony,” in: Aesthetic 
Ideology, ed. Andrzej Warminski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 163–84. 
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savoir-faire of the pure event, and the ‘fourth person singular’ – with every signification, denota-
tion, and manifestation suspended, all height and depth abolished.”188 
 Humor is thus not so much concerned with the (idealist) opposition between system and 
fragment, totality and part, nor that between the fragmentariness of the parts and the organic total-
ity of the whole. As Jean Paul writes, “[a]n die humoristische Totalität knüpfen sich allerlei Er-
scheinungen. Z. B. sie äußert sich im sternischen Periodenbau, der durch Gedankenstriche nicht 
Teile, sondern Ganze verbindet […].”189 From the perspective of humor, the parts, taken on their 
own, appear as “wholes,” and the wholes, once connected together, appear as “parts.”190 In Jean 
Paul’s idylls, humor stages the attempt to create an internally-closed work as an aesthetic unity, 
such that life appears as a seamless, gap-free whole, and at the same time unravels the hermeneutic 
project of writing the (auto)biography by exposing at the material level the material interfaces – 
the gaps – between the fragmentary (excerpted) parts that hold the whole – life and book, book 
and life – together. Strung together by hyphens, gaps, and stitches, they serialize and juxtapose the 
fragments or excerpts without transition – a typographic operation that both syntactically connects 
the parts together and simultaneously reveals them to be fragments. 
                                                
188 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 141. 
189 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 127f. 
190 In the introduction to a text that exists only as an appendix, Der Jubelsenior. Ein Appendix (1797), Jean Paul 
sketches out a poetics of digression that carries out precisely this reversal of the part-whole relation: “Die Digression 
ist nie im Roman Hauptsache, darf hingegen nie im Appendix als Nebensache behandelt werden; dort ist sie wartendes 
Auskehricht, hier ist sie ein musivisch in den Stubenboden eingelegtes, ein poetisches Asaroton, sowie die Alten auf 
ihren Fußböden musivisches Vexier-Stroh, Knochen und dergleichen, kurz die Stube des Auskehrichts wegen hatten” 
(Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 413f). Jean Paul describes digression as a “mosaic” [musivisch], a “poetic asaroton,” meaning 
“unswept floor,” which refers to an ancient Roman floor mosaic technique. The poetological significance of the “as-
aroton” lies in its reconceptualization of the relation of parts and wholes: for Jean Paul, this relation is neither logical 
nor organic, but the result of a specific standpoint: if from the microscopic perspective the parts appear as heteroge-
neous fragments that are incoherently juxtaposed together, from the macroscopic perspective the parts appear instead 
to constitute a loosely interconnected whole. For more on Jean Paul’s poetics of the appendix in relation to this double 
perspectivization, cf. Fleming, Pleasures of Abandonment, 134–35. See also: Wieland, Vexierzüge: Jean Pauls Di-
gressionspoetik (Hannover: Wehrhahn, 2013), in particular 185–93. 
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 Humor, in short, is an aesthetics of finitude. Wutz, Fixlein, and Fibel are all humorous 
figures whose lives are small and skew – a “multitude of crooked lines”191 [Anzahl der krummen 
Linien]. It indifferently conflates life and book, book and life, but as fragments – as excerpts – of 
one another, torn asunder.192 They are glued and grafted together from the fragmentary materiality 
of unbounded sheets of paper, such as the paper scraps and scribblings and assorted “waste-paper,” 
from which Jean Paul’s idylls are (fictionally) stitched together. This is the technique of “humorous 
sensuality” [humoristische Sinnlichkeit], which “individualisiert bis ins Kleinste, und wieder die 
Teile des Individualisierten.”193 Their biographies emerge from immanent differences – from het-
erogeneous narrative structure that undermine mimetic mirroring and suspend aesthetic distance. 
Their narrative situation is not a homogeneous one, but penetrated by the heterogeneous event of 
writing (life), which fragments the text and introduces the perspective of the “fourth person singu-
lar.” By effecting an impossible perspective, the moment of observing one’s own death, the voice 
the “fourth person” – neither entirely that of the author-instance “Jean Paul” nor the fictional nar-
rator – undermines the identity of these humorous figures and their perspective, it defers the mo-
ment of narrative closure and the end of the book, and thereby seeks to overstep the medial con-
straints and closure of the book as a discursive form.194  
                                                
191 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 102. 
192 “Die irritierende Gleichgültigkeit von Leben und Buch, in der Wendung gegenwärtiges Leben oder Buch, präzisiert 
Leben und Buch zu Auszügen auseinander: das ins Buch – biblos – verzeichnete Leben – bios –, das vom Leben – 
bios – durchworfene Buch – biblos –.” Schestag, “Bibliographie für Jean Paul,” 506. 
193 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 140. 
194 For a poetological specification of Deleuze’s concept of the “fourth person singular” using the example of the 
narrative techniques of Franz Kafka, cf. Joseph Vogl, “Vierte Person. Kafkas Erzählstimme,” in: Deutsche Viertel-
jahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 68:4 (1994), 745–56. “Diese vierte Person artikuliert die 
Erfahrung eines abgestorbenen, sich selbst fremden und vergangenen Ichs; diese vierte Person spricht als unmöglicher 
Zeuge einer Erfahrung, der das Ich zum Opfer gefallen ist und die Paradoxie eines ‘Ich bin tot’ auszusprechen ver-
sucht. Ein unmögliches, verwundetes und verfolgtes Ich also, zugleich aber eine unpersönliche Stimme, eine Vielheit 
von Stimmen, die aus den immanenten Differenzen des ‘ich,’ des ‘er,’ des Erzählers heraus reden […]” (ibid., 755). 
There are uncanny parallels between the impossible perspective of witnessing one’s own death in Kafka’s writings 
and in Jean Paul’s, as in his 1789 satire Meine Überzeugung, daß ich todt bin (cf. Jean Paul, Ausgearbeitete Schriften 
1786–1792, in: Werke, II/3, 96 ff.), his satirical 1790 text Meine lebendige Begrabung (cf. Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 280 
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2. “SEIN SCHREIBZEUG WAR SEINE TASCHENDRUCKEREI.” 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC FANTASIES IN LEBEN DES VERGNÜGTEN 
SCHULMEISTERLEIN WUTZ 
 
Wir Gelehrte wissen Gelehrte, hoft man, zu schäzen und schreiben über nichts lieber als 
über Bücher Bücher; allein niemand thut’s so gern und oft als H. Hirsching *) und ich.195 
 
—Jean Paul, Beschreibung der öffentlichen und Privatbibliotheken des Dorfes unweit der 
See Kuhpanz 
 
Jede Leidenschaft grenzt ja ans Chaos, die sammlerische aber an das der Erinnerungen. 
Doch ich will mehr sagen: Zufall, Schicksal, die das Vergangene vor meinem Blick durch-
färben, sie sind zugleich in dem gewohnten Durcheinander dieser Bücher sinnenfällig da. 
Denn was ist dieser Besitz anderes als eine Unordnung, in der Gewohnheit sich so heimisch 
machte, daß sie als Ordnung erscheinen kann? Sie haben schon von Leuten gehört, die am 
Verlust ihrer Bücher zu Kranken, von anderen, die an ihrem Erwerb zu Verbrechern ge-
worden sind. Jede Ordnung ist gerade in diesen Bereichen nichts als ein Schwebezustand 
überm Abgrund.196 
 
—Walter Benjamin, “Ich packe meine Bibliothek aus” 
 
The form or deformity of Jean Paul’s texts cite forms, techniques, and operations of scholarly 
knowledge. His literary texts, which appear in the form of slip boxes and post-scripts, prefaces and 
appendices – forms whose poetic styles and conventions Jean Paul developed in an exemplary, if 
bewildering, fashion – thereby disclose their own precarious and unstable integrity by coupling 
themselves to all different types of texts or genres, which cite themselves as genres. They are texts, 
in other words, which approximate their own textuality: they are books about the writing of books, 
                                                
ff.), his visions of an imagined future death in Konjektural-Biographie, as well as those in Siebenkäs, in which the 
novel’s protagonist fakes his own death by switching bodies with his “Doppeltgänger” named “Leibgeber” and is thus 
able to observe his own burial. As Helmut Pfotenhauer writes, “Das Motiv des sich tot Sehens, sei es im Spiritus-
Licht, sei es beim Scheintod, sei es während der lebendigen Begrabung, wandert in immer anderen Ausformungen 
durch die verschiedenen Textsorten und kehrt dann in der bekanntesten Variante, der des Siebenkäs wieder.” (Pfoten-
hauer, “Das leben schreiben,” 49). 
195 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 256. The asterisk next to Hirsching’s name continues: “*) Er schrieb eine Beschreibung der 
vornehmsten Bibliotheken in Deutschland, die meiner obigen so ähnlich ausfiel, daß ich und ieder seine, wäre sie 
nicht früher dagewesen, für eine Parodie und Satire auf meine halten müßte” (ibid.). Eduard Berend notes in his com-
mentary to Kuhpanz-See: “Der Kuhpanz-See liegt, wie sich Richter in seiner Namenliste (Fasz. 10) notiert, bei Lie-
benwalde in der Mittelmark und stößt an den Wutz-See, nach dem er den Helden seiner ersten Idylle taufte” (Jean 
Paul, Werke, II/3, 457). 
196 Walter Benjamin, “Ich packe meine Bibliothek aus. Eine Rede über das Sammeln,” in: idem., Gesammelte Schrif-
ten, vol. IV, 388–96, here: 388. 
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biographies about the production of biographies – and their impossibility. Much to the irritation of 
contemporary readers, Jean Paul rarely ascribed to his texts traditional genre designations such as 
“novel” [Roman], as was customary for the time. Instead, they often present themselves in the 
form of heterogeneous fragments or as supplements to other works, into or onto which he inserted 
or appended them in a seemingly arbitrary manner – and they reflect, in turn, on their own frag-
mentariness and supplementary dynamic. In this way, the “birth” of his texts from antecedent writ-
ings makes itself explicit and perceptible. 
 Such is the case with Jean Paul’s first foray into the idyllic genre, his short prose piece 
Leben des vergnügten Schulmeisterlein Maria Wutz in Auenthal. Eine Art Idylle (1790/93).197 Nei-
ther a “novel” nor even really a “biography,” Schulmeisterlein Wutz was conceived from the be-
ginning as a supplement to a larger work, Die unsichtbare Loge, into which Jean Paul inserted 
Wutz as an appendix. The unusual constellation in which Wutz was published foregrounds the 
ambivalence with which Jean Paul regarded the book as a discursive form. In fact, in the preface 
to the second volume of Siebenkäs (1796–97), he even jokingly confesses to his readers, “es hat 
mich oft verdrüßlich gemacht, daß ich jeder Vorrede, die ich schreibe, ein Buch anhängen muß 
[…].”198 This comic inversion of the hierarchy between book and preface, between the work and 
its parergic supplement, through the marginalization of the book-format in favor of an excessive 
inter- or paratextuality – what has been termed in the secondary literature Jean Paul’s “monstrous 
writing”199 – is therefore not without significance for the reading of Wutz. For it is precisely there 
that the status of the book itself becomes investigated in relation to reading and book-writing: “Sie 
diskutiert, unumwundener, buchstäblicher genommen, das Bibliographieren.”200 
                                                
197 Jean Paul, Leben des vergnügten Schulmeisterlein Maria Wutz in Auenthal, in: Werke, I/1, 422–62. 
198 Jean Paul, Siebenkäs, in: Werke, I/2, 143. 
199 Cf. Schäfer, “Jean Pauls monströses Schreiben.” 
200 Schestag, “Bibliographien für Jean Paul,” 477. 
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 “Bibiographization,” or the recording of paratextual data such as author, title, genre, and 
date of publication, is a scholarly technique – one essential to the book trade, or Buchwesen – that 
becomes explicitly thematized in different ways in Schulmeisterlein Wutz. Perhaps no where more 
prominently or irritatingly does the recording of bibliographic data become reflected – and, in turn, 
destabilized – than in the subtitle of Wutz, which furnishes an unusual genre designation. It reads: 
“A Kind of Idyll” [Eine Art Idylle]. With this “kind of idyll,” Jean Paul does not simply designate 
the genre of the text as an “idyll,” but rather cites its genre as a genre: it is a recording of a record-
ing, a citation as repetition or iteration, which thereby contaminates and deforms the genre which 
it cites. With this citation of genre, the characteristic conventions of a genre appear as conventions, 
such that genre and its citation are inscribed within a performative act.201 In a paradoxical logic 
similar to that of Jean Paul’s satirical inversion of the relation of preface to book, the subtitle “a 
‘kind of idyll’ does not simply name the particular makeup, the deviating mode of an idyll, but 
combines the kind [Art] with the genre [Gattung], in other words, it combines species and ge-
nus.”202 In this reversal of the hierarchies of classification, the species – the part to be subsumed – 
breaks away from the coherent order – the genus – in which it is contained, which subsequently 
appears as a kind of supplement in which the species, “a kind of idyll,” no longer has a place in 
the subordinate whole. The “monstrous” potential of this metalepsis between part and whole, spe-
cies and genus, points to the way in which the recording of bibliographic information in Wutz no 
                                                
201 In his well-known critique of J. L. Austin’s concept of the performative, Jacques Derrida refers to this as “general 
citationality”: “For ultimately, isn’t it true that what Austin excludes as anomaly, exception, ‘non-serious,’ citation 
(on stage, in a poem, or a soliloquy) is the determined modification of a general citationality – or rather, a general 
iterability – without which there would not even be a ‘successful’ performative? So that – a paradoxical but unavoid-
able conclusion – a successful performative is necessarily an ‘impure’ performative, to adopt the word advanced later 
on by Austin when he acknowledges that there is no ‘pure’ performative” (Jacques Derrida, “Signature Event Con-
text,” in: Limited Inc [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988], 1–24, here: 17). 
202 Cf. Andrea Krauß, “‘A Kind of Idyll’: Epistemologies of Citation in Jean Paul,” in: The Germanic Review 89.1 
(2014), 76–93, in particular 77–80, here: 86. 
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longer aims at a harmonious “order of things,” but brings about instead their dispersion and delim-
itation into indeterminacy by repetition – by the citation of a citation, the recording of a record-
ing.203 
 In order to examine more precisely how Jean Paul’s first “kind of idyll,” Schulmeisterlein 
Wutz, stages the formation and deformation of the idyll in relation to reading and book-writing, it 
is worth briefly turning to the long history of the genre, which can be traced with relative consi-
stency from the ancient Greek and Roman pastoral poems, which established “Arcadia” – a myth-
ological, geographically isolated paradise – as the topos of ancient bucolic literature, to the modern 
period with the genre’s revival in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Early enlightenment 
authors such as Johann Heinrich Voß and Salomon Geßner, among others, sought to reinvent the 
long-outdated genre not merely as a pastoral representation of an idealized past, but above all as a 
moral genre, which by harkening back to the lost golden age of Arcadia – now envisioned as a 
geographic site where life beyond social constraints would be possible – opened up the possibility 
of a social critique from the perspective of the nascent bourgeois class that sought to diagnose the 
constraints and limitations of the real world on individual freedom. 
 Jean Paul’s ‘modern idyll,’ by contrast, marks a decisive break with the Enlightenment 
idylls of Voß and Geßner. On the one hand, he conceives of the idyll as a kind of “Freudenspiel,” 
and hence as a literary form which should give rise to pleasure and happiness. On the one hand, 
he situates it within the epic genre, defining it several years later in the second edition of the 
Vorschule der Ästhetik (1813) as the “epic representation of full happiness in limitation” [epische 
Darstellung des Vollglücks in der Beschränkung].204 According to this paradoxical formula, which 
                                                
203 For more on the paradoxical or ‘impure’ order of genre, see Derrida, “The Law of Genre,” in: Critical Inquiry, 
trans. Avital Ronell, 7.1 (1980), 55–81. 
204 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 258. 
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describes the idyll in quasi-Kantian terms of constraint and limitation, the conventions of the genre 
are no longer tied to specific geographic or temporal reference points.205 They can therefore apply 
not only to any point in time or space, but can also encompass numerous objective constraints 
imposed on the (bourgeois) subject, such as social standing and character: “Die Idylle fodert eben 
für ihre Beschränkung im Vollglück die hellsten örtlichen Farben nicht nur für Landschaft, auch 
für Lage, Stand, Charakter und verwirft die unbestimmten duftigen Allgemeinheiten Geßners, in 
welchen höchstens etwan Schaf und Bock aus den Wasserfarben auftauchen, aber die Menschen 
verschwimmen.”206 
 Whether such constraints on the individual’s subjective perspective situate “full happiness” 
[Vollglück] as an impossible goal that always remains beyond the individual’s reach or, in a more 
dialectical fashion, as in fact precisely what such constraints give rise to, crucial for Jean Paul is 
that by making limitation a condition of “full happiness,” the modern idyll no longer presupposes 
an undialectical contrast or harmonious balance between the deficiencies of the real world and the 
fantasies of an imaginary world beyond. Rather, his modernization of the idyll into a “kind of 
idyll” offers only a “kind of happiness.” In its representation of the small, quiet, and quotidian 
existence of the bourgeois individual, happiness is ineluctably shot through with pain, suffering, 
and death – in other words, with the insuperable “constraints” of finitude that define the modern 
conditio humana. “In the idyll, the subject never completely breaks free from the constraints of his 
or her surroundings. Instead one creates interruptions, like holidays and ‘blue Mondays,’ within 
                                                
205 “So wie übrigens für die Idylle der Schauplatz gleichgültig ist […]” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 261). 
206 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 260f. 
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one’s limitations.”207 Jean Paul’s modern idylls thus seek to expose the ambivalences and antino-
mies contained within the poetic imagination itself:208 
Ihr könnt die Geh-Fahrt eines Fuhrmanns bei gutem Wetter und gutem Straßenbau 
und bei seinen kostbaren Mahlzeiten zur Idylle erheben und ihm – es ist aber Über-
fluß – im Gasthofe gar seine Braut anbieten. So kann z. B. die Ferienzeit eines ge-
druckten Schulmannes – der blaue Montag eines Handwerkers – die Taufe des ers-
ten Kindes – sogar der erste Tag, an welchem eine von Hoffesten mattgehetzte 
Fürsten-Braut endlich mit ihrem Fürsten ganz allein (das Gefolge kommt sehr spät 
nach) in eine volle blühende Einsiedelei hinausfährt – kurz alle diese Tage können 
Idyllen werden und können singen: auch wir waren in Arkadien. –209 
 
Here his reference to the traditional idyllic topos “et in Arcadia ego” – potentially intended as a 
subtle revision of Goethe’s epigraph to the Italienische Reise, “Auch ich in Arkadien!” – in the 
line “auch wir waren in Arkadien” should not be read, therefore, as a flight into a timeless “golden 
age” that would eliminate the experience of human finitude – of death and suffering – but rather 
as an embrace of the possibility of the idyll in the “microscopic amusements”210 [mikroskopische 
                                                
207 Jörg Kreienbrock, Malicious Objects, Anger Management, and the Question of Modern Literature [New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2013, 88. 
208 Thus while Geßner ascribes to fantasy the psychologically curative power to overcome the tension between happi-
ness and melancholy in the real world by presenting the idyllic one as a closed microcosm, for Jean Paul fantasy is 
more complex and ambiguous. Rather than contrasting the microcosm of idyllic fantasy with the macrocosm of the 
real world, he uses the imagination to turn the gaze of idyllic happiness inward, toward the ‘transcendent’ present of 
the individual, whose childhood past becomes the reservoir of idyllic representations. This temporization of the idyll 
in terms of the past, present, and future of the individual’s existence is suggested in the poetological text included in 
the appendix “Einige Jus de tablette für Mannspersonen” which concludes Leben des Quintus Fixlein, entitled “Über 
die natürliche Magie der Einbildungskraft” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 195–205). There he attributes the “liveliness” or 
energeia – the Aristotelian rhetorical figure of vivid representation – “of fantasy” [Lebhaftigkeit der Phantasie] (Jean 
Paul, Werke, I/4, 196) to the perception of the plurality of spatial and temporal relations between images, likening it 
to a “telescope” [Fernrohr], which “zieht […] einen bunten Diffusionsraum um die glücklichen Inseln der Vergangen-
heit, um das gelobte Land der Zukunft” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 197). The epistemological significance of this elliptical 
temporal structure of imagination articulates itself in his concept of the “pre-mirrored infinity” [vorgespiegelte Un-
endlichkeit], which stands for the ability of man’s imaginative faculty to constitute a world without constraints: “Das 
Idealische in der Poesie ist nichts anders als diese vorgespiegelte Unendlichkeit; ohne diese Unendlichkeit gibt die 
Poesie nur platte abgefärbt Schieferabdrücke, aber keine Blumenstücke der hohen Natur” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 202). 
For more on the poetological significance of Jean Paul’s theory of the imagination, cf. Ulrike Hagel, Elliptische Zeit-
räume des Erzählens. Jean Paul und die Aporien der Idylle (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003); Till Dem-
beck, Texte rahmen. Grenzregionen literarischer Werke im 18. Jahrhundert (Gottsched, Wieland, Moritz, Jean Paul) 
(Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2007), 359., in particular 297–313. See also: Eckart Goebel, “Vorgespiegelte und 
wahre Unendlichkeit. ›Mise en abyme‹: Gide, Huxley, Jean Paul,” in: Die Endlichkeit der Literatur (Berlin 2002), 
85–99; Fleming, Pleasures of Abandonment, in particular 76–81. 
209 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 259. 
210 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 11. 
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Belustigungen] of everyday life, in the concrete hic et nunc of the “real” world. Against an ideal-
izing conception of the idyll in the eighteenth century, Jean Paul’s modern idyll as a “kind of idyll” 
no longer presupposes the presence of a mythical unity of origin, but stages instead the aporias and 
interruptions – the literal caesuras – within life and book. For this reason, life and book do not 
complete or compliment each other as wholes, but appear instead as ‘citations’ of one another. The 
idyll as a “kind of idyll” specifies man, in turn, as a “kind of” caesura, “der große Gedankenstriche 
im Buch der Natur” – a motto which, not without coincidence, prefaces the very novel, Die un-
sichtbare Loge, to which Schulmeisterlein Wutz was appended – and the book as caesured, incom-
plete, and unbound by the part, by the supplement or fragment, namely Wutz itself, which appends 
it. 
 
2.1. My Own Private Library: The Wutzean Art of Book-Making 
In Leben des vergnügten Schulmeisterlein Wutz, Jean Paul not only stages the idyllic genre as a 
distinctly modern ‘small form’ – one which elevates the small, quotidian, and trivial to the center 
of literary representation – but also inaugurates a subversive twist on bibliographic forms of 
knowledge, touching upon nothing less than the literary institutions of authorship, work, and her-
meneutic reading practices around 1800. The subversive thrust of Schulemsterlein Wutz consists 
in the way it conceives the relation of life to book: far from completing each other as ‘wholes,’ 
both are shown to be grounded in a citational, supplementary dynamic, which reveals meaning to 
be a retroactively constitutive effect of the material contingency of text – in other words, of non-
meaning and even of misreading. It thereby “opens up a perspective that was all but unknown in 
German letters: a view onto the small, the quotidian, and strange – a strangeness nevertheless 
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strangely familiar.”211 Just as the text of Schulmeisterlein Wutz relates to Die unsichtbare Loge as 
its parergic supplement, so too does its protagonist, the pedagogue and “kind of” scholar by the 
name of Maria Wutz, who in the title of the work is referred to not simply as a “schoolmaster,” but 
as a “little schoolmaster” [Schulmeisterlein], appear as a marginal, supplementary figure in the 
context of the “discourse network” around 1800. 
 Wutz’s diminutive stature and apparent insignificance is made all the more apparent in the 
text by the numerous constraints – both physical and mental – which are imposed upon him: he is 
a simple teacher who lives in the small village of Auenthal, and is therefore constrained by both 
geography and rank; he is extremely poor, and can therefore afford no personal possessions; and 
he has a childlike naivety, which prevents him from any kind of deeper reflection, reveling instead 
in the immediate pleasures of the present.212 In these respects, Schulmeisterlein Wutz seems to 
fulfill all the criteria of Jean Paul’s definition of the idyll; it stages an ensemble of different forms 
of constraints and limitations which come into witty combinatorial play with one another – as if 
with his own (author) name “Wutz” presents a minimal deformation, a kind of paronomasia, of 
the word “wit” [Witz].213 
                                                
211 Fleming, Pleasures of Abandonment, 60. 
212 Already in the first page of Schulmeisterlein Wutz, the narrator explains that, for Wutz, learning how to spell was 
a useless endeavor: “unser Maria Wutz dozierte unter seinem Vater schon in der Woche das Abc, in der er das Buch-
stabieren erlernte, das nichts taugt” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 422). As in all of Jean Paul’s “kind of idylls,” this ambig-
uous relation to language in childhood serves as the zero point for the text’s reconfiguration, and subsequent defor-
mation, of the technical system which manifests itself between reading and writing as one of contingency and play, 
rather than order and meaning. While in Wutz this deformation of language and the Abc’s remains largely nascent, it 
is radicalized in Jean Paul’s third and final “kind of idyll,” entitled Leben Fibels, des Verfassers der Bienrodischen 
Fibel, which is the subject of the last chapter of this section. 
213 “Nicht zuletzt auch im Eigennamen Maria Wutz, der in Maria männliches und weibliches Geschlecht, sakrale und 
profane Sphäre mischt, in Wutz aber Mensch und Tier, Begriff und Onomatopoesie, Klangbild und Bedeutung” 
(Schestag, “Bibliographien für Jean Paul,” 482). See also: “Wutz,” in: Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm 
Grimm, 16 Bde. in 32 Teilbänden, vol. 30, [Leipzig 1971], 2555; as well as: “Wutz,” Grimm-Wörterbuch, accessed 
20 Jan. 2016, <http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemma=wutz>). 
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 While the proximity in publication history between Jean Paul’s early satirical writings, 
such as Grönländische Prozesse (1783) and Auswahl aus des Teufels Papiere (1789), and Schul-
meisterlein Wutz may suggest a reading of the story as a satirical narrative, in no way is Maria 
Wutz simply an ironic-satirical representative of bourgeois society, a “Verkörperung ge-
meindeutscher Kauzigkeit,”214 as Max Kommerell contended. Rather, Wutz appears as a decidedly 
humorous figure whose unusual strategies of reading and writing – and of reading that which he 
has written – are characterized by the technique of witty juxtaposition. Due to his dire financial 
circumstances and limited mental abilities, his access to the conventional channels of scholarly 
knowledge are restricted. He is so impoverished, in fact, he can only afford the yearly “catalogue 
of books”215 [Meßkatalog], rather than the books themselves, and so must write the books he 
wishes to own by hand based on the titles and authors’ names, which are published in the book 
catalogue. In this way, “der Wutzischen Kunst, stets fröhlich zu sein”216 appears to succeed against 
all limitations: after dutifully studying the catalogue of books to appear, Wutz checks off the works 
he must read and then gets down to work, writing every word of them by hand. In this way, he 
undertakes the impossible hermeneutic task of producing the full contents of a work based solely 
on its title and author: 
Der wichtige Umstand, bei dem uns, wie man behauptet, so viel daran gelegen ist, 
ihn voraus zu hören, ist nämlich der, daß Wutz eine ganze Bibliothek – wie hätte 
der Mann sich eine kaufen können – sich eigenhändig schrieb. Sein Schreibzeug 
war seine Taschendruckerei; jedes neue Meßprodukt, dessen Titel das Meisterlein 
ansichtig wurde, war nun so gut als geschrieben oder gekauft […]217 
 
                                                
214 Kommerell, Jean Paul, 286. 
215 “Nur ein Buch ließ er in sein Haus, den Meßkatalog” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 426). 
216 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 431. 
217 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 425f. 
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Wutz’s book-making thus literally begins in the margins of the books – that is, not coincidentally, 
in the threshold space of the paratext, which by establishing an undefined ‘grey zone’ between 
interior and exterior, between book and life, is what first enables a book to become a book.218 With 
his handwritten authorship – for he needs, and can afford, no more than pen and paper – he “be-
comes his own printing press, indeed, his own publishing house.”219 Wutz writes down the titles 
of books which interest him, and under these titles the respective content of the book, and 
schenkt’ es seiner ansehnlichen Büchersammlung, die wie die heidnischen aus lau-
ter Handschriften bestand […] sein Sohn klagte oft, daß in manchen Jahren sein 
Vater vor literarischer Geburtarbeit kaum niesen konnte, weil er auf einmal Sturms 
Betrachtungen, die verbesserte Auflage, Schillers Räuber und Kants Kritik der rei-
nen Vernunft der Welt zu schenken hatte.220 
 
Far from an author in the conventional sense, Wutz appears here as a ‘kind of’ “Enzyklopädist”221 
who “schreibt über alles,”222 and whose personal library, like Friedrich Nicolai’s Allgemeine 
                                                
218 For more on the theory of the paratext, cf. Gérard Genette, Paratexts. Thresholds of Interpretation, trans. Jane E. 
Lewin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For the related concept of parergon, see Louis Marin, “The 
Frame of Representation and Some of Its Figures,” in: On Representation, trans. Catherine Porter (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), 352–72; Derrida, “Parergon,” in: The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian 
McLeod (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 15–148. For further theories of paratextuality in Jean 
Paul’s writing, cf. Dembeck, Texte rahmen, in particular 1–52; Uwe Wirth, Die Geburt des Autors aus dem Geist der 
Herausgeberfiktion. Editoriale Rahmung im Roman um 1800: Wieland, Goethe, Brentano, Jean Paul, E.T.A. Hoff-
mann (München 2008), in particular 81–142 and 338–53. 
219 Fleming, Pleasures of Abandonment, 61. 
220 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 426–27. 
221 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 427. 
222 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 428. 
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deutsche Bibliothek,223 seems at first glance to perfectly mirror the wider “gelehrte[n] Welt,”224 
containing all the significant books of the eighteenth century, including Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, Schiller’s Die Räuber, and Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werthers. 
 The narrator insists, however, that Wutz’s books are neither plagiarisms nor parodies: “Er 
war kein verdammter Nachdrucker, der das Original hinlegt und oft das meiste daraus abdruckt.”225 
Instead, his hand-written method of book-making proceeds according to a witty-combinatorial 
logic of scouting out “distant similarities”226 [entfernte Ähnlichkeiten]: with all the rigor of a clas-
sical philologist, he takes the titles of the books that interest him, which in the place of the absent 
book serve as fragments or excerpts of the original, and from them alone he deduces the book’s 
content. For this reason, he has no need for the originals. However, as a result of this unusual twist 
                                                
223 In Schulmeistereien Wutz, Jean Paul explicitly mentions Friedrich Nicolai by name: “Ich möchte seine Meisterstü-
cke nicht schreiben. Den größten Schaden hatte der Mann davon – Verstopfung zu halben Wochen und Schnupfen auf 
der andern Seite –, wenn der Senior (sein Friedrich Nicolai) zu viel Gutes, das er zu schreiben hatte, anstrich und seine 
Hand durch die gemalte anspornte […]” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 427). The Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek was a 
quarterly review journal published by Friedrich Nicolai that appeared from 1765 until 1806, during which time was 
largely associated with the discourse of the late Enlightenment. Not only did Jean Paul frequently excerpt from the 
Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, as evinced by his excerpt manuscripts, but the encyclopedic ordering of knowledge 
of the literary journal was of profound epistemological significance for his conception of form: “Dieser formbildende 
Einfluß der Zeitschrift läßt sich an mindestens drei Strukturanalogien zwischen der literarischen Kommunikation in 
Zeitschriften und Jean Pauls Romanen vergegenwärtigen. Erstens sind Zeitschriften unabgeschlossene, dynamische 
Medien der Wissensproduktion. Ihre Produzenten sind sich der Vorläufigkeit und der im Prinzip infinite Revi-
sionsbedürftigkeit des von ihnen zur Verfügung gestellten Wissens bewußt. Für Zeitschriften wie die Allgemeine 
deutsche Bibliothek oder die Allgemeine Litteratur-Zeitung dürfte dieses Bewußtsein sogar Teil der Gewinnkalku-
lation gewesen sein. Die Vorläufigkeit des Wissens ist die Bedingung der permanenten Nachfrage nach ihrer 
Zeitschrift und der stetigen sekundären Textproduktion. Die Nähe Jean Pauls zu diesen publizistischen Textverfahren 
dokumentiert sich nicht nur in der Übernahme einzelner Gattungen […] sonder auch in der Offenheit seiner Ro-
manstrukturen” (Stephan Pabst, “‘Herr Gedruckt.’ Fingierte Autorschaft als Funktion der Wissensorganisation in Jean 
Pauls Leben Fibels,” in: Kunst und Wissen. Beziehungen zwischen Ästhetik und Erkenntnistheorie im 18. und 19. 
Jahrhundert, eds. Astrid Bauereisen, Stefan Pabst, Achim Vesper [Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009], 
237f). While Pabst focuses in his article on the significance of the newspaper as both a publication format and a form 
of knowledge-organization for Leben Fibels, I argue in the fourth chapter of this section that, in fact, this re-organiza-
tion presents itself most strikingly in his anthology Herbst-Blumine, oder gesammelte Werkchen aus Zeitschriften 
(1810–20), with specific reference to his short text contained therein, entitled “Meine Miszellen,” in which Jean Paul’s 
‘miscellaneous’ method of writing may be said to ‘cite’ the miscellaneous order and (un)form of contemporaneous 
miscellanies which widely circulated around 1800. 
224 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 428. 
225 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 426. 
226 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 170. 
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on the hermeneutic method, Wutz’s books turn out to be unexpected – though perhaps no less 
incorrect – readings of the bibliographic titles. Hence the narrator remarks apropos Wutz’s hand-
written edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, “daß er z.B. im ganzen Federschen Traktat über 
Raum und Zeit von nichts handelte als vom Schiffs-Raum und der Zeit, die man bei Weibern Men-
ses nennt.”227 This freely interpretive attitude toward pre-written titles is one of two remarkable 
facts mentioned by the narrator. The other, a matter of faith, results from the first: in the course of 
his many years of writing books by hand, this second fact helps to cement in Wutz his peculiar 
conception of what constitutes an ‘original’ work: 
da er einige Jahre sein Bücherbrett auf diese Art voll geschrieben und durchstudie-
ret hatte, so nahm er die Meinung an, seine Schreibbücher wären eigentlich die 
kanonischen Urkunden, und die gedruckten wären bloße Nachstiche seiner ge-
schriebnen; nur das, klagt’ er, könn’ er – und böten die Leute ihm Balleien dafür an 
– nicht herauskriegen, wienach und warum der Buchführer das Gedruckte allzeit so 
sehr verfälsche und umsetze, daß man wahrhaftig schwören sollte, das Gedruckte 
und das Geschriebne hätten doppelte Verfasser, wüßte man es nicht sonst. 
 
At first glance, this phenomenon of “double authorship” seems like mere caprice. Yet it turns out 
to contain an almost coherent logic, for nothing prevents one from assuming that a book is in fact 
nothing other than the exegesis of a title, possibly in connection with the author’s name: “So wäre 
etwa Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft, das Buch dieses Titels, nichts anderes als eine, und zwar 
nur eine, mögliche Auslegung des Titels Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Und Maria Wutzens 
Auslegung nur eine andere, nicht weniger mögliche, nicht weniger berechtigte und unberechen-
bare der selben Überschrift.”228 Hence it is possible for the narrator to claim – free of any trace of 
irony – “J. J. Rousseau oder Wutz (das ist einerlei).”229 
                                                
227 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 426. 
228 Schestag, “Bibliographie für Jean Paul,” 478f. 
229 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 428.  
 
89 
 Thus while bibliographies typically consist of indexes or records of book title, author and 
publisher name, the place of printing, and the year of publication, Wutz’s erudition serves no such 
pragmatic function: he writes without reading, “und damit ohne jede Kenntnis der für seine 
Themen einschlägigen ‘Realien.’”230 The “beste Inventarienstücke”231 in his book collection are 
not ‘inventoried’ works in the baroque sense of the storage of diverse materials according to a 
well-ordered loci communes – that is, in the sense of inventio, from which the word “inventory” 
etymologically derives.232 His bibliographies, in other words, record no pertinent scholarly infor-
mation whatsoever, but only that which has been recorded; they are citations of citations, out of 
which he ‘invents’ or ‘produces’ the new and the novel: he writes down – cites, excerpts – the 
headings to books, which he himself does not possess because he cannot afford them, and in doing 
so he uncouples the title of the work from the ‘original,’ which figures as its withdrawn referent – 
its distant and inaccessible trace or adumbration: “Citation, we might say in the terms of Rousseau 
or Wutz or the narrator, is the name of the originarily withdrawn. The ‘authentic’ citation – the 
source – always remains hidden in the background ‘accoutered in different words.’”233 By effect-
ing in this way the displacement, as well as the fragmentation, of the original through the exegesis 
of the title, Wutz’s book-making disrupts the semblance of identity which governs the relation of 
form to content, of idea to word. It thereby comes to undermine the very institutions of literature, 
                                                
230 Schmidt-Hannisa, “Lesarten,” 39. 
231 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 426. 
232 For a performative reading of Jean Paul’s inventio, cf. Menke, “‘Ein-Fälle – aus Exzerpten,” in particular 294–98. 
In her essay Menke contends that what distinguishes the forms of knowledge produced by Jean Paul’s combinatorial 
technique of writing from the outdated, ‘baroque’ forms of knowledge used by Enlightenment encyclopedists like 
Daniel Georg Morhof is the citational dynamic of Jean Paul’s inventio: “Charakterisiert werden die Jean Paulschen 
Texte durch ihren Anschluss an eine veraltete Wissensform. Erinnert wird an Daniel Georg Morhofs Polyhistor […], 
der die inventio im Sinne des topischen Suchsystems, ‘das für die Zuordnung des allgemeinen Materials (der loci 
communes) mit dem besonderen Redegegenstand zuständig ist,’ noch einmal vorstellt. Jean Paul ‘zitiert’ diesen Typus 
des Wissens; er zitiert derart die soeben veraltete Wissensform, und er zitiert sie als Verhalten – des exzerpierend-
aus-schreibend Lesens und des inventiven Schreibens aus Exzerpten” (ibid., 294f). 
233 Krauß, “Epistemologies of Citation in Jean Paul,” 89. 
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such as the concept of work and the “author function,” both of which are premised on a reciprocal, 
co-originary identity formation.234 
 The legitimation for Wutz’s “double authorship” lies in his dire material circumstances, 
namely in the poverty in which he dwells. As the narrator reports, “»er würde wahrhaftig nicht so 
dumm sein, daß er Federn nähme und die besten Werke machte, wenn er nichts brauchte, als bloß 
den Beutel aufzubinden und sie zu erhandeln. Allein er habe nichts darin als zwei schwarze Hemd-
knöpfe und einen kotigen Kreuzer […]«.”235 The recurring motifs of currency and money in Wutz 
go deeper, however, than merely presenting yet another constraint on Wutz’s existence. The 
presentation of various economic constraints on Wutz are not merely intended to satisfy the 
poetological criteria of the modern idyll; rather, they concern at bottom a far more fundamental 
problematic of circulation and exchange – in this context, the economic dispostifs of book-printing 
and the book-market – in relation to the worthless, trivial, and unexchangeable in the context of 
Wutz’s peculiar art of book-making: 
So fällt aber auch das geschriebene Buch aus dem Schema des Tausches, nicht we-
niger als das Geschriebene. Und genauer: so sehr Buch und Sprache aus diesem 
Schema herausfallen, so sehr unterbrechen sie es. Sie stellen den ökonomischen Auf-
riß der Sprache infrage. Das Lesen im Buch, dessen, der es schrieb, weil er es nicht 
kaufen konnte, sucht nicht, auf seine Kosten zu kommen.236 
 
Here it is not so much the economic motif of penury that is of significance, but rather the way in 
which Schulmeisterlein Wutz repeatedly stages financial ruin as leading to linguistic ruin; hence 
the real crisis of meaning (‘value’) prompted by Wutz’s book-making, which falls outside of the 
circulating realm of exchange and hence of value, turns out to result from a deficiency – not only 
                                                
234 Cf. Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?,’’ in: idem., Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and 
Interviews, ed. Donald Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 113–38. 
235 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 428. 
236 Schestag, “Bibliographie für Jean Paul,” 482. 
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from the fact that Wutz has no money, but from the very indeterminacy of words themselves which 
his own interpretive methods repeatedly expose. 
 Wutz’s authorship encompasses many different authors, from Rousseau to Kant, as well as 
vastly different genres. We learn, for instance, that he is a prolific author of, amongst other literary 
genres, travelogues, namely to countries which he (like most other travel writers, according to the 
narrator) has, in fact, never visited.237 In addition to Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, he also 
counts Johann Caspar Lavater’s Physiognomische Fragmente as one of the innumerable books of 
which he considers himself to be the true author. The reference to Lavater here is not without 
epistemological significance, for it is here where the text implicitly cites a method of interpretation 
– namely, that of physiognomic exegesis – which posits a reflective relation between inner and 
outer, spirit and letter, soul and body. Just as Lavater argued that one can grasp the (inner) ‘moral-
ity’ of an individual from the analysis of their (outer) physical, particularly facial, characteristics, 
Wutz – in a similar metalepsis of part and whole, cause and effect – seeks to deduce the inner 
contents of a book from its outer (bibliographic) properties.238 Thus it comes as no surprise to learn 
                                                
237 “[…] abends aber mußte der gute Mann nach dem Abendessen noch gar um den Südpol rudern und konnte auf 
seiner Cookischen Reise kaum drei gescheite W orte zum Sohne nach Deutschland hinaufreden. Denn da unser En-
zyklopädist nie das innere Afrika oder nur einen spanischen Maulesel-Stall betreten, oder die Einwohner von beiden 
gesprochen hatte: so hau’ er desto mehr Zeit und Fähigkeit, von beiden und allen Ländern reichhaltige Reisebeschrei-
bungen zu liefern […] Wutz zerrete sein Reisejournal auch aus niemand anders als aus sich” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 
427). 
238 For more on the relation of physiognomic discourse to liternature and aesthetics around 1800, cf. Wolfram Grod-
deck and Ulrich Stadler (eds.): Physiognomie und Pathognomie. Zur literarischen Darstellung von Individualität 
(Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 1994). For the significance of the discourse of physiognomy in relation to Jean Paul’s 
writing, see Stefan Pabst, Fiktionen des inneren Menschen. Die literarische Umwertung der Physiognomik bei Jean 
Paul und E.T.A. Hoffmann (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Heidelberg, 2007); Müller, “Jean Pauls Ästhetik im Kon-
text der Frühromantik und des deutschen Idealismus,” in: idem., Jean Paul im Kontext. Gesammelte Aufsätze (Würz-
burg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1996), 63–76, in particular 69–73; Müller, Jean Pauls Ästhetik und Naturphiloso-
phie (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1983), 59f. As Müller writes: “Die Physiognomik wird als alltägliche Zeichendeutung 
begriffen, die aus der körperlichen Gestik und Mimik des ‘innerlich’ unbekannten Gegenübers Schlüsse auf dessen 
seelische und geistige Verfassung zieht” (Müller, Jean Pauls Ästhetik und Naturphilosophie, 83). Müller demonstrates 
in particular the influence which the discourse of physiognomy had on Jean Paul. This is especially evident in Jean 
Paul’s essay “Über die natürliche Magie der Einbildungskraft,” where he writes: “Unsere Seele schreibt mit vierund-
zwanzig Zeichen der Zeichen (d. h. mit vierundzwanzig Buchstaben der Wörter) an Seelen; die Natur mit Millionen. 
Sie zwingt uns, an fremde Ichs neben unserem zu glauben, da wir ewig nur Körper sehen – also unsere Seele in fremde 
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that Wutz shamelessly erases Lavater’s name from his Physiognomische Fragmente and, in its 
place, stamps his own: 
so ließ Wutz diesem fruchtbaren Kopfe dadurch wenig voraus, daß er sein Kon-
zeptpapier in Quarto brach und drei Wochen lang nicht vom Sessel wegging, son-
dern an seinem eignen Kopfe so lange zog, bis er den physiognomischen Fötus 
herausgebracht (– er bettete den Fötus aufs Bücherbrett hin –) und bis er sich dem 
Je Schweizer nachgeschrieben hatte. Diese Wutzische Fragmente übertitelte er die 
Lavaterschen und merkte an: »er hätte nichts gegen die gedruckten; aber seine Hand 
sei hoffentlich ebenso leserlich, wenn nicht besser als irgendein Mittel-Fraktur-
Druck.«239 
 
In the name of physiognomy, Wutz’s so-called “Wutzische Fragmente” do not so much bring inner 
and outer, soul and body, into harmony with one another as radically fragment them apart, splitting 
title and author name from the ‘original’ work. His writing – and reading that which he has written 
– stands the relation of spirit to letter on its head, ‘defacing,’ as it were, the very form of the book 
into an ensemble of material fragments. His technique of writing by hand thus appears as the per-
fect compliment to such a fragmentary-material conception of literary production, for the papers 
which bear the title “Wutzische Fragmente” are – not without coincidence – said to be written in 
Fraktur, which in Wutz’s case quite literally fractures the text, splitting it apart and thereby effac-
ing any trace of the ‘original’ referent. 
 Hence, just as Wutz attempts to produce his own version of Kant’s first Critique, yet with-
out having any clue as to how the concepts of space and time relate to Kant’s argument in the 
“Transcendental Aesthetic” as to the a priori forms of intuition, his book-making is, in the end, 
                                                
Augen, Nasen, Lippen überzutragen. Kurz, durch Physiognomik und Pathognomik beseelen wir erstlich alle Leiber – 
später alle unorganisierte Körper” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 203f). Monika Schmitz-Emans reads this passage as evi-
dence of Jean Paul’s awareness of the semiotic-linguistic mediation of interpreting natural signs, which stumbles upon 
a larger epistemological problem with respect to language: “Die Wortsprache is Metasprache der physiognomischen, 
ist notwendige Vermittlerin zwischen Gegenstand und erkennendem Ich. Die Mienen müssen übersetzt werden, um 
verständlich zu sein: nur dem abwägenden und vergleichenden Verstand erschließt sich ihr vollständiger Sinn” 
(Monika Schmitz-Emans, Schnupftuchsknoten oder Sternbild. Jean Pauls Ansätze zu einer Theorie der Sprache 
[Bonn: Bouvier, 1986], 81). 
239 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 426. 
 
93 
only capable of reproducing his own idyllic microcosm, the spatial-temporal hic et nunc of his 
phenomenologically-constrained life-world, such that, upon Wutz’s reading, Kant’s conception of 
“space” can only naturally refer to the space of a boat, while the concept of “time” refers, on this 
‘distorted’ reading, to a woman’s menstrual cycle. In this sense, his “literarische Geburtarbeit” 
always yields a kind of monstrosity or Missgeburt, a so-called “physiognomic fetus” [physiog-
nomischen Fötus], which foregrounds the ‘corporeal’ materiality of the text. Far from conjuring 
up the ideality of spirit, such a Wutzean maieutics of book-making thus collapses into the raw 
materiality of the ‘fractured’ letter, which his handwriting perpetually disfigures. 
 The repeated exposition of the literal-materiality of Wutz’s technique of writing and book-
making takes on almost unfathomable proportions in the case of his extraordinarily bizarre rendi-
tion of Klopstock’s Messiade. Because Klopstock’s epic poem is written in a verse form – hexam-
eter – that is incomprehensible to modern readers, Wutz must carefully mis-trim his feather-pen in 
order to translate the hermeneutically incomprehensible (hexameter) into the physically ungrasp-
able (illegibility): 
so mußte der Dichter, da ers durch keine Bemühung zur geringsten Unverständlich-
keit bringen konnte – er fassete allemal den Augenblick jede Zeile und jeden Fuß 
und pes -– aus Not zum Einfall greifen, daß er die Hexameter ganz unleserlich 
schrieb, was auch gut war. Durch diese poetische Freiheit bog er dem Verstehen 
ungezwungen vor.240 
 
If one could read Wutz’s illegible, ink-spilled attempts at hexameter, one would find in the place 
of Klopstock’s epic poem the description of the dinner with Wutz’s fiancée and future father-in-
law, for “[e]r dachte, in der gedruckten Messiade stehe der Abend auch.”241 With this contrast 
between the limits of cognition and those of the textual material itself, the text brings into view the 
                                                
240 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 441. 
241 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 444. 
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minimal, yet nonetheless crucial, gap which separates Jean Paul’s poetics of the small, fragmen-
tary, and material from that of contemporary Romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel, whose concept 
of irony advanced to a new aesthetic norm around 1800. In his essay “Über die Unverständlichkeit” 
(1800),242 Schlegel confronts readers steeped in the hermeneutic method with the problem of (non-
)understanding, with the possibility of a code that could not be deciphered, by implying that there 
is no longer a self-evident, guaranteed mutual understanding between reader and author. Jean Paul, 
by contrast, presents in Wutz a figure who, from the need to produce at the semantic level no texts 
which are incomprehensible, produces at the level of the materiality of the medium – text – nothing 
but illegibility. 
 While Jean Paul doesn’t speak explicitly here of the concept of humor, which he only first 
came to consider in the second preface to Leben des Quintus Fixlein (1796/1802) and later arrived 
at a programmatic theoretical formulation in the Vorschule der Ästhetik (1801/13), his conception 
of text production as a kind of material “Flechtwerk” – a quasi-mechanical technique of wattling 
or wickerwork, for which no route of reflection is possible any more – in many ways anticipated 
his subsequent introduction of humor into the poetological frame of the idyll. One is tempted there-
fore to put forth the claim that, already in Wutz, the performativity of the citation no longer corre-
sponds to a form of epistemological self-reflection that may be described as “romantic,” as in the 
case of Friedrich Schlegel’s concept of irony. Rather, in the place of hermeneutic incomprehensi-
bly steps textual illegibility, and in the place of irony’s capacity for infinite reflection appears 
                                                
242 Cf. Friedrich Schlegel, “Über die Unverständlichkeit,” in: Charakteristiken und Kritiken I (1796–1801), Kritische 
Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe (henceforth as KA), ed. Hans Eichner (Munich 1967), I/2, 363–72. There Schlegel reacts 
to the misunderstood reception of his famous fragment in the Athenäums-Fragments on Goethe’s Meister, Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre and the French Revolution as “tendencies” of his epoch, and therefore deems it necessary to enter 
into a dialogue with the reader. In a decidedly ‘ironic’ manner he goes on to name the author’s new burden of having 
to “konstruieren” and “deduzieren” his own reader if understanding can no longer be posited as self-evident: “Daher 
hatte ich schon vor langer Zeit den Entschluß gefaßt, mich mit dem Leser in ein Gespräch über diese Materie zu 
versetzen, und vor seinen eignen Augen, gleichsam ihm ins Gesicht, einen andern neuen Leser nach meinem Sinne zu 
konstruieren, ja, wenn ich es nötig finden sollte, denselben sogar zu deduzieren” (ibid., 363) 
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instead the material discontinuity of writing itself – in other words, what Jean Paul will later call 
“humor” – which serves not only as a subversive critique of the hermeneutic method, but also as 
a (self-)parody of Romanticism and its own writing practices. 
 
2.2. Bio-Bibliographization: Writing the Life of Writing – in Miniature 
Jean Paul’s Leben des vergnügten Schulmeistereien Wutz presents not only the life story of a “kind 
of” scholar and book-maker, but also a fictional frame-story about the writing of a biography, 
namely of Wutz’s life, which takes the form of the novel Schulmeisterlein Wutz itself. In the course 
of the narration it is revealed that the narrator is not an omniscient witness to all the events of 
Wutz’s life, but rather acts in the capacity of his biographer,243 and therefore has access to the 
entire archive of Wutz’s writings which the latter has, as is revealed near the end of the text in the 
scene of Wutz’s death, posthumously bequeathed to the narrator precisely for this purpose. In 
Wutz’s life’s work, the biographer discovers a wealth of resources for the biographical project 
with which he has been tasked: hence the time between Wutz’s engagement and marriage, for 
instance, “vielleicht nirgends deutlicher beschrieben als in seinen ‘Werther Freuden,’ die seine 
Lebensbeschreiber fast nur abzuschreiben brauchen.”244 Thus the narrator remarks: 
– Freilich du, mein Wutz, kannst Werthers Freuden aufsetzen, da allemal deine 
äußere und deine innere Welt sich wie zwei Muschelschalen aneinander löten und 
dich als ihr Schaltier einfassen; aber bei uns armen Schelmen, die wir hier am Ofen 
sitzen, ist die Außenwelt selten der Ripienist und Chorist unsrer innern fröhlichen 
Stimmung.245 
 
                                                
243 “So beschreibt er [Wutz] wenigstens selber diese Erinnerung- hohen-Opern in seinen Rousseauischen Spaziergän-
gen, die ich da vor mich lege, um nicht zu lügen….” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 425). 
244 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 433. 
245 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 434. 
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Akin to Friedrich Schlegel’s (in)famous characterization of the Romantic fragment as “like a 
hedgehog” – “Ein Fragment muß gleich einem kleinen Kunstwerke von der umgebenden Welt 
ganz abgesondert und in sich selbst vollendet sein wie ein Igel”246 – Wutz’s existence is completely 
monadic and self-enclosed; he exists in his own idyllic microcosm as a “physiognomic fetus,” 
which constitutes its own inner surroundings that cannot be irritated or stimulated from the outside. 
Thus in a comical twist on Wutz’s unusual method of bibliographization, the biographer does not 
find it at all necessary to investigate or consult “objective” information related to Wutz’s life in 
the writing of his own “kind of” biography, but only their fictional doubling in the form of various 
“pretexts,” namely the narrations contained in Wutz’s hand-written copies of famous books like 
Goethe’s Werther; for all of Wutz’s writing is – like Jean Paul remarked apropos his own – “inner 
autobiography.”247 From this perspective, life and book, book and life, appear indeed as reflections 
of one another, yet in a way that completely undermines any possibility of there being an originary 
referent due to the inherent circularity which governs the relation of life to writing, of bio to 
graphy. 
 Thus whereas Wutz’s art of book-making is characterized by the principle of “double au-
thorship,” Wutz itself presents a narrative technique of “double perspectivization.”248 With the in-
troduction of the biographer as a fictional figure, and not just narrator, the text stages an otherwise 
seemingly impossible perspective, namely that of retrospectively narrating the course of Wutz’s 
entire life from the perspective of his death in order to bring the life and work of the deceased into 
congruity with each other – to complete each other: “da sie [Justine] mich im Gehen meine 
Schreibtafel vollarbeiten sah, angeschrien hätte: ob ich nicht auch ein Büchermacher wäre. – »Was 
                                                
246 Friedrich Schlegel, Athenäums-Fragment Nr. 206, in: KA, I/2, 197. 
247 Jean Paul, Ideen-Gewimmel, 33. 
248 For more on the technique of double perspectivization in relation to Jean Paul’s concept of humor and his ‘poetics 
of paratextuality,’ cf. Dembeck, Texte rahmen, 327–59. 
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sonst, Liebe?« – versetzt’ ich – »jährlich mach’ ich dergleichen und schenke alles nachher dem 
Publiko.« – So möcht’ ich dann, fuhr sie fort, mich auf ein Stündchen zu ihrem Alten hineinbemü-
hen, der auch ein Buchmacher sei, mit dem es aber elend aussehe.”249 Just as the reader learns in 
the course of the narration how Wutz came to be a book-maker, it is also revealed in this scene 
near the end of the story – in yet another moment of unusual doubling – how the narrator of the 
book about a book-maker himself came to be a book-maker. The reader learns that Wutz cannot 
die in peace until he finds someone to complete his library, for his compulsion to self-documenta-
tion demands that even the end – his death – be written: “»er müss’ aber einen haben, der seine 
Bibliothek übernehme, ordne und inventiere und der an seine Lebensbeschreibung, die in der gan-
zen Bibliothek wäre, seine letzten Stunden, falls er sie jetzt hätte, zur Komplettierung gar hinan-
stieße; denn seine Alte wäre keine Gelehrtin und seinen Sohn hätt’ er auf drei – Wochen auf die 
Universität Heidelberg gelassen.«”250 
 With his call to completion, to writing the end, to introducing the notion of the end, the 
narrator enters the story: “The narrator plays a crucial role in the idyll’s literary form, since he 
culls most of the story from Wutz’s archive, frames it, interrupts it, and directly addresses (the now 
dead) Wutz as well as the readers and his friends.”251 Curiously, however, the moment in which 
the death of the protagonist and the life of the book appear to converge turns on a citation – one 
which is marked as a citation – drawn ostensibly from Wutz’s own fictional archive, in which 
Wutz refers to himself in the third person while simultaneously deploying free indirect speech. 
Out of this unusual, seemingly impossible, overlap of competing narrative voices – of the protag-
onist, Wutz, of the biographer and narrator of the story, and even of the author-instance “Jean 
                                                
249 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 454. 
250 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 454f. 
251 Fleming, Pleasures of Abandonment, 76. 
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Paul” itself – there emerges the narrative voice of the “fourth person singular.” There one encoun-
ters neither the voice of the narrator nor the protagonist, but only the polyphonous differences 
between voices – the echoes and adumbrations of a ‘lost’ referent. Just at the moment when the 
biography appears to circle in on itself and complete itself, it in fact fragments itself by introducing 
a foreign presence into the narration which contaminates the narrative frame: the narrator becomes 
a fictional character, implicated in the very biography which he himself seeks to narrate. From this 
perspective, the citation which recalls the moment in which the biography itself was set into motion 
does not so much constitute a successful act of framing, nor does it bring to completion the idyll 
qua idyll; rather, it marks the very heterogeneity of the event of writing itself, as any possibility of 
a straightforward referent has been obliterated through the multiple levels of intertwining cita-
tions.252 Precisely in the moment when life and book appear to complete each another as wholes, 
the narrative establishes a retroactive loop by calling the narrator into being in the role of the 
fictional biographer, thus harkening back to the beginning of the narration, which constituted the 
moment of narration. In doing so, the text explodes its own circular movement by effecting an 
impossible perspective: the citationality of Wutz’s own life – the writing of the life of writing – 
entails the presence of an impossible ‘Other’ in order to complete the task of writing the (cited) 
life, of ‘bio-bibliographization.’ Biography, in idyllic sense of a “kind of idyll,” is not a homoge-
neous medium or narrative, but the staging of an impossible double perspectivization that may be 
described as “extimate”253 [extime] – that is, at once intimate and external – pervaded by disruption 
                                                
252 Cf. Joseph Vogl, “Vierte Person. Kafkas Erzählstimme.” 
253 “[C]’est en tant qu’il est ici une place que nous pouvons designer du terme conjoignant l’intime à la radicale exté-
riorité, c’est en tant que l’object a est extime” (Jacques Lacan, Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Livre XVI: D’un autre à  
l’Autre 1968–1969, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller [Paris: Seuil 2006], 249). See also: Jacques Allain-Miller, “Extimité,” 
in: Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure, and Society, eds. Mark Bracher, et al. (New York: New York 
University Press, 1994), 74–87. 
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and discontinuity, fragmentation and defacement, which effaces every ostensible origin and orig-
inal referent.  
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3. SMALL FORMS, PART I: DANCING (IN) EXCERPTS (DIE 
TASCHENBIBLIOTHEK) 
 
Wie der Taschenspieler aus einem gefalteten Papier eine Kappe macht, eine Serviette p. so 
macht ein Autor aus seinem Papier alles.254 
 
—Jean Paul, Merkblätter 
 
The notion that writing is a maieutic process of self-birth plays a central role not just in Jean Paul’s 
“kind of idylls,” such as Schulmeisterlein Wutz, but also in his authorship. He repeatedly empha-
sized that autobiography is for him the core of all poetology, and concerns nothing but the task of 
‘writing oneself’: “Alle meine Schreiberei ist eigentlich innere Selbstbiographie; und alle Dicht-
werke sind Selberlebensbeschreibungen […].”255 If it is only in writing that the “subject” can be-
come readable and recognizable, then the telos of writing would consist in, “das Ganze selbst nach 
Außen zu kehren und in einem gewaltigen Schriftmonument zu objektivieren, das quantativ und 
qualitativ mehr wäre als bloßes ‘Werk.’”256 As Hans-Walter Schmidt-Hannisa argues, Jean Paul 
undertook numerous efforts to set out in writing his “inner life” as comprehensively as possible: 
that includes not only his literary texts, but also his countless notebooks, pamphlets, diaries, ex-
cerpt manuscripts, meticulous recordings of ideas, memories, projects, observations, dreams, col-
lectanea, states of health, weather forecasts, and working conditions. This obsession with the trans-
formation of the “inner life” of the subject into writing culminates in a negative feedback loop, in 
which the life of the writer is said to consist in nothing but writing life: “Das Wichtigste in einer 
Autobiographie eines Autors ist eigentlich das seines Schreibens.”257 If writing life means writing 
                                                
254 Jean Paul, Merkblätter, in: Werke, II/6, 328. 
255 Jean Paul, Ideen-Gewimmel, 33 
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257 Jean Paul, Werke, II/6, 265. 
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writing, this marks in turn an inversion: “Leben hat nur noch statt im Akt des Schreibens, in der 
‘Schreibstunde’; statt das Leben zu schreiben, lebt Jean Paul im Schreiben und durch 
Schreiben.”258 
 Despite this ostensible privileging of writing in Jean Paul’s work – a dynamic which may 
be said to be parodied in Wutz in the form of Wutz’s one-sided erudition of writing without reading  
– he does not at all ignore the enormous significance of reading. Its value is nonetheless based 
primarily on it being put into the service of writing. In that respect, Jean Paul, like his contempo-
raries, operates within the discursive constraints of the “discourse network” around 1800, which 
as Friedrich Kittler argues made reading for the first time into a necessary pre-condition of author-
ship: “Authorship in the discourse network around 1800 is not a function simultaneous with the 
act of writing, but a deferred effect of rereading.”259 Yet while Jean Paul doubtlessly counts among 
those authors who represent in an exemplary manner this literary system, he is nonetheless – and 
this is a circumstance which Kittler constantly overlooks in his citations of Jean Paul’s writings – 
an extremely marginal figure within this discourse network, who developed his own peculiar ways 
                                                
258 Schmidt-Hannisa, 36. See also Pfotenhauer, “Das Leben schreiben.” According to Pfotenhauer, Jean Paul con-
ceived of his final autobiography according to the model of such “Schreibstunden”: “In einer Notiz zur Wochenschrift 
Der Apotheker heißt es: ‘Aufsätze kleine Bücherchen [...] Papierdrache betitelt.’ Eine kleine Schrift mit dem Titel 
Ausschweife für künftige Fortsetzungen von vier Werken, 1823/24 im Morgenblatt erschienen – der letzte Aufsatz 
übrigens von Jean Paul – gibt darüber nun nähere Auskunft. Schon der Titel zeigt, wie nachdrücklich hier das Werk 
verabschiedet und wie sehr das Beiwerk an seine Stelle getreten ist. Wie im Titel, so auch in dem, wovon er handelt. 
Zunächst wird in dem Text von drei anderen Werken geredet, denen es der Fortsetzung ermangelt. Dann kommt der 
Autor auf sein ‘letztes Werk’ zu sprechen. Es solle unter diesem Titel und dem anderen des Kometen angekündigt 
werden. ‘Papierdrache’ solle es vor allem heißen und in der Form einer „Wochenschrift, wie etwa der englische Zu-
schauer, erscheinen und von einer gewissen fruchtbringenden Palmgenossenschaft [...] verfaßt sein“. In das Buch 
müsse ‘alles hineingeschrieben werden,’ ‘damit nur einmal ein Ende wird mit mir und von mir.’ Es ist ein Buch des 
eigenen Lebens als Schreiben. Es nimmt alles auf, ‘was ich nur von Einfällen, komischen Auftritten, Bemerkungen 
über Menschen und Sachen und von [...] Satan und seiner Großmutter’ ‘im Pulte und im Kopfe vorrätig beherberge.’ 
Ein ‘wahres umgestürztes Fruchthorn’ ergebe dies, ‘bei welchem das unter dem Schreiben und Erleben noch nach-
kommende Fallobst gar nicht einmal für etwas angeschlagen’ werde – „woraus allein auf eine Länge des Werks zu 
schließen, von dem der letzte Bogen kaum abzusehen.’ ‘Natürlich,’ so fährt Jean Paul fort, ‘wird das Werk eine Ge-
neralsalve meines ganzen Kopfes, ein Allerheiligenfest aller Gedanken, ein Polterabend, Kehraus, Chariwari aller 
Ideenhochzeiten’” (ibid., 57f). 
259 Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, 111. 
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of writing – and reading. More specifically, writing for Jean Paul does not simply mean to write 
his writing, but also to write his reading. Before collectanea find their way into his texts, they are 
always already caught within an extremely complex system of information management whose 
central technique is the excerpt.260 Jean Paul’s system of excerpting, which is of central signifi-
cance to his way of reading and writing, ostensibly functions according to the model of baroque 
collectanea: the storage of diverse materials according to a well-ordered loci communes – that is, 
the rhetorical technique of inventio, the terminus technicus for the discovery of arguments and 
their “realia.” 
 
3.1. Aubin’s “Lebenstropfen,” or How to Make Excerpts from Excerpts 
The key fictional text for understanding Jean Paul’s method of excerpting is his short prose piece 
Die Taschenbibliothek (1796).261 Like Leben des vergnügten Schulmeisterlein Wutz, Die Taschen-
bibliothek concerns a “kind of” scholar who makes use of a very similar technique for organizing 
information as the little schoolmaster Maria Wutz: his own private “pocket library” [Taschenbib-
liothek]. Yet whereas Wutz writes without reading, producing extraordinarily bizarre renditions of 
                                                
260 In the course of his life Jean Paul amassed a collection of approximately 12,000 pages of excerpt manuscripts 
which contain over 100,000 individual entries. They consist of a copious handwritten collection of collectanea, which 
he compiled from 1778 to 1825, gathered from practically every contemporary field of knowledge, including religion, 
philosophy, customs and nature, as well as natural history and medicine. Since 1998, the research project “Exzerpt-
hefte” at the University of Würzburg has undertaken to transcribe and make accessible a digital edition of all of Jean 
Paul’s excerpts and the respective register. Excerpts can be accessed at the following web address: http://www.jp-
exzerpte.uni-wuerzburg.de/index.php?seite=exzerpte/vorlage&navi=_navi/reg01. On the project description page on 
the University of Würzburg homepage, the purpose of the research project “Exzerpthefte” is explained as follows: “In 
der Jean-Paul-Edition hat das Projekt »Exzerpthefte« eine Art Brückenfunktion: einerseits ist es eine Ergänzung zur 
historisch-kritischen Edition des Nachlasses, die derzeit an der Würzburger Arbeitsstelle in den Projekten »Satiren 
und Ironien« und »Bausteine und Erfindungen« abgeschlossen wird; andererseits ist die Edition der Exzerpthefte eine 
wichtige Grundlage für die Kommentierung der Historisch-kritischen Ausgabe der zu Lebzeiten erschienenen Werke 
Jean Pauls. Diese wurde an der Würzburger Arbeitsstelle mit dem »Pilotband Hesperus« (erschienen 2009) begonnen; 
weitere Editionen (»Siebenkäs«, »Vorschule der Ästhetik«, »Komet« und »Titan«) folgen” (Sabine Straub, Monika 
Vince, Dr. Michael Will, “Projektbeschreibung ‘Exzerpthefte,’” Universität Würzburg, accessed 22. Jan. 2016, 
<http://www.jp-exzerpte.uni-wuerzburg.de/index.php?seite=projekt>). For a recent critique of the hermeneutic as-
sumptions underlying this approach to Jean Paul’s excerpts, see Andrea Krauß, “Sammeln – Exzerpte – Konstellation. 
Jean Pauls literarische Kombinatorik,” in: Monatshefte 105.2 (2013), 291–314. 
261 Jean Paul, “Die Taschenbibliothek,” in: Werke, II/3, 769–73. 
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well-known books based solely on the interpretation of their titles, the protagonist of Die Taschen-
bibliothek, the “pageant dancing master” [Pagentanzmeister] Aubin, reads without writing: his 
process of reading consists merely in taking notes and making excerpts for himself of what he has 
read, but without turning these excerpts into new works of fiction. Thus in contrast not only to 
Wutz, but also to the “real author” Jean Paul, Aubin is not an author at all, but merely a collector 
of texts in the condensed form of excerpts. Within the discourse network around 1800, the juxta-
position of Wutz and Aubin thereby underscores, “daß Lesen und Schreiben nur als strikt 
aufeinander bezogene Prozesse wahrhaft legitimiert sind”;262 for if reading without writing pre-
cludes authorship, then writing without reading withdraws from a subject-centered poetology ori-
ented around the mediation of understanding. 
 After revealing the basic contours of Aubin’s unusual approach to reading, the narrator 
goes on to praise his acquisition of universal knowledge: “In der flüchtigen Viertelstunde unsers 
Gesprächs setzte er mich durch seine Kenntnisse in Ungewißheit, ob er außer der Tanzkunst ei-
gentlich Theologie – oder Jurisprudenz – oder Astronomie – oder Geschichte, oder andere Wis-
senschaften verstehe.”263 While one might be inclined to assume that a man with such universal 
knowledge would have an extraordinary memory, it turns out that Aubin, in fact, “hatte wenig 
Zeit, wenig Geld, noch weniger Gedächtnis und Bücher: – und doch wußt’ er fast alle auswendig 
und war nicht bloß auf dem Tanzboden zu Hause.”264 Aubin, like Wutz, thus appears to satisfy the 
criteria of the idyll as the “epic representation of full happiness in limitation,” albeit in a somewhat 
different manner; for against all constraints and limitations – he is said to have “little time, little 
money, and even less memory and books” – he nonetheless continues to persevere and succeed in 
                                                
262 Ibid. 




his “polyhistoric” ambitions to accumulate and memorize a wealth of encyclopedic knowledge. 
And this is precisely what fills him with “full happiness”: “Ich bin so glücklich […] daß ich keine 
Zeit und keine Langweile habe. Ich fühle nie, daß ich auf etwas warte; denn ich ziehe sogleich 
einen Teil meiner Taschenbibliothek aus der Tasche […]”265 
 While at first glance this meticulous method of collecting excerpts appears to belong to the 
encyclopedic tradition of Daniel Georg Morhof’s Polyhistor, “der in De excerpiendi ratione die 
Anhäufung des Wissens als Basis für ‘neue Gedanken und Erfindungen’ rühmt,”266 upon closer 
inspection it becomes apparent that Aubin, like Jean Paul, orients himself in his excerpt manu-
scripts “weder an den disziplinären Grenzen und der strikten Sachbezogenheit der zeitgenössi-
schen Wissenschaften noch an Ordnungssystemen des Polyhistorismus.”267 He no longer orders 
excerpted information according to a well-ordered loci communes – the traditional objective cate-
gories of knowledge that governed early-modern excerpting practices. Rather, he uses a witty-
combinatorial method – akin to the poetic machinery of “wit” [Witz] – of juxtaposing “distant 
similarities”268 [entfernte Ähnlichkeiten] whose underlying realia are neither objective nor pre-
existing, but radically subjective and “unstable.”269 In Jean Paul’s entries in his excerpt register, 
for instance, his idiosyncratic emphasis on certain meanings of words and their neglect has been 
noticed, as in the case of the keyword “Maschine.” In contrast to the polyhistoric scholars of the 
baroque period, Jean Paul notes everything which could belong to this topos according to his own 
                                                
265 Ibid. 
266 Cf. Götz Müller, “Jean Pauls Privatenzyklopädie. Eine Untersuchung der Exzerpte und Register aus Jean Pauls 
unveröffentlichtem Nachlaß,” in: Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur, ed. Wolfgang 
Frühwald et al., 11 (1986), 73–114, here: 75. 
267 Dembeck, Texte rahmen, 365. 
268 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 170. 
269 Menke, “‘Ein-Fälle’ – aus Exzerpten,” 295. 
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understanding of the word and not its objective meaning. For Jean Paul, ‘Maschine’ loses its ob-
jective realia and means for him primarily the simulation of life.270 From his untamed collections 
of excerpted material he produces not only outlandish metaphors, but also invents essential motifs 
– beyond those of satire – for his novels and takes inventory of them, such that semantic fields 
appear in places in the text like unruly and disordered clusters of synonyms.271 
 The narrator of Die Taschenbibliothek assigns himself the ethnological task of solving the 
“riddle” [Rätsel] of how the dancing pageant master Aubin acquired his enormous knowledge 
despite his dearth of memory and time. He comes to learn that Aubin is able to accomplish this 
extraordinary feat of reading without recollecting by employing a similar method of excerpting as 
the “real author” Jean Paul. Aubin describes his method to the narrator as follows: 
Bloß Exzerpten. Ich fing mir anfangs aus jedem Buche zwei, drei Sonderbarkeiten 
wie Schmetterlinge aus und machte sie durch Dinte in meinem Exzerptenbuche 
fest. Ich hob aus allen Wissenschaften meine Rekruten aus. Drei Zeilen Platz, mehr 
nicht, räumt’ ich jeder Merkwürdigkeit ein […] Oft besteht aller Geist, den ich mit 
meiner Kelter aus einem Buche bringe, in einem einzigen Tropfen. Diese Exzerpten 
zieh’ ich wie Riechwasser überall aus der Tasche, auf der Straße, im Vorzimmer, 
auf dem Tanzboden, und erquicke mich mit einigen Lebenstropfen. Wäre meine 
Gedächtnis noch schwächer: so las’ ich sie noch öfter.272 
                                                
270 For more on the significance of “Maschine” in Jean Paul, cf. Schmidt-Biggemann, Machine und Teufel. Jean Pauls 
Jugendsatiren nach ihrer Modellgeschichte (Freiburg i. B./Munich 1975), 107f, as well as Götz Müller, Jean Pauls 
Exzerpte (Würzburg 1988), “Nachwort,” 318–47, in particular 333f. There Müller shows how the excerpts located 
within the register article “Maschine” follow an extremely idiosyncratic associative logic that deviates entirely from 
the everyday meaning of the word “machine.” Müller notes how “[i]n zahlreichen Beispielen ist von der Belebung 
von Statuen die Rede” (ibid., 333), as well as how Jean Paul connections the topos “machine” to the “magische Seite 
des Umgangs mit Bildern” (ibid., 334), and furthermore “[w]o von Magie die Rede ist, ist die Alchemie nicht weit 
[…]” (ibid.). This associative chain from statues to magic to alchemy leads in turn to excerpts concerning the corpo-
reality of Christ as well as the non-corporeality of the divine existence of man (‘palingenesis’). Müller’s meticulous 
reconstruction of Jean Paul’s excerpting way of reading leads him to the following remarkable conclusion: “Warum 
hat Jean Paul diese theologischen Ansichten über den Körper unter dem Titel Maschine versammelt? Es gibt nur eine 
Erklärung, die dem Metapherngebrauch des 18. Jahrhunderts entspringt: er setzte schlechterdings Körper und Mas-
chine gleich. Wann immer er bei seiner Lektüre auf theologische Konstruktionen stieß, die die Bedeutung der gehaßten 
Körpermaschine zugunsten der Seele herabsetzten, vermerkte er sie in der Rubrik Maschine seines Registers. Christus 
konnte als Gottmensch schlechterdings nicht von der Körpermaschine abhängig sein. Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele 
war stets ein zentrales Thema Jean Pauls. Dieses vitale Erkenntnisinteresse spiegelt sich in der Überdehnung des 
Wortfelds ‘Maschine’” (ibid., 336f). 
271 For more on Jean Paul’s serial technique of arranging words into synonym clusters, see Mainberger, Die Kunst des 
Aufzählens, 144–46. 




For the dancing master Aubin, the pocket library – generated from his voluminous collection of 
excerpts – serves a principally mnemotechnic function. The small books filled with excerpts, 
which comprise his pocket library, can be used at any time to repeat what he has already read and 
thereby commit it again to memory. Yet the result of this practice is considerably different than 
what one might ordinarily understand as an excerpt, for Aubin has no interest whatsoever in a 
systematic collection and organization of knowledge. Rather, his technique of excerpting – like 
Jean Paul’s – “besteht in der radikalen Dekontextualisierung von Daten und in der Auflösung aller 
hierarchischen Strukturen des Wissens.”273 By ordering information not according to objective 
categories of knowledge, but subjective ones – the collection of “oddities” [Sonderbarkeiten] and 
“curiosities” [Merkwürdigkeiten], reminiscent of cabinets of curiosities (Wunderkammer), whose 
categorical boundaries were in a constant state of flux and permeability – Aubin repurposes a 
traditional scholarly technique for his own idiosyncratic ends. 
 Aubin’s description of his own technique of reading in excerpts, whereby that which is 
read becomes immediately written down – yet, crucially, without being further elaborated or turned 
into a work  of literature – foregrounds the relation between excerpts and the concept of life. By 
displacing and dispersing any original, objective meaning, his practice of excerpting basis itself 
on the continual deterritorialization of scholarly information, which allows for “oddities” in the 
form of idiosyncratic excerpted material to be transformed into ones own “Lebenstropfen.” Thus 
if the practice of recruiting “oddities like butterflies” [Sonderbarkeiten, wie Schmetterlingen] 
would lead to their fixation or “Festmachung” – a deadly stasis – then that which is already written 
down must become “zu einem flüchtigen Zwischen-Leben als ‘Sonderbarkeiten’ aufgescheucht 
                                                
273 Schmidt-Hannisa, “Lesarten,” 39. 
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[…], um abgelöst aus ihrem Kontext erneut in eine Fixiertheit überzugehen.”274 This tension be-
tween life and death – between endless proliferation and deadly stasis – hints at the idyllic dimen-
sion of Aubin’s excerpting practice in Die Taschenbibliothek, for it is precisely the oscillation 
between the artificial fixity of the constraints and the withdraw of any original point of reference 
that generates the effect of a “flüchtigen Zwischen-Leben.” 
 This tension between life and death, between proliferation and stasis, becomes all the more 
evident in the (christological) metaphor of the “winepress” [Kelter]. Aubin distills the ‘wine of 
knowledge’ in order to unburden the storage capacity of his mind: 
Die Hauptsache ist, daß ich Exzerpten aus meinen Exzerpten mache und den Spiri-
tus noch einmal abziehe. Einmal les’ ich sie z.B. bloß wegen des Artikels vom 
»Tanze« durch, ein anderes Mal bloß über Blumen, und trage dieses mit zwei Wor-
ten in kleinere Hefte oder Register und fülle so das Faß auf Flaschen.275 
 
The register, which represents “the excerpts from excerpts” and thereby the kernel of his system 
for managing the information contained in his pocket library, is the end-form of this distillation 
process.276 Yet the register does not yield a baroque form of knowledge, in the sense of inventio, 
which systematically organizes objective knowledge according to a well-ordered loci communes. 
Rather, it aims at discovery of the new and the novel through the witty-combinatorial juxtaposition 
of the most heterogeneous “excerpts from excerpts.” The repetition of this distillation process is, 
therefore, no longer characterized by a logic identity but of difference: from the fluidity of the 
spirit, the Geist, a “Spiritus” – Aubin’s vital “Lebenstropfen” – is distilled, which leads to drunk-
enness, intoxication and a permanent “disorder of things.” Aubin’s profession and choice of article, 
                                                
274 Menke, “‘Ein-Fälle – aus Exzerpten,” 292. 
275 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 772. 
276 As Thomas Schestag notes, this passage is prefigured in suggestive ways by other formulas which can be found in 
Jean Paul’s early writings: “‘Nach I. Exzerpten durch lesen zu[m] Exzerp[ieren]’ und ‘Extrakte aus den Exzerpten’ 
sind zwei unter zahllosen andern, ähnlich formulierten Wendungen, hier aus Jean Pauls Studier-Reglement (1795) 
exzerpiert. Sie führen in die cella seines Schreibens, das seinen Ursprung im Auszug aus Büchern hat. Ein irritierendes 
Denkmal setzt Jean Paul diesem Ursprung in der Gestalt des Pagentanzmeisters Aubin, seiner kleinen Schrift Die 
Taschenbibliothek (1795)” (Schestag, “Bibliographien für Jean Paul,” 505, note 16). 
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“Tanze,” is far from coincidental, for his method of excerpting – and reading in excerpts – bears 
little resemblance to the polyhistoric enterprise of Enlightenment scholars like Daniel Georg 
Morhof, who praised in De excerpiendi ratione the accumulation of knowledge as the basis for 
“new thoughts.”277 Rather, what the “pageant dancing master” [Pagentanzmeister] Aubin master-
fully stages with his pocket library is a performance of reading and writing, in which the citation 
– the excerpt – is uncoupled from its originary referent. His pirouettes of mnemonic inscription 
are not therefore mere pageantry, but rather constitute the operational procedures of the scribal 
page, der Page – the messenger or courier who quietly unfurls the pages of the pocket-library 
books upon the floor. 
  
                                                
277 Cf. Wolfgang Proß, Jean Pauls geschichtliche Stellung (Tübingen 1975), 172. 
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4. SCHOLARLY MACHINES OF FANTASY. MATERIALITY AND MEDIA 
TECHNOLOGY IN LEBEN DES QUINTUS FIXLEIN 
 
Und schon heute ist das Buch, wie die aktuelle wissenschaftliche Produktionsweise lehrt, 
eine veraltete Vermittlung zwischen zwei verschiedenen Katalogsystemen. Denn alles 
Wesentliche findet sich im Zettelkasten des Forschers, der’s verfasste, und der Gelehrte, 
der darin studiert, assimiliert es seiner eigenen Kartothek.278 
 
—Walter Benjamin, Einbahnstraße 
 
Als Ergebnis längerer Arbeit mit dieser [Zettelkasten-]Technik entsteht eine Art Zweitge-
dächtnis, ein Alter ego, mit dem man laufend kommunizieren kann. Es weist, darin dem 
eigenen Gedächtnis ähnlich, keine durchkonstruierte Gesamtordnung auf, auch keine Hie-
rarchie und erst recht keine lineare Struktur wie ein Buch. Eben dadurch gewinnt es ein 
von seinem Autor unabhängiges Eigenleben. Die Gesamtheit der Notizen läßt sich nur als 
Unordnung beschreiben, immerhin aber als Unordnung mit nicht-beliebiger interner Struk-
tur.279 
 
—Niklas Luhmann, Universität als Milieu 
 
The next chapter of the dissertation examines the relationship between life and writing in Jean 
Paul’s other famous “kind of idyll,” Leben des Quintus Fixlein, aus fünfzehn Zettelkästen gezogen; 
nebst einem Mustheil und einigen Jus de tablette (1796/1801). The central narrative of the book 
recounts the tale of a pedagogue and parson from Leipzig by the name of Quintus Zebedäus Egi-
dius Fixlein, whose obsession with his own demise can only healed by the novel’s eponymous 
narrator “Jean Paul” through the “elementary principles of the Science of Happiness” [Elementar-
kenntnisse der Glückseligkeitslehre]. Jean Paul’s second idyll, which he published just three years 
after Schulmeisterlein Wutz, shares much in common with its predecessor. Both works narrate the 
life stories of minor scholars whose lives revolve around nothing but the collection and production 
                                                
278 Walter Benjamin, Einbahnstraße, in: Gesammelte Schriften, vol. IV, 1 (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1972), 84–148, 
here: 103. 
279 Niklas Luhmann, “Kommunikation mit Zettelkästen,” in: Universität als Milieu. Kleine Schriften, eds. Niklas Luh-
mann and André Kieserling (Bielefeld: Haux, 1992), 57f. 
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of text. In Leben des Quintus Fixlein, the protagonist Fixlein finds pleasure above all in the col-
lection of seemingly trivial and insignificant ephemera and collectanea. Moreover, just like Wutz, 
he is just as much constrained by his surroundings in the village of Hukelum as he is by his unu-
sually static development and unreflective character; hence even his surname, meaning literally 
“little fixer,” alludes to the psychological notion of the idée fixe, which the novel’s preface links 
to the genre poetics of the modern idyll: “jede fixe Idee, die jedes Genie und jeden Enthusiasten 
wenigstens periodisch regiert, scheidet den Menschen erhaben von Tisch und Bett der Erde, von 
ihren Hundsfotten und Stechdornen und Teufelsmauern – gleich dem Paradiesvogel schläft er 
fliegend, und auf den ausgebreiteten Flügeln verschlummert er blind in seiner Höhe die untern 
Erdstöße und Brandungen des Lebens im langen schönen Traume von seinem idealischen Mutter-
land […].”280 
 As Friedrich Kittler argues in Discourse Networks 1800/1900, the concept of the idée fixe 
was the “sole form of unreason to be accorded the rank of poetic dignity” around 1800, one which 
served as the privileged connection between genius aesthetics and the new human sciences, in 
particular that of empirical psychology, with its myriad theories and diagnoses of forms of madness 
and unreason.281 According to Kittler, it is for this reason not at all a coincidence that the quintes-
sential embodiment of the writer who cultivates the idée fixe in miniature would thus be named 
“Fixlein.”282 Yet Fixlein does not present a classic case of poetic madness à la Hölderlin or the 
                                                
280 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 11. 
281 “The new human sciences, with their medico-psychological investigations of insanity, discovered around 1800 
among the countless manifestations of unreason a distinguished form that revealed the very nature of unreason. This 
was the idée fixe […] the fixed idea moved into the center of nosological categories, etiological explanations, and 
psychic cures, which were directed above all toward distract. But most importantly the fixed idea became the sole 
form of unreason to be accorded the rank of poetic dignity” (Friedrich A. Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, 
trans. Michael Metteer [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990], 110). 
282 Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, 110. 
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various figures of madness which populate the ‘dark romantic’ novellas of E.T.A. Hoffmann. Ra-
ther, Fixlein’s “fixed idea” consists in the belief that he, like his father and ancestors before him, 
will suddenly die at the young age of thirty-two. His recovery from madness, aided by the “philo-
sophical physician” Jean Paul, who serves as both the novel’s narrator as well as a fictional char-
acter within the text, lies not so much in being cured of his delusion and coming to terms with 
reality as it does in the ability to return to a uniquely naive, childlike mode of being – to an “inner 
world” of fantastic idealization and prelapsarian possibility far removed from the sufferings and 
anxieties of the real one. 
 By presenting an imaginary world that is nonetheless shot through with the traumatic real-
ity of pain, suffering, and death, Leben des Quintus Fixlein appears on the one hand to satisfy Jean 
Paul’s elusive criteria of the idyll as the “epic representation of full pleasure in limitation.” On the 
other hand, by pathologizing the imagination as both illness and cure, revealing its potentially 
perilous consequences when taken to excess, Quintus Fixlein goes one step further than Schul-
meisterlein Wutz. In Wutz, the imagination is depicted as a harmonizing force capable of transport-
ing its protagonist from the reality of death and mortality to the “golden arcadia” of childhood 
fantasies – the topos of the idyll. In contrast to Wutz, Fixlein’s madness is shown to exceed even 
the limits of the mind, leading to immediate and deadly affects on the physical body. Hence, it is 
not the ailing body which is to be cured, but rather the mind as the source of psychic delusion: 
paradoxically, then, it is only by substituting one “fancy” [Einbildung] for another – the irrational 
fear of death for the belief that he is an eight-year-old child – that Fixlein can be cured of his 
imaginary illness. 
 Analogous to Kant’s transcendental critique of pure reason by means of pure reason alone, 
Jean Paul’s ‘modern idyll’ likewise demonstrates in narrative form how the imagination must be 
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turned against itself as the cure for its own excesses. By showing how the imagination can be 
transformed from a potentially deadly source of unreason into a philosophical remedy for the very 
madness which it itself engenders, the novel presents itself as a quasi-pedagogical exercise in in-
structing the reader how to attain a kind of happiness through fantasy, yet without succumbing to 
poetic madness.283 Fixlein might therefore be read an exemplary idyllic hero, for just like Wutz 
his happiness derives from his ability to negotiate the tension between the dream-like world of 
idyllic reverie and the ever-present possibility of death. From this perspective, the novel’s first 
preface, entitled “Billet an meine Freunde anstatt der Vorrede,” sketches out the program of the 
modern idyll in the form of three maxims or “paths” [Wege] by which humans may be said to 
achieve a happier – though not a happy – life. The first path, according to the narrator, “[geht] in 
die Höhe […] so weit über das Gewölke des Lebens hinauszudringen, daß man die ganze äußere 
Welt mit ihren Wolfsgruben, Beinhäusern und Gewitterableitern von weitem unter seinen Füßen 
nur wie ein eingeschrumpftes Kindergärtchen liegen sieht.”284 
 This first “skyward track” [Himmelfahrt] may thus be said to present an epic perspective 
without limits. That is, by ascending to the highest, most sublime heights of idyllic fantasy, it 
furnishes an image of an imaginary world that is completely disconnected from the real one, with 
its myriad “wolf dens, bee houses and lightning rods,” as Jean Paul writes, and in doing so flirts 
with poetic madness. This first path, however, is meant only for the smallest, most diminutive 
figures – those like Wutz and Fixlein: “Diese Himmelfahrt ist aber nur für den geflügelten Teil des 
                                                
283 For more on Jean Paul’s relationship to the discourse of psychology as well as his embrace of the Stoic ideal of ars 
semper gaudendi in Leben des Quintus Fixlein, cf. Götz Müller, Jean Pauls Ästhetik und Naturphilosophie (Niemeyer, 
1983), in particular 203–17; Jörg Kreienbrock, Malicious Objects, in particular 84–95. 
284 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 10. 
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Menschengeschlechts, für den kleinsten.”285 By elevating the perspective of the (small, diminu-
tive) observer to the sublime heights of the divine ‘bird’s eye view’ – “above the clouds of life” – 
everything in comparison appears infinitely small. 
 The second path, in contrast, proceeds in the opposite direction, namely by demeaning the 
large and grandiose and by elevating, in turn, the small, microscopic, and detailed; as the narrator 
writes, this path entails “ein zusammengesetztes Mikroskop zu nehmen und damit zu ersehen, daß 
ihr Tropfe Burgunder eigentlich ein rotes Meer, der Schmetterlingsstaub Pfauengefieder, der 
Schimmel ein blühendes Feld und der Sand ein Juwelenhaufe ist. Diese mikroskopischen Belust-
igungen sind dauerhafter als alle teuern Brunnenbelustigungen….”286 Here the reference to the 
composite microscope [zusammengesetztes Mikroskop] opens up the reading of the novel as an 
experimental site, or Versuchsanordnung, in which the infinitely small presents itself in the mode 
of the sublime. The microscope, as an epistemic figure of observation and perception, deforms 
reality in that what one sees through its lens no longer bears a mimetic resemblance to what one 
sees with the naked eye. The second path thereby completely transforms the representation of 
reality. From the microscopic perspective of the second path, everyday objects such as “drops of 
burgundy,” once placed under the lens of the microscope, suddenly appear defamiliarized as the 
sublime image of the “red sea,” or in the case of “butterfly dust” as “peacock feathers,” or of 
“mold” as a “blooming field.” As in Jean Paul’s formula for “wit” [Witz], the poetic machinery of 
inventio, which he tasks with scouting out “distant similarities”287 [entfernte Ähnlichkeiten] be-
tween heterogeneous objects, such “microscopic amusements” [mikroskopischen Belustigungen] 
                                                
285 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 11 
286 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 11. 
287 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 169. 
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yield new and unexpected meanings by juxtaposing the infinitely big and the infinitely small, the 
macrocosmos and the microcosmos.288 
 In the context of Fixlein’s biography, his fortunate promotion from “Quintus,” the fifth 
teacher at a school, to the vice-principal [Konrektor] and finally to the pastor of his hometown of 
Hukelum; his fortunate betrothal and marriage to a woman of nobility; his fortunate fate as the 
protagonist of his own life-story, which thousands of readers will eventually own – all of these 
improbable fortunes make Fixlein, for Jean Paul, not into the “Auszug,” an out-dated term for the 
lowest-level lottery winner, but rather into the “Quinterne,” the jacket pot.289 Thus from the second 
perspective of idyllic representation, the narrator advices the reader, “daß man kleine sinnliche 
Freuden höher achten müsse als große, den Schlafrock höher als den Bratenrock, daß man Plutos 
Quinterne seinen Auszügen nachstehen lassen müsse.”290 In this way, one can magnify trivial, “mi-
croscopic” fortunes and turn them from “Auszügen” into “Quinterne.” 
 It is from this perspective that the narrator exhorts the reader not to dwell upon the minor 
vexations and annoyances of everyday life, but instead to derive pleasure from them. The novel’s 
                                                
288 As Dembeck argues, Jean Paul’s appreciation for the ‘micrological’ implies an attempt to endow the missing mid-
dle term in his comparisons with a new meaning: “Die Wertschätzung des Mikrologischen impliziert vielmehr auch, 
daß der verlorene ‘Nexus’ konkret als Grundlage einer neuen Sinnstiftung angesehen werden kann. Die ‘überfließende 
Darstellung’ manifestiert sich insbesondere in der Unterbrechung bereits gegebener Zusammenhänge, die aber alter-
native Verbindungsmöglichkeiten aufdecken soll. Ganz konkret sollen diese Unterbrechungen bzw. die heterogenen 
Zusammenstellungen, die sich aus ihnen ergeben, ernstgenommen und zum Ausgangspunkt einer Lektüre gemacht 
werden, die, wie in den ‘occasional meditations,’ gerade die zufällige Konstellation zum Mittel der (wenn auch immer 
nur vorläufigen) Vergewisserung über die Einheit der Welt nutzt – wenn auch auf einem gänzlich anderen Weg, näm-
lich auf dem des Witzes” (Dembeck, Texte rahmen, 359). 
289 According to the commentary to the text, the prize categories of the ancient lottery were as follows: “Auszug, 
Ambe, Terne, Quaterne und Quinterne, den eigentlichen Haupttreffer” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 1142). In Hesperus, the 
term “Ehelotto” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 530) is also mentioned; there the jack pot, or “Quinterne,” is described as a 
“wahre[r] Engel” (ibid.), while the author is characterized as a “dummer Auszug, ein Ambe” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 
531). In Leben des Quintus Fixlein, the text repeatedly plays with the etymologically-related words Quintur, 
Quinterne, and Quintaner; see, for instance, Jean Paul, Werke,  I/4, 141 and 185. The paronomastic allusion to 
“Auszug” in the double sense of “excerpt” is also not without poetological significance for the reading of the text, and 
the connection it establishes between excerpting and chance is discussed at numerous points in this chapter. 
290 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 12. 
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elevation of the “microscopic” and “micrological” to a therapeutic mode of being-in-the-world – 
to “biographical amusements”291 [biographische Belustigungen] as Jean Paul titled another one of 
his biographical works – is reflected in the narrator’s maxim, espoused in a later passage in the 
text, that “[m]an muß dem bürgerlichen Leben und seinen Mikrologien, wofür der Pfarrer einen 
angebornen Geschmack hat, einen künstlichen abgewinnen, indem man es liebt, ohne es zu achten, 
indem man dasselbe, so tief es auch unter dem menschlichen stehe, doch als eine andere Verästlung 
des menschlichen so poetisch genießet, als man bei dessen Darstellungen in Romanen tut.”292 In 
other words, coping with the vexations of everyday life not only involves transforming reality into 
fiction, but also the privileging of “civic life and its micrologies.” Micrology, “die Lehre von den 
kleinen Dingen, die mit der Erfindung des Mikroskops ihre wissenschaftliche Nobilitieren erfahren 
hat,”293 lends the small its own aesthetic dignity; for from the perspective of the mundane and 
everyday, nothing can be too small or trivial, since everything, as Jean Paul writes, is considered 
a “twig” [Verästlung] of the human. 
 Jean Paul’s maxims for achieving a happier life are not exhausted, however, by the first 
and second paths. To those he adds a third and final “skyward track”: “Der dritte Himmelsweg,” 
he writes, “ist der Wechsel mit dem ersten und zweiten.”294 Though not yet formulated in the pro-
grammatic manner in which he presents it in the Vorschule der Ästhetik, Jean Paul’s formula for 
the third path in the “Billet an meine Freunde” bears a close resemblance to the concept of humor, 
his technique for contrasting between (bodily-sensual) finitude and the infinite (sublime-spiritual) 
idea. Leben des Quintus Fixlein thus marks a significant revision to his poetics of the idyll. Humor, 
                                                
291 Cf. Jean Paul, Jean Pauls biographische Belustigungen; unter der Gehirnschale einer Riesin. Eine Geisterges-
chichte, in: Werke, I/4, 261–408. 
292 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 185. 
293 Marianne Schuller, Mikrologien: Literarische und philosophische Figuren des Kleinen (Bielefeld 2003), 6. 
294 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 12. 
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as the “third path” of idyllic representation, entails the connection of both narrative perspectives 
through perpetual alternation [Wechsel] and perspectivization. Far from being a steady, progres-
sive path, humor proceeds through a series of endless detours and digressions, thereby deforming 
the narrative logic of chronological biographical narrative. The “crooked line of humor” [krumme 
Linie des Humors], as Jean Paul refers to it in the preface, is askew and oblique, just like the lives 
of his numerous off-kilter protagonists.295 
 More specifically, the introduction of the concept of humor into the framework of the idyll 
splits the narrative structure in two: while the ostensible “main” narrative consists of the idyllic 
biography of Quintus Fixlein, narrating his sufferings and eventual recovery from madness and 
death, the second narrative is told from the perspective of the narrator and fictional author-instance 
“Jean Paul” who collects the (para-)textual material from Fixlein’s fifteen “slip boxes” [Zet-
telkästen], in which the latter is said to have recorded all his childhood memories, in order to 
transform them into poetic fiction. As Till Dembeck argues, “[d]amit rücken auch die (Para-
)Textsammlungen der idyllischen Charaktere in eine neue Perspektive. Im ‘Quintus Fixlein’ gibt 
es auf der Ebene der Erzählfiktion eine Verstrickung des Erzählens in eine der Sammeltätigkeiten 
Fixleins, der sich der vorliegende Text selbst verdankt” – namely, as Dembeck goes on to write, 
the poetological motif of the slip box.296 With the introduction of this second narrative reality in 
the form of the slip box motif, humor acts as a framing device which in the end completely desta-
                                                
295 In the second preface to Leben des Quintus Fixlein, entitled “Geschichte meiner Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage des 
Quintus Fixlein,” Jean Paul explicitly invokes the concept of humor using the geometric metaphor of the crooked line: 
“[…] ferner daß die krumme Linie des Humors zwar schwerer zu rektifizieren sei, daß er aber nichts Regelloses und 
Willkürliches vornehme, weil er sonst niemand ergötzen könnte als seinen Inhaber - daß er mit dem Tragischen die 
Form und die Kunstgriffe, obwohl nicht die Materie teile - daß der Humor (nämlich der ästhetische, der vom prakti-
schen so verschieden und zertrennlich ist wie jede Darstellung von ihrer dargestellten oder darstellenden Empfindung) 
nur die Frucht einer langen Vernunft-Kultur sei und daß er mit dem Alter der Welt so wie mit dem Alter eines Indivi-
duums wachsen müsse” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 27). 
296 Dembeck, Texte rahmen, 355. 
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bilizes the coherence of the biographical narrative by revealing at the material level the contin-
gency of the novel’s production from the myriad slip boxes, fragments, and other miscellaneous 
scraps of paper from which it was (fictionally) assembled. 
 Thus in contrast to Schulmeisterlein Wutz, in which the motif of text collection is confined 
to the level of narrative fiction, Leben des Quintus Fixlein no longer narrates the straightforward 
story of an idyllic protagonist, but instead stages the very emergence of the biography itself – 
namely the narrative text inserted into the book, entitled “Des Quintus Fixlein Leben bis auf unsere 
Zeiten; in fünfzehn Zettelkästen” – from the fragmentary constellation of pre-existing autobio-
graphical writings. As will be argued throughout the following pages, the novel’s numerous refer-
ences to the “slip box” system are therefore not only of poetological but also epistemological sig-
nificance with respect to the discursive form of the book. In contrast to the medial constraints of 
the book as a closed and bound form of text production, the slip box system presents a technique 
of storing written information that ultimately leads to a contingent conception of narrative order 
and to a serialization of text that is no longer coupled to the rhetorical function of memoria or to 
the mimetic representation of life. From the perspective of humor, life is not conceived as some-
thing which is (re)presented as pre-given, but is rather first and foremost presented – that is, pro-
duced – as a metaleptic effect of the technics of writing. This “humorous” conception of life as a 
material effect of writing stands in sharp contrast, as will be shown, to the contemporaneous ide-
alist tradition – and in particular that of Hegel, who made use of the slip box system in his own 
writing process – which sought to conceal the medial-technological preconditions of its represen-
tation of “spirit” as a living form. 
 
4.1. Drafting – Collecting – Pulping: Fixlein’s “Sudelbibliothek” 
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Leben des Quintus Fixlein narrates the life story of a “kind of” scholar whose life revolves around 
nothing but the collection and production of texts. Like the poor little schoolmaster Maria Wutz, 
Quintus Fixlein can only afford the catalogue of books rather than the books themselves. The point 
of departure for Fixlein’s encyclopedic writing project is thus the massive library of secondary 
texts of the Gelehrtenrepublik, the modern Republic of Letters – that is, books about books – such 
as the “Literaturzeitung”297 and “den Meßkatalog, den er jährlich statt der Bücher desselben 
kaufte.”298 Yet whereas Wutz undertakes the impossible hermeneutic task of reproducing by hand 
an entire pocket library of books based solely on the titles of previously published works, the 
original copies of which he is far too impoverished to afford, Fixlein specializes in the pleasure of 
producing new texts which no one has yet to write or in all likelihood ever will write: “wahrlich, 
wenn ich Xerxes einen Preis auf die Erfindung eines neuen Vergnügens aussetzte: so hatte der, der 
nur über die Preisfrage seine Gedanken niederschrieb, das neue Vergnügen schon wirklich auf der 
Zunge.”299 
 More specifically, Fixlein’s literary endeavor entails not the the writing of completed 
works or books, but fragments and small forms. For him, the full pleasure of writing consists in 
spontaneously jotting down his thoughts and ideas onto paper without further reflection or devel-
opment: “Am liebsten gebar er Entwürfe zu Büchern.”300 Fixlein finds pleasure not in the writing 
of the books themselves, but in the production of the “drafts” or “sketches” [Entwürfe] to books. 
He is not so much a writer as a “drafter” or “outliner,” whose collected works consists entirely of 
“small little works” [kleine Werklein]. As the narrator concurs apropos Fixlein’s production of 
                                                
297 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 71. 
298 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 89. 
299 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 81. 
300 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 82f. 
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drafts, “[i]ch kenne nur eine Sache, die süßer ist, als ein Buch zu machen, nämlich eines zu ent-
werfen. Fixlein schrieb kleine Werklein von 1/12 Alphabet, die er im Manuskript, vom Buchbinder 
in goldne Flügeldecken geschnürt und auf dem Rücken mit gedruckten Lettern betitelt, in die lite-
rarische Stufensammlung seines Bücherbrettes mit einstellte.”301 The draft constitutes a micro-
scopic form of writing, limited to just a few pages in length, that is grounded in the pleasure of 
free association.302 In contrast to the medial closure of the book, the draft remains tentative and 
open as unbounded sheets of paper, thereby encouraging writing that unfolds according to a serial 
and metonymic, rather than sequential and linear, rhythm. In this respect, the epistemology of the 
draft recalls what Ernst Mach termed, with respect to the conditional status of scientific hypothe-
ses, the “thought experiment” [Gedankenexperiment], a form of free association that foregrounds 
the process of thinking and the emergence and development of ideas.303 Writing in drafts, as 
Fixlein does, arguably goes one step further: it transforms the physical space of the material paper 
into an experimental space for the production of ever new thoughts and ideas, yet without conceiv-
ing of the draft as the groundwork for or precursor to a future “completed” work. For Fixlein, the 
point of writing is the draft itself.304 
                                                
301 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 81. 
302 Cf. Fleming, Pleasures of Abandonment, 62. As Fleming remarks in a lengthy footnote on this passage, Grimm’s 
Wörterbuch defines an “Alphabet” as consisting of twenty-three sheets of paper, which means that Fixlein’s collection 
of books contains as many front and back covers as it does pages of content. Cf. “Alphabet,” Grimm- Wörterbuch, 
accessed 25 Nov. 2015, <http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemma=alphabet>. 
303 “Der Projektenmacher, der Erbauer von Luftschlössern, der Dichter socialer oder technischer Utopien experimen-
tiert in Gedanken. Aber auch der solide Kaufmann, der ernste Erfinder oder Forscher thut dasselbe. Alle stellen sich 
Umstände vor, und knüpfen an diese die Vorstellung, Erwartung, Vermutung gewisser Folgen, sie machen eine Ge-
dankenerfahrung” (Ernst Mach: “Über Gedankenexperimente,” in: Zeitschrift für den Physikalischen und Chemischen 
Unterricht 10 (1897), Nr. 1, 1). For more on the concept of the thought experiment and its relation to literature, science, 
and the arts, see Sigrid Weigel, “Das Gedankenexperiment: Nagelprobe auf die facultas fingendi in Wissenschaft und 
Literatur,” in: Science & Fiction: über Gedankenexperimente in Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Literatur (Frankfurt 
a. M.: Fischer, 2004), 183–205. 
304 For more on the epistemology of writing in drafts, cf. Karin Krauthausen and Omar W. Nasim (eds.), Notieren, 
Skizzieren. Schreiben und Zeichnen als Verfahren des Entwurfs (Zürich: diaphenes, 2010), in particular 7–26. 
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 As the text makes clear, Fixlein’s writing process quite literally gets itself entangled in the 
“body” and “soul” of books by incorporating the body and soul of the writer into the act of writing: 
“Der freudige Narr hatte unter dem Schreiben den Kopf geschaukelt, die Hände gerieben, mit dem 
Steiße gehüpfet, das Gesicht gebohnt und an dem Zopfe gesogen.”305 With Fixlein’s constant 
“head wagging,” “hand rubbing,” “jumping around on his bottom,” “face stroking,” and “braid 
sucking,” the scene of writing is depicted as one of lively gesture and mimicry. Fixlein’s writing 
process, to quote Rüdiger Campe, presents itself in the form of “ein nicht-stabiles Ensemble von 
Sprache, Instrumentalität und Geste.”306 That is, far from being a purely intellectual affair, the 
writing of drafts is an extremely bodily one, for which the inscription of thoughts onto draft paper 
cannot be divorced from the corporeality of the gesture of writing. Writing in drafts is therefore 
indeed a kind of maieutics – that is, a process of “giving birth” [gebären] to new thoughts and ideas 
–, yet one which emphasizes the irreducibly somatic, rather than eidetic, side of the writing pro-
cess. For Fixlein, thoughts cannot but be marked by the physical birth pangs of having first brought 
them to life through the labor of writing. 
 Fixlein’s talent thus lies not so much in the art of narration as it does in the art of collection. 
For him, there are no strict rules or criteria for what constitutes a collection; all that counts is what 
can be counted [gezählt] or enumerated [aufgezählt], rather than what what can be recounted or 
narrated [erzählt]. His collections take the form of absurd lists and miscellaneous collectanea, 
which, by abandoning conventional criteria for organizing information, can be virtually infinite, 
                                                
305 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 89. 
306 For more on the concept of the scene of writing, cf. Rüdiger Campe, “Die Schreibszene, Schreiben,” in: Parado-
xien, Dissonanzen, Zusammenbrüche. Situationen offener Epistemologie, eds. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and K. Ludwig 
Pfeiffer (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1991), 759–72. 
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without a fixed number [Zahl] or end-point.307 As a writer who privileges lists and list-making as 
productive forms of writing, Fixlein confines himself in his drafts to one particular genre above all 
others, namely that of advising scholars, “was sie zu schreiben hätten in der Gelehrtengeschichte,” 
und suggests for orientation in the search for new ideas lists of works which address all possible 
themes: Hommel’s “index” [Register] “von Juristen […], die Hurenkinder gewesen,” Bernhard’s 
index “von Gelehrten, deren Fata und Lebenslauf im Mutterleibe erheblich waren,” Bailet’s regis-
ter of scholars “die etwas hatten schreiben wollen,” Ancillon’s list of those “die gar nichts ge-
schrieben,” as well as the Lübeck superintendent Götze’s index of scholars “die Schuster waren, 
die, die ersoffen usw.”308 Through the enumeration of Fixlein’s seemingly incoherent and absurd 
lists, Jean Paul satirizes both the proliferation of marginal secondary texts in the Republic of Let-
ters, as well as the insignificant scholars-cum-bureaucrats around 1800, such as those who merely 
“wanted to write something,” or those who were said to have “written nothing” – thus putting into 
question their status as scholars. 
 Fixlein’s lists thereby reveal their subversive potential with respect to the “discourse net-
work” around 1800. In the above passage – itself a collection or series of absurd things – Fixlein 
organizes scholars into distinctly “unscholarly” lists, such as those who were born as “bastards” 
[Hurenkinder] or those for whom “Fata und Lebenslauf im Mutterleibe erheblich waren.” Here 
and elsewhere the text subtly links the conditions of birth to the semantics of scholarly text-pro-
duction; for just as Fixlein is said to have “given birth to drafts” [gebar Entwürfe], the passage 
plays on the word “Lebenslauf” to refer to both gestation in the womb and to a curriculum vitae. 
                                                
307 In her study on the poetics of enumeration, Die Kunst des Aufzählens, Sabine Mainberger persuasively argues that 
the possibilities of arranging series or lists are potentially endless. Cf. Sabine Mainberger, Die Kunst des Aufzählens. 
Elemente einer Poetik des Enumerativen (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 2003). See also: Jack Goody, “What’s in a 
list?,” in: The Domestication of the Savage Mind (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 74–111. 
308 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 82f. 
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Furthermore, the close proximity in the above passage between the words “bastard” [Hurenkinder] 
and “cobbler” [Schuster] suggests an allusion to the technical language of the printing press. In the 
context of modern typesetting practices, these terms refer to the phenomena of “widowed lines” 
[Hurenkinder] and “orphans” [Schusterjunge], the lines at the beginning or end of a paragraph that 
are left dangling at the top or bottom of a column. Like the aesthetically unpleasing effects of 
modern book-printing, which occasionally disturbed the linear flow of reading by relegating the 
first or last lines of a paragraph to the preceding or following page, the passage likens the scholar 
to a kind of typographic Missgeburt – to a “monstrosity” or “abortion” of writing. This satirical 
conception of the scholar as typo starkly diverges from the optimistic portrayal of the scholar pre-
sented by Fichte in Über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, in which Fichte identifies the scholar as 
the model of the fully-formed, educated individual. For Jean Paul/Fixlein, in contrast, only the 
scholars who’ve produced nothing – those whose names have been figuratively “orphaned,” that 
is, deformed and displaced – are the ones worth counting, since their existence is no different than 
that of stray or surplus text. 
 In the end, Fixlein, as another insignificant writer-bureaucrat around 1800, remains quite 
similar to schoolmaster Wutz; rather than seeking to create entirely new works from scratch, it 
turns out that he, too, occupies himself primarily with the texts of others. For the novelty of his 
(incomplete) scholarly project builds upon the vast collection of what has already been written, 
namely upon secondary works which are considered to be the epitome of outdated and function-
less. This is revealed by Fixlein’s other major scholarly passion: the accumulation of miscellane-
ous collectanea and typographic errata. According to the narrator, Fixlein “arbeitete […] an einer 
Sammlung der Druckfehler in deutschen Schriften; er verglich die Errata untereinander, zeigte, 
welche am meisten vorkämen, bemerkte, daß daraus wichtige Resultate zu ziehen wären, und riet 
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dem Leser, sie zu ziehen.”309 In addition to these “microscopic amusements,” Fixlein’s carni-
valesque collection also reflects a microcosm of the scholarly world around 1800, replete with 
literary annuals and miscellanies, secondary scholarly writings, a well as book-trade material such 
as pocket calendars, advertisements, and alphabetic lexicons of German praenumerations: “Auch 
sammelte der Quintus vieles: er hatte eine schöne Kalender- und Katechismus- und Sedezbücher-
sammlung – auch eine Sammlung von Avertissements, die er angefangen, ist nicht so unvollstän-
dig, als man sie meistens antrifft. Er schätzet sehr sein alphabetisches Lexikon von deutschen Bü-
cherpränumeranten […].”310 
 As a collector of the insignificant scholarly texts produced by the Republic of Letters, 
Fixlein demonstrates a particular obsession with the alphabet, which he perceives as a kind of 
contingent combinatory of printed letters – that is, as materially-embodied signs – rather than as a 
logical series whose sensual elements compose individual words and imbue them in turn with 
meaning. While this tension between the “spirit” and the “letter” of words – between the produc-
tion of (transcendental) meaning and the unveiling of their material contingency in print – is even 
more fully realized in a radical way in Jean Paul’s Leben Fibels, in Quintus Fixlein it nonetheless 
comes to inform Fixlein’s peculiar practice of reading, which foregrounds the materiality of writ-
ing through the comparative analysis of letters. Instead of adopting the dominant hermeneutic ap-
proach around 1800, which instructed readers to decipher the underlying meaning of texts in a 
coherent, systematic fashion, Fixlein proceeds according to statistical methods of reading based 
on quantity, average, and frequency. This statistical approach manifests itself in his philological 
exegesis of the German Masorethen: 
                                                
309 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 81. 
310 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 82. According to the Lexikon des gesamten Buchwesens, praenumeration was an early form 
of book subscription service in the 18th century. Cf. Severin Corsten, “Praenumeration,” in: Lexikon des gesamten 
Buchwesens, vol. 6 (Stuttgart: Verlag Anton Hiersemann, 1991), 81. 
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Ferner trat er unter den deutschen Masorethen auf. Er bemerkte ganz richtig in der 
Vorrede: »Die Juden hätten ihre Masora aufzuweisen, die ihnen sagte, wie oft jeder 
Buchstabe in ihrer Bibel vorkomme, z.B. das Aleph (das A) 43277mal – wie viel 
Verse darin stehen, wo alle Konsonanten auftreten (26 Verse sinds) – oder nur acht-
zig (3 sinds) – wie viele Verse man habe, worin gar 42 Wörter und 160 Konsonan-
ten erscheinen (nur einer ist da, Jerem. XXI. 7) – welches der mittelste Buchstabe 
in einzelnen Büchern sei (im Pentateuch 3. B. Mos. XI. 42 ists [footnote – B.K.] 
das adelige V) oder gar in der ganzen Bibel. – Wo haben aber wir Christen einen 
ähnlichen Masorethen für Luthers Bibel aufzuzeigen? Ist es genau untersucht, wel-
ches in ihr das mittelste Wort oder der mittelste Buchstabe sei, welcher Vokal am 
wenigsten vorkomme, und wie oft jeder? – Tausend Bibelfreunde gehen aus der 
Welt, ohne zu erfahren, daß das deutsche A 323015mal (also über 7mal öfter als 
das hebräische) in ihrer Bibel stehe.« –311 
 
Here the “double perspective”312 of humor presents itself as an effect of reading which transforms 
the micrological into the sublime – in this case, with specific reference to the alphabet. The Holy 
Scripture, the Lutheran Bible, is no exception, since for Fixlein – and especially, as will be seen, 
for Fibel – what counts as sublime lies precisely in the microscopic literality of the text, that is, in 
the alphabet as the raw material of writing. It is hardly a coincidence in this regard that in the 
Vorschule der Ästhetik Jean Paul explicitly cites Luther in his description of humor’s technique of 
double perspectivization: “Wie Luther im schlimmen Sinn unsern Willen eine lex inversa nennt: 
so ist es der Humor im guten; und seine Höllenfahrt bahnet ihm die Himmelfahrt.”313 Just as Luther 
called the human will a “lex inversa” in a negative sense, Jean Paul’s humor is a “lex inversa” in 
a good sense: its descent into hell paves its way for an ascent to heaven. This reversal of the “old 
theology” [alte Theologie] reveals the poetological strategy of inversion at work in Jean Paul’s 
humor, not only between good and bad or the infinite and finite, but also between spirit (as sublime 
                                                
311 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 81f. 
312 Dembeck, Texte rahmen, 355. 
313 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 129. For more on the poetological significance of Jean Paul’s references to Luther with 
respect to his concept of humor, cf. Hans Esselborn, “Luther in Jean Pauls Werk,” in: Martin Luther. Images, Appro-
priations, Relectures, ed. Monique Samuel-Scheyder (Nancy 1995), 257–73. 
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idea) and letter (as finite/material content). In doing so, humor attributes the significance or mean-
ing of the Bible, as the “book of books,” not to the “divine word” or logos of God, but rather to a 
marginal (paratextual) secondary text, that is, to the masora, the scholarly marginalia composed 
by rabbinic scholars as explanatory addenda to the Bible. As a result, it is the contingent repetition 
of letters, words, and phrases – in other words, letter and number, rather than idea or meaning – 
that become the decisive elements in the exegesis of the text. 
 As the elementary basis of all writing, the alphabet is for Fixlein just as crucial as the raw 
material upon which and with which text is written. On the days on which he is said to write 
nothing, he therefore dedicates himself to “Abc-Schützen” at a nearby school. It is in this context 
that he announces to his guests and the fictional biographer “Jean Paul,” among others, a new 
“clerical script” [Kanzleischrift] which he himself has invented and whose individual letters he 
has engraved onto copperplates in order to encourage their adoption by the Prussian bureaucracy: 
Er war so glücklich gewesen, herauszubringen, daß aus einem Zuge, der einem um-
gekehrten lateinischen S gleichsieht, alle Anfangsbuchstaben der Kanzleischrift so 
schön und so verschlungen, als sie in Lehr- und Adelsbriefen stehen, herauszuspin-
nen sind. »Bis sie sechzig zählen,« sagt er zu mir, »hab ich aus meinem Stammzuge 
einen Buchstaben gemacht.« Ich kehrte es bloß um und zählte so lange sechzig, bis 
er ihn hin hatte. Diese Schönheitslinie, in alle Buchstaben verzogen, will er durch 
Kupferplatten, die er selber sticht, für die Kanzleien gemeiner machen, und ich darf 
dem russischen, dem preußischen Hofe und auch einigen kleinern in seinem Namen 
Hoffnung zu den ersten Abdrücken machen: für expedierende Sekretäre sind sie 
unentbehrlich.314 
 
From the “umgekehrten lateinischen S” – what the narrator refers to as the “Schönheitslinie”315 – 
“alle Anfangsbuchstaben der Kanzleischrift” are able to be developed in a systematic fashion. The 
                                                
314 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 167. 
315 “Fixleins Verfahren der Buchstabenproduktion kehrt ein Verhältnis um, von dem man meinen sollte, daß es für 
Buchstaben konstitutiv ist. Eine Linie, und zwar eine ‘Schönheitslinie,’ nach Hogarth etwas genuin Ornamentales, ein 
Moment ‘typographischer Pracht,’ ist hier die Figur, aus der alle Buchstaben gezogen werden können – während man 
doch davon ausgehen sollte, daß es die unterschiedliche Figuren sind, die Buchstaben als Zeichen erkennbar machen” 
(Dembeck, Texte rahmen, 314). As Dembeck points out, Jean Paul’s reference to the “Schönheitslinie” in the above 
passage alludes to William Hogarth’s physiognomic theory of geometric lines in The Analysis of Beauty, in which 
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passage’s description of Fixlein’s invention of a new script makes clear once more that for him it 
is the somatic dimension of writing and the typographical grandeur of the ornamental figure, rather 
than the signifying content or underlying idea, which plays the decisive role. In particular, it is 
through a movement of “inversion” [umkehren] that Fixlein’s “line of beauty” [Schönheitslinie] is 
transformed from mere ornament into the combinatory principle from which “to spin out” 
[herauszuspinnen] – like textile from a strand of yarn – the entire alphabet. By furnishing a double 
perspectivization between the ornamental and figural sides of the line of beauty, Fixlein’s letter 
‘s’ presents itself in the form of the “crooked line of humor” [krumme Linie des Humors], which 
subverts the originally-intended bureaucratic ends of his clerical script. On the one hand, it pro-
duces the effect of liveliness and vitality – of enargeia, the rhetorical figure for the (re-)presenta-
tion of an abundance of details in order to make present an absence – through the sublime move-
ment of its curves.316 On the other hand, like a loose thread being “pulled” [gezogen] – or perhaps 
even “excerpted” [ausgezogen] – from the textile, causing it to quickly unravel, it simultaneously 
reveals the material contingency – the “Glückszufälle”317 of the lotto as “Auszug” – of all the 
                                                
Hogarth postulates the figura serpentina, the serpentine line, as the “line of beauty” due to its possession of the greatest 
variety of movements and potential for liveliness and vitality: “Though all sorts of waving-lines are ornamental, when 
properly applied; yet, strictly speaking, there is but one precise line, properly to be called the line of beauty,” and 
several pages later continues, “[f]or as among the vast variety of waving-lines that may be conceived, there is but one 
that truly deserves the name of the line of beauty, so there is only one precise serpentine-line that I call the line of 
grace” (William Hogarth, The Analysis of Beauty. Written with a view of fixing the fluctuating Ideas of Taste [London: 
J. Reeves, 1753], 38, 52). The extent to which Hogarth’s “line of beauty” touched upon fundamental concepts of 
aesthetics in the second half of the eighteenth century manifests itself in the work of Moses Mendelssohn, who in his 
letters Über die Empfindungen (1756) equated the subtle movement of the line of beauty with a distinct “allure” [Reiz]: 
“Man kennt in Deutschland nunmehr die Wellenlinie, die unser Hogarth für die Maler, als die ächte Schönheitslinie 
festgesetzt hat. Und den Reitz? Vielleicht würde man ihn nicht unrecht durch die Schönheit der wahren oder an-
scheinenden Bewegung erklären. Ein Beyspiel der erstern sind die Mienen und Geberden der Menschen, die durch 
die Schönheit in den Bewegungen reitzend werden; ein Beyspiel der letztern hingegen, die flammigten, oder mit Ho-
garth zu reden, die Schlangenlinien, die allezeit eine Bewegung nachzuahmen scheinen” (Moses Mendelssohn, Über 
die Empfindungen, in: Gesammelte Schriften (Jubiläumsausgabe), ed. Fritz Bamberger, vol. 1 [Stuttgart 1971], here: 
282f). 
316 Cf. Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 27; idem., Werke, I/5, 102. For more on the poetological significance of Jean Paul’s 
references to gold and currency, cf. Menke, “Jean Pauls Witz. Kraft und Formel,” in particular 210–11. 
317 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 12. 
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letters to the extent that they are grounded in a single “warped” or “distorted” [verzogen] typo-
graphic gesture. 
 Hence, despite Jean Paul’s implicit reference to Hogarth’s The Analysis of Beauty in this 
passage, there is nonetheless a clearly satirical dimension to his invocation of the letter ‘s’ as the 
origin of all the initial letters of the alphabet – a satirical play on letters through assonance, which 
Jean Paul reveals to the reader in the “Postskript” appended to Quintus Fixlein. In order to improve 
the trade balance between Germany and other nations, he suggests in the postscript that satires 
produced in Germany no longer be allowed to be converted as raw materials into satires abroad in 
the future: 
Aber satirische Münzmeister werden schlecht aufgemuntert: wie die Fabriken auf 
die Gefäße von Semilor ein »s« einzeichnen müssen, um dasselbe vom wahren 
Golde zu unterscheiden: so muß ein solcher Münzer den Anfangsbuchstaben der 
Satire (auch ein »s«) überall einhauen, weil das Publikum alles in der Welt eher 
versteht (sogar seinen Kant) als Spaß, und dieses buchstäbliche Signieren (damit 
das Publikum nicht aus Spaß Ernst mache) verdirbt jedes Subjekt, es sei Schaf-
wolle, oder Satire, oder eine Menschenstirne.318 
 
While the letter ‘s’ distinguishes between authentic and counterfeit, real and fictional, it cannot do 
so in such an obvious way that the play between reality and appearance is decided in advance. In 
the end, however, it must be decided – if not without some degree of ambivalence: “hier unter der 
Schwelle, indem die Abendglocke meines Buches läutet, würd’ es mir wie eine zersplitternde Blei-
kugel im Herzen sitzen bleiben, wenn ich etwas anders – etwan: leset wohl! - zu den Lesern sagte 
als: lebet wohl!”319 When one takes into consideration the fact that later in life Jean Paul would 
polemically campaign against the use of the “Bindung-s” in written German,320 the only thing left 
                                                
318 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 258f. 
319 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 259. 
320 Cf. Jean Paul, “Über die deutschen Doppelwörter,” in: Werke, II/3, 9–108. 
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for such an author would be to proceed according to Fixlein’s own absurd approach of unsystem-
atically collecting paper waste and errata. 
 In short, it is the spirit of the encyclopedia which Fixlein embodies. However, in contrast 
to the “polyhistoric” ambitions of the Enlightenment, which starting with Diderot conceived of the 
encyclopedia as a project of cataloguing and ordering all of the world’s knowledge into a single 
book, Fixlein’s encyclopedic project entails the unsystematic collection of the most trivial and 
insignificant scholarly publications around 1800. His library, which consists of fragmentary drafts, 
pocket calendars, scholarly registers, and alphabetic lexicons, amongst other kinds of “miscella-
nies” and collectanea, constitutes what Magnus Wieland refers to as a “Sudelbibliothek,”321 a li-
brary filled with nothing but “sheets of paper waste” [Makulaturbögen]. In Quintus Fixlein, the 
collection of paper waste is not merely a minor motif or plot detail, but, as will be argued, is 
symptomatic with respect to Jean Paul’s own method of text-production, as in the following pas-
sage which describes Fixlein’s unusual reading habits: 
Ist es nicht daraus zu erklären, daß [Fixlein] sich, wie Morhof rät, die einzelnen 
Hefte von Makulaturbögen, wie sie der Kramladen ausgab, fleißig sammelte und in 
solchen wie Virgil im Ennius scharrte? Ja für ihn war der Krämer ein Fortius (der 
Gelehrte) oder ein Friedrich (der König), weil beide letztere sich aus kompletten 
Büchern nur Blätter schnitten, an denen etwas war. Eben diese Achtung für Maku-
latur nahm ihn für die Vorschürzen gallischer Köche ein, welche bekanntlich aus 
vollgedrucktem Papier bestehen; und er wünschte oft, ein Deutscher übersetzte die 
Schürzen.322 
 
Fixlein’s appreciation for material paper waste shares much in common with Jean Paul’s excerpt-
ing method, which as Götz Müller argues has little do with the “polyhistoric” ambitions of En-
lightenment encyclopedists like Daniel Georg Morhof, but rather with the discovery and invention 
                                                
321 Magnus Wieland, “Jean Pauls Sudelbibliothek. Makulatur als poetologische Chiffre,” in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-
Gesellschaft 46 (2011), 97–119, here: 113. 
322 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 88. 
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of the new through a revaluation of the old.323 Fixlein treats the sheets of paper waste or Makulatur 
from the “junk shop” [Kramladen] that are occasionally lying around as packaging material not as 
trash, but instead as carriers of important information. What appears at first glance as a kind of 
comic error on his part – that is, the (humorous) misrecognition of the paper waste’s useless ma-
teriality as, in fact, imbued with significance and meaning – turns out to be grounded in his sincere 
respect for the medium of paper waste. The text further legitimates this viewpoint by way of re-
course to various historically significant precursors, including Virgil, Fortius, Morhof, and Frie-
drich the Great. Fixlein’s approach is thereby situated in a broader discursive context of scholarly 
reading practices, which by tearing out sheets of paper from a book transform the latter into frag-
mentary paper waste. According to this reading, the book is no longer perceived as a self-evident 
aesthetic unity, but one which instead disintegrates into a slew of unbounded sheets of paper – into 
fragments or excerpts, Auszüge – which appear as a kind of trash heap of paper shavings through 
which the reader can rummage at their own discretion. 
 Thus while the text dignifies Fixlein – if in a decidedly ironic manner – by portraying him 
as the proud inventor of a new script, it nonetheless insists on a conception of authorship which is 
no longer grounded in the literary tradition of “invention” [erfinden] or inventio, the rhetorical 
terminus technicus for the discovery of a well-ordered loci communes, but rather in that of “col-
lection” [sammeln], which presents an entirely different notion of invention: that of an inventory 
of the bizarre and miscellaneous, and of the seemingly trivial and insignificant. From this perspec-
tive, the narrator praises the author, 
                                                
323 “In der zeitgenössischen Rezeption fielen immer wieder die Stichwörter »barock« und »Polyhistor«. […] Jean Paul 
stehe in der Tradition von Daniel Georg Morhofs Polyhistor, der in De excerpiendi ratione die Anhäufung des Wissens 
als Basis für »neue Gedanken und Erfindungen« rühmt. In der Tat ähnelt Jean Pauls Verteidigung des gelehrten Witzes 
Morhofs Lob des Exzerpts. Jean Pauls gelehrter Witz treibt eklektisch Informationen und Lehrmeinungen aus allen 
Ecken der Welt zusammen, um sie unter einem neuen Gesichtspunkt oder in einer neuen Färbung zu vereinigen” 
(Müller, “Jean Pauls Privatenzyklopädie,” 75). 
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der mehr sammelt als erfindet – weil das letztere mit einem ängstlichen Feuer das 
Herz kalzinieret –; ich lobe den Antiquar, Heraldiker, Notenmacher, Sammler, ich 
preise den Titelbarsch (ein Fisch, namens perca diagramma, wegen seiner Buch-
staben auf den Schuppen) und den Buchdrucker (ein Speckkäfer, namens 
scarabaeus typographus, der in die Rinde der Kienbäume Lettern wühlt) – beide 
brauchen keinen größern oder schönern Schauplatz der Welt als den auf dem Lum-
penpapier und keinen andern Legestachel als einen spitzigen Kiel, um damit ihre 
vierundzwanzig Lettern-Eier zu legen.324 
 
Just like Fixlein, who prefers to accumulate scholarly errata and produce drafts, rather than write 
completed books, the passage glorifies the kind of author who appears to quietly satisfy himself 
with his vast collections of collectanea and miscellanies.325 Such an author would no longer need 
to produce anything “new” at all, but would instead only need to bring about a revaluation – 
through a humorous inversion of perspective – of what, on the one hand, is considered trivial and 
insignificant and what, on the other hand, is considered important and worth being preserved in a 
collection.326 For the “antiquarian, heraldist, note maker, collector,” it is not so much the “content” 
or “soul” of the work that is significant, but rather the corporeal materiality of the text-object – its 
finitude, mortality, and capacity for dismemberment and “death,” in the sense of being pulped or 
turned into discarded “rag-paper” [Lumpenpapier]. 
                                                
324 Jean Paul, Werke, 1/4, 166. 
325 Jean Paul’s conception of authorship as collection also has discursive consequences for his understanding of read-
ership. If the author’s task is not so much to “invent,” but rather to “collect” – that is, to stitch together heterogeneous 
textual material from a variety of different sources – this liberates the reader in turn from an author-centric mode of 
linear, sequential narrative, allowing them to freely peruse the text, to pick and choose passages as they see fit, in a 
decidedly non-linear manner, as was increasingly the case for readers at the turn of the 18th century with the rise of 
literary short-formats such as pocket books, pocket calendars, anthologies, and collected editions. On this point, see 
Piper, Dreaming in Books, in particular 121–25. In Quintus Fixlein, Jean Paul thus likens the author to “a kind of bee-
keeper” and the reader to a “reader-swarm” that clusters and swarms around “flora,” which in this context ostensibly 
functions as a paronomastic reference to florilegium, the Latin word for “anthology”: “Der Autor ist eine Art Bienen-
wirt für den Leser-Schwarm, dem zu Gefallen er die Flora, die er für ihn hält, in verschiedene Zeiten verteilt und die 
Aufblüte mancher Blumen hier beschleunigt, dort verschiebt, damit es in allen Kapiteln blühe. –” (Jean Paul, Werke, 
I/4, 151). For more on the discursive and poetological significance of authorship and readership for Jean Paul, cf. 
Schmidt-Hannisa, “Lesarten.” 
326 For more on the creation and destruction of value with respect to “waste,” cf. Michael Thompson, Rubbish Theory: 
The Creation and Destruction of Value (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1979), in particular 77–102. 
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 Mortality, dismemberment, and death – these are in fact the criteria of the animalistic 
around 1800.327 It is hardly coincidental that the text goes on to identify forms of creaturely mate-
riality, through paronomastic references to a bestiary of unusual life-forms like the fish “title 
perch” [Titelbarsch] and beetle “book printer” [Buchdrucker], with the technical conditions of text-
production: typography, book-printing, and the letters of the alphabet. Thus while the text presents 
a conception of the scholar as Buchstabenmensch in the form of Fixlein’s suffering from the ma-
teriality of signification and the literality of human existence, it nonetheless situates him at the 
precarious threshold between the human and the inhuman and the organic (biological) and the 
inorganic (textual/technical). With respect to the technics of writing, the termini “body and soul” 
no longer suffice as the criteria which distinguish man from animal; writing therefore ceases to be 
conceived as a purely human technics and comes to possess a decidedly monstrous, inhuman ele-
ment, one which denaturalizes even organic life-forms.328 In the end, it is the alphabet which serves 
as the primary generative metaphor in the text, for according to the narrator the only “ovipositor” 
[Legestachel] that is needed to produce – to give birth to – the “twenty-four letter-eggs” [vierun-
dzwanzig Letter-Eiern] of the alphabet is a “pointed quill” [spitzigen Kiel]. 
 
4.2. Thinking in Boxes: The Slip Box as “Lebens-Laboratorium” 
                                                
327 “Sterblichkeit, Zerstückelung und Tod erweisen sich als Kriterien des Tierischen, Viehischen. Das Schicksal, der 
individuelle Lebensweg wird gleich-gültig, selbst die Differenz von Tod und Leben scheint angesichts der zerteilten 
Körper kein Kriterium mehr an die Hand zu geben. Die Gleichgültigkeit, die [Moses] Mendelssohn dem alphabet-
ischen System attestierte, findet hier in der von keiner Transzendenz affizierten Zerstückelung des Körpers ihre par-
allele Inszenierung” (Keck, Buchstäbliche Anatomien, 30). 
328 The element of the monstrous plays an especially central role in Jean Paul’s Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise. For a 
poetological reading of teratological discourse in that novel, cf. Armin Schäfer, “Jean Paus monströses Schreiben,” 
in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft (37) 2002, 216–32; Maximilian Bergengruen, “Missgeburten. Vivisektionen 
des Humors in Jean Pauls Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise,” in: Anatomie. Sektionen einer medizinischen Wissenschaft 
im 18. Jahrhundert, eds. Jürgen Helm and Karin Stukenbrock (Stuttgart 2003), 271–92. 
 
132 
Not only is Fixlein a collector of paper waste and a writer of drafts, but he is also, as the novel 
reveals, his own biographer. Fixlein connects his project of encyclopedic writing with his autobi-
ographical writing through his use of the card-index system known as the “slip box” [Zettelkasten], 
a scholarly tool used for recording, ordering, and storing knowledge onto unbounded index cards, 
which was invented by the 18th-century legal scholar and jurist Johann Jacob Moser (1701–1785). 
By unbinding freely interconnected index cards from the spine of the book, Moser’s invention of 
the slip box paved the way for a fundamental transformation of the scholarly means of collecting 
excerpt material and producing, in turn, new texts and new knowledge in the 18th century.329 In 
his tract Einige Vortheile vor Canzley-Verwandte und Gelehrte (1773), Moser illustrates his 
method of collecting material for future writing: 
Ich mache alle meine Collectaneen auf einzelne Blättlein, deren ich aus jedem Bo-
gen Papier 16. oder aus jedem Octav-Blatt 2. mache. Finde ich nun an einem Ort 
etwas, davon ich glaube, dass es mir in künfftigen Zeiten gute Dienste leisten 
könnte; so treffe ich es entweder in einem Buch, oder in einer Schrifft, oder sonst 
an, und das Buch etc. ist nicht mein eigen, oder ich kann es künftig, wänn ich es 
nöthig hätte, nicht leicht, oder gar nicht, wieder zu meinem Gebrauch haben; so 
schreibe ich es auf halbe octav=Blättgen ab, oder extrahire es daraus; zumalen wänn 
es etwas wichtiges betrifft. […] Ich lasse mir ferner vom Schreiner hölzerne Käst-
gen verfertigen, von denen jedes 2. Reihen solcher halber octav=Blätter fasset, wel-
che in der Mitte durch ein dünnes Holz von einander unterschieden werden. Die 
Breite solcher Zettelkästgen ist so beschaffen, dass auf jeder Seite zwischen dem 
mitten hindurch gehenden Unterschid, ein halbes octav=Blättgen in der Breite 
genügsamen Plaz hat: Die Höhe ist der Höhe eines solchen halben octav=Blättgens 
gleich, und die Tieffe oder Länge ist etwa 1. Schuh; so dass in ein solches Zet-
telkästgen ungefähr 1000. dieser Zettel gehen.330 
                                                
329 “Infolge ihrer einseitigen Entbindung vom Buchrücken gewähren frei verschaltbare Zettel ausgeweitete Schnitt-
stellen, um die Konnektivität möglicher Anschlüsse zu steigern. Das Material der Gelehrtenmaschine wartet in Form 
ideal adressierbarer Zettel-Agglomerationen in geeigneten Kästen auf seine fachkundige Befragung” (Markus Kra-
jevski, Zettelwirtschaft: Die Geburt der Kartei aus dem Geiste der Bibliothek [Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2002], 
69). For a mediological reading of the slip box as a tool for knowledge-administration in the 18th century, cf. Helmut 
Zedelmaier, “Zettelkasten,” in: Gedächtnis und Erinnerung. Ein interdisziplinäres Lexikon, eds. Nicolas Pethes, Jens 
Ruchatz (Reinbek: Rowohlt Taschenbuch, 2001), 671–72; idem., “Buch, Exzerpt, Zettelschrank, Zettelkasten,” in: 
Archivprozesse. Die Kommunikation der Aufbewahrung, eds. Hedwig Pompe, Leander Scholz (Köln: DuMont, 2002), 
38–53. 
330 Johann Jacob Moser, Einige Vortheile vor Canzley-Verwandte und Gelehrte: In Absicht auf Acten-Verzeichnisse, 
Auszüge und Register, desgleichen auf Sammlungen zu künfftigen Schrifften und würkliche Ausarbeitung derer 




After stipulating these requirements as the model for all future slip boxes, Moser goes on several 
pages later to attempt to persuade readers of the numerous technological advantages of the slip 
box system over the traditional book-format. Amongst the eight reasons he lists for using slip 
boxes over collectanea-books or excerpt manuscripts, arguably the two most important advantages 
are, first, that with slip boxes all topics remain together, rather than being written one after another 
as in a notebook: “So bleibt jede Materie beysammen; wo hingegen in die Collectaneen=Bücher 
alles unter einander geschriben werden muss, oder bey einer Materie, wänn man eine gewisse 
Anzahl Blätter darzu aussezet, bald deren zu vil übrig bleibe, bald zu wenige seynd, und allzuvile 
dergleichen Bücher gehalten werden müssen.”331 Second, rearranging an entire text, adding new 
chapters, or removing old ones is, according to Moser, far more easily accomplished with paper 
slips, while notebooks remain unchangeable: “Will ich ein ganzes Werck, oder Haupt= oder spe-
cial=Materien umschmelzen, und in eine ganz andere Ordnung bringen, oder neue Capitel hinzu= 
oder alte Capitel heraus thun, kan es bey einzelnen Zettelgen mit geringer Mühe in kurzer Zeit 
bewerckstelliget werden. […] [Collectaneen=Bücher] müssen bleiben, wie sie nun einmal 
seynd.”332 In both cases, Moser emphasizes the advantage of the unbounded format of the individ-
ual index cards over the book, while also acknowledging that as a result they are more easily lost.333 
Thanks to this technological innovation, his slip box system allows for a much great degree of 
flexibility and mobility in the arrangement of information, according to whatever categories or 
organizing principles are favored by the owner, than the traditional bound-book format. 
                                                
331 Moser, 50. 
332 Moser, 51. 
333 “Wahr ist es, daß dergleichen einzelne Zettel leichter zerstreut werden oder verlohren gehen können, als was in 
Bücher eingetragen worden ist: Da ich aber meine Zettelkästgen in eigene Repositorien, wie die Bücher, stelle, und 
die Meinige wissen, daß sie keine Hand daran legen dürffen; so ist mir in langen Jahren kein widriger Zufall auch nur 
mit einem einigen Blättgen begegnet” (Moser, 53). 
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 While the first mention of the slip box appears in the second preface to Quintus Fixlein, it 
features more prominently in the second chapter of the novel, in which the narrator explicitly refers 
to Moser by name in connection with his invention of the slip box system. There the conception 
of the slip box undergoes a decisive shift in meaning and function, however, from its originally-
intended purpose as an exclusively scholarly instrument for the recording of objective knowledge. 
In the novel, by contrast, it is the fictional form given to Fixlein’s autobiographical writings and 
serves as the micrological pendant to his encyclopedic writing project. In his slip boxes, he records 
the most significant moments of his life, such that even the most trivial and unremarkable events 
are taken into account, which he then arranges into chronological order: 
Unter dem Essen fiel etwas vor, das ein Biograph nicht entbehren kann: seine Mut-
ter mußt’ ihm die Landkarte seiner kindlichen Welt unter dem Käuen mappieren 
und ihm alle Züge erzählen, woraus von ihm auf seine jetzige Jahre etwas zu schlie-
ßen war. Diesen perspektivischen Aufriss seiner kindlichen Vergangenheit trug er 
dann auf kleine Blätter auf, die alle unsere Aufmerksamkeit verdienen. Denn lauter 
solche Blätter, welche Szenen, Akte, Schauspiele seiner Kinderjahre enthielten, 
schlichtete er chronologisch in besondere Schubläden einer Kinder-Kommode und 
teilte seine Lebensbeschreibung, wie Moser seine publizistischen Materialien, in 
besondere Zettelkästen ein. Er hatte Kästen für Erinnerungszettel aus dem zwölften, 
dreizehnten,vierzehnten etc., aus dem einundzwanzigsten Jahre und so fort. Wollt’ 
er sich nach einem pädagogischen Baufron-Tag einen Rastabend machen: so riss er 
bloß ein Zettelfach, einen Registerzug seiner Lebensorgel, heraus und besann sich 
auf alles.334 
 
In this remarkable passage, which stages nothing less than the primal scene of Fixlein’s invention 
of the slip box system from the memories dictated to him by his mother, the slip box is revealed 
to no longer serve the purely pragmatic function of storing bureaucratic, library-oriented, or other 
kinds of scholarly information. Instead, Fixlein excerpts and stores information only for his own 
purposes, namely that of pleasurably recollecting and re-reading the childhood memories which 
he has written down onto index cards, as when he “riss […] bloß ein Zettelfach, einen Registerzug 
                                                
334 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 83f. 
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seiner Lebensorgel, heraus” and “besann sich auf alles.”335 Fixlein’s use of the slip box as a mne-
monic device, which allows him to read in an excerpting manner, presents an alternative method 
of recollection than that recounted in Schulmeisterlein Wutz. For whereas Wutz’s regression to an 
earlier, prelapsarian state of child-like being is made possible by the “natural magic of the imagi-
nation” [natürliche Magie der Einbildungskraft], Fixlein’s construction of an inner world, by con-
trast, is mediated entirely by the media technology of index cards. In this way, the voice of the 
mother that dictates to him his own childhood memories – mapping out a kind of panorama of 
geographic “features” [Züge], or perhaps contingently selected “excerpts” [Auszüge] – about 
which he himself is completely ignorant of, becomes displaced and effaced by a bureaucratic-
technical machinery.336 
 Fixlein’s autobiographical repurposing of the slip box system thereby transforms the “nat-
ural” magic of the imagination – here, the Mother’s voice as the source of discursive production – 
into a completely denaturalized mnemotechnics, that is, into a kind of prosthesis or second-hand 
memory for storing and archiving information. Hence, just like the dancing master Aubin, who 
had “keine Zeit und kein Gedächtnis und doch so viele Kenntnisse”337 thanks to his handwritten 
                                                
335 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 84. 
336 According to Kittler, Romantic poetry – poetry around 1800 – consists precisely in this discursive-technical pro-
cedure of rewriting that which is posited as having been produced by and through maternal dictation – in other words, 
the Mother’s voice – which orally affixes an imaginary childhood existence to the scene of writing: “Dichtung um 
1800 heißt nicht wie Literatur um 1900, den ‘nie wirklich ausgesprochenen Satz ich schreibe’ an den Grund allen 
Schreibens setzen. Dichtung heißt vielmehr: um diesen Satz herumschreiben, ihm aus Erinnerung ans frühste Schrei-
benlernen eine Mündlichkeit zuschreiben. ‘Das mütterliche Diktat fixiert – oral – zur Schreibszene und zum Schrift-
zeichen, was die psychologische Struktur der Kindheit, die Art der Existenz der Erinnerten am Individuum ist.’ Aus 
dieser imaginären, aber um so inständiger beschworenen Mündlichkeit rührt das nicht textuelle, sondern ‘gleichsam 
textuelle Wesen des Bourgeois’ und seiner Dichtung” (Kittler, Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900, 128). Rüdiger Campe, 
in an essay on Jean Paul that Kittler cites in the above passage, reads this scene, therefore, as a parody of the scene of 
writing: “das Wissen dessen, was man nicht weiß, ein Lesen der diktierten und von eigenen Hand hingeschriebenen 
Wörter” (Campe, “Schreibstunden in Jean Pauls Idyllen,” in: Deutsch-Französisches Jahrbuch für Text-Analytik I 
[1980], 132–70, here: 153). 
337 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 772. 
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pocket library, Fixlein’s actual memories of earlier life experiences may be long forgotten or per-
haps even completely fabricated. Yet by systematically recording the “perspektivischen Aufriss 
seiner kindlichen Vergangenheit” onto index cards, not only can he overcome his own forgetful-
ness, but he can also transform these past moments into highly idealized, fairytale-like representa-
tions of his earlier life, which he subsequently organizes according to a quasi-theatrical schema of 
“Szenen, Akte, Schauspiele seiner Kinderjahre.” 
 This repurposing of the slip box system into a highly idiosyncratic tool for organizing and 
retrieving information from one’s own life makes Fixlein, like Aubin, into a decidedly humorous 
figure, for in spite of his meticulous accumulation and organization of autobiographical index 
cards he cannot grasp the larger narrative context of his own life story.338 Instead, that is the job 
of the novel’s narrator and fictional author-instance “Jean Paul.” According to the novel’s full title, 
Leben des Quintus Fixlein, aus fünfzehn Zettelkästen gezogen, it is from Fixlein’s autobiographical 
slip boxes – fifteen in total – that the narrator is said to have “drawn” [gezogen] the raw material 
for his own fictional biography based on Fixlein’s life, which the “real author” Jean Paul subse-
quently inserted into his book, following the short essay “Mußteil für Mädchen,” under the title 
“Des Quintus Fixlein Leben bis auf unsere Zeiten; in fünfzehn Zettelkästen,” which he then di-
vided not into traditional chapters, but rather into corresponding “Zettelkästen.” The poetological 
motif of the slip box thereby introduces two different levels of narrative reality into the novel, both 
of which concern the collection and production of text: first, there is Fixlein’s fictional autobio-
graphical material, which he has stored in the drawers of his custom-made “Kinder-Kommode”; 
and second, there is the fictional frame story, in which the narrator and fictional author-instance 
                                                
338 “Aubin wird zur humoristischen Figur, weil er zwar einerseits dank seiner Speichertechnik Massen isolierter Daten 
zu memorieren vermag, andererseits aber außerstande ist, einen schlichten narrativen Zusammenhang zu erfassen. 
Dies stellt sich heraus, als der Erzähler eines Tanzschülerin eine Geschichte vorträgt. Außerdem hat seine Gelehrsa-
mkeit keinerlei pragmatische Funktion” (Schmidt-Hannisa, “Lesarten,” 39). 
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“Jean Paul” constructs from Fixlein’s vast repository of forgotten childhood memories as building 
blocks, or Bausteine, the entire biographical project presented in the form of the novel Leben des 
Quintus Fixlein itself. At numerous points in the text, the narrator even interrupts the narrative 
continuity of the novel, appearing at the scene in his role as the secondary editor and collector of 
Fixlein’s unpublished autobiographical writings, as in the following passage in which the narrator 
is depicted as being in immediate physical possession of Fixlein’s slip box archive: “Fixleins Zet-
telkästen hab’ ich schon in der Tasche bei mir, und darf nur nachschauen und aus seinen nehmen, 
was in meine taugt.”339 
 This more complex framing technique distinguishes Quintus Fixlein at the narrative level 
from its idyllic predecessor, Schulmeisterlein Wutz, in which the motif of writing is still largely 
confined to the fictional biographical narrative. In Quintus Fixlein, by contrast, the “life” of the 
life story, in the sense of the subject or subjectivity of its protagonist, is no longer represented as 
something ‘pre-given,’ but is instead, according to the title, “pulled from slip boxes” [aus Zet-
telkästen gezogen]: it is, in other words, the precipitate, remnant, or residue of a poetological-
technical calculus. With the introduction of this second narrative reality in the form of an all-
pervasive editorial fiction, the text presents a conception of (scholarly) life as the metaleptic effect 
of writing.340 In other words, there is no “life” in the novel which is antecedent to the slip box; 
instead, like Aubin, who makes “Exzerpten aus [s]einen Exzerpten […] und den Spiritus noch 
einmal abzieh[t],”341 it is the force of (re)presentation – the act of “distilling” [abziehen] or “pull-
ing” [ziehen] from excerpts, Auszüge – which first constitutes life as an object of representation. 
Fixlein’s slip boxes thus serve as his “Lebensorgel” in a double sense, as both a carnivalesque 
                                                
339 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 165. 
340 For more on the poetological significance of Jean Paul’s use of the editorial fiction or “scene of editing” as a 
framing device, cf. Wirth, Die Geburt des Autors aus dem Geist der Herausgeberfiktion, in particular 338–53. 
341 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 772. 
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musical instrument that can be repeatedly played simply by pressing on its “knee-lever” [Regis-
terzug], as well as a kind of prosthetic organ without which he cannot live. 
 What the text stages, in other words, is the birth of the scholar from the spirit of excerpts,342 
– albeit with one major qualification: for humorous figures like Wutz, Aubin, and Fixlein, it is the 
Spiritus – meaning not only “spirit” in the sense of an “absoluter Geist,” but also in the sense of 
an alcoholic spirit – which is distilled from the “Lebenstropfen” or pulled from the “Lebensorgel” 
of the excerpts [Auszüge]. These scholars’ texts, which refer to other texts that refer, in turn, to 
other texts, no longer constitute an encyclopedic “order of things,” but lead instead to drunken 
disorder and the material contingency of the “private encyclopedia.”343 From this perspective, the 
novel presents itself in the form of an open experimental arrangement or Versuchsanordnung, such 
that the material traces of the biographical narrative are left open, unfinished, and exposed. It is 
not a representation of life in its immediacy and completion, but instead an artificial “Lebens-
Laboratorium”344 which the text embodies – a term that the narrator uses later on to describe 
Fixlein’s peculiar repurposing of the slip box system for his own autobiographical ends. In this 
respect, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger’s characterization of the laboratory situation as a Zettelwirtschaft 
is especially relevant for the reading of Leben des Quintus Fixlein, for as Rheinberger argues both 
the index card [Zettel] and the draft [Entwurf] constitute essential elements of the epistemological 
regime of the laboratory: 
Sie sind schriftlich verfaßt in dem weiteren Sinn, den Jacques Derrida dem Begriff 
der Schrift gab – sie haben das Potential, sich nicht nur von ihrer ersten Referenz, 
von dem, worauf sie sich anfänglich bezogen, sondern auch vom Schreiben-
den/Experimentierenden selbst zu treffen. Der Zettel und die Kritzelei, als fixierte 
                                                
342 Cf. Menke, “Die Geburt des Gelehrten aus den Exzerpten.” See also: Schmitz-Emans, “Vom Leben und Schreiben 
der Bücher. Das Buch als Objekt bei Jean Paul,” in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft 28 (1993), 17–46. 
343 Cf. Müller, “Jean Pauls Privatenzyklopädie.” 
344 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 109. 
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Spuren, reichen aber nicht in die Sphäre der gedruckten Mitteilung an die Wissen-
schaftlergemeinde, sie bleiben Funktionen des experimentellen Engagements. Sie 
gehören zum Erkenntnisregime des Labors.345 
 
For Rheinberger, the index card and the draft are to be understood not as predetermined by their 
initial point of reference in a given experimental arrangement, but instead as forms of writing 
which imbricate at the interstice between the materiality of the experimental system and narrative 
order. “Sie liegen zwischen den Materialitäten der Experimentalsysteme einerseits und den begrif-
flichen und narrativen Gebäuden andererseits, die als sanktionierte Forschungsberichte den unmit-
telbaren Kontext des Labors verlassen.”346 In Quintus Fixlein, the poetological motif of the slip 
box likewise comes to stand not for a sequential, linear narration, but instead for a highly fragmen-
tary and discontinuous one, which serves to expose the materiality and media technology that con-
dition the writing process and the techniques of representation in the novel. By staging the trans-
formation of Fixlein’s autobiographical writings into a fictional biography, namely the book Leben 
des Quintus Fixlein, the novel’s editorial frame story introduces a double perspectivization be-
tween the “micrological” materiality of Fixlein’s written scraps of paper and the cohesion of that 
raw material into the fictional form of a biographical narrative. 
 The material traces of Jean Paul’s own writing process manifest themselves above all in 
the highly digressive preface which he inserted into the second edition of Quintus Fixlein, where 
he offers the reader a satirical glimpse into the conditions of his “writing laboratory.”347 Entitled 
                                                
345 Cf. Rheinberger, “Zettelwirtschaft,” 442. 
346 Rheinberger, “Zettelwirtschaft,” 442. According to Rheinberger, these traces of the research and experimentation 
process include “Exzerpte […], Notizen […], Gedankenfetzen oder auffälligen Überschneidung, Skizzen experimen-
teller Anordnungen, Datenstreifen, die ein einzelner Experimentalverlauf geliefert hat, versuchsweise Interpretationen 
experimenteller Ergebnisse, Korrekturen dieser Interpretationen, vorläufige Berechnungen, Kalibrierungen einzuset-
zender Apparate, Entwürfe neuer Vorrichtungen” (ibid.). 
347 As Sabine Straub has shown, the second preface was already composed in 1796, the same year in which the first 
edition of Leben des Quintus Fixlein was published, though it was not included until the release of the second edition 
in 1801. According to Straub, text-genetic analysis of the preface reveals a highly serialized, fragmentary emergence 
process that bears a striking resemblance to Jean Paul’s excerpting method of text production: “Auf drei Seiten […] 
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the “Geschichte der Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage des Quintus Fixlein,” the preface to the second 
edition tells the story of a journey by foot from Hof to Bayreuth, which is meant to result in the 
production of the preface itself, rather than in a finished product. There the metaphor of walking 
clues the reader to shift their perspective away from reading the work as a product of writing to a 
process of writing.348 Far from securing the “aesthetic unity” of the work, however, the preface 
instead hints at its material contingency through the proliferation of its frames. This is reflected 
especially in a series of subsections included in the preface entitled “Fortsetzung der Vorrede,” 
whose “continuation” [Fortsetzung] is punctuated, in Jean Paul’s typical fashion, by perpetual di-
gressions of narrative. The serial arrangement of the preface manifests itself in particular in the 
narrator’s story of the “Zeugung einer Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage.”349 Just like Fixlein is said to 
have “given birth to drafts,” the narrator likewise makes use of reproductive metaphors with re-
spect to his narration of the emergence of the preface, constantly conflating biological and textual 
metaphors in his description of its genesis. It thereby anticipates not only the novel’s use of the 
slip box motif, but also its fictional depiction of the novel’s own emergence. Far from being a 
successful birth, the preface presents a scene of writing which foregrounds the failure to bring the 
writing to completion: the narrator – ostensibly the “real” author Jean Paul – “trug nämlich die 
offne Schreibtafel vor mir, um die Vorrede, wie sie mir Satz für Satz entfiel, darin aufzufangen 
[…].”350 Here the narrator’s recounting of the process of writing while sitting at his “open writing 
desk,” rather than relating the individual sentences to the narrative whole, proceeds instead in a 
                                                
bietet sich hier jedoch ein Erscheinungsbild, das auf eine ganze andere Arbeitsweise schließen läßt: wie auf einer 
Kette aneinandergereiht, durch Gedankenstriche getrennt, folgen […] einzelne Gedankensplitter, Stichworte aus den 
Bausteinen und Wortspiele aufeinander. Umrahmt und zum Teil überschrieben werden sie von zahllosen graphischen 
Spielereien mit dem Buchstaben ‘d,’ von Zahlen, Brüchen und Additionen” (Sabine Straub, “‘Vorrede zur Vorrede’: 
Aus Jean Pauls unveröffentlichten Materialien zur Geschichte meiner Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage des Quintus 
Fixlein,” in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft 44 [2009], 18–32, here 20f). 
348 Cf. Wirth, Die Geburt des Autors aus dem Geist der Herausgeberschaft, in particular 331–42. 
349 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 16. 
350 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 16f. 
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fragmentary manner, metonymically stringing the parts together bit by bit, sentence by sentence. 
In the end, the writing of the preface thus yields only a kind of half-woven monstrosity – unable 
to engender anything legitimate – such that each sentence of the text continually falls through the 
slats of the writer’s loom: “– im Webstuhl der Vorrede eingesperrt und mit dem Weberschiffchen 
werfend – ohne doch etwas Rechtes herauszubringen.”351 
 For this reason, Jean Paul abandons his previous unsuccessful efforts at attempting to 
weave together a seamless whole and expresses his desire to write in a manner that would instead 
be “bandfrei,”352 namely by employing the same slip box technique that Fixlein himself uses to 
record his forgotten memories. It is at this point in the preface that Jean Paul stages the “primal 
scene” of writing as a medial conjuncture between the sequentiality of the narrative whole and the 
serialization of the parts, namely by invoking Moser’s name for the first time in connection with 
his own process of writing: “Steht es dir denn nicht frei, wie Herr von Moser zu arbeiten (der 
Gevatter und Vorläufer deiner Zettelkästen), der in seinem Leben keinen zusammenhängenden 
Bogen geschrieben, sondern nur Aphorismen, Gnomen, Sinnsprüche, kurz nichts mit 
Flechtwerk?”353 Here he places Moser’s slip box system, as a technique for organizing written 
material, in opposition to his previous attempts at composing the preface in the course of his me-
andering peregrinations “wie ein Zwickstein,”354 which according to Grimm’s Wörterbuch refers 
to “kleine keilförmige steine, mit denen man löcher im pflaster und in mauern ausfüllt.”355 In con-
trast to “wickerwork” [Flechtwerk] or “pinch stones” [Zwicksteine], both of which hold the prom-
ise of a meticulously hand-crafted, gap-free whole, Jean Paul opts instead for Moser’s approach, 
                                                
351 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 16. 
352 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 19. 
353 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 19. 
354 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 19. 




which he suggestively likens in this passage to an aphoristic form of writing – one which far more 
resembles a kind of collage-work or bricolage, such that no sheets of papers or the thoughts which 
have been written down on them either logically “cohere” or even physically “hang together” 
[zusammenhängen]. 
 To be sure, as numerous scholars have rightly pointed out, Jean Paul himself did not make 
use of Moser’s slip box technology to compose his novels. Yet his repeated references in Quintus 
Fixlein to Moser’s slip boxes and Daniel Georg Morfhof’s “polyhistoric” art of excerpting, as well 
as the pervasive motif of collection, hint at the foundations of his own method of text-production 
as an attempt to surpass the medial constraints of the book. As is well known, Jean Paul’s writing 
bases itself, as it were, on a complex apparatus for managing information in the form of his prodi-
gious collection of excerpts. For this reason, Markus Krajevski argues that the juxtaposition of 
Aubin/Fixlein constitutes a medial conjuncture in Jean Paul’s work. For Krajevski, Jean Paul’s 
method of excerpting, a fictional account of which he claims Jean Paul sketches out in “Die 
Taschenbibliothek,” is not nearly as radical as either Moser’s real slip boxes or Fixlein’s fake ones, 
since it still remains confined to the medial and epistemological limitations of the bound book 
format. Yet in making this media-archaeological claim, Krajevski overlooks the material contin-
gency of Jean Paul’s excerpting method in that he misreads the excerpts as evidence of a baroque, 
polyhistoric tendency. As Götz Müller among others has shown, the keyword for Jean Paul with 
respect to his excerpts is that of play: Jean Paul ascribes to his own method of excerpting a striking 
degree of contingency, in which “Ideen aus allen Wissenschaften ohne bestimmtes gerades Ziel – 
weder künstlerisches noch wissenschaftliches – sich nicht wie Gifte, sondern wie Karten mischten 
und folglich, ähnlich dem Lessingschen geistigen Würfeln, dem etwas eintrügen, der durch Spiele 
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zu gewinnen wüßte.”356 In his excerpts, and especially in the register to his excerpts, Jean Paul 
abandons the traditional loci communes and establishes an entirely new order of things, one which 
depends on the contingency of the aleatory throw of dice and on the idiosyncrasy of the excerpter, 
rather than on logical necessity or pre-established categories of knowledge. 
 By exposing the material interfaces of the novel and foregrounding the scholarly media 
technology that first make possible its production, Jean Paul’s Quintus Fixlein presents a concep-
tion of writing that is fundamentally at odds with the approach of another avid excerpter and slip 
box user around 1800, namely G. W. F. Hegel. In 1785, the same year in which Moser died and 
left behind instructions for how to replicate his system, the fifteen year old Hegel began to dili-
gently transcribe excerpts onto loose sheets of paper. According to his biographer, Karl 
Rosenkranz, Hegel maintained this method of excerpting books throughout his entire life: 
Bei seiner Lektüre ging er nun folgendermaaßen zu Werke. Alles, was ihm be-
merkenswerth schien – und was schien es ihm nicht! – schrieb er auf ein einzelnes 
Blatt, welches er oberhalb mit der allgemeinen Rubrik bezeichnete, unter welche 
der besondere Inhalt subsumiert werden mußte. In die Mitte des oberen Randes 
schrieb er dann mit großen Buchstaben, nicht selten mit Frakturschrift das Stich-
wort des Artikels. Diese Blätter selbst ordnete er für sich wieder nach dem Alphabet 
und war mittelst dieser einfachen Vorrichtung im Stande, seine Excerpte jeden Au-
genblick zu benutzen.357 
 
Although Hegel made extensive use of the slip box system, he made one decisive and far-reaching 
modification to Moser’s method. As Friedrich Kittler argues, the reformulation of excerpts into 
new texts transforms the copyist into an artist and author. By erasing all traces of bibliographic 
references, Hegel’s index cards constituted an archive of knowledge that allowed for easy retrieval 
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357 Karl Rosenkranz, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegels Leben (Berlin: Dunker & Humbolt, 1844), 12f; cited in Stefan 




of information while simultaneously concealing his sources, nowhere more so than in his philo-
sophical magnum opus the Phenomenology of Spirit, which elides most proper names – even Kant 
is only mentioned once – and scholarly footnotes, as well as veils the medial and material condi-
tions of text production. Hence, for Kittler, Hegel’s “absolute Spirit” in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit appears as a “versteckter Zettelkasten.”358 
 Thus while Hegel sought to suppress the technical materiality that renders possible his 
idealist theory of the “absolute Spirit,” for Jean Paul, by contrast, there is no possibility of an 
absolute spirit which is capable of recollecting and storing all information, only the carnivalesque 
contingency of the distilled Spiritus. In Quintus Fixlein, he foregrounds the materialities and media 
technologies that condition the production of text and its forms of literary representation. This is 
the double perspectivization of humor, which by introducing the motif of the slip box as an all-
encompassing frame device makes possible the inversion of perspective from that of narrative 
order – the perspective from which the entire archive of knowledge contained in the slip box can 
be surveyed – to the “micrological” materiality of writing. From this perspective, Fixlein’s “knee-
lever” [Registerzug] can consequently be read as a paronomastic allusion to the “register” Jean 
Paul employs in his own excerpting system, which brings his and Fixlein’s respective idiosyncratic 
methods for organizing information into proximity. By likening both to the performance of a mu-
sical instrument that can be turned around again and again through the random selection of index 
cards, the novel envisions scholarly knowledge-organization as an aleatory game of chance. Not 
coincidentally, contingency is already embodied in Fixlein’s name, which alludes to the 
                                                
358 Friedrich Kittler, “Memories Are Made of You,” in: Schrift, Medien, Kognition: Über die Exteriorität des Geistes, 
eds. Peter Koch and Sybille Krämer (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 1997), 197; see also: Krajevski, Zettelwirtschaft, in 
particular 67. For more on Hegel’s method of excerpting and its relationship to his transformation of scientific data 
into a philosophical subject, cf. Friedrich Kittler, Die Nacht der Substanz (Bern: Benteli, 1989). 
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“Quinterne,” the five-number Roman “lottery of chance” [Lotto des Zufalls].359 In its narration of 
the contingent series of fortunate promotions that accompany Fixlein throughout his life, the novel 
stages the transformation of the contingency of life – from the lowest-level of the lotto, the Auszug 
– and the material contingency of writing – the material trace of the “excerpt” [Auszug] – into the 
cohesion of narrative order, which only retroactively appears as an autotelic end in the form of a 
fortunate “fate” – in other words, the Auszug as Quinterne.  
                                                
359 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 141. 
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5. SMALL FORMS, PART II: “DOPPELTE FRAKTUREN.” ON THE 
CORPOREALITY OF THE INFINITELY SMALL (MEINE MISZELLEN) 
 
Jean Pauls große Formen sind so wenig reine Art, wie er als Dichter reine Art ist: er ist ein 
gemischt-Mischender, und jeden Augenblick droht seine Kunst in ihre Elemente zurück-
zubrechen.360 
 
—Max Kommerell, Jean Paul 
 
 Der Autor ist eine Art Bienenwirt für den Leser-Schwarm, dem zu Gefallen er die Flora, 
die er für ihn hält, in verschiedene Zeiten verteilt und die Aufblüte mancher Blumen hier 
beschleunigt, dort verschiebt, damit es in allen Kapiteln blühe. –361 
 
—Jean Paul, Leben des Quintus Fixlein 
 
Between the years 1810 and 1820 Jean Paul collected a series of his fragmentary short texts from 
newspapers and other literary annuals such as almanacs and paperbacks, and republished them in 
three volumes under the name Herbst-Blumine, oder gesammelte Werkchen aus Zeitschriften.362 
This eclectic anthology of literary ephemera and marginal miscellanies, whose transience is re-
flected in titles like “Die Junius-Nacht-Gedanken,” “Nachlese für die Levana,” “Meine 
Miszellen,” and “Poetische Kleinigkeiten,” brings together an extraordinarily heterogeneous array 
of different kinds of texts. Their printed origins from newspapers, paperbacks and so-called 
Musen-Almanache363 recall the typological interconnection between a variety of different literary 
publication formats, such as satires, miscellanies, almanacs and journals, which distinguished 
themselves through their hybrid character, mixing prose with poetry, satire with sentimentality, 
                                                
360 Kommerell, Jean Paul, 82. 
361 Jean Paul, Werke, I/4, 151. 
362 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 109–618. 
363 While the publication format of the Musenalmanach, a kind of literary annual widespread in the 19th century, is 
originally of French origin – a German translation of the French Almanach des Muses, which was first published by 
Claude-Sixte Sautreau de Marsy in 1765 – its popularity in Germany can be dated back to roughly 1770 with the 
publication of the Göttinger Musenalmanach by Johann Christian Dietrich. Perhaps the most famous example of the 
genre, however, is Friedrich Schiller’s Musen-Almanach (1796–1800), whose contributors included Johann Wolfgang 
von Goethe, Johann Gottfried Herder, Ludwig Tieck, Friedrich Hölderlin and August Wilhelm Schlegel. 
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dream diaries with fictional epistles. For mixed collections of texts such as these, which in the 19th 
century frequently bore titles like “Miszellaneen,” “Museum,” “Kritische Wälder,” and “Ver-
mischte Schriften,” the only applicable motto would be: “Variatio delectat.”364 
 In the title of Herbst-Blumine, Jean Paul suggestively refers to his own literary miscellanies 
not as “works,” Werke, but instead as “minor works” – Werkchen. The diminutive term “Werk-
chen,” which implies the meaning of a ‘small whole,’ foregrounds not only the smallness and 
brevity of the collected short texts – particularly in contrast to his notoriously lengthy and digres-
sive novels such as Titan (1800–03), which encompasses four volumes and stretches over 900 
pages – but also their materiality and ephemerality as print objects. For in contrast to “major” 
works of literature, “minor works” are fleeting, corporeal, and finite. Unlike novels or books, they 
will not be preserved in the public library system, and hence are destined to quickly vanish from 
the book market. The narrator of the preface to the first volume of Herbst-Blumine specifically 
alludes to this medial circumstance when he observes that “nichts sich so schnell aus den Taschen 
verliert als Taschenbücher und keine in die Obstkammern öffentlicher Bibliotheken kommen.”365 
In fact, the very title of the compendium, “Herbst-Blumine,” alludes in a witty manner to this 
circumstance in at least two respects, first by likening the short lifespan of literary anthologies – 
literally Blumensammlungen – to the seasonality of “autumn crocuses” [Herbst-Blumen], and se-
cond by paronomastically linking the autumn crocus, which as the narrator observers are a “poi-
sonous” [giftig] and hence “unenjoyed”  [ungenossen] species of flower, to the “unenjoyed” and 
“forgotten” minor works included in the anthology.366 
                                                
364 Johann Georg Gessler chose this motto for his “Satyrisch-moralisches Allerley voller anmuthigen Erzählungen und 
Gedichte” (Ulm u. Leipzig 1762). 
365 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 115. 
366 “Taschenbücher erscheinen im Herbste als Herbstblumen oder Zeitlosen (welcher letztere Name auf sie doppelt 
paßt, da nichts sich so schnell aus den Taschen verliert als Taschenbücher und keine in die Obstkammern öffentlicher 
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 The preface to the first volume of Herbst-Blumine thereby explicitly positions the collected 
edition in relation to the genre tradition of the florilegium, whose etymological origins derive from 
the phrase “a gathering of flowers,” and refers to a compilation of excerpts from writing. While 
the genre of the florilegium dates as far back to antiquity, from which point onward it became 
associated with the rhetorical tradition of inventio and, relatedly, with the capricious ordering of 
reference-, excerpt-, and commonplace-books,367 around 1800 the miscellany – whether it was in 
the German states, England, France, or the United States – served a crucial ordering function in an 
age of too much writing. Unlike the contemporaneous format of the collected edition or anthology, 
which was an attempt to re-inscribe the wild proliferation of scattered, fleeting publications back 
into a unified discursive format – namely, the book – under a unified authorship, for in most cases 
it was the author who deliberately assembled the selection of their own works for the purposes of 
republication, the miscellany of the 19th century was not organized around the unifying figure of 
the author, but instead around the figure of the reader.368 “Where the collected edition aimed to 
canonize its author and in the process create a literary canon, the miscellany was far more a docu-
ment of the carnivalesque impulse to undo such rules, standards, or means. With the absence of 
any obvious organizing principle and the simultaneous presence of high, low, and outright weird 
texts, the romantic miscellany authorized the reader to create the linkages between such cultural 
                                                
Bibliotheken kommen und da sie nach keiner Zeit fragen, sondern schon im Jahre 1810 sich um eine Jahrszahl älter 
ausgeben). Bedenkt man vollends, daß die Herbstblumen giftig sind, auf der Weide ungenossen bleiben (hier muß 
man sich große Schul- und Geschäftsmänner denken, die es tun), und daß sie ihre Früchte erst nach Dreivierteljahren 
tragen: so glaub' ich meinem meistens aus Herbst- oder Michaeliskalendern gesammelten Strauße nur mäßig mit dem 
schönen Titel Herbst-Blumen geschmeichelt zu haben” (ibid.). 
367 For more on the literary tradition of florilegia in the early modern period, especially in relation to the miscellanies 
of the Renaissance, see Ann M. Blair, Too Much to Know, in particular 126–131. 
368 For more on the distinction between collected editions and miscellany, especially in 19th-century British literature, 
see Barbara M. Benedict, “Collecting and the Anthology in Early Modern Culture,” in: Barbara Korte, Ralf Schneider, 
and Stefanie Lethbridge (eds.), Anthologies of British Poetry: Critical Perspectives from Literary and Cultural Studies 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001), 43–55. 
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strata.”369 It was not just any reader, then, that the 19th-century miscellany appealed to, but the 
growing community of readers who were trained in the techniques of literary “flower picking”: of 
skimming, selection, and collection. Hence, what distinguishes the miscellany of the 19th century 
from its generic predecessors in antiquity and the Renaissance is that its emergence around 1800 
coincided with both the “transition from the cyclicality to the seriality of cultural production”370 
and with the re-orientation of the book market, which in the early-19th century witnessed the rapid 
proliferation of cheap, easily produced and consumed “paperbacks” [Taschenbücher], around an 
ever-expanding reading public who consumed books in a far more fragmentary, selective, and non-
linear manner.371 
 Against this background, Jean Paul’s Herbst-Blumine can perhaps be read as the outcome 
of two mutually contradictory medial logics. On the one hand, the unification of scattered miscel-
lanies into the discursive format of the collected edition or anthology reflects in part a pragmatic 
calculation to grant his numerous short, fleeting texts an afterlife on the book market and to rein-
force, in turn, the unity and canonical stature of his authorship. Jean Paul had in fact already ex-
perimented with just such a strategy at least a year prior to the release of the first volume of Herbst-
Blumine. In 1809, he published the first of three volumes of his novel Dr. Katzenbergers Ba-
dereise; nebst einer Auswahl verbesserten Werkchen. The “selection of minor works” [Auswahl 
verbesserten Werkchen] which accompanied the first volume of Dr. Katzenberger consisted for 
                                                
369 Cf. Piper, Dreaming in Books, in particular 121–25, here: 122. 
370 Ibid., 123. 
371 “Der im Laufe des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts expandierende Buchmarkt beeinflußt in hohem Maße die Lesege-
wohnheiten des gleichfalls immer zahlreicher werdenden Publikums. […] Der Viel-Seitigkeit der Romane steht in-
folge dieses Befalls bzw. infolge des merkantilen Booms oft inhaltliche Einseitigkeit entgegen, der Leser beginnt zu 
blättern. Unter dem Stichwort ‘Blattlausfruchtbarkeit’ übt Jean Paul auch in der Kleinen Nachschule zur ästhetischen 
Vorschule (1825) Kritik an der zeitgenössischen Romanflut, die allein auf Quantität statt auf Qualität setzt und so 
ihrerseits das blätternde, ennuyierte Lesen befördert” (Ulrike Hagel, “Vielseitige ‘Blattlausfruchtbarkeit’ bei Jean 
Paul,” in: Literatur als Blättwerk. Perspektiven einer nichtlinearen Lektüre, eds. Jürgen Gunia and Iris Hermann (St. 
Ingbert 2002), 241–58, here: 242f). On this point, see also: Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, in particular 143–
48, as well as Piper, Dreaming in Books, 125. 
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the most part of revised almanac and paperback entries or date back to his early satirical collec-
tions. In the introduction to Dr. Katzenberger, he cites literary short formats such as Taschenkal-
ender, almanacs, and newspapers in order to justify the seemingly capricious juxtaposition of the-
oretical texts, fictional prose, and paratextual material included within the frame of a single book: 
“Mit den Taschenkalendern und Zeitschriften müssen die kleinen vermischten Werkchen so zu-
nehmen – weil die Schriftsteller jene mit den besten Beiträgen zu unterstützen haben –, daß man 
am Ende kaum ein großes mehr schreibt.”372 To be sure, he parodies here the medial relations 
around 1800 which led to the acceleration of book-production and text-circulation, with the result 
that ever more “kleinen vermischten Werkchen” began to flood the book market in ever shorter 
amounts of time.373 
 On the other hand, the medial conjuncture between “major” and “minor” works – between 
Werk and Werkchen, between novel and miscellany – in Jean Paul’s oeuvre is neither merely prag-
matic nor satirical. Although he most often used the designation “Werkchen” pragmatically – al-
most all of his so-called “Werkchen” are reprises of his submissions to newspapers and almanacs 
– he also lent it critical potential by opposing it to the “major” work of literature, that is, to the 
canonical and the formally closed. Both Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise and Herbst-Blumine present 
a tendency toward the breakdown and dismemberment of narrative closure by mixing “minor” 
publication formats into “major” works of literature, namely that of the novel. What Jean Paul later 
                                                
372 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 81. 
373 With his frequent references to the economic dispositifs of book-printing and the book-market in connection with 
the concept of “minor work,” Jean Paul doubtlessly aligns himself with this satirical tradition which inveighed against 
the encroachment of popular literature on the book market to the detriment of major literary works, such as those of 
Christian Ludwig Liscow’s Vortrefflichkeit und Nothwendigkeit der elenden Scribenten (1734) and Friedrich Justus 
Riedel’s newspaper Bibliothek der elenden Scribenten (1768). At the same time, as Magnus Wieland argues, Jean 
Paul’s reflections on the material conditions of text-production around 1800 are also of central poetological signifi-
cance to his writing. Cf. Wieland, “Jean Pauls Sudelbibliothek. Makulatur als poetologische Chiffre,” in: Jahrbuch 
der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft 46 (2011), 97–119. See also: Hagel, “Vielseitige ‘Blattlausfruchtbarkeit’ bei Jean Paul”; 
Schäfer, “Jean Pauls monströses Schreiben”; Schmidt-Hannisa, “Lesarten.” 
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called “Werkchen” may thus be read in part as a successor format to his earlier preoccupation with 
small, marginal, and fleeting literary forms, whose two principle characteristics are – not coinci-
dentally – the satirical and the paratextual. This includes the “satirischen Essigfabrik”374 of his 
early satirical collections, namely the Grönländische Prozesse (1783) and the Auswahl aus des 
Teufels Papiere (1789), as well as the numerous digressive paratexts that Jean Paul frequently 
grafted onto his books, such as the “comic appendix” which he appended to Titan (1800–03), the 
desultory “extra bits of paper” [Extrablättchen] such as the “Mußteil für Mädchen” and “Jus de 
tablette für Mannspersonen” which inexplicably frame the novel Leben des Quintus Fixlein 
(1796); or they present themselves as collections of fragments, “remarks” [Bemerkungen], 
“Schwefelblumen,”375 and other miscellaneous collectanea which proliferate into potentially end-
less compendia – none more so, arguably, than Jean Paul’s massive collection of excerpts, which 
he gathered from nearly every conceivable domain of knowledge and juxtaposed in a manner that 
he likened to the aleatory throw of dice.376 
 If one considers the traditional conception of the literary work as it prevailed in the early 
nineteenth-century – especially with an eye toward the model of classicism –, then closure, con-
sistency, necessity and the coherence of outer and inner form are its fundamental characteristics. 
Integration, in other words, is the decisive criteria for this conception of “work.” The literature and 
literary criticism of the 19th century advocated for such a work-concept, and the reception of Jean 
Paul’s writings has been determined by it ever since.377 In 1923, Rudolf Alexander Schröder ad-
vised readers of Jean Paul’s novels – acknowledging the ‘miscellaneous’ character of his writing 
– to separate the “Spreu vom Weizen, […] das Ganze in seine gesonderten Eidyllien zu zerlegen 
                                                
374 Jean Paul, Werke, I/1, 15. 
375 Jean Paul, Flegeljahre, in: Werke, I/2, 634–37. 
376 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 202f. 
377 Cf. Schmidt-Hannisa, “Lesarten,” 42–43. See also Schäfer, “Jean Pauls monströses Schreiben,” 216–20. 
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und dann jedes einzelne rein zu genießen.” What gets lost in this filtering – namely the “chaff” 
[Spreu] – is according to Schröder nothing but “ein in bezug auf Jean Paul im Grunde unwesent-
liches.”378 With such explanations, the reader is confirmed as well-versed in the techniques of 
reading florilegia, and in fact Jean Paul’s works are till this day still characterized by this selective, 
‘excerpting’ way of reading. Similar judgments present themselves in the reviews of Jean Paul’s 
works by his contemporaries. “Die häufigen Digressionen,” reads one review of Die unsichtbare 
Loge from 1794, “erwecken nicht die Aufmerksamkeit, sondern die Ungeduld der Leser.”379 A 
reviewer of Hesperus likens the novel to a piece of forest, “in welchem nur das üppige Buschwerk, 
das die schönsten Baumgruppen und Aussichten versteckt, vorsichtig ausgehauen zu werden 
braucht, um sich in einen romantischen Garten zu verwandeln.”380 Another sees in Siebenkäs a 
kind of “Fachwerk,” into which Jean Paul “den Reichtum seiner Ideen ordnet; und seine Schriften 
gleichen daher einem Museum, in welchem eine Menge von Kunstwerken zusammengestellt sind, 
die zwar einzeln genommen die Aufmerksamkeit der Betrachtenden auf sich ziehn, aber nicht bes-
timmt sind, durch ihre Gruppierung die Idee eines schönen Ganzen zu geben.”381 In the 20th cen-
tury, it was arguably the literary critic Robert Minder who best summarized such views when he 
confessed that reading Jean Paul constitutes a unique lesson in “das Geheimrezept aller Litera-
turwissenschaft (wie sonst denn fräse sich unserein je durch den Bücherhirsebrei hindurch?) das 
Darüberhinweglesenkönnen, nobler gesagt: die Geschwindigkeitsregelung.”382 
 While many readers and critics still widely regard Jean Paul as an author of notoriously 
long, unwieldy texts, exemplified by digressive novels like Hesperus, oder 45 Hundposttage 
                                                
378 R. A. Schröder, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2 (Berlin/Frankfurt a. M.: 1952), 697. 
379 Neue allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, vol. 11 (Kiel 1794), 317. 
380 Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 317, November 26, 1795, 417–22. 
381 Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, 361, November 17, 1796, 425–29. 
382 Robert Minder, “Jean Paul oder die Verlassenheit des Genius,” in: Jean Paul, ed. Uwe Schwiekert, 266–76, here: 
67, cited in Fleming, Pleasures of Abandonment, 19. 
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(1795), Siebenkäs (1796–97), and Titan, which in many cases stretch multiple volumes and en-
compass hundreds or even thousands of pages, this article makes the case for the reading of Jean 
Paul above all as a writer of small forms. According to Ulrich Stadler’s formulation, “small forms” 
are distinguished above all by their smallness, fragmentariness and brevity, and cover a broad 
range of genres, from “Beispiel, Facetie, Apophthegma, Kalendargeschichte, Fabel, Anekdote, 
Idylle, Pastorelle,” to “Aphorismus, Fragment, [und] Kurzgeschichte.”383 That Jean Paul experi-
mented with such a conception of “work” as a small, open form – namely what he calls “minor 
works” or Werkchen – in which the decomposition of narration went further than many of his 
readers were willing to go, does not exclude the obvious fact that he primarily wrote novels. For 
there is another kind of “small form” – one which is, paradoxically, potentially infinite in length, 
and which Stadler himself excludes from his definition: namely the compendium of excerpts. 
Again and again, it is the ‘excerpted’ character of Jean Paul’s texts – their disturbingly heteroge-
neous, ‘miscellaneous’ manner of representation and excessive intertextuality – which readers fre-
quently complained about and which threatens at every point to overstep the formal strictures of 
the novel as a closed form. Admittedly, the novel in its origins proved itself to be a unique medium 
of formal experimentation – a kind of “poetic encyclopedia,”384 with openness counting as one of 
its essential attributes. Yet as a primarily plot-oriented medium, as it was influentially conceived 
of by Friedrich von Blanckenburg in his poetological treatise Versuch über den Roman (1774),385 
                                                
383 Cf. Ulrich Stadler, “Kleines Kunstwerk, kleines Buch und kleine Form,” 15. 
384 This is how Jean Paul himself understands and defines the novel in the Vorschule der Ästhetik, in which he writes 
that the novel is “eine poetische Enzyklopädie, eine poetische Freiheit aller poetischen Freiheiten” (Jean Paul, Werke, 
I/5, 233). From this perspective, Wolfgang Proß influentially describes the form of Jean Paul’s novels “als ‘poetische 
Enzyklopädie’”: as an encyclopedia, “in einem ganz wörtlichen Sinn […] als ein Netzwerk von wissenschaftlichen 
Aussagen […], die aufeinander Bezug nehmen,” and as “‘poetisch,’ weil die wissenschaftlich-philosophischen 
Grundlagen in der Ära Kant ihrer einheitlichen, naturrechtlichen Fundierung verlustig gehen” (Wolfgang Proß, Jean 
Pauls geschichtliche Stellung [Tübingen 1975], 170). 
385 For this reason, Blanckenburg not only forbids digression, which separates, rather than integrates, the individual 
parts of narration from the whole of the novel, but also condemns the epistolary novel due to its lack of progression 
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the novel cannot be considered “open” to the extent that it is premised on the epic integration, 
rather than the separation, of the individual parts of the narration into a cohesive, unified whole – 
in other words, a “work” in the sense of “eines schönen Ganzen,” as the reviewer of Siebenkäs 
wrote. 
 In order to advance the claim that Jean Paul be understood above all as a writer of small 
forms, this article will examine one of his “minor works” included in Herbst-Blumine entitled 
“Meine Miszellen.” There it will be shown how the ephemerality and fragmentariness of the mis-
cellany serves as an experimental medium for an alternative method of text-production – one which 
seeks to foreground at the material level the contingency of writing – its production, distribution, 
and circulation – as finite and decomposable. The formal influence of the newspapers as a discur-
sive medium is crucial in this respect, for newspapers are “unabgeschlossene, dynamische Medien 
der Wissensproduktion,”386 and Jean Pauls proximity to journalistic methods of text-production 
presents itself not only in his adoption of individual genres – these include paratextual inserts such 
as “Extra-,” “Morgen-,” “Real-,” and “Intelligenzblätter” – but also in the radical exteriority of his 
writings. In the discursive-historical context not only of classicist aesthetics, but also of romanti-
cism and the discourse of hermeneutics, Jean Paul’s conception of the literary work as a kind of 
recycled piece of secondary text – what he calls “Werkchen” – thereby gains subversive potential 
as a hybrid literary form, as a play with multiple authorships, “die über die Grenze einzelner Texte 
hinsausreichen oder such innerhalb eines Textes zum Autorenkollektiv formieren, […] eine 
                                                
and interconnection of the inner and outer existence of the persons. Cf. Christian Friedrich von Blanckenburg, Versuch 
über den Roman (Stuttgart 1965), in particular 56–58. 
386 Stephan Pabst, “‘Herr Gedruckt.’ Fingierte Autorschaft als Funktion der Wissensorganisation in Jean Pauls Leben 
Fibels,” in: Kunst und Wissen. Beziehungen zwischen Ästhetik und Erkenntnistheorie im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, eds. 
Astrid Bauereisen, Stefan Pabst, Achim Vesper (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2009), 237f. 
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Wiederverwertung bestimmter Textpassagen […], die Auflösung der Ganzheit zugunsten poten-
ziell infiniter Medien der Textproduktion, der fließende Übergang zwischen Poesie und paratheo-
retischen Reflexionen etc.”387 A close engagement with his short text “Meine Miszellen” thus aims 
to show how his notoriously fragmentary manner of representation gains central poetological and 
epistemological significance in his writing. 
 In “Meine Miszellen,” the nexus of the small and fragmentary is reflected first and foremost 
in the text’s unusual, collage-like method of text-production. Not only is the edition of the text 
included in Herbst-Blumine itself recycled from an earlier work that was first published several 
years earlier, namely in the yearly almanac Taschenbuch der Liebe und Freundschaft gewidmet, 
but each of the text’s three separate sections – consisting respectively of satirical aphorisms (“Nro. 
1: Bemerkungen über den Menschen”), a somnambular epistle (“Nro. 2: Springbrief wines Nacht-
wandlers”), and a collection of sentimental lyric written in so-called “polymetric” verse (“Nro. 3: 
Polymeter”) – were likewise first published as standalone texts, numerous passages of which are 
taken directly from previous books, collections, and manuscripts.388 From the perspective of its 
‘hybrid’ principle of composition, the significance of the title of the text comes closer into view. 
For just as the broader arrangement of “minor works” included in Herbst-Blumine or those grafted 
onto Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise are not at all merely random or contingent in their ordering, but 
arranged according to a principle of serial sequentiality for the purposes of an “intensification” 
                                                
387 Ibid., 238. 
388 The first section of Meine Miszellen, “Nro. 1: Bemerkungen über den Menschen,” is taken largely without revision 
from Jean Paul’s collection of aphorisms, entitled “Bemerkungen verschiedener Autoren,” which was first published 
as part of his posthumous writings. Earlier drafts of the second and third sections of the text, “Nro. 2: Springbrief eines 
Nachtwandlers” and “Nro. 3: Polymeter,” were likewise published independently prior to their inclusion in “Meine 
Miszellen”; a version of the latter, for instance, was first mentioned in the novel Flegeljahre (1804/05) and subse-
quently included as one of the “minor works” appended to Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise. 
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[Steigerung] of rhythmic variation,389 so too does the seemingly capricious juxtaposition of three 
different kinds of texts – namely satirical “remarks,” epistolary narration, and sentimental verse – 
into a single “minor work” serve the crucial function of variatio, which in addition to the rhetorical 
attributes of brevitas and ordo artificialis represent the principle characteristics of the pseudo-
genre of the “miscellany.”390 In fact, already in the first line of “Meine Miszellen,” Jean Paul ex-
plicitly aligns his text with precisely this genre tradition by citing a list of contemporaneous mis-
cellanies from around the world in order to justify the production of his own idiosyncratic rendi-
tion. There he asks the reader, “Wenn es russische, englische, französische etc. Miszellen gibt, 
warum soll es nicht deutsche geben? Und wenn diese, warum nicht auch meine?”391 The cunning 
irony of this hypophoric turn-of-phrase lies in Jean Paul’s characteristic tendency toward citation 
of genre, which engenders impurities, corruptions, and contaminations of any genre designation.392 
The citation of genre is thus a “differential concept that makes it possible to trace not so much the 
accordance with a supposed ideal type but the dynamics of historical modulations.”393 
 Hence, just as the genre designation “A kind of idyll,” which appears on the title page of 
Schulmeisterlein Wutz, marks a modulation of the genre of the idyll, so too does Jean Paul’s cita-
tion of the (pseudo-)genre “miscellany” within the paratextual threshold of “Meine Miszellen” 
distinguish it both from its predecessors in antiquity as well as its contemporaneous manifestation 
in the romantic miscellanies of the 19th century. As will be argued in the following pages, Jean 
                                                
389 “Für die Werkchen gilt insgesamt zunächst das Prinzip der Addition, doch beginnt jede Gruppe mit einem sati-
rischen Text und wird durch einen unsatirischen, ersten geschlossen” (Peter Horst Neumann, “Die Werkchen als Werk: 
Zur Form- und Wirkungsgeschichte des Katzenberger-Korpus von Jean Paul,” in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesell-
schaft 10 [1975], 151–86, here: 176). 
390 Cf. R. B. Kremer, “Miszellen,” in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, vol. 10 (2011), 711–16. 
391 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 129. These include the Miszellen für die neueste Weltkunde (1807), as well as the “Russische 
Miszellen” (1803/4), “Englische Miszellen” (1806) and “Französischen Miszellen” (1803–06). For further citational 
information of miscellanies referenced by Jean Paul in “Meine Miszellen,” cf. Jean Paul, “Kommentar zu den Ver-
mischten Schriften,” in: Werke, II/3, 578–79. 
392 For more on the paradoxical order of genre, see Derrida, “The Law of Genre.” 
393 Krauß, “Epistemologies of Citation in Jean Paul,” 78. 
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Paul’s citation of the genre “miscellany” opens up the space for his own experimental form of 
fragmentary writing. It is not without coincidence that he cites not a canonical genre, but a ‘kind 
of’ genre – the “miscellany” – whose principle characteristic is that it eludes any and all subsump-
tion under a higher generic principle or unity as well as the traditional conventions of authorship. 
It is the paradoxical genre of no genre, or perhaps the genre of the heterogeneous, which Jean Paul 
imbues with the capacity dismantle every “major” form and disperse every unity or law of sub-
sumption under a higher generic principle. 
 Before proceeding further, it must be asked at this point to what extent Jean Paul’s citation 
of the genre “miscellany” in “Meine Miszellen” approximates another, far better known kind of 
small form around 1800: namely the romantic fragment. A quick glance at the startling mixture of 
different genres in “Meine Miszellen” – aphorism, epistle, and lyrical verse – immediately recalls 
Friedrich Schlegel’s famous dictum that romantic literature ought to bring together all genres of 
poetry, rhetoric and philosophy, so that “Poesie und Prosa, Genialität und Kritik, Kunstpoesie und 
Naturpoesie bald mischen, bald verschmelzen.”394 Schlegel’s ambiguous invocation of the words 
“mischen” and “verschmelzen” with regard to the poetic program of romantic Universalpoesie 
leaves to a certain extent unanswered the question as to whether the fragment – or, for that matter, 
the romantic novel – ought to strive toward integration in its reflective “hovering” [Schwebe]. To 
be sure, while both small forms – miscellany and fragment – may be said to present a conception 
of writing whose fragmentariness opposes both systematic and narrative closure. Yet Jean Paul’s 
recourse to the marginal and pragmatic genre tradition of the “miscellany” may be read as a poetic 
calculation to open up the small form of the fragment to a greater degree of heterogeneity than the 
form of the romantic fragment – in Schlegel’s specific sense – allowed for at this point in time. By 
                                                
394 Friedrich Schlegel, KA, I/2, 114. 
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1810, the year in which the first volume of Herbst-Blumine was published and nearly a decade 
after the publication of Friedrich Schlegel’s Lyceums- and Athenäums-Fragmente (1797/98), the 
romantic fragment had advanced to an aesthetic norm – one that was subsequently canonized as a 
philosophical genre.395 
 In this discursive-historical context, “Meine Miszellen” brings fragmentary writing to bear 
on the tradition of the romantic fragment itself. There Jean Paul “überall seine nettesten romanti-
schen Gestalten anheftet und umhängt,”396 standing the romantic genre tradition on its head and 
transforming it into an object of satire and critique. In the confrontation between romantic fragment 
and miscellany, it will be argued that Jean Paul’s concept of humor thus comes to play a decisive 
role. The resistance in “Meine Miszellen” to “mix” and “melt” all genres together shows how, 
despite the resemblances between these two small forms, Schlegel’s emphasis on hybridity and 
mixture proceeds in the exact opposite direction as Jean Paul’s “Meine Miszellen,” which deploys 
the small form of the miscellany as an experimental medium of text-production in order to expose 
at the material level the contingency of writing – in other words, humor as the “inverted sublime.” 
Thus in contrast to Schlegel’s theory of romantic irony, which seeks to transcendentally uncouple 
the epistemological from the material through the infinite approximation of the absolute, Jean 
Paul’s humor serves as the privileged form-theoretical instrument in his texts for exposing the 
                                                
395 Around 1800, the fragment was taken up in particular by philosophers of nature, as in F. W. J. Schelling’s Apho-
rismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie (1806/1807), which despite its title conforms much more closely to the 
formal conditions of the fragment laid out by Schlegel than to those of the aphoristic tradition; in Henrich Steffen’s 
Grundzüge der philosophischen Naturwissenschaft, which explicitly cites Schelling’s fragmentary-aphoristic ap-
proach as its model; as well as in J. W. Ritter’s Fragmente aus dem Nachlass eines jungen Physikers (1810). While 
these later fragmentary works still operate to a certain extent within the transcendental framework established by 
Schlegel and the Romantics, who saw in the constrained form of the fragment the possibility of unlimited meaning-
production, their primary orientation concerns not the critical epistemology of linguistic reflection, but rather the 
presentation of ideas of a philosophical system which in its totality lies outside the field of representability. For more 
on the fragment, and more broadly the aphorism, as a philosophical form around 1800, see Heinz Krüger, Über den 
Aphorismus als philosophische Form (Munich 1988), in particular 60–75. 
396 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 134. 
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small, fragmentary, and corporeal materiality of writing, which in “Meine Miszellen" gains epis-
temology significance in connection with his own small and fragmentary procedure of writing.397 
 
5.1. Skim Reading: Dispersing Remarks in “Bemerkungen über den Menschen” 
In the first section of “Meine Miszellen,” entitled “Nro. 1: Bemerkungen über den Menschen,” 
Jean Paul presents a heterogeneous collection of witty “remarks,” many of which are taken directly 
from an expansive collection of apothegm that he began to compile starting approximately around 
1780.398 With the title’s anthropological theme, these remarks are situated within a specific literary 
topos – one that approximates the anthropological thinking of Jean Paul’s mentor Ernst Platner, 
and specifically the fragmentary-aphoristic style of the latter’s anthropological treatise Anthropol-
ogie für Aerzte und Weltweise (1772). These remarks, which are extremely brevity – one or two 
sentences at most – and greatly vary in their content, ranging from satirical gender clichés to po-
litical and moral discourse, sentimental anecdotes to witty reflections on philosophy and literature, 
thus conform on the one hand to the rhetorical attributes of the miscellany,399 while on the other 
hand its apothegmatic style bears a striking proximity to Jean Paul’s own poetics of “wit” [Witz], 
                                                
397 “Die Philosophie ist die eigentliche Heimat der Ironie, welche man logische Schönheit definieren möchte: denn 
überall, wo in mündlichen oder geschriebenen Gesprächen, und nur nicht ganz systematisch philosophiert wird, soll 
man Ironie leisten und fordern […] Die Poesie allein kann sich auch von dieser Seite bis zur Höhe der Philosophie 
erheben und ist nicht auf ironische Stellen begründet, wie die Rhetorik. Es gibt alte und moderne Gedichte, die durch-
gängig im ganzen und überall den göttlichen Hauch der Ironie atmen. Es lebt in ihnen eine wirkliche transzendentale 
Buffonerie. Im Innern die Stimmung, welche alles übersieht, und sich über alles Bedingte unendlich erhebt, auch über 
eigne Kunst, Tugend oder Genialität: im Äußern, in der Ausführung die mimische Manier eines gewöhnlichen guten 
italienischen Buffo” (Friedrich Schlegel, Lyceum-Fragment Nr. 42, in: KA, I/2, 152). For more on the Platonic ten-
dency in Friedrich Schlegel’s theory of irony, see: Wolfram Groddeck, Reden über Rhetorik. Zur einen Stilistik des 
Lesens (Basel/Frankfurt a. M.: Stroemfeld Verlag, 1995), 277–78.  
398 Cf. Jean Paul, Werke, II/5, 145–337. In addition to the inclusion of that text in “Meine Miszellen,” Jean Paul also 
included parts of the original text as “Bemerkungen über den Menschen” in another one of his numerous “Werkchen” 
entitled Museum (1814) (Jean Paul, Werke, II/2, 975–83). 
399 “Abgrenzungsmerkmale von [Miszellen] gegenüber anderen Textsorten sind Kürze—sowohl des Textes als auch 
der Herstellungszeit—sowie die Varianz ihrer Themen und ihrer Anordnung. Rhetorisch erfüllen [Miszellen] damit 
insbesondere die Gebote der brevitas and variatio, die dem taedium entgegenwirken sollen und der memoria dienen. 
[…] Durch die mehr oder weniger willkürliche Anordnung (ordo artificialis) und den geringen Kohärenzgrad provo-
zieren [Miszellen]-Sammlungen meist eine nichtlineare Lektüre” (Kremer, “Miszellen,” 711f). 
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which he tasks with juxtaposing the most disparate similarities for the purposes of inventing the 
new. These witty pairs include satirical contrasts between “good” and “bad” novelists as well as 
“moral” and “immoral” profit, and paronomastic contrasts between words like “premonition” [Ah-
nen] and “revenge” [Ahnden]: 
Der Furchtsame erschrickt vor der Gefahr, der Feige in ihr, der Mutige nach ihr. 
 
Jede kühne Tat macht eine zweite nötig, sonst bringt sie Untergang; und eben das 
Ahnen und Ahnden dieser Notwendigkeit entkräftet die Menge, welche sonst wohl 
den größten Mut verspürte, ganz so zu handeln wie Cäsar, oder wie Sokrates, oder 
wie Friedrich II., aber nur einmal im Jahre oder im Leben. 
 
Jeder Schmeichler hat wieder seinen Schmeichler; den Bandwurm halten wieder 
nadelförmige Würmchen besetzt. 
 
Schlechte Schriftsteller sollte man vor, große nach ihren Büchern kennen lernen, 
um jenen mehr die Bücher, diese mehr den Büchern zu vergeben.400 
 
As this selection of remarks demonstrates, there appears to be strikingly little in common between 
the remarks, and like the aphoristic genre as a whole, Jean Paul’s remarks are arranged in a manner 
that formally distinguishes one from the other through visual line breaks, rendering them internally 
closed and distinct. At the same time, their condensation and juxtaposition engenders an associate 
reading process, which seeks to find interconnections and relations between the remarks in order 
to reveal their obscure meaning. As a result, they no longer remain exclusively confined within 
their own distinct boundaries, but instead continuously break away from these formal con-
straints.401 More specifically, by privileging the reader rather than the author, the seemingly inco-
                                                
400 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 130. 
401 As Gerhard Neumann argues in Ideenparadiese, it is precisely the short form of the aphorism, maxim, or saying 
[Spruch] around 1800 which rhetorically, as sentencia, compels the reader to indefinitely reflect on its ambiguous 
meaning through a process of specification. More specifically, as Neumann contends, the implicit tension between 
individual and general which lies at the basis of this poetically condensed form that engenders in the eighteenth century 
the possibility of a transcendental moralistics: “Die bislang letzte Stufe dieses Prozesses bildet die ‘transzendentale 
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herent juxtaposition and brevity of Jean Paul’s miscellaneous remarks allow for the perpetual for-
mation of unexpected connections between one another, and in doing so blur the boundaries be-
tween the various ordered remarks. 
 Thus while some remarks more explicitly harken back to previous ones, others appear to 
implicitly anticipate a remark that comes after it; in both cases, however, they compel the reader 
to proceed backwards and forwards, or even skip or skim around between remarks, and in doing 
so invite a decisively non-linear process of reading.402 This network-like dynamic which estab-
lishes relations between the various remarks presents itself in the proliferation of small text-parti-
cles like “vor,” “in,” and “nach,” which on the one hand emphasize through their brevity the mo-
ment of witty contrast between figures within individual remarks, such as in the above-quoted 
remark, “Der Furchtsame erschrickt vor der Gefahr, der Feige in ihr, der Mutige nach ihr,” while 
on the other hand their spatiotemporal connotation of linearity and succession reflects, in a highly 
condensed manner, both the tripartite structure of the text as a whole as well as its serial ordering 
principle, which simultaneously draw the reader’s eye toward the microscopic differences between 
the particles within a single remark and at the same time emphasize the underlying formal unity 
and relations between the remarks. 
                                                
Moralistik’: In ihr verdichtet sich der Konflikt von Einzelnem und Allgemeinem zur Auseinandersetzung von emp-
findend-erlebenden und gedanklichen Impulsen im Erkennen des Menschen, von ästhetischer und logischer Kompo-
nente im Erkenntnisprozeß und ihrer Auseinandersetzung im Aphorismus: ‘Im Detail,’ wird Doderer später schreiben, 
‘müssen Leben und Denken coagulieren’” (Neumann, Ideenparadiese, 79f). 
402 As Rüdiger Campe has recently argued, a similar dynamic presents itself in Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s Waste 
Books [Sudelbücher], another compilation of miscellaneous “remarks” [Bemerkungen] around 1800. According to 
Campe, a close examination of Lichtenberg’s method of text production in the Waste Books reveals the emergence of 
a process of “prolepsis and analepsis” [“Vorgreifen und Zurückgreifen”] that, especially in Notebook “E,” unfolds in 
the space of the notebook itself. Cf. Campe, “Vorgreifen und Zurückgreifen.” 
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 Even more so, however, this formal technique of connecting manifests itself in a number 
of seemingly unrelated remarks which immediately precede or follow one another. Thus in a sa-
tirical remark on the figure of “great men” [große Manner], the remark which immediately follows 
deals with the figure of “women” [Weiber] who “spielen auf der Bühne die Rolle der An- und 
Verstellung viel besser als die der Aufrichtigkeit; denn jene ist Rolle in der Rolle, diese nur 
Rolle.”403 In this remark, what at first appears to be a mere gender cliché turns out in fact to be a 
reflection on the rhetorical conceptualization of the theatrical. Here the term “Verstellung” – illu-
sion or dissimulation – makes an entrance, a term which is associated with rhetoric as the art of 
persuasion, and specifically with irony as the rhetorical mode of dissimulation. 
 Yet in the following the remark, the text subtly shifts registers from a gender cliché in 
relation to the theater by taking up this reference to the term “dissimulation” and inscribing it into 
the philosophical discourse of essence and appearance: “Doch oft scheinen sie sich uns vorher 
verstellt zu haben, bloß weil sie sich nur nachher zu schnell veränderten; ja meistens wird selber 
das Verstellen Verändern und Schein Sein.”404 In this passage, the preposition “doch” establishes 
a syntactic connection between the two remarks as one of reflection on the ambiguity of essence 
versus appearance, of being versus semblance. This reflection is hardly coincidental, for it con-
cerns the very associative movement within the text itself; that is, while the references to the dis-
courses of theater and rhetoric foreground the epistemological ambiguity between the factual and 
the illusory, they also reflect on the ambiguity of the relations between the remarks. The com-
mercium of the disparate words and figures, which circulate between one remark and the next and 
leap from one discourses or genre into a completely different one, stages this dynamic as one of 
                                                




theatrical role-playing – as “roles within roles.” It thus renders what at first appears to be seemingly 
stable object-formations increasingly obscure or “miscellaneous.” 
 This relational dynamic is repeated in the interplay between two remarks which concern 
the discourse of power-relations. In the second remark cited above, this manifests itself in the form 
of a satirical analogy between the disparate figures of Caesar, Socrates, and Friedrich the Great, 
while the remark which immediately follows presents a veiled reference to the preceding one with 
its mention of “flatterers” or “courtiers” [Schmeichler] – ostensibly in relation to Friedrich the 
Great. When read together, they form satirical depictions of the royal court – a trope which mani-
fests itself in another remark on convex and concave mirrors that will be addressed momentarily 
– in which the king’s followers are portrayed as blind flatterers of one another and, akin to the 
logic of simulacra, without an initial point of reference; thus Jean Paul writes, “Jeder Schmeichler 
hat wieder seinen Schmeichler; den Bandwurm halten wieder nadelförmige Würmchen besetzt.”405 
In the second clause, however, this remark no longer explicitly refers to the royal court, but instead 
juxtaposes the parasitic figure of the “ringworm” [Bandwurm] and the “needle-shaped little 
worms” [nadelförmige Würmchen] which possess or occupy it. Here the satirical analogy between 
courtly life and parasitic worms breaks down, yielding an obscure metaphor whose only underly-
ing relation to the previous clause is its repetition of the word “wieder,” which implies a parallel 
between the figures of the worms and those of the flatterers featured in the first half. The text’s 
invocation of the signifier “Band” in this passage is for this reason all the more striking: the con-
trast formation between the (big) ringworm and (little) needle-shaped worms within it stages here, 
as it were, on the one hand the opposition between big and small, macrocosmos and microcosmos, 
and on the other hand an implicit reflection on the mediality of Jean Paul’s remarks, whereby the 




poetic figure of the “Band” – the ring or volume – brings the small, fragmentary remarks into loose 
interconnection with one another or, in more explicit connection with the medial conjuncture be-
tween miscellany and the collected edition, like sheets of paper loosely inserted into a volume, 
namely Herbst-Blumine itself, which attempts to re-inscribe the fragmentary and heterogeneous 
“Werkchen” back into a unified corpus. 
 Jean Paul’s “Bandwurm” thus serves as a kind of condensed poetological figure for his 
own fragmentary, miscellaneous method of representation, and in doing so may be said to join the 
bestiary of creaturely-corporeal figures of the small and fragmentary around 1800, including most 
famously Friedrich Schlegel’s figure of the hedgehog [Igel]. As Schlegel writes of the hedgehog 
in Athenäums-Fragment Nr. 206: “Ein Fragment muß gleich einem kleinen Kunstwerke von der 
umgebenden Welt ganz abgesondert und in sich selbst vollendet sein wie ein Igel.”406 With its 
quills aimed outward to provoke and irritate the reader toward infinite reflection on the fragment’s 
illusive meaning, the hedgehog serves for Schlegel as the poetological embodiment of the Roman-
tic fragment. While Schlegel on the one hand emphasizes the unity of the fragment, describing it 
as “completely separated from the surrounding world,” it remains nonetheless fragmentary in the 
perspective which it opens up and in its opposition to other fragments. Its “unity” thus reflects 
Schlegel's view of the whole of things not as a totality, but rather as a universality of infinite 
opposing stances.407 Where Jean Paul and Friedrich Schlegel part ways, however, concerns pre-
cisely the formal condition of “dissociation” [Absonderung] and “internal perfection” [in sich 
selbst Vollendung] with respect to his metaphor of the hedgehog. That is, in order to achieve effect 
                                                
406 Friedrich Schlegel, KA, I/2, 197. 
407 “Das Fragment wird den Frühromantikern zum Ort einer Reflexion, deren Medium nicht, wie bei Fichte, das Ich, 
sondern die Kunst ist. Was Schlegel die schriftstellerische Dialektik von ‘Selbstschöpfung und Selbstvernichtung’ in 
der ironischen künstlerischen ‘Selbstbeschränkung’ nennt, erscheint als Selbstreflexion, die sich Eintrag tut; dieser 
Eintrag ist das Fragment” (Justus Fetscher, “Fragment,” in: Ästhetische Grundbegriffe: Historisches Wörterbuch, vol. 
2, 551–88, here: 566). 
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of sublime brevity, Schlegel’s fragments seek to demarcate themselves from their medial context 
by forming an internally closed and complete “monad” that separates or “fragments” itself from 
the external world – from the textual material or frame-structure that surrounds it. For Jean Paul, 
in contrast, his miscellaneous remarks do not constitute single, discrete hedgehogs, as they do for 
Schlegel, but through their perpetual contrast formations come into fleeting relation with one an-
other and leap outside of their respective medial boundaries. While both Jean Paul and Friedrich 
Schlegel’s fragmentary small forms thus present themselves as obstinate, “needle-shaped” forms 
– as hedgehogs and “nadelförmige Würmchen” – Jean Paul’s miscellany point as much outward 
toward the reader as back within themselves, in that the disparate fragmentariness of their writing 
on the one hand provokes the reader into a circular, repetitive reading, while on the other hand 
fragmenting and suturing the body of the text in a manner analogous to the surgical instrument of 
the needle. 
 The hyperbolic process of reading provoked by Jean Paul’s miscellany comes especially 
to the fore in the final remark of “Bemerkungen über den Menschen,” in which Jean Paul explicitly 
refers to his own miscellany. There he satirically relates the contingent, arbitrary ordering principle 
of his miscellaneous collection of “dispersed thoughts” [zerstreute Gedanken], as he refers to them 
in the passage, to a potentially infinite, circular reading which likewise proceeds through a tech-
nique of “dispersion” or “distraction” [Zerstreuung]: 
Wie unersättlich ist der Mensch, besonders der lesende! sogar zerstreute Gedanken 
lieset er wieder zerstreut und blättert und schauet in Sentenzen, anstatt sie von vorn 
anzufangen, zuerst ein wenig herum, wie jeder noch von diesen Miszellen her sich 
erinnern wird. Findet er seine sentenziöse Kürze und Abwechslung schon vor, wie 
er sie in keinem weitschweifenden Werke genoß: so will er diese gegen die Lange-
weile noch einmal abgekürzt und abgewechselt sehen, wirklich als ob die Leser 
Große wären, oder die Großen Leser. Ich weiß nicht, wie man diesem Lesen ein 
Ende machen soll.408 
 
                                                
408 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 133. 
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Here the contingency of the text and the repetitious form of reading – what Jean Paul satirically 
describes as “reading around” [herumlesen] or “skim reading” [blättern] – demeans the text’s ar-
bitrary and capricious organization, as well as the distractedness of its readers, whose inability to 
digest “grandiose works” of literature furnishes in turn the ostensible raison d’être for Jean Paul’s 
“minor” form of miscellanies.409 At the same tine, his satirical observation in the first line – “How 
insatiable is man, especially the reading kind!” – gives way to a more radical abyssal doubt or “not 
knowing”410 in the last line, “I don’t know how one ought to end this reading,” which is impossibly 
connected to the text itself. While it informs the reading of the text as a potentially endless process 
of “reading around,” in the very same moment it contradicts this reading by bringing the collection 
of remarks to an end. The expression of ignorance in the final line, “I don’t know” [Ich weiß nicht], 
thus conceals a more radical dissimulation: the possibility that, as the witty abbreviation of Socratic 
irony goes, “I know that I know nothing” or “I don’t know that I know.” The effect of writing “I 
don’t know how one ought to end this reading” at the end of the text amounts to a paradox, which 
puts into doubt both the epistemic status of the utterance and more broadly reflects the epistemic 
uncertainty between finite conclusion and its infinite deferral which characterizes Jean Paul’s re-
marks. 
                                                
409 Jean Paul’s remark thus reflects the widespread diagnosis around 1800 for the nosological category of “reading 
addiction” [Lesesucht] – the pathology of distraction [Zerstreuung] – which was said to afflict (mostly female) readers, 
whose consumption of low-brow literature seemed to imperil the authorship of “great authors” through an ever-ex-
panding book market oriented around a growing female reading public. According to Friedrich Kittler, one solution 
to the problem of the rapidly expanding book market was to constrict the channels that made popular literature known 
and available to female readers, all but ensuring that “schlechte Produkte” remained “ignorier[t], so werden sie unge-
lesen bleiben” (Friedrich Kittler, Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900, 174). 
410 For more on “not knowing” [Nichtwissen] in literature, see Ulrike Bergermann/Elisabeth Strowick, “Weiterlesen: 
Literatur und Wissen,” in: Weiterlesen: Literatur und Wissen, 11–30, in particular 13–15. “Das Wissen der Literatur 
[…] artikuliert sich nirgendwo anders als im Akt des Lesens. Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Literatur und Wissen 
zeigt sich […] in ihrer methodologischen Relevanz für die Literaturwissenschaften. […] Eine Lesepraxis, die Nicht-
Wissen als konstitutiv für Wissensproduktion artikuliert, stellt für die Literaturwissenschaft allemal eine methodische 
und disziplinäre Herausforderung dar; sie tritt in jedem ihrer Akte nicht hinter den Versuch zurück, ‘das literaturwis-
senschaftliche Sprechen in die Frage der Grenze des Wissens hineinzuziehen’” (ibid., 13). 
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 Moreover, while the remark’s equalization of the “great” author and the (distracted) reader 
– the figures of the big and the small – seems to echo a similar remark by Novalis in the Blüthen-
staub that “the true reader has to be the extended author,” for Novalis this relation is characterized 
by a transcendental movement in which the textual material is perpetually “filtered” upward in the 
direction of the infinite and the absolute in order to become, as Novalis writes, “a member of the 
effective Spirit [Geist].”411 In other words, by turning the “true reader” into an “extended author,” 
Novalis’s fragmentary poetics leads out of the realm of rhetoric and language and into that of 
philosophical idealism by theorizing a reading process which seeks in each case to separate the 
“raw and the formed of the book” [das Rohe und das Gebildete des Buchs]. For Jean Paul, how-
ever, the dynamic is not one of “filtering” between the raw and the formed, but instead one of 
endless dispersion which mixes the raw and the formed together. The elevation of the reader to the 
position of the “great” author, in other words, yields a form of reflection that leads not to infinite 
approximation of the absolute or the infinite idea – the “wirksamer Geist” – but instead to the 
“dispersal” of meaning and poetic obscurity. 
 This contrast between infinite and finite, between big and small, in which the question of 
reading comes into play – if only implicitly – manifests itself once more in another of Jean Paul’s 
remarks in which the figure of the mirror appears, as in earlier remarks, in connection with the 
discourse of power-relations. The remark concerns a satirical contrast of perspectives between 
royal rulers and their onlooking subjects, in which Jean Paul depicts a scenario involving two 
mirrors, one a “magnifying mirror” [Vergrößerungsspiegel] held on stage by the rules and aimed 
                                                
411 “Der wahre Leser muß der erweiterte Autor sein. Er ist die höhere Instanz, die die Sache von der niedern Instanz 
schon vorgearbeitet erhält. Das Gefühl, vermittelst dessen der Autor die Materialien seiner Schrift geschieden hat, 
scheidet beim Lesen wieder das Rohe und das Gebildete des Buchs – und wenn der Leser das Buch nach seiner Idee 
bearbeiten würde, so würde ein 2. Leser noch mehr läutern, und so wird dadurch daß die bearbeitete Masse immer 
wieder in frischtätige Gefäße kommt die Masse endlich wesentlicher Bestandteil – Glied des wirksamen Geistes” 
(Novalis, Blüthenstaub Nr. 125, in: Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe [Munich 1978], 282). 
 
168 
in the direction of the viewing public, and the other a mirror which renders everything smaller 
[Verkleinerungsspiegel] and is held by the royalty to view the crowd behind them. The two mirrors 
are then pointed in the same direction, the effect of which is to produce an “interstitial space” 
[Zwischenraum] between them in which neither group directly views the other, thus rendering the 
space in between paradoxically both “bigger and smaller” [größer und kleiner]: 
Am Throne ist ein Vergrößerungsspiegel angebracht, worin der Menge fürstliche 
Mängel, fürstliche Tugenden, Freuden und Leiden größer erscheinen, als die Fürs-
ten selber es finden können. Diese hingegen haben wieder einen Taschen-Verklei-
nerungsspiegel—oder ist es eine dunkle Kammer—worin sie die Zustände der 
Menge beobachten, also macht derselbe Zwischenraum größer und kleiner.412 
 
Thus while the first mirror which is brought up to a throne has the effect of magnifying the “fürst-
liche Mängel, fürstliche Tugenden, Freuden und Leiden,” the second, pocket-sized mirror both 
diminishes the size of the crowd who are observing the image presented in the first mirror for the 
onlooking sovereigns, as well as creates the effect of a “dark chamber” [dunkle Kammer], that is, 
a camera obscura.413 Here there occurs a conjuncture between two epistemic spaces of the small: 
on the one hand, an instrument of reflection and, on the other hand, one of optical observation and 
perception of men. Their equivalence, however, presents a perspective of impossibility in the text; 
for it is unclear in this passage whether the mirrors reflect each other or instead face opposite 
directions, or how the pocket mirror acts as a camera obscura, which would constitutes an entirely 
                                                
412 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 131. 
413 “Die camera obscura sorgt für Licht Einsichten. Sie ist nicht nur ein optisches Instrument, sie gewinnt für die 
Denker der Aufklärung eine Modellfunktion, an der sich Sehen, Wahrnehmen, Erkennen exemplifizieren lassen. In 
den dunklen Kopf fällt durch die Augenöffnungen das Licht der Welt: Ich sehe, also habe ich Wissen. Die Repräsen-
tation der Wirklichkeit geschieht als Lichtpunkt, als Aus-schnitt. […] Die camera obscura ist das Konkurrenzmodell 
zum Spiegelkabinett; und sie hat in der Erkenntnistheorie der Neuzeit gewiss die grundlegende Rolle gespielt. Hier 
begegnen wir dem selbstverantwortlichen, von den Traditionen sich abwendenden einsamen Subjekt. Es imaginiert 
sich als Mittelpunkt, von dem aus die Welt perspektiviert wird” (Marianne Schuller, Mikrologien: Literarische und 
philosophische Figuren des Kleinen [Bielfeld 2003], 54–57.) For more on the camera obscura as an epistemic figure 
of perception in the 17th and 18th centuries, cf. Jonathon Crary, Techniques of the Observer (Massachusetts 1993). 
See also: Crary, “Modernizing Vision,” in: Hal Foster, ed., Vision and Visuality (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988), 29–44, 
cited in Schuller, Mikrologien, 54. 
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different metaphor, or even what the status of the “Zwischenraum” is in which the image of the 
observed object is simultaneously made bigger and smaller.  
 The “humor” of the passage thus lies in the paradoxical presentation of a mise en abyme, a 
scenario of infinite reflection that ultimately ends in obscurity rather than further reflection.414 At 
the very moment in the text in which the figure of the camera obscura appears, the text thus in-
scribes a literal aporia – a “dunkle Stelle” – within itself. The mirror no longer serves an epistemic 
figure of reflection, but as one of obscurity, for the direction between the mirrors in the passage 
remains wholly unclear. This stands in marked contrast to Friedrich Schlegel’s famous invocation 
of the mirror as an epistemic figure of infinite reflection in connection with his concept of “pro-
gressive universal poetry” [progressive Universalpoesie]. In Athenäums-Fragment Nr. 116, Schle-
gel writes: “Und doch kann auch sie am meisten zwischen dem Dargestellten und dem Darstellen-
den, frei von allem realen und idealen Interesse auf den Flügeln der poetischen Reflexion in der 
Mitte schweben, diese Reflexion immer wieder potenzieren und wie in einer endlosen Reihe von 
Spiegeln vervielfachen.”415 
 Against this conception of poetics as a process of infinite reflection, Jean Paul offers the 
concept of humor as the “inverted sublime.” In Jean Paul’s texts, humor serves as a form-theoret-
ical instrument of contrast-formation and infinitesimal differentiation. By putting into tension the 
infinitely big and the infinitely small, the infinite idea (spiritual, rational) and finite existence (cor-
                                                
414 As Paul Fleming argues apropos a passage from Jean Paul’s Flegeljahre in which he parodies the infinite reflexivity 
of Romanticism, “Romanticism’s program of being lifted up ‘on the wings of poetic reflection’ crashes back down to 
earth. […] The sense of the infinite that such a plunge into the abîmes de réflexion is, at least in Jean Paul’s view, a 
mise en abyme. Despite its long and storied career, such a philosophy of the genitive – ‘the poetry of poetry’ or ‘the 
irony of irony’ – is for Jean Paul a failed project, because its movement toward an abstract, progressive infinite de-
mands, in turn, the ‘neglect of all reality’ and, therefore, is the ‘despiser of reality’” (Fleming, Pleasures of Abandon-
ment, 44). 
415 Friedrich Schlegel, Athenäums-Fragment Nr. 116, in: KA, I/2, 182f. 
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poreal, transient, sensual), humor paradoxically negates the difference. In this way, it draws spe-
cific attention to the ‘physiognomy’ of the text, that is, to the relation of its ‘external’ corporeality 
to its ‘interior’ sense or meaning. Rather than striving toward the negative representation of the 
absolute – the infinite idea – the movement of reflection it sets into motion continually collapses 
in on itself, exposing in turn its contingency and fragmentariness. Humor for this reason furnishes 
a paradoxical double-perspectivization: 
er [Humor] hebt—ungleich dem gemeinen Spaßmacher mit seinen Seitenhieben—
keine einzelne Narrheit heraus, sondern er erniedrigt das Große, aber—ungleich der 
Parodie—um ihm das Kleine, und erhöhet das Kleine, aber—ungleich der Ironie—
um ihm das Große an sie die Seite zu setzen und so beide zu vernichten, weil vor 
der Unendlichkeit alles gleich ist und nichts.416 
 
Rather than the infinity of the mise en abyme, humor remains at the surface as a “pure becoming 
without measure,”417 as Deleuze writes of Alice’s paradoxical becoming bigger and smaller at the 
same time. “She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one 
becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a becoming 
whose characteristic is to elude the present.”418 Just as Alice, according to Deleuze, is said to 
“move[] in both directions at once,”419 so too does the paradoxical juxtaposition of magnification 
and miniaturization mirrors in the previous passage from “Meine Miszellen” imply a completely 
different notion of space than that of the romantic mirror. It is the impossible perspective of an 
incomprehensible “interstitial space” [Zwischenraum] that is bigger and smaller at once – “also 
macht derselbe Zwischenraum größer und kleiner” – which negates their difference and leads not 
to sense or idea, but to non-sense and not-knowing. 
                                                
416 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 125. 
417 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 1. 
418 Ibid. 
419 Ibid., 2. 
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 Humor’s destructivity capacity for negating and dispersing any and all meaning manifests 
itself at the very performative level in the passage from the Vorschule. There Jean Paul opposes 
macrocosmos and microcosmos, big and small, as a dialectical moment of mutual self-negation. 
The passage’s rhetorical compression of a multitude of circulating concepts such as “parody,” 
“irony,” “satire,” and “the infinite,” along with its overabundance of hyphenations that appear to 
hold the parts of the formula together, at the same time fragment the passage into pieces which 
cannot be unified. In the final line, humor’s strategy of perpetual differentiation collapses at the 
moment in which all differentiations between the big and small, the infinite and finite, are ulti-
mately suspended and, as Jean Paul writes, “everything is equal and nothing” [alles gleich ist und 
nichts] – that is, in other words, rendered genre-less or miscellaneous. 
 
5.2. Writing in Stitches: The Materiality of the Letter in the “Springbrief” 
The second section of “Meine Miszellen,” entitled “Springbrief eines Nachtwandlers,” features a 
short piece of narrative fiction said to have resulted from a night of somnambulism, which is sur-
rounded in turn by a frame story that narrates the fictional history of the letter’s production. In the 
preface to the letter, Jean Paul foregrounds the palimpsestic character of the letter by revealing – 
in an intertextual allusion to Scheherzade’s One Thousand and One Nights – that it has emerged 
not just out of one dream, but in fact “aus 1001 solchen brief-zeugenden Nächten.”420 As the result 
of a multitude of oneiric visions which have been scribbled onto paper during numerous somnam-
bular states, the letter presents itself as an experimental form of text-production – a “test” (Probe) 
brought “zur Probe,” as Jean Paul writes – whose contingency and fragmentariness is reflected in 
                                                
420 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 134. 
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the numerous logical and syntactical “leaps,” or “Sprünge,” in the text, which the fictional editor 
of the letter attempts to mediate by inserting logical connecting words and paragraph breaks: 
Hier folgt ein Springbrief zur Probe. Die auffallenden Sprünge darin hab’ ich durch 
Absätze für die Augen vermittelt und angezeigt damit richt etwa ein unphilosophi-
scher Leser aus den häufigen logischen Bindewörtern: “daraus folgt aber—doch 
geb ich zu” etc. gar auf logische Bindung schließe; denn ein philosophischer Ken-
ner weiß ohne mich, daß er bei diesen logischen Stichwörtern und Stichblättern 
weiter nichts zu denken habe als nichts.421 
 
Here Jean Paul presents the insertion of “häufigen logischen Bindewörtern” – arbitrary syntactical 
turns of phrase like “daraus folgt aber,” “doch gib ich zu,” or later in the text particles like “doch,” 
“aber,” “weil,” “Apropos!,” and “denn” – as a remedy for the incomprehensibility and collage-like 
composition of the text. While their inclusion is intended, then, to “stitch” together the epistle into 
a whole, the relation between the parts is ultimately that of contiguity and juxtaposition without, 
in fact, an underlying logical connection; for as Jean Paul ironically remarks to the reader, “ein 
philosophischer Kenner weiß ohne mich, daß er bei diesen logischen Stichwörtern und Stichblät-
tern weiter nichts zu denken habe als nichts.” In this way, the material which binds together the 
various parts of the letter act instead as “Stichwörtern und Stichblättern,” that is, as “stitches” 
which serve to hold together the loose fragments of the textual body, while at the same time they 
ironically expose at the material level the interface or wound between the “corporeal” breaks or 
logical leaps within the text. 
 The preface to the letter narrates the story of the poet-author who is said to have composed 
the letter while sitting in the middle of a garden with paper in front of him. As he begins to write, 
the verdant surroundings suddenly appear to him “mehr wie Schwarz und Nacht” and he 
“entschlief neben dem Briefpapier, ging ins Nachtwandeln über und fing dann auf dem Papiere 




das Schreiben an, das ich hier vorlege, aber an einen Korrespondenten, den ich eigentlich gar nicht 
kenne.”422 With the transition to the scene of somnambular writing, the writing subject suddenly 
disappears from the scene of writing entirely and in its place is to be found instead the intransitive 
writing process itself – “the writing” [das Schreiben], as Jean Paul writes – without a determinate 
author or recipient. His description of the dream as the spontaneous unleashing of fantasy, in which 
the dreaming poet “erschrickt selber über das ermattende Abflattern aller Kräfte im Traum, über 
das Umherschießen dieser Nordlichtsstrahlen nach allen Richtungen,” thereby associates the 
dream with a form of poetic productivity, and thus more broadly reflects the poetological function 
of the dream around 1800.423 In Jean Paul’s text, however, it more specifically serves to bring into 
view the fragmentariness of his own miscellaneous manner of writing, whereby the author-poet is 
confronted on the sheet of paper by “das ganze Nachtgarn wimmelnd von Fang aller Art […] im 
selben Netz, Phalänen und Sternschnuppen und Nachtraubvögel, oder ohne Metapher, ein bescher-
tes Christgeschenk von Miszellen oder Mischlingen aus allem anzutreffen.”424 Like the figure of 
the ringworm in the first section of “Meine Miszellen,” this constellation of miscellaneous objects 
– ranging from shooting stars to nocturnal raptors – emphasizes their “swarming,” network-like 
dynamic. 
 While the form of the dream and the remark thus present in different ways modes of inven-
tio, the rhetorical term for the invention and discovery of the new, the description of the production 
of the “Springbrief” simultaneously satirizes the use of dreams as inspiration for the creative pro-
cess, which became widespread amongst authors and poets during the romantic period as a means 
of intensifying the poetic imagination through the deformation of reality. In addition to metaphors 
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of drunkenness and inebriation, the dream served as a virulent trope for the diminished state of 
consciousness that would allow for uninhibited literary productivity.425 However, by falling asleep 
or even “dying” [entschlafen], the somnambular poet is fragmented into both his own “copyist and 
adorer” [Abschreiber und Verehrer], and in that sense serves much more as the secondary reader 
of the text than its author. The text’s production thus ironically puts into question the authorial 
status of the poet, as in a later passage in which Jean Paul refers to the (miscellaneous) production, 
distribution and circulation of ideas on the book-market: “Sondern viele Menschen—das mein’ 
ich—legen (denn ich rede von Buchschreibern) ihre Gedanken so wechselnd-umgekehrt durchei-
nander als gewöhnlich die Buchhändler die Bogenlagen derselben, wovon ich Beispiele ge-
kauft.”426 While book-writers, in the miscellaneous manner of Jean Paul’s “Meine Miszellen,” “le-
gen […] ihre Gedanken wechselnd-umgekehrt durcheinander,” and booksellers order the sheets of 
paper – “die Bogenlagen der selben” – upon which they are printed in a likewise disorderly and 
miscellaneous manner, the writer or poet (re)purchases their “examples” [Beispiele] back from the 
booksellers. The writer thus paradoxically plays as much the role of the consumer as the producer 
in the circulation his thoughts. It is in this sense that he may be said to act as his own “publisher” 
[Herausgeber] as well as “copyist and admirer” [Abschreiber und Verehrer]. The ensuing circular-
ity of exchange, as recounted alternatively in the scene of the letter’s genesis which frames the 
“Spring-Brief,” crucially excludes the possibility of an original source or “Grundlage,” as well as 
the exegetical “Auslegung” of an originally intended meaning. 
                                                
425 “Poetic writing in 1800 always meant letting oneself go; for ‘the time for rewriting, deleting, and polishing what 
needs to be polished can always be found.’ Only upon returning from intoxication or dream and in rereading the 
unconscious handiwork does an ego appear, together with its narcissism. […] Thus the narcissistic pleasure of reread-
ing one’s unconscious poetic liberties gave birth to the ‘authorial function.’ Authorship in the discourse network of 
1800 is not a function simultaneous with the act of reading, but a deferred effect of rereading” (Kittler, Discourse 
Networks 1800/1900, 111). 
426 Jean Paul, Werke, II/3, 140. 
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 This fragmentary conception of text production is reflected in Jean Paul’s peculiar analogy 
between the typography of the Gothic script, or “Fraktur,” in which the “Springbrief” was said to 
have been composed, and the textual body of the text as wounded – literally fractured. In the 
following passage from the second section of the text, he paronomastically likens a “writing mas-
ter” [Schreibmeister] who binds “on doubled Fraktur” [doppelte Fraktur] to a “wound surgeon” 
[Wundarzt] who binds together “doubled fractures” [doppelte Frakturen]: 
Was Sie mir aber schreiben, ist mir ausgeschrieben aus der Brust, wenn Sie Schreib-
meister und Wundärzte so unterscheiden, wie Sie tun. Wie wahr, Herr Ober-Zoll! 
Der Schreibmeister bindet an doppelte Fraktur, der Wundarzt an doppelte Fraktu-
ren; – ein wahrer arithmetischer Doppelbruch.427 
 
The broken typography of the “doubled Fraktur” is thus compounded, so to speak, by a double 
break or fracture within the body of the text itself, which the figurative surgeon “heals” by stitching 
together the fragmented fragments with logical connecting words, which Jean Paul suggestively 
refers to in the earlier passages as “Stichwörtern” and “Stichblättern.” The composition of the 
“Spring-Brief” thus presents a “true arithmetic double break” [wahrer arithmetischer Doppel-
bruch], as Jean Paul enigmatically asserts. That is, while the Romantic fragment obeys a dialectic 
of fragment and totality, of constraint and unlimited free play, Jean Paul’s fragments constitute 
instead fragment within fragments – fractures within fractures – which continually bring into view 
their corporeal-material dimension of the text. 
 In the above passage, one can thus read in Jean Paul’s use of the word “binden” a parono-
mastic reference to both the medial format of the work, in the sense of “Werkchen” collected into 
“Bändchen,” as he refers to the “volumes” in which his minor works are contained, but also to his 
remark from the first section of the text, in which the figure of the “Bandwurm” and the “nadelför-
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mige Wörmchen” appear. As a figure of the small, corporeal, and fragmentary, Jean Paul’s ring-
worm or “Bandwurm” may thus be read as that which constitutes the small form of “Bändchen” 
or “Werkchen” – a circularity which both “links” together the text, and at the same time fragments 
it into the infinitely small, as per the logic of Jean Paul’s “humorous totality” [humoristische To-
talität], which rather than progressively approximating the infinite and abstract, “individualisiert 
[…] bis ins Kleinste, und wieder die Teile des Individualisierten.”428 In humor, as Jean Paul writes, 
one for this reason does not simply fall on one’s knees – a sign of reverence and supplication 
before the infinite and the divine – but on “both knee caps” [beide Kniescheiben], which consti-
tutes not merely a surplus of particularization that subverts the intention of the gesture, but which 
in doing so foregrounds the finite corporeality of the supplicant and the possibility that their knee’s 
could in that moment be fractured.429 
 
5.3. Collapsing Frames: Sentimentality and Dispersion in “Polymeter” 
In the third and final section of “Meine Miszellen,” entitled “Polymeter,” Jean Paul appends to the 
text a selection of pseudo-poems composed in his so-called “polymetric” verse, a condensed form 
of rhythmical prose or “free-metric” verse, as Jean Paul characterizes it, which he first coined in 
the novel Flegeljahre (1804–05) and with which he later experimented as a form of “minor work” 
included in the “Auswahl verbesserten Werkchen” that he appended to Dr. Katzenbergers Ba-
dereise.430 “Polymeter” offers yet another small form of inventio which Jean Paul adds to his litany 
                                                
428 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 140. 
429 “er [der Komiker] fällt, z.B., nicht auf die Knie, sondern auf beide Kniescheiben, ja er kann sogar die Kniekehle 
gebrauchen” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 140). 
430 Cf. Jean Paul, Werke, I/2, 634–37, 671–72. See also: Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 358–63. 
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of miscellaneous poetic forms – “eine neue Erfindung,”431 as Jean Paul writes, which does not 
obey the formal rules or poetic strictures of rhyme scheme and verse. 
 While the entries which he includes in “Polymeter” are less epigrammatic than lyrical-
sentimental, and thereby connect with the repeated appearance of sentimental rhetoric as a repre-
sentational technique in Jean Paul’s texts for staging the end, as the figurative “death,” of his 
works, the poetic condensation of the lyrical prose in “Polymeter” picks back up in certain respects 
the aphoristic form of the remarks from the first section as well as the sentimental tone of the 
conclusion of the “Springbrief.” The tripartite organization of the text is for this reason not at all 
contingent or arbitrary, but suggests instead a framing structure, whereby the first and third sec-
tions, “Bemerkungen über den Menschen” and “Polymeter,” function as a symmetry axis that 
frames the narrative center of the text, the “Springbrief eines Nachtwandlers.” However, rather 
than establishing a clear demarcation between the frame and the content which it frames, the os-
tensible frame structure of “Meine Miszellen” remains open and porous, presenting itself in each 
case in the theatrical mode of a scene change, which dynamizes the transition between sections 
and provokes once again a non-linear, “dispersed” reading of the text. This is reflected in the first 
entry of “Polymeter,” entitled “An eine in der Sonne erblassende Rose,”432 which immediately 
picks up the sentimental rhetoric of the concluding paragraph of the frame story of “Springbrief 
eines Nachtwandlers,” in which the narrator is overcome with “Tränentropfen […] weil mir im 
                                                
431 “»Ah ça!« wandt’ er sich zu Walten (mehr französisch konnt’ er nicht), »Ihre Polymeter!« – »Was sinds?« fragte 
Knoll trinkend. »Herr Graf,« (sagte Schomaker und ließ die Pfalz weg) »in der Tat eine neue Erfindung des jungen 
Kandidaten, meines Schülers, er machet Gedichte nach einem freien Metrum, so nur einen einzigen, aber reimfreien 
Vers haben, den er nach Belieben verlängert, seiten-, bogenlang; was er den Streckvers nennt, ich einen Polymeter«” 
(Jean Paul, Werke, I/2, 634). 
432 Jean Paul, Werke, SW II/3, 142. 
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Traum vorgekommen war, der Mann, an den ich im Wachen schreiben wollen, sei vergangen, was 
leider später wahr genug geworden.” As the passage continues: 
Plötzlich riß mir waagrecht in die Laube eindringende Sonne das Augenlid empor, 
die Welt trat auf; – den, den ich für gestorben gehalten, sah ich traumtrunken als 
Sonne auf den roten Gebirgen in Westen stehen; und noch als die Sonne dahinter 
versunken war, sah ich sein Bild wie einen Heiligenschein auf den Bergen schwe-
ben, bis es sich allmählich in die weiten Rosenfelder des Abendrots verlor.433 
 
At the moment in the text in which one section breaks off and transitions into the next, the text 
draws the sections together, blurring their boundaries by flowing the language of the preceding 
section into the one which immediately follows; hence the first entry in “Polymeter” recapitulates 
both the figure of the sun and of the rose (“Bleiche Rose, die Sonne gab dir die Farbe, die glühende 
nimmt sie dir wieder”434) which appear in the final paragraph of the “Springbrief.” Even more so, 
however, is that the transition of the sun from daylight to sunset gains poetological significance in 
this passage as a representational technique for the very transitional character of the frame struc-
ture, which stages the dynamic between one section and the other as a dynamic process, whereby 
the figure of the dreamed about dead man in the above paragraph transforms or even “deforms” 
into the sentimental image of the sun. 
 This moment of quasi-theatrical transition between different “sets” or “stages” in the text 
may also be said to mark a return to the first remark in “Bemerkungen über den Menschen,” in 
which Jean Paul writes of “Wölkchen, die am Morgen die Sonne rot schmückten, hüllen sie am 
Tage grau zu.”435 Not coincidentally, that is a satirical passage about marriage [Ehe], and in that 
respect recalls Jean Paul’s well-known description of “wit” as the technique of coupling or 
“binden” – “der verkleidete Priester, der jedes Paar kopuliert” – but also of the “spouses” [Gatten] 
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who are betrothed or copulated, that is, “begattet,” by wit. The rising and setting of the sun at the 
outset and end of each of the respective sections of the text thus marks the point of insuperable 
mixture and transition, in which the designation of the genre or “Gattung” in their respective head-
ings is suddenly suspended and abolished, and in which the sections suddenly flow into one an-
other. “Meine Miszellen” thus stages itself as an arbitrary or contingent arrangement of distinct 
genres and text-components, whose boundaries or points of interface cannot be disaggregated and 
instead perpetually blur into one another.  
 
180 
6. “…UND ES WIRD DAS GANZE WERK EIN WRACK.” CONTINGENCY 




In diesem Buche stehen Bilder und Buchstaben. 




Das zweite Bild stellt einen Knaben vor, der unter einem Baum sitzt, und in einem Buche 
lieset. 
Der Knabe hält den rechten Zeigefinger auf das Buch, damit er in der rechten Zeile bleibe. 
Der Knabe ist sehr aufmerksam und gaft nicht umher. 
 
 Bei den Bildern stehen Buchstaben. 
 Unter den Bildern stehen Worte, 
 
[…] Das offene Auge sieht ins Buch.436 
 
—Karl Philipp Moritz, Neues ABC-Buch 
 
“Kein Werk wurde von mir so oft […] angefangen und unterbrochen als dieses Werkchen.”437 
Thus opens the preface to Jean Paul’s Leben Fibels, des Verfassers der Bienrodischen Fibel 
(1811), a biography of a young bookmaker by the name of Gotthelf Fibel who is said to be the 
writer and inventor of the first ABC book and from whose name the German word for “primer,” 
Fibel, ostensibly derives. With these words, Jean Paul foregrounds the remarkably discontinuous 
process of writing the novel. In doing so, he ostensibly inverts the relation between two vastly 
different conceptions of work: here, the “work” [Werk] as a “finished work” appears as the point 
of departure for the writing process, while the “minor work” [Werkchen] figures paradoxically as 
the end result. In contrast to how Jean Paul had originally conceived of the term “minor work” 
[Werkchen] in the prefaces to Dr. Katzenbergers Badereise, nebst einer Auswahl verbesserten 
                                                
436 Karl Philipp Moritz, Neues ABC-Buch, welches zugleich eine Anleitung zum Denken für Kinder enthält [1794], in: 
idem., Werke, vol. 3, ed. Horst Günther (Frankfurt a. M.: Insel Verlag, 1980), 7f. 
437 Jean Paul, Leben Fibels, des Verfassers der Bienrodischen Fibel, in: Werke, I/6, 367. 
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Werkchen and Herbst-Blumine, oder gesammelte Werkchen aus Zeitschriften, however, here it no 
longer ostensibly refers exclusively to the genre of minor works and miscellanies published in 
literary short formats such as newspapers and almanacs. In Jean Paul’s Leben Fibels, rather, the 
term “minor work” now designates an alternative conception of “work” – one which paradoxically 
incorporates the discontinuity and material ephemerality of “minor works,” as small, fleeting, and 
finite texts destined to become “waste-paper” [Makulatur], within the poetological and narratolog-
ical strictures of the novel as “work.” 
 The poetological significance of this minor conception of work becomes apparent in con-
nection with the pervasive editorial fiction staged throughout the novel’s elaborate frame story in 
the novel. There it presents itself as a contingent constellation of fragments, which the narrator – 
ostensibly the “real author” Jean Paul, who situates himself once again not so much in the role of 
author as that of secondary editor and collector of pre-existing material – attempts to meticulously 
weave together into a seamless, gap-free whole. In doing so, however, this fictional editorial pro-
ject simultaneously renders visible the material interfaces of the text, at which points its fragmen-
tariness – and relatedly the narrative gaps in Fibel’s own life story – become ever more evident 
and impossible to cover up.438 Left open and exposed as a loosely glued-together ensemble of 
fragments and paper remnants – what the narrator refers to in the preface as “Trümmern von his-
torischen Quellen”439 – that in the end cannot be brought together as a whole, this book about the 
writing of a book, a biography about the writing of a biography – and their impossibility – explodes 
the self-evident “aesthetic unity” of the work from within. 
                                                
438 Thus Uwe Wirth argues that for Jean Paul “wird auf allen Ebenen des Diskurses eine ‘Poetik der verdoppelten 
Erzählinstanzen’ in Szene gesetzt, deren Resultat Ego-Pluralität ist” (Wirth, Die Geburt des Autors, 331). According 
to Wirth, this is the case not only for the fictional representations of split subjects such as between Siebenkäs and 
Leibgeber in Siebenkäs, but also for the author-instance “Jean Paul.” Wirth thereby relates Jean Paul’s “poetics of a 
double narrator-instance” to the editorial traces left behind at the paratextual margins of his books, in which the split 
author-subject finds itself permanently in transition between “real” author-instance and “fictional” narrator. 
439 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 375. 
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 By expanding the small, the fragmentary, and the miscellaneous within the frame of the 
book, of the autobiographical novel, Leben Fibels presents the transformation and even the defor-
mation of the “work” into the minor work, into the Werkchen. It carries out, in other words, the 
transformation of a conception of the work as a self-evident aesthetic unity into an open and in-
complete form of writing, whose authorship correspondingly now comes to take the form of the 
editorial delivery of stacks of loose-leaf paper. As will be shown in the course of the following 
pages, this undermining of the conventions of writing and authorship around 1800 in Leben Fibels 
belongs to the material strategy of Jean Paul’s concept of humor – what he defines in the Vorschule 
as the form of the “inverted sublime” [umgekehrte Erhabene] – which, as has been argued through-
out the previous chapters, exposes the contingency of writing and the corporeal materiality of the 
text – of the literal letter – in its raw, textual condition. 
 In the preface to Leben Fibels, Jean Paul introduces a series of hermeneutic cues which 
serve to orient the reader in the reading of the work as yet another exemplar of the idyllic genre – 
or, to be more precise, as yet another “kind of idyll.” In this way, the preface appears to serve the 
traditional function of the paratext, namely that of guiding the reception of the work according to 
either its genre, the stated aims or intentions of its author, or by cluing the reader in to certain facts 
or pre-information which are crucial to the understanding of the work, yet which can only be 
known after having read it.440 The preface begins wth the presupposition of a threat of a potential 
                                                
440 “[T]he paratext is what enables a text to become a book and to be offered as such to its readers and, more generally, 
to the public. More than a boundary or a sealed border, the paratext is, rather, a threshold, or – a word Borges used 
apropos of a preface – a ‘vestibule’ that offers the world at large the possibility of either stepping inside or turning 
back. It is an ‘undefined zone’ between the inside and the outside, a zone without any hard and fast boundary on either 
the inward side (turned toward the text) or the outward side (turned toward the world’s discourse about the text), an 
edge, or, as Philippe Lejeune put it, ‘a fringe of the printed text which in reality controls one’s whole reading of the 
text’” (Genette, Paratexts, 1f). See also: Dembeck, Texte rahmen, in particular 1–52; Wirth, Die Geburt des Autors, 
in particular 81–142. 
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misreading in the guise of an “errant reader” [irrender Leser], whom Jean Paul cautions against 
expecting anything epic, grandiose, or exciting in the course of the novel: 
Nimmt also ein irrender Leser dasselbe [Werklein] darum in die Hand, um sich 
darin auf seinem Sessel mit den größten Himmels- und Erden-Stürmern, die es je 
gegeben, in Bekanntschaft zu setzen – und mit Riesenkriegen gegen Riesenschla-
gen auf Riesengebirgen – mit reißenden Höllenflüssen der Leidenschaften – mit 
Nachhöllen voll Kreuzfeuer romantischer Liebes-Qualen – mit weiblichen 
Erzengeln und männlichen Erzteufeln – ja mit Ober-Häuptern, welche auf 
Staatsgebäuden als Drachen-Köpfe von Tränen-Rinnen den Regen in die Traufe 
verwandeln –; nimmt darum der Leser geneigt mein Buch in die Hand: so wart’ er 
so lange, bis ers durchgelesen hat, um nach einem andern zu greifen, worin der-
gleichen Sachen wirklich stehen.441 
 
Instead of “giant wars against giant snakes on giant mountains” [Riesenkriegen gegen Riesen-
schlagen auf Riesengebirgen] or a “netherworld full of the cross-fire of romantic love-pains” [Na-
chhöllen voll Kreuzfeuer romantischer Liebes-Qualen], Jean Paul characterizes Leben Fibels in 
the preface instead as “a soothing still-life” [ein stillendes Still-Leben], and the reader ought to 
expect to find nothing else in the book: 
Wahrlich in diesem nichts – einige harmlose, schuldlose, lichtlose, glanzlose Leute 
mit ähnlichen Schicksalen durchleben darin ihr Oktavbändchen – das Ganze ist ein 
stillendes Still-Leben – eine Wiege erwachsener Leser zum Farniente – ein leises 
graues laues Abendregen, unter welchem statt der Blumen etwan die unscheinbare 
Erde ausduftet, wozu höchstens noch ein Fingerbreit Abendrot und drei Strahlen 
Abendstern kommen möchte. 
Weiter gibts nichts darin, im Buch.442 
 
The calm and tranquility which pervade this idyll, in which nothing cataclysmic or exciting hap-
pens and where there are no great events or epic heroes – a tranquility which is mediated as well 
through the double intonation of the phrase “stillendes Still-Leben” – is nevertheless far from 
harmless. Upon closer inspection, the ambivalence of this description becomes increasingly evi-
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dent, for not only do “still life,” “idleness” [Farniente], and “grey” [grau] suggest an implicit con-
trast with the “soothing” [stillend], “balancing” [wiegend], “gentle” [leise], and “tepid” [lau] – the 
conventional characteristics of the idyllic genre –, but the characters which appear in the book are 
likewise described not simply as “harmless” [harmlos] and “innocent” [schuldlos], but also as 
“lightless” [lichtlos] and “drab” [glanzlos]. The “stillendes Still-Leben” is situated not only in the 
context of calmness and tranquility, then, but also in that of boredom, stand-still, and even death, 
as suggested by the images of evening time in the above passage.443 The preface thereby subverts 
the reader’s expectation of an idyllic biography: here there will be no straightforwardly tranquil 
“arcadia,” but rather a complete standstill of representation and language – a moribund standstill, 
moreover, which verges on the deadly and mortifying. 
 The allusions to silence and death – the ceasing of all movement and meaning and in its 
place the literal “still-life” of life in the form of the drab, grey, and moribund – in the preface thus 
complicate the reading of the novel as an exemplar of the idyllic genre. In Leben Fibels, one thus 
encounter an even further turning of the screw than in Jean Paul’s previous idylls, namely Schul-
meisterlein Wutz and Leben des Quintus Fixlein, and a further elaboration, in turn, of his concept 
of humor as a technique of double perspectivization. This elaboration of the concept of humor 
comes to the fore in a series of passages that follow the presentation of the novel in the preface as 
a “stillendes Still-Leben.” There the narrator redirects the reader’s gaze inland, across the shore of 
this “stillen Meerchen” – the small and quiet Werk-chen, with an implied assonance with the word 
“fairytale” [Märchen] –, in order to observe a vivid scene of mining and milling: 
                                                
443 For a close reading of this passage, see Ulrike Hagel, “‘Stillende Still-Leben’ oder: Das Paradox idyllischen 
Erzählens bei Jean Paul,” in: Stillstellen. Medien/Aufzeichnungen/Zeit. Zeiterfahrung und ästhetische Wahrnehmung, 
eds. Andreas Gelhard, Ulf Schmidt, and Tanja Schultz, vol. 2 (Schliengen: Edition Argus, 2004), 129–39. 
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Wendet man sich freilich am Ufer um von diesem stillen Meerchen und blickt 
landeinwärts in das Treiben und Laufen jetziger Zeit und Politik samt deren da-
rangehängten Menschen: so erstaunt man über den Unterschied und Glanz dieser 
Treiber und Läufer und vergleicht sie bald mit den sogenannten Bergmännlein, wel-
che neben den Bergknappen so ausnehmend arbeiten, in Stollen fahren, Fäustel 
handhaben, Erz hauen, Bergzuber ausgießen, Haspel ziehen – –.444 
 
Here the “shoreline” [Ufer] can be read not simply as a feature of the idyllic landscape, but as an 
allegory for the preface itself as the paratextual threshold of the work. The scene on the horizon of 
ore mining and physical labor – of “Treiber und Läufer” who resemble “Bergmännlein, welche 
neben den Bergknappen so ausnehmend arbeiten, in Stollen Fahren, Fluster handhaben,” and so 
forth – hints from this perspective at an alternative reading of the novel: rather than presenting 
itself here as a placid and tranquil “still-life,” the passage points instead to the quasi-handcrafted 
character of the text. The glance into the construction site from the novel’s paratextual margins 
thereby opens up a view onto the work as a kind of “work in progress,” whereby the calm, tranquil 
of the country-side – the traditional topos of idyll as a “golden arcadia” – is contrasted with the 
raw materiality of the text’s production process, which according to Uwe Wirth always become 
visible at the margins of Jean Paul’s novels.445 From the perspective of the “shoreline” of the book 
– its preface – the novel Leben Fibels would thus no longer appear as an expertly pieced-together, 
internally-closed and complete literary “work,” but rather as a kind of “handiwork” in the most 
literal sense: a multi-authorial, unfinished project whose gaps and ruptures remain open and ex-
posed to the reader – in other words, a Werkchen. 
 Not only does this scene appear to contradict the presentation of the novel as consisting of 
nothing but “harmlose, schuldlose, lichtlose, glanzlose Leute,” but it also reveals another (unspo-
ken) dimension contained in the description of the work as a “stillendes Still-Leben.” The double 
                                                
444 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 367f. 
445 “Die Spuren, die der Autor als Selbstherausgeber und als diskursives ‘Subjekt in Bewegung’ hinterläßt, werden an 
den Rändern der Romane Jean Pauls sichtbare” (Wirth, Die Geburt des Autors, 331). 
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meaning of this phrase is revealed in a passage immediately following the description of the land-
scape scenery, in which the rural countryside and the mining operation are opposed to one another 
in specifically acoustic terms: “So haben leise Menschen tiefer, wenigstens fruchtbringender in die 
Zukunft hinein gehandelt als laute; den Stillen im Lande wurde öfters Raum und Zeit das Spra-
chgewölbe, das sie zu den Lauten außer Landes machte.”446 Here the landscape metaphors of the 
mining operation, which imply a conception of the work as a raw and incomplete construction site 
– that is, as a kind of “handiwork” – converge on a paradigm of orality in the architectural form of 
a “Sprachgewölbe,”447 which situates “silence” [Stillen] and “noise” [Lauten] both in spatial and 
temporal opposition, as well as in close interconnection with one another. Implicit in the metaphor 
is the circular, retroactive temporality, which relates the silence one cannot hear in one’s own land 
to the noise it makes on the other end of the arch’s focal point, namely the noise of production in 
the ore mines. In semiotic terms, the passage presages the circularity of Fibel’s own linguistic-
pedagogical program of alphabetization, which, as will be shown, posits a double movement, 
which splits apart sound and letter – phoneme and grapheme – while the aural “wording” or “pro-
nunciation” [Wortlaut] of words figures as a distant, retroactively-constitutive effect of (silent) 
moveable type – that is, of the written letter as empty placeholder or mere typographic “Spa-
tium.”448 
                                                
446 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 368. 
447 “SPRACHGEWÖLBE, n. ‘ein elliptisches gewölbe, wo der schall, welcher sich aus einem brennpuncte gegen die 
ellipse bewegt, nach dem andern brennpuncte geworfen wird; daher derjenige, welcher in dem einen brennpuncte 
stehet, den in dem andern brennpuncte stehenden sprechen höret, obgleich andere nichts davon vernehmen’” (“Spra-
chgewölbe,” in: Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, 16 Bde. in 32 Teilbänden, vol. 16, [Leipzig 
1971], 2757. See also: “Sprachgewölbe,” Grimm-Wörterbuch, accessed 8 Jan. 2016, <http://www.woerterbuch-
netz.de/DWB?lemma=sprachgewoelbe>). 
448 “Der zweifellose Ursprung beweglicher Lettern besagt aber noch lange nicht, ihre ganze Beweglichkeit erkannt zu 
haben. Dass alle Buchstaben im Setzerkasten Ersetzungen sind, die an die Stelle eines leeren Platzhalters treten, dass 
aber dieser Platzhalter – als Spatium oder Durchschuss – ohne jede Vertretung auch selber zum geduckten Papier 
kommen kann, setzt eine Geschichte voraus, deren Ursprünge älter und rätselhafter sind als Gutenbergs Unternehmen, 
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 If the narrative principle of the idyll thus concerns the depiction of a tranquil still-life in 
which nothing grand or epic ever occurs, then the author-cum-narrator of Leben Fibels goes one 
step further by suggesting to readers how to read “ein solches Werkchen […] auf die rechte 
Weise,” namely on a calm, quiet afternoon, so that one “durch ein so treffliches, ruhiges Buch 
(wofür dem Verfasser ewiger Dank sei!) zur Anspannung für ein eignes glänzendes ausgeholt 
hätte.”449 In this satire of the hermeneutic method, the narrator implies that just as important as an 
approach to reading which is steeped in the teachings of hermeneutics would be the way in which 
the reader physically comports him- or herself in the very act of reading: to read an idyll one must, 
according to the narrator, read in an equally idyllic time and place, “nämlich Ende Novembers (der 
wie der April der Teufel immer schmutzig abzieht) […].”450 
 According to this description, it is in fact the authorial “I” who situates himself in the place 
of the reader: “So würd’ ich das Werkchen lesen; aber leider hab’ ich es selber vorher gemacht.”451 
As in the hermeneutic circle, which seeks to reconstruct the parts from the whole and the whole 
from the parts, the production of meaning is, according to this formula, only possible once the 
entire novel has been read – or, as in the author’s case, first written and subsequently re-read. The 
preface thus lays bare the circular logic of presupposition, or “vorauswissen,”452 which is not only 
central to the hermeneutic method, but also becomes an an object of (satirical) reflection through-
out the novel. As will be argued in the course of the following pages, the inherent circularity of all 
meaning – meaning, that is, as the retroactive effect of a narrative feedback loop – encompasses 
not only the reading strategy laid out in the preface to Leben Fibels, but also the presentation of 
                                                
Weinpressen zu Druckerpressen zu ernüchtern” (Friedrich Kittler, “Buchstaben – Zahlen – Codes,” in: Die mathe-
matischen Wurzeln der Kultur. Mathematische Innovationen und ihre kulturellen Folgen, eds. Jochen Brüning and 
Eberhard Knobloch [Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005], 65–76, here: 65). 
449 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 368. 
450 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 368. 
451 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 368. 
452 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 368. 
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the text’s composition, its conceptions of authorship and readership, as well the relationship be-
tween life and book, life and book – the life of the scholar and the biographical project of writing 
life – which it stages. 
 
6.1. Combinatory and Contingency: The Birth of the Scholar from the Abc’s 
Like its idyllic predecessors Leben des vergnügten Schulmeisterlein Wutz and Leben des Quintus 
Fixlein, Leben Fibels presents the birth of the scholar from writing in the most literal sense: it the 
birth of Fibel from the Fibel, the personification of the name of the ABC book, the Fibel, in the 
form of a fictional biography, Leben Fibels, in which the “Produktion eines Lebens geschieht im 
Modus des misreadings.”453 In a reversal of the metonymic relationship between author and work, 
whereby a work is identified with the author’s name, “wie man etwa raffaelische Gemälde Raffaele 
nennt,”454 here the author – Gotthelf Fibel – is retroactively attributed to the work – the Bien-
rodische Fibel, which Jean Paul appends to his own biography of Fibel’s life – as its cause, gen-
erated from the very ABC book which he is said to have written as its own metaleptic effect, and 
whose “life” is subsequently presented in the fictional form of a biographical novel. 
 According to the novel’s second preface, “Vor-Geschichte oder Vor-Kapitel,” Fibel’s 
work, which “mit den Elementen aller Wissenschaften, nämlich mit dem Abcdef etc. etc. zugleich 
eine kurze Religionslehre, gereimte Dichtkunst, bunte Tier- und Menschen-stücke und kleine Still-
Leben dazu, eine flüchtige Natur- und Handwerks-Geschichte darbringt,” serves not simply as a 
fictional pretext to Jean Paul’s biography, but also as a kind of Urtext, insofar as his ABC book 
“Millionen Leser nicht bloß gefunden, sondern vorher dazu gemacht [hat].”455 Fibel’s book is thus 
                                                
453 Menke, “Die Geburt des Gelehrten aus den Exzerpten,” 122. 
454 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 370. 
455 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 369. 
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situated not as the product of, but instead as the very foundation of the discourse network around 
1800, which first programmatically made readership into a precondition of authorship.456 Later in 
the text, the narrator provides insight into the significance of Fibel’s unusual program of alphabet-
ization, which he satirically likens to Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre: 
Wer schon bloß bedenkt, was Buchstaben sind […], wer nun oben erwägt, daß über 
diese Vierzundzwanziger kein Gelehrter und keine Sprache hinauszugehen vermag, 
sondern daß sie die wahre Wissenschaftslehre jeder Wissenschaftslehre sind und 
die eigentliche, so lange gesuchte und endlich gefundne allgemeine Sprache, aus 
welcher nicht nur alle wirkliche Sprachen zu verstehen sind, sondern auch noch 
tausend ganz unbekannte, indem 24 Buchstaben können 
1391724288887252999425128493402200 mal versetzt werden […], würde 
schwerlich sich der Frage enthalten: wer ist wohl größer als Fibel?457 
 
Fibel’s work speaks of reading and writing as a combinatory of elements, whose ‘raw material’ 
are in this case the twenty-four letters of the (German) alphabet. As such, Fibel’s book constitutes 
a form of encyclopedic knowledge – the “Wissenschaftslehre jeder Wissenschaftslehre,” in refer-
ence to Fichte, as well as the “Enzyklopädie aller Wissenschaften” – without which, as the narrator 
wryly notes, there would be neither writers nor readers.458 In this way, Fibel’s book flips on its 
head Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, which according to Till Dembeck presupposes at the communi-
cative level “Rezipienten, die dazu in der Lage sind, wiederum ihren Geist, und war möglichst 
unabhängig von den Buchstaben, in denen sie sich darbietet, zu erfassen.”459 For Fibel, rather, the 
                                                
456 Cf. Friedrich Kittler, Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900, in particular 37–55. 
457 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 489. 
458 “Nirgends besser als hier lernt man begreifen, wie die Alten im dickbändigen Homer die Enzyklopädie aller Wis-
senschaften finden konnten, wenn man in einem so schmalen Werkchen nicht weniger antrifft, indem darin bald Ge-
ographie vorkommt, z.B. polnische (Wie grausam ist der wilde Bär, Wenn er vom Honigbaum kommt her) oder ara-
bische (Camele tragen schwere Last) oder italienische in M (Mit Messern stich bei Leibe nicht) – bald Kriegskunst in 
D (Soldaten macht der Degen kund) — bald Mystizismus in L (Geduldig ist das Lämmelein. Das Licht gibt einen 
hellen Schein) — bald Teleologie in O (Das Ohr zu hören ist gemacht).” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 490f.). 
459 Dembeck, “Fichte dem Buchstaben nach auslegen,” 115. There Dambeck cites a suggestive passage from Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre: “Die Wissenschaftslehre ist von der Art, daß sie durch den blossen Buchstaben gar nicht, sondern 
daß sie lediglich durch den Geist sich mittheilen läßt; weil ihre Grundideen in jedem der sie studiert, durch die schaf-
fende Einbildungskraft selbst hervorgebracht werden müssen” (Fichte, GA, I/2, 415). 
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act “creation,” the birth of man – what the biblical tradition identifies with the name Adam, and 
thereby with the letter “A” as the first letter of the alphabet – lies not, as it does for Fichte, in the 
self-activity of an “absolute I” or “spirit” independent of the “letter” – a transcendental-philosoph-
ical notion which for Fichte is, naturally, grounded in the self-identity of the letters of the alphabet, 
as in the proposition: “A = A” – but begins instead with the positing of the word, logos, albeit here 
in its literal literality, i.e., the letters of the alphabet.460 
 The respective “pretext” to Fibel’s work, therefore, is not so much Fichte’s Wissen-
schaftslehre as it is the Bible, the divine “book of books.” Hence in an earlier scene in which the 
narrator recalls the moment of Fibel’s calling as a genius author and scholar, the narrator likens 
Fibel’s ABC book to the “Buch der Bücher”: “‘Sitze ab, Student, und ziehe aus eine Schwanzfeder 
dem Hahn und setze auf damit das Buch der Bucher, voll aller matres et patres lectionis, […]; 
schreibe dergleichen, mein Fibel, und die Welt liest.’”461 Fibel’s primer situates itself in the place 
of the Bible, which, as a text, it deforms from the perspective of its literality – in fact, according 
to Grimm’s Wörterbuch, the word “primer” [Fibel] is itself, not coincidentally, an etymological 
deformation of the very word “Bible.”462 In Fibel’s primer, writing is decomposed into arbitrary 
                                                
460 If the entries for the letter “A” in Fibel’s ABC book, “Affe” and “Apfel”  – “Ein Affe gar possierlich ist, / zumal 
wenn er vom Apfel frißt” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 555)) – are interpretable as an „Idee einer adamitischen Ursprache, 
in der das Wesen der Dinge durch das Wort sich aussprach” (according to Schmitz-Emans, “Der verlorene Urtext. 
Fibels Leben und die schriftmetaphorische Tradition,” in: Jahrbuch der Jean-Paul-Gesellschaft 26/27 [1991/92], 197–
222, here: 208), then the name “Adam” would already ‘in the beginning’ have been explicitly effaced by the word 
“Affe” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 433) and its “apfelessendes Zerrbild,” which in the beginning stands for a repetition in 
the place of a lack. For more on this point, cf. Menke, “Alphabetisierung. Kombinatorik und Kontingenz. Jean Pauls 
Leben Fibels, des Verfassers der Biendrodischen Fibel,” in: Medienphilosophie: Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kultur-
forschung, eds. Lorenz Engel and Bernhard Siegert [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2010], 43–60, here: 49). 
461 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 427. 
462 “FIBEL, f. abecebuch, liber literarum elementariarum, es ist noch ungefunden, wann und wo diese entstellung des 
wortes bibel für den angegebnen besonderen sinn aufkam, sie hat allmälich überall eingang erlangt. aus bibel machte 
die bairische mundart wibel (wie aus babe wawe, aus bart wart und umgekehrt aus warf barf, aus weib beiw); wenn 
H. Sachs in seinem gedicht vom hausrat schreibt” (“Fibel,” in: Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, 
16 Bde. in 32 Teilbänden, vol. 3, [Leipzig 1971], 1611; “Fibel,” Grimm-Wörterbuch, accessed 12 Jan. 2016, 
<http://www.woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB?lemma=fibel>). “Das Buch – Leben Fibels – beschreibt, gleichsam, das Le-
ben von Buch, der ein Buch des Titels Buch geschrieben hat. Den Ursprung des Buchs. Und genauer: dies Buch, die 
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elements, such that the actual “meaning” of words is shown to be produced from the meaningless-
ness of the letters of the alphabet: hence the letter ‘A’ can be retroactively coupled to the signifier 
“Affe” just as much as it can to those of “Adam” or “Apfel,” or the rest of the letters of the alphabet 
to signifiers like “Wolf,” “Quarkkäse,” “Hure,” “Drache,” “Munch,” “Nonne,” “Lämmlein,” 
“Ochse,” “Ziegenbock,” and “Zählbrett.”463 
 The origin story of Fibel’s invention of the primer, and with it his development of a highly 
unusual program of alphabetization, is recounted in the thirteenth chapter of the novel, entitled 
“Papierdrache.” There the contingency and idiosyncrasy of Fibel’s conception of language be-
comes explicit and discernible. On one fateful afternoon, Fibel is said to have “vor der zerbroche-
nen Fensterscheibe des Schulmeisters vorbeiging,” whereupon he noticed that, “darein statt des 
Glases der sogenannte Abc-Hahn eingeklebt war, dessen Tierstück die ältern Abcbücher mit einem 
Prügel in der Kralle abschließt. Aber dieser Scheiben-Hahn wird noch viel wichtiger durch einen 
Traum, womit er Fibels ersten Schlummer schwängerte, und welcher nachher so gewaltig alle 
Schulbänke und Abcschützen erschütterte.”464 The significance of this “Abc-Hahn” is clarified by 
the narration of the dream sequence which immediately follows. Later that night while sleeping, 
Fibel dreamt of the birds kept by his father Siegwart, a fowler, which “flatterten und stießen ge-
geneinander, pfropften sich ineinander und wuchsen endlich zu einem Hahne ein.” His oneiric 
vision of a dancing “Abc-Hahn” owes to the imaginary “grafting” [Pfropfung], which transforms 
                                                
Fibel, mimt die Überbietung, das Über- und Vorleben im Hintergrund nicht nur des Buchs der Bücher, Bibel, sondern 
eines jeden Buchs. Die Fibel ist – ein Schibboleth – jenes Buch, ohne das kein Buch je geschrieben, geschweige denn 
gelesen werde könnte: das Buchstaben- oder Abc-Buch. Die Fibel, und a fortiori dasjenige Buch, das den Ursprung 
der Fibel, das Leben Fibels – vorgreifende Parodie einer andern Überschrift: Leben Jesu – schreibt, tritt, aus Gründen, 
Hintergründen, die leicht einzusehen, aber schwer zu durchschauen sind, in Konkurrenz zum Buch der Bücher, Bibel.” 
For more on the theological significance of Jean Paul’s deformation of the bible in Leben Fibels, cf. Schestag, “Bib-
liographien für Jean Paul,” in particular 495–523, here: 495f. 
463 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 555–62. 
464 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 426. 
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the multiplicity of his father’s birds into a new whole – a single rooster – on whose back he rides 
as he attempts to translate incomprehensible so-called “rooster German” into “human German”: 
Der Hahn fuhr mit dem Kopfe zwischen Fibels Schenkel, und dieser mußte auf 
dessen Halse davonreiten, mit dem Gesichte gegen den Schwanz gekehrt. Hinter 
ihm krähete das Tier unaufhörlich zurück, als würd es von einem Petrus geritten - 
und er hatte lange Mühe, das Hahnen-Deutsch in Menschen-Deutsch zu übersetzen, 
bis er endlich herausbrachte, es klinge ha, ha. Es sollte damit weniger – sah er schon 
im Schlafe ein – der Name des Hahns ausgesprochen (das n fehlte), noch weniger 
ein Lachen oder gar jener Verwunderungs-Ausbruch […] angedeutet werden, son-
dern als bloßes ha des Alphabets, welches h freilich der Hahn ebensogut he betiteln 
konnte, wie b be, oder hu, wie q ku, oder hau, wie v vau, oder ih, wie x ix.465 
 
In this scene, which parodies the biblical tale of the Denial of Peter (in which the figure of a rooster 
plays an equally prominent role), Fibel’s rooster is revealed not to have the task of representing 
the letter “H,” unlike the “monkey” [Affe] which stands for the letter “A” and the “billy goat” 
[Ziegenbock] for the letter “Z” in his ABC book; rather, it emerges as the so-called “Abc-Hahn” 
which haunts Fibel’s dreams and eventually comes to emblazon his primer as its “Wap-
penschild.”466 By sounding out not its own name, “Hahn,” but instead the meaningless syllable 
“Ha” – not laughter, but the name of the letter “H” itself – the dancing rooster inspires Fibel with 
the idea of combining letter, syllable, and image as the experimental basis for his ABC book. Thus 
from the single letter “H” – the only letter in the German alphabet which, not coincidentally, was 
originally neither pronounceable nor audible in spoken German – Fibel goes on to develop iconic 
and poetic representations for all the letters of the alphabet according to a combinatorial princi-
ple.467 His primer thereby presents a conception of language, one could say, in the form of what 
                                                
465 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 426. 
466 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 502. 
467 “Fibel hörte hinter sich über fünfzehn Schulbänke das Abc aufsagen, aber jedesmal das h überhüpfen; endlich fuhr 
der Reithahn unter sie, und sie riefen einhellig: ha, ha etc. etc., ohne zu lachen. Und Helf konnte jetzt sehen, daß jede 
Bank ein Abcbuch voll eingeschnitzter Bilder war – z. B. bei A einen Hintern, bei B eine Birkenrute für jenen –, aber 
nur um H war nichts gemalt, bis der Hahn leibhaftig den Buchstaben vorstellte so wie Hennen die en” (Jean Paul, 
Werke, I/6, 426). The passage’s focus on the letter ‘H’ is far from coincidental, for in the discursive-historical context 
 
193 
the preface refers to a “Sprachgewölbe,” in which silent graphemes, Stillen – here the silent, su-
perfluous letter “H” as the primal scene of all the letters of the alphabet – and aural phonemes, 
Lauten, are contingently paired together according to a combinatory logic. 
 Against the more contemporary phonetic method, or Lautiermethode which, as Friedrich 
Kittler argues, constituted a genuine revolution in the context of the reading culture around 1800 
by making oralization into the end-goal of literacy learning for the first time, Fibel’s program of 
alphabetization in his ABC book has recourse to the much older letter- or syllable method of 
spelling, the Buchstabier- or Syllabiermethode, which demanded that the names of individual let-
ters of the alphabet be learned, as in “Haus = Ha, A, U, Es.” This meant, however, that there was 
little possibility for readers to learn how to translate individual letters directly into their respective 
phonemes, except by guessing their phonetic expression on the basis of the external appearance of 
words alone.468 By drawing on the older letter or syllable method, which already by 1800 was long 
outdated, Fibel’s program of alphabetization foregoes the revolutionary paradigm of orality in 
reading pedagogy which, according to Kittler, sought to naturalize language by linking it to the 
                                                
of eighteenth-century orthographic debates, the presence of the letter ‘H’  in the German alphabet was highly conten-
tious due to its lack of a determinate phoneme. Thus in his polemical tract “Neue Apologie des Buchstaben h” (1773), 
J.G. Hamann defended the function of the silent letter H’s inclusion in the German alphabet on the grounds that it 
represents that which is inaudible, concealed, and hidden, whereas Moses Mendelssohn, among others, argued in favor 
of its repeal due to its apparent superfluousness. At stake in these orthographic debates, however, was a deeper medial 
and epistemological problematic concerning the ostensible arbitrariness of the letters of the alphabet, and relatedly the 
relation of phoneme to grapheme, text-image to sound, and even the (physical) “body” of the letter to its “spirit.” Cf. 
J. G. Hamann, “Neue Apologie des Buchstaben h. Oder: Außerordentliche Betrachtungen über die Orthographie der 
Deutschen von H. S. Schullehrer,” in: Sämtliche Werke, vol. 3, ed. Josef Nadler (Vienna 1951), 89–108. For Moses 
Mendelssohn’s pro-rationalist critique, cf. Moses Mendelssohn, “Sammelrezension zu Hamann,” in: Allgemeine 
Deutsche Bibliothek, vol. 24 (Berlin 1775), 1. Stück, 287–89. 
468 “Die Revolution des europäischen Alphabets ist seine Oralisierung. Unscheinbare Fibeln wirken mit am epistemo-
logischen Schwenk von allgemeiner Grammatik zu Sprachwissenschaft […] Stephanis Begriff von ‘aussprechen’ be-
zeichnet den Schwenk, der nach Foucaults Analyse das transzendentale Wissen begründet hat, sehr genau: Lernbar 
heißt das Alphabet nur ‘aus der Gesichtssprache in die Gehörsprache übersetzt’” (Friedrich A. Kittler, Aufschreibesys-
teme 1800/1900, 43). On the following page, Kittler makes more explicit what is at stake in this epistemological shift 
between the old and new programs of alphabetization: “Die Lautiermethode gipfelt darin, einen neuen Körper zu ben 
oder vorzuschreiben. Dieser Körper hat Augen und Ohren nur, um ein großer Mund zu sein. Der Mund überführt alle 
Buchstaben, die zu Augen und Ohren gedrungen sind, in tönende Laute. Das ist im Bezug aufs Ohr ein alter Gedanke, 
im Bezug auf Augen und Buchstaben aber eine Revolution” (ibid., 44). 
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mother’s voice. In doing so, his primer foregrounds instead the contingency of linguistic and writ-
ing systems, dissociating language and nature by breaking words down into arbitrary letters and 
syllables, which it then links together with hyphens – of which Fibel is also said to be their (acci-
dental) inventor: “Er tat auf dem Papier keinen Schritt, ohne von einer Silbe zur andern auf zwei 
übereinander liegenden Teilungs-Strichen (z.B. Stri-che) wie auf einer Brücke überzugehen, aber 
auf diese Weise eben schließt er sich an das lange Narren- und Weisen-Seil der Erfinder an, näm-
lich als der Erfinder der – Gedankenstriche […].”469 
 Not surprisingly, the most important typographic character for Fibel turns out to be a typo-
graphic character outside the standard alphanumeric set which cannot be pronounced: the hyphen, 
which appears as an empty placeholder – a literal gap or caesura in the text. While it appears at 
first to serve the pedagogical purpose of visually mediating the pronunciation of words in the ABC 
book by breaking them down into their constituent syllables and linking them together, “wie auf 
einer Brücke überzugehen,” his use of the hyphen turns out to be a completely arbitrary authorial 
strategy, “[um] mehr Raum auf dem Papier zu leeren und in dem Beute zu füllen.”470 The hyphen, 
like wit, is thus a combinatory instrument for arbitrarily joining together disparate material in order 
to set the writing into motion, transforming the dead letter of written language into genuine “mov-
able type” – that is, into “Buchstabieren in Bewegung.”471 
 Yet in the very same gesture, the hyphen also breaks the linearity of the text; it signifies an 
absence, creates a gap or “wound” in its physiognomy, which it simultaneously sutures and ex-
poses. In doing so, it draws attention away from the underlying meaning of words and directs the 
reader’s gaze instead toward the arbitrary gaps or blanks – the literal “voids” or Leerstellen – which 
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fill up the sheets of paper of the ABC book, thereby bringing into proximity “das Körperliche bei 
seinem geistigen Erzeugen.”472 Like the origin of the letter “H,” the hyphen is an alphanumeric 
symbol which cannot be spoken: it is, in other words, a silent grapheme without a phoneme; hence 
a text or sheet of paper that is filled with nothing but hyphens, or alternatively with the letter “H,” 
would be utterly incomprehensible to a listener. It would constitute a “stillendes Still-Leben” in 
the most literal sense of the phrase – nothing but a ‘dead letter.’ 
 Through the repeated inversion of the corporeal and the spiritual sides of language in Fi-
bel’s primer, the novel stages a dynamic which may be said to approximate Jean Paul’s concept of 
humor as the form of the inverted sublime. For from the perspective of Fibel’s dream, which pre-
sents an inverted perspective from atop the back of the rooster – “mit dem Gesichte gegen den 
Schwanz gekehrt” – Fibel’s “Abc-Hahn” can be brought into proximity with the figure of Merops, 
which Jean Paul adopts in the Vorschule der Ästhetik as the poetological symbol for his concept 
of humor: “Er [der Humor] gleicht dem Vogel Merops, welcher zwar dem Himmel den Schwanz 
zukehrt, aber doch in dieser Richtung in den Himmel auffliegt. Dieser Gaukler trinkt, auf dem 
Kopfe tanzend, den Nektar hinaufwärts.”473 According to this formula, humor does not simply 
invert the perspective between heaven and hell, between the infinite and the finite, but by opening 
up a “double perspective” between two opposite realms, it furnishes a perspective of impossibility 
– of looking in two opposing directions simultaneously. Humor is therefore not merely a conven-
tional poetological technique of perspectivization, but one which serves as a material strategy in 
                                                
472 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 431. In the appendix which contains Fibel’s ABC book, Fibel goes on to apply his spelling 
method to excerpts from the Old and New Testaments: “Das hei-li-ge Va-ter Un-ser. Va-ter Un-ser, der Du bist im 
Him-mel. Ge-hei-liget wer-de Dein Na-me. Zu-kom-me Dein Reich,” etc. As in the etymology of “Fibel” – a defor-
mation of the word “Bibel” – Fibel’s book likewise deforms the “word” of God – the “book of books” – into an 
incomprehensible ensemble of meaningless fragments of words. 
473 Jean Paul, Werke, I/5, 129. 
 
196 
Jean Paul’s texts for completely disorienting the material and the spiritual, the finite and the infi-
nite. For this reason, it is not a sense-making “idea,” but instead a “destructive” or “negating” 
[vernichtend] force,474 as he refers to it in the Vorschule, which in its role as “the inverted sublime” 
explodes the form of the sublime from within, exposing in turn the fragmentariness and materiality 
that underlies every “infinite idea” (spirit, form, reason). Humor may thus be said to deface the 
theological – the Bible as the “book of books” – into the life of Fibel, whose ABC book fore-
grounds the sensuous materiality of language by showing how all meaning is produced from a 
meaningless combinatory matrix of arbitrary letters. 
 
6.2. Textual Bodies: Collecting, Excerpting, and Engrafting the “Life of Fibel” 
While Fibel’s program of alphabetization is not itself directly carried out in Leben Fibels, the text 
nevertheless presents a conception of writing and reading which inscribes contingency at the ma-
terial level through the principle of combinatory production. At the various levels of its nested 
frame stories, the novel continuously recycles previously written material: the “real author” Jean 
Paul grafts onto his novel Fibel’s ABC book as an appendix; the fictional author-instance of the 
same name produces his biography from antecedent “pretexts” such as manuscripts, excerpts, and 
fragments; and finally the protagonist Fibel stamps his name onto numerous scholarly works which 
have long been out of circulation, including one that impossibly dates back to the 1600s. Just as 
Fibel’s letter-method of alphabetization evacuates meaning from language by coupling speech 
back to an arbitrary writing system, the novel presents itself as a contingent constellation of frag-
ments, which the editor and narrative voice “Jean Paul” attempts to glue together into a seamless 
whole, while at the same time ironically rendering visible the gaps in the text. 
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 The material contingency of Fibel’s biography is reflected in the names of various chapter 
titles like “Leibchen-Muster,” “Herings-Papiere,” “Zwirnwickler,” “Papierdrache,” “Kaffee-
Düten,” and other “fliegende Blätter fiblischen Lebens,” which allude to the fictional scraps of 
“waste paper” [Makulatur] and remnants that constitute the fictional pre-texts, or “Vor-Ges-
chichten,” of (the writing of) Fibel’s biography.475 The frame story presented in the “Vor-Kapitel” 
goes on to depict a literal paper chase in search of “Trümmern von historischen Quellen,” which 
the fictional author-instance “Jean Paul” attempts to retrieve from the townspeople of Fibel’s 
hometown of Heiligengut, which “hebt sich zu einer biographischen Schneiderhölle voll zugewor-
fener Papier-Abschnitzel.”476 In this fictional scenario of the biography’s production, the preface 
makes explicit not only the (material) contingency of the origin of the texts which constitute it, but 
also the contingency of its authorship; for the author, who wishes to become the (as it later turns 
out, second) “fibelschen Lebensbeschreiber,” searches in Heiligengut, “mich da ein wenig anzu-
setzen, urn wenigstens noch so viele aufzutreiben, als etwa notig waren, um aus allen biographi-
schen Papierschnitzeln geschickt jenen Luftballon” – that is, the “work” Leben Fibels, which the 
text conflates as “gegenwärtiges Leben oder Buch”477 – “zusammenzuleimen,” which is to then be 
“inflated” [aufgeblasen] and carried up into the heavens like the biographical equivalent of Christ’s 
Ascension.478 
 The constellation of Leben Fibels as the heterogeneous product of a collage technique not 
only presents the paper on which it is written as palimpsestic carriers of biographical data, but also 
leaves the points of intersection where the different fragments of text have been stitched and glued 
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together open and exposed as “eingebrachten papiernen Verkröpfungen.”479 In this sense, the bi-
ography is not really a book anymore, at least in the conventional sense, but turned into a kind of 
three-dimensional material object – one whose (architectonic) “crankings” or “offsets” [Verkröp-
fungen], which feature prominently in Baroque carpet patterns, far more resembles something like 
the paper form of an origami. From this interstitial or enfolded perspective, the (fictional) editor’s 
technique of composition could perhaps be described as one of textilic enfolding and unfolding, 
not unlike Deleuze’s notion of the fold, which conceives of a serial logic of enfolding, an adding-
in of a potentially limitless number of unrelated elements.480 
 In the novel’s nested story-within-the-story of Joachim Pelz, Fibel’s first biographer, the 
serial logic of textilic enfolding is made even more explicit with the revelation that the novel Leben 
Fibels is, in fact, a multi-authorial work – one which was erected upon the fragmentary remains of 
Pelz’s own forty-volume biography. In reality, this fact was already first divulged in the preface, 
as when the narrator presents his own biography as an excerpt – an Auszug – of Pelz’s fragmentary 
“pretext”: “Das folgende Buch ist demnach der treue Auszug aus den 40 bruchstücklichen Bänden 
des Christen-Judas und meiner Jünger […].”481 Later on in the novel, in the so-called “Pelz-
Kapitel,” the narrator goes on to ironically reveal the “allegorical” significance of Pelz’s name in 
connection with Jean Paul’s own excerpting method of text production, which refers to the material 
usage of textual sources that serve as paper bandaging material for “engraftments” in the so-called 
“Pelzgarten”: “Dieses ganze Kapitel wurde in einem Impf- oder Pelzgarten im Grase gefunden 
und schien zum Verbinden der Pelz-Wunden gedient zu haben.”482 Here the passage paronomas-
tically alludes to an alternative meaning of the verb “pelzen,” which is a synonym for the process 
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of “seeding” [impfen] or “grafting” [pfropfen], a horticultural technique whereby tissues from one 
plant are artificially implanted onto those of another so that the two sets can join together at the 
“wounded” point of intersection.483 
 While the fictional origin of the “Pelz-Kapitel” suggests an organic metaphor of gardening 
and natural proliferation, the text’s allusion to the origin of Pelz’s own name implies, on the con-
trary, a completely denaturalized technique or handiwork of grafting. As Uwe Wirth argues, “Das 
Verfahren der Aufpfropfung impliziert nun eine Beschleunigung dieses Hybridisierungsvorgangs. 
Die Aufpfropfung ist eine Kultivierungstechnik, die der künstlichen – nicht-sexuellen – Fortpflan-
zung dient – eine Technik, die seit alters her bekannt ist und im 18. Jahrhundert zu neuer Blüte 
gelangt, nämlich als Wissensfigur für einen aufgeklärten Umgang mit der Natur.”484 As Wirth goes 
on to argue, a glance into the technical side of engrafting, as a principle technique of (en)folding, 
makes clear the extent to which it concerns a means of artificial production, namely that of healing 
wounds. “Dabei bringt die Kultivierungstechnik der Aufpfropfung einen Begriff der Schnittstelle 
ins Spiel, der ein weites Feld kulturwissenschaftlicher und medientechnischer Implikationen er-
öffnet.”485 One could similarly argue, in harmony with Wirth’s argument, that the technique of 
“engrafting” opens up an interstitial perspective onto the texture of the text itself, not only in con-
nection with the imaginary engraftments in Fibel’s dream, which transform the multiplicity of his 
father’s birds into a single, unified “Abc-Hahn” – and hence with a media-technical conception of 
the alphabet as an ars combinatoria – but also with the composition process of filling in gaps and 
                                                
483 “PELZEN, verb. gleich belzen theil 1, 1456, vergl. Kluge 24a. Schm.2 1, 389: die Griechen nennens ἐµφυτεύειν, 
die Lateiner inserere, die Deutschen impfen, pfropfen oder pelzen. Colerus hausbuch 110 (doch in der älteren sprache 
auch im sinne von pflanzen)” (“Pelzen,” in: Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, 16 Bde. in 32 
Teilbänden, vol. 13, [Leipzig 1971], 1535. See also: “Pelzen,” Grimm-Wörterbuch, accessed 18 Sept. 2015, 
<http://woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB/?sigle=DWB&mode=Vernetzung&lemid=GP01621>). 
484 Uwe Wirth, “Aufpfropfung als Figur des Wissens in der Kultur- und Mediengeschichte,” in: Kulturgeschichte als 
Mediengeschichte (oder vice versa?), eds. Lorenz Engell, Bernhard Siegert, and Joseph Vogl (Weimar: Univer-
sitätsverlag Weimar, 2006), 111–22, here: 111. 
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suturing so-called “Pelz-Wunden” with “bandages” or “grafts” composed of previously written 
material, which the fictional author-instance “Jean Paul” finds lying around at various locales. 
 The “grafting” [aufpfrofen] or “gluing together” [zusammenleimen] of the remnants of Fi-
bel’s life in the form of the heterogeneous remnants of text which he left behind – and the impos-
sibility of that (auto-)biographical project – becomes all the more apparent as the novel progresses. 
Thus in the sixteenth (or seventeenth) chapter, entitled “Nicht das 16., sondern das 17. Kriminal-
Kapitel,” the chapter immediately exposes itself as a gap in the text that must be arbitrarily filled 
in with narrative exposition. There, at the point in the novel where the gaps begin to destructively 
proliferate, the narrator decides to abandon his earlier effort of composing Fibel’s life on the basis 
of so-called “historical sources” and develops instead a strategy of interspersing the narrative of 
Fibel’s life story with various “cues” [Winke] or so-called “fateful cues” [Schicksals-Wink[e]] for 
readers, “die ich sogleich hie und da einstreuen will” and from which “[z]u erraten ists” what 
events presage Fibel’s future fame.486 By attempting to weave later portions of the novel back into 
earlier portions, allegedly in order to make more comprehensible an ever more incomprehensible 
and fragmentary work, the material strategy of recycling raw text-material, such as Pelz’s biog-
raphy, in order to fill in gaps – Leerstellen – through the techniques of engrafting sets into a motion 
an extremely destabilizing dynamic that ultimately explodes the narrator’s attempt to narrate Fi-
bel’s life story in a consistently chronological manner. 
 If at the material level the novel reveals itself to be a work of seriality, materiality, and 
contingency through the linking, gluing, and grafting together of heterogeneous material, then at 
the semiotic level it shows how meaning – in a metaleptic reversal of cause and effect – is produced 
and fixated in an entirely retroactive manner. In the “Pelz-Kapitel,” this becomes apparent in the 
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way that the biographical narrator’s material process of writing threatens to narrate its own prem-
ises, encountering and repeating its own “scene of writing” by incorporating previously written 
material into the fragmentary gaps of the biography.487 The chapter on Pelz thereby foregrounds 
the inherently circular or chiastic order of narration that was already to be found at very beginning 
of Leben Fibels, namely in the opening line of the preface, the so-called “Vor-Kapitel”: “Das Zähl-
Brett hält der Ziegen-Bock.”488 This line is in fact a citation of the last seven words of the parergic 
appendix containing Fibel’s ABC book, which – in yet another metaleptic reversal of cause and 
effect, of primary and secondary – now figures as the “primary” work, while the biography Leben 
Fibels itself subsequently appears as the “secondary” work, that is, as the commentary or post-text 
that seeks to exegetically unfold the initial citation.489 
 This narrative positing of presuppositions – that is, the inherently metaleptic structure of 
the biographical project as such – arguably finds its poetological pendant much earlier in the novel, 
namely in the allegorical tale of the ring, which first appears in the seventh chapter, “Der Zwirn-
wickler,” and reappears across various chapters at the beginning of the book. There the seriality of 
composition and the circularity of meaning are brought together and shown to be thematically and 
epistemologically intertwined. In the chapter “Der Zwirnwickler,” the narrator recounts the tale of 
Fibel’s childhood as well as the unusual family constellation into which he was born: Siegwart, 
Fibel’s father, is a mute fowler who can only whistle or mumble in broken syllables, while his 
mother, Engeltrut, not only suffers from constant headaches, but also gives birth to dozens of still-
born children – twins, triplets, and quintuplets – which they bury in a makeshift grave in their 
                                                
487 A similar narratological strategy is employed by Jean Paul in his novel Siebenkäs. As Gerhard Neumann argues, 
“Jean Pauls Roman, der Anfänge zu erzählen vorgibt, ist zugleich die Inszenierung von deren Subversion: Er setzt 
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backyard without mourning. By presenting Fibel’s family as creaturely and animalistic, the text 
not only anticipates Fibel’s own highly idiosyncratic conception of language as evacuated of all 
meaning and signification, which manifests itself in the child-like language of his ABC book, but 
also foregrounds the potent and monstrous bodily moment in language – a “stillendes Still-Leben” 
in the most grotesquely literal sense – in which human fetuses, “stillborns,” can be serialized just 
as much as meaningless letters of the alphabet. 
 Several pages later after recounting the details of this grotesque birth-ritual, in which Fi-
bel’s mother finishes “delivering” [das Entbinden] her two most recent dead twins, the narrator 
introduces the reader to the story of the ring in connection with the appearance of a talking bird 
[Sprachvogel]: Fibel’s father “hört […] sich oben im Blau mit menschlichen, obwohl 
ausländischen Worten anreden: Filou, bourreau, diable sacre etc.; und zu gleicher Zeit fiel ein 
goldener Ring vor seine Füße nieder. Er hob ihn auf und sah in die Höhe; – ein grüner Vogel, so 
groß wie ein Papagei (wahrscheinlich auch einer), flog über ihn hin und nahm mit dem Antritts-
Gruß filou Abschied.”490 The appearance of the ring, which in this scene is shown to drop from 
the bird’s mouth as soon as he mimics human language, serves not merely as a portent of Fibel’s 
future fame – that is, while the ring’s jewel is soon stolen from his father, its gold is extracted and 
circulates on the market to become “zu einem Selbst-Angebinde” for Fibel, “zum Ankaufe eines 
schönen Werks, des sogenannten ‘Neu geöffneten Ritterplatzes’ in drei Duodezbänden, worin er 
sich in allen Wissenschaften umsehen konnte, weil er noch immer zweifelhaft war, in welcher er 
ein Skribent werden wolle,” before knowing that later he would of course go on to become the 
scribe of all the sciences;491 rather, in the context of the novel’s circular narrative, which presup-
poses at the outset what occurs at the end, the ring gains poetological significance in relation with 
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the figure of the talking bird – and ostensibly with the other bird metaphors in the text, such as 
Fibel’s dancing “Abc-Hahn” – as an allegorical figure for the continual metalepsis in the text of 
cause and effect, primacy and secondarity, beginning and end. It thereby links the circularity of 
the novel’s narrative structure back to a conception of language for which contingency plays a 
central role, as in the figure of the talking bird whose mindless mimicry of human words from all 
different languages implies that actual “sense” or “meaning” is the retroactive effect of the pro-
duction of meaningless nonsense. 
 Several chapters later, in the so-called “Laternen-Kapitel,” the inherent circularity of the 
novel Leben Fibels is retroactively exposed by the narrator in the course of the proceedings of the 
“academic club” [Gelehrter-Verein], which is convened in order to celebrate Fibel’s genius au-
thorship and invention of the first ABC book. There “Jean Paul” reveals Pelz’s teleological method 
of biographical description in the latter’s forty-volume biography of Fibel’s life, which transforms 
the young Fibel into the fictional prototype of the messiah, in whose childhood past already lurks 
– like a literal homunculus – his future fame and fortune: 
Große Lebensbeschreiber – sah Pelz – wetteifern in Versuchen, schon aus der Kind-
heit oder Zwiebelwurzel des Helden die ganze künftige Tulpe vorzuschälen, aus 
der kindlichen Typologie den Messias, so daß die nachherigen männlichen 
Kränungskleider nichts sind als die vorherigen kindischen Windeln, und daß die 
Kartenhäuser desselben schon die Modellzimmer seiner künftigen Lehrgebäude, 
Krönungssäle und babylonischen Türme u.s.f. vorstellen.492 
 
In the decidedly self-ironic manner of the above passage, the narrator and author of Leben Fibels 
parodies the technique of retrospective narration at work in biographical writing, which only fur-
nishes excerpts – Auszüge – from the life of the subject or hero of the biography and must present 
as logically plausible the successive continuity, from beginning to end, of the narration of the 
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hero’s life which, only in retrospect, is to be described.493 In contrast to the preface which claims 
that “[d]as folgende Buch ist demnach der treue Auszug aus den 40 bruchstücklichen Bänden des 
Christen-Judas und meiner Jünger,”494 Leben Fibels, as well as all biographies, only feign their 
own possibility to be “faithfully” [treu] narrated, ineluctably revealing that it is in fact the arbitrary 
decision of the author as to what gets included or excluded. 
 It is precisely at this point in the text, however, where the biographical project threatens to 
unravel and turn in on itself as its narration begins to narrate itself and the biography encounters 
the premises of its own production in the form of Pelz’s 40-volume biography. This narrative 
doubling of the novel within the novel, of the biography within the biography, manifests itself 
most explicitly in the chapter which immediately follows, entitled “Patronen-Kapitel,” in which 
the author and narrator “Jean Paul” attempts to graft portions of Pelz’s biography onto his own: 
Ich kann mich hier sehr leicht lächerlich machen, wenn ich nicht verständig ver-
fahre. Setz’ ich nämlich die Pelzischen Sitzungen her, so bring’ ich das aus ihnen 
ausgehobne Leben zum zweiten Male und fange mitten im Buche wieder beim An-
fange des Lebens an. Merz’ ich die Sitzungen aus, so fehlt gerade der Teil des Fi-
belischen Lebens, der in die Vorlesungen hineinfällt, und es wird das ganze Werk 
ein Wrack.495 
 
                                                
493 Pelz’s teleological approach is further specified in a subsequent passage that parodies the discourse of physico-
theology, which sought to discover the divine as pervading even the smallest objects of nature. There the Rektor 
magnifikus from Leipzig – the university magistrate endowed with the power to confer a scholarly degree upon Fibel, 
thereby altering his future (scholarly) life-course – suddenly pulls out a handheld microscope from his attaché and 
begins to carefully examine a louse which he finds lurking in Fibel’s hair, and which he reads in turn as a portent of 
Fibel’s destiny to become a famous author and scholar: “Aus der Laus, welche, wir wir alle gelesen, der Rektor mag-
nifikus ihm zu mikroskopischen Belustigungen vom Kopfe abgehoben, zog Pelz viel und legte sie gleichsam, so wie 
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nodal point in the text at which the (metaleptic) relation of author to work, the “microscopic amusements” of the 
infinitely small, and the creaturely materiality of Jean Paul’s humor all intersect. 
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By filling in the gaps of his own account of Fibel’s life with the fragments of Pelz’s, the narrative 
threatens to repeat itself by re-staging its beginning media res: “Die Leser wissen schon seit meh-
reren Bogen, daß der Magister Pelz alle Pflichten guter Lebensbeschreiber in den Sessionen erfüllt 
und des Helden Vergangenheit ausführlich abgehandelt – denn woher sollt’ ich die vorigen Kapitel 
sonst darüber nehmen, falls ich sie nicht geradezu erfabeln wollte?”496 With the introduction of 
Pelz’s biographical activity into the narrative, the biographer must substitute in the place of an 
absence a doubling: by having to narrate what the biographical academy discovers about Fibel’s 
biography – without which the entire “Werk” would otherwise become a “Wrack,” with an ironi-
cally-implied tonal assonance) – the narrator finds himself thrust into the role not of the biographer, 
but the “Lebensbeschreiber der Lebensbeschreiber,”497 and if he wishes to follow the chronologi-
cal order of the biography, he must now recapitulate what is, in fact, to be produced as a biography. 
As a result, the hierarchy of material presented in the novel – between primacy and secondarity, 
text and pre-text – unravels, and in the place of a retroactive dependence or derivation of one text 
from the other surfaces a perplexingly self-referential repetition as the narrated content begins to 
narrate the premises of the narration. 
 By the twenty-fourth chapter, it turns out that not only the author and narrator of the biog-
raphy, but also the reader, are caught in a circular movement of reading which repeats itself again 
and again without end. The infinity of the text in the form of Fibel’s quasi-biblical, other-worldly 
age (at the end of the novel, he is reported to be approximately 125 years old), whose conclusion 
– namely his death, and after-life – is continually deferred and postponed in the form of numerous 
“post-chapters” [Nachkapitel], can only be escaped by the narrator’s decision to leave: as Fibel 
“ganz ruhig an seine Drehorgel trat” in order to continue producing more texts, the narrator frees 
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himself “von ihm wie von einem Leben los.”498 The biographer thus brings the text to its conclu-
sion, realizes its finitude, only by freeing himself from the “life” of Fibel, while his object, Fibel, 
performs – like Quintus Fixlein with his slip boxes – the seemingly endless signifying process of 
his “Drehorgel” and thereby initiates yet another iteration of the biography. The contrast between 
the biographical author’s decision to bring the text to an end at an arbitrary  narrative point – that 
is, simply by leaving – with the ostensible infinity of the text itself – the medium of writing as a 
phantasm – reflects the poetological inversion of the text, which through endless feedback loops 
and retroactive recalls catches its own process of narration in an infinite narrative loop. The nar-
ration capitulates to the overwhelming surplus of its object – the life of the scholar, Fibel, who in 
himself personifies the infinity of writing – and the novel Leben Fibels itself retraces and re-sig-
nifies this process: from the spirals of permanent self-reflexive digression, the text stumbles into 
the material heterogeneity of its own writing practices. 
 Leben Fibels is not an expertly linked together biography, nor is it really a biography in 
the conventional sense. Rather, it is a biography in the most literal sense of the word: a bio-graphy, 
the writing of life – the life of a scholar, the life of writing – without end. In Leben Fibels, Jean 
Paul gave this peculiar model of biography a name: “Papierdrache.”499 “Im Leben Fibels ist dieser 
                                                
498 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 546. 
499 There Jean Paul formulates the model of the “Papierdrache” thusly: “Leidenschaftlicher sah wohl niemand aus als 
ich in der ersten Stunde, wo ich das 13te Kapitel aus dem Juden-Buche ausgerissen fand, man müßte denn mich selber 
in der zweiten ausnehmen, wo ich die Sache dennoch bekam, als eine spielende Knapp- oder Knabschaft (es war nicht 
meine biographische) das Kapitel an mein Fenster steigen ließ, als Papierdrachen. Ein artiger Schicksals-Wink! Er 
will damit wohl sagen: so heben wir Autoren auf Papier uns sämtlich hoch genug (höher vielleicht, als unsere Be-
scheidenheit anerkennen will); Wind (er bedeutet das Publikum) trägt auf- und fortwärts; an der Schnur hält den 
Drachen ein Knabe (er soll den Kunstrichter vorstellen), welcher durch sein Leitseil dem Flugtiere die ästhetische 
Höhe vorschreibt” (Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 425f). 
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zusammengeleimt aus Fetzen einer Biographie des Helden, aus denen wieder eine neue Lebens-
beschreibung entsteht – das Leben schreiben ohne Ende, ohne endgültige Gestalt.”500 As such, 
Jean Paul’s model of biography as “Papierdrache” would result neither in a closed work nor the 
representation of “lived” life, but the writing of life – and its writing – which can go on indefinitely. 
Thus while the irritating conflation between “gegenwärtiges Leben oder Buch”501 at the beginning 
of the novel implies a conception of life or book, book or life, as indifferent reflections of one 
another, and hence that the aspiration of the biographical project would be to furnish a “whole” 
(life or book), the preface reveals at the same time that life and book are not wholes, but fragments, 
excerpts – Auszüge – of one another: “[d]as folgende Buch ist demnach der treue Auszug aus den 
40 bruchstücklichen Bänden des Christen-Judas und meiner Jünger […].” Hence, “[d]ie irritie-
rende Gleichgültigkeit von Leben und Buch, in der Wendung gegenwärtiges Leben oder Buch, 
präzisiert Leben und Buch zu Auszügen auseinander: das ins Buch – biblos – verzeichnete Leben 
– bios –, das vom Leben – bios – durchworfene Buch – biblos –. Die bruchstückliche Lebensbe-
schreibung ist nicht das ins Buch gebundene Leben, Fibels. Sondern Leben Fibels […] wird vom 
Vor-Kapitel her zum Auszug präzisiert.”502 
 By foregrounding the relationship between life and book not in terms of a hermeneutic 
process of relating the parts to the whole and the whole to the parts, but instead in terms of the 
                                                
500 Pfotenhauer, “Das Leben schreiben,” 49. According to Pfotenhauer, Jean Paul himself, not coincidentally, had 
planned his last “autobiography” to be titled Papierdrache: “In einer Notiz zur Wochenschrift Der Apotheker heißt 
es: ‘Aufsätze kleine Bücherchen [...] Papierdrache betitelt.’ […]. In das Buch müsse ‘alles hineingeschrieben werden’, 
‘damit nur einmal ein Ende wird mit mir und von mir.’ Es ist ein Buch des eigenen Lebens als Schreiben. Es nimmt 
alles auf, ‘was ich nur von Einfällen, komischen Auftritten, Bemerkungen über Menschen und Sachen und von [...] 
Satan und seiner Großmutter’ ‘im Pulte und im Kopfe vorrätig beherberge.’ Ein ‘wahres umgestürztes Fruchthorn’ 
ergebe dies, ‘bei welchem das unter dem Schreiben und Erleben noch nachkommende Fallobst gar nicht einmal für 
etwas angeschlagen’ werde – ‘woraus allein auf eine Länge des Werks zu schließen, von dem der letzte Bogen kaum 
abzusehen.’ ‘Natürlich,’ so fährt Jean Paul fort, ‘wird das Werk eine Generalsalve meines ganzen Kopfes, ein Aller-
heiligenfest aller Gedanken, ein Polterabend, Kehraus, Chariwari aller Ideenhochzeiten’ (ibid., 57f). For more on Jean 
Paul’s concept of the “Papierdrache” and its relationship to his aphoristic forms of writing, see Neumann, Ideenpar-
adiese, 799–803. 
501 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 376. 
502 Schestag, “Bibliographien für Jean Paul,” 507. 
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heterogeneous writing practices and scholarly techniques of fragmentation and excerpting, Jean 
Paul’s Leben Fibels brings into view its own irreducible materiality in the form of the fictional 
scraps of paper on which it is written, which it explicitly thematizes as remnants, as well as the 
letters of the alphabet not as sense-making elements, but instead as arbitrary permutations of a 
combinatory principle of production. This fragmentary, specifically material, conception of the 
book (and/or life) which Jean Paul presents in his novel Leben Fibels starkly diverges in turn from 
contemporary idealist thought, which sought to distinguish between the corporeal and the spiritual, 
the material and the formal, aspects of the book – that is, to separate “spirit” from the “letter.” 
Thus according to Fichte’s Beweis der Unrechtmässigkeit des Büchernachdrucks (1793): 
Wir können an einem Buche zweierlei unterscheiden: das Körperliche desselben, 
das bedruckte Papier; und sein Geistiges. Das Eigenthum des ersteren geht durch 
den Verkauf des Buches unwidersprechlich auf den Käufer über. […] Dieses Geis-
tige ist nemlich wieder einzutheilen: in das Materielle, den Inhalt des Buches, die 
Gedanken, die es vorträgt; und in die Form dieser Gedanken, die Art wie, die 
Verbindung in welcher, die Wendungen und die Worte, mit denen es sie vorträgt.503 
 
Against Fichte’s conception of the book which privileges its spiritual, i.e., formal dimension as 
“intellectual property,” Leben Fibels opens up instead a perspective of inversion between the cor-
poreal and the spiritual, the letter and the spirit by continually dismantling and unbinding of loose 
sheets of “paper waste” [Makulatur] stored in Fibel’s “Gewürzladen” from the spines of the book 
                                                
503 J. G. Fichte, Beweis der Unrechtmässigkeit des Büchernachdrucks, in: Fichte-Gesamtausgabe, I/1, 410. The fact 
that Fibel’s authorship is based above all on the act of plagiarism (cf. Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 373) suggests another 
way in which Leben Fibels satirically undermines Fichte’s moral defense of Prussian copyright laws: “Jeder hat seinen 
eigenen Ideengang, seine besondere Art sich Begriffe zu machen, und sie unter einander zu verbinden […]. Alles was 
wir uns denken sollen, müssen wir uns nach der Analogie unsrer übrigen Denkart denken; und bloß durch dieses 
Verarbeiten fremder Gedanken […] werden sie die unsrigen […]. […] Da nun reine Ideen ohne sinnliche Bilder sich 
nicht einmal denken, vielweniger Andern darstellen lassen, so muß freilich jeder Schriftsteller seinen Gedanken eine 
gewisse Form geben, und kann ihnen keine andere geben als die seinige, weil er keine andere hat; aber er kann durch 
die Bekanntmachung seiner Gedanken gar nicht Willens sein, auch diese Form gemein zu machen; denn niemand 
kann seine Gedanken sich zueignen, ohne dadurch dass er ihre Form verändere. Die letztere also bleibt auf immer sein 
ausschliessendes Eigenthum” (Fichte, Fichte-Gesamtausgabe, I/1, 412, cited in Dembeck, “Fichte dem Buchstaben 
nach auslegen,” 129). 
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– a perspective which Jean Paul calls humor. By coupling Fibel’s book to the discourse of philo-
sophical idealism as the “Wissenschaftslehre jeder Wissenschaftslehre,” or the divine “Buch der 
Bücher,” humor as “inverted sublime” is not so much a representational technique of circularity 
as a form of reflection which foregrounds the decoupling of the epistemological from the material 
in idealist thought, for which the conception of language still remains primarily an instrumental 
one, whereby words are perceived as the mere carriers of underlying thoughts or ideas, without 
reflecting on their sensual materiality as Fibel and “Jean Paul” do. 
 Consisting of fragments, excerpts and remnants of paper, “Trümmern von historischen 
Quellen,” which cannot be brought to together or unified into a whole – whether life or book, book 
or life – the novel begins to turn in on itself as a biographical “Drehorgel,” which continually “sich 
umdreht[].”504 Through the perpetual deferral of an end, it leaves itself open and incomplete as a 
book about the writing of a book, a collection of papers presented to readers in the form of a 
courier. Here the numerous references to the serial technique of “binding” or “linking” [binden] – 
the golden ring as “Angebinde”; Fibel’s mother’s “unbinding” [entbinden] of her stillborn twins 
in the grotesque scene of birth at the beginning of the novel; and the proliferation of hyphens, 
Gedanken- or Bindestriche, in Fibel’s own ABC book – can be read not only as a cue not only for 
the reading of the novel’s fragmentary conception of language, but also for the bodily moment in 
language that links together mother and child, orality and writing. Jean Paul’s final idyll, one could 
say, necessarily entails the production and serialization of corpses – of “stillborns” and the “stillen-
des Still-Leben” of the material scraps of paper on which the biography itself is written. By bring-
ing the narrative form of the series and the metalepsis of the hermeneutic process together, the 
motifs of binding, connecting, gluing, and linking simultaneously reveal how the novel seeks in 
                                                
504 Jean Paul, Werke, I/6, 538. 
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various ways to “unbind” itself from the discourse network around 1800, while also unbinding 
from the infinity of sheets of paper that constitute Fibel’s life from the medial closure of the “vol-
ume” [Band], the book, which contains them – as if with his novel Jean Paul “versucht habe, das 
Buch über die Grenzen des Buches hinauszutreiben, als ob seine Bücher Experimente mit der 
Diskursform Buch wären […]. Als ob das Buch als Form nicht genügte und immer seine fertige 
Gestalt verfehle, wuchert Jean Pauls Schreiben über die Ränder der Bücher hinaus.”505  
                                                
505 Schäfer, “Jean Pauls monströses Schreiben,” 221. 
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CHAPTER III. GOETHE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: EXPERIMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
In the previous chapters on Jean Paul, I explored the myriad ways in which certain “forms of life,” 
namely the life of the scholar, and certain practices of writing, namely different scholarly 
techniques of writing and reading, gain epistemological as well as poetological significance in the 
context of Jean Paul’s transformation and reworking of the conventions of the idyllic genre. There 
it was argued that the seemingly capricious manner in which his texts are composed concerns 
above all a poetology of contingency; it is under the signs of contingency and play, in other words, 
that his texts present the lives of scholars and their discursive practices, and they do so above all 
through the exposition of their own fragmentariness and material heterogeneity. The key word for 
this poetic procedure, as I argued throughout those chapters, is what Jean Paul refers to as humor, 
the form of the “inverted sublime,” which in his oeuvre serves as the privileged material strategy 
for bringing into view the small, fragmentary, and heterogeneous. 
 The transition to the writings of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), which occupy 
the focus of the following chapters, might thus strike readers as something of a forced and 
unnatural pairing of the disparate, to paraphrase Jean Paul’s own definition of the concept of wit. 
To be sure, any attempt to draw an unmediated connection between Jean Paul’s and Goethe’s 
disparate works presents numerous obvious obstacles. Was it not precisely Goethe, after all, who 
– in addition to Hegel – denounced in an exemplary fashion Jean Paul’s aesthetics, referring to his 
novel Hesperus as “ein Tragelaph von der ersten Sorte,”506 and who, furthermore, frequently 
                                                
506 Emil Staiger, ed., Der Briefwechsel zwischen Goethe und Schiller (Frankfurt a. M. 1966), 110. 
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complained of “Gehirnkrämpfe von dem Werfen aus einer Wissenshaft in die andere”507 in Jean 
Paul’s texts? It should be noted, however, that by 1819 Goethe had significantly revised his earlier 
assessment of Jean Paul’s work; for in the two-page essay entitled “Vergleichung,” which he 
included in the Noten und Abhandlungen zum besseren Verständis appended to the first edition of 
the West-östlicher Divan, Goethe now indicates mild praise for Jean Paul.508 
 While this fleeting remark, in which Goethe now alludes positively to Jean Paul’s work, is 
perhaps of mere biographical interest, it is nonetheless significant, as I will seek to demonstrate in 
the course of the following pages, in that represents a gradual yet decisive shift in Goethe’s 
conceptions of authorship, work, and literary form more broadly. In other words, while the early 
Goethe of Weimar Classicism and Sturm und Drang still held fast to a conception of author as 
genius and of the work as an indivisible “aesthetic unity” that could conceivably be brought to 
completion, this is no longer the case, I argue, for the late Goethe of Faust II and the Wanderjahre. 
As was the case with Jean Paul, the motivations behind this shift have little to do with stylistic 
idiosyncrasy or with the decline of literary quality wrought by senility and old age, as traditional 
interpretations have put forth, but are in fact intimately intertwined with a fundamental rethinking 
of the notion of form during Goethe’s later phase of writing. Furthermore, the seeds for this 
decisive shift in perspective, it will be argued, are to be found not so much in Goethe’s literary 
works as they are in his writings on natural science. One could perhaps say briefly and 
                                                
507 Cited in Gerhard Fiegurth, Jean Paul. Begegnungen mit Zeitgenossen (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel Verlag, 1964), 37. 
Jean Paul himself reports Goethe’s remark in a letter to Christian Otto dated January 17, 1798. 
508 Curiously, Goethe came to praise Jean Paul’s way of writing through the prism of oriental literature and language 
– that is, the quintessential “Other” of Western European aesthetics: “Allerdings zeugen, um von der Persönlichkeit 
anzufangen, die Werke des genannten Freundes [Jean Paul – B.K.] von einem verständigen, umschauenden, einsich-
tigen, unterrichteten, ausgebildeten und dabei wohlwollenden, frommen Sinne. Ein so begabter Geist blickt, nach 
eigentlichst orientalischer Weise, munter und kühn in seiner Welt umher, erschafft die seltsamsten Bezüge, verknüpft 
das Unverträgliche, jedoch dergestalt, daß ein geheimer ethischer Faden sich mitschlinge, wodurch das Ganze zu einer 
gewissen Einheit geleitet wird” (Goethe, MA, I/11, 190). 
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preliminarily that it was Goethe’s confrontation with the irreducible heterogeneity and plurality of 
objects in nature that made possible his break with the dominant aesthetic conventions and what 
accounts, in turn, for what Adorno refers to as the “overabundance of material” in his late works.509 
 As in the immediately preceding chapters on Jean Paul, then, the focus of the following 
chapters will likewise be on the nexus of “forms of life” and discursive practices. Here, however, 
it is no longer a question of the life of the scholar and the idiosyncratic repurposing of scholarly 
techniques of writing and reading, but the practices of observation and inscription developed in 
Goethe’s literary and scientific works, in particular his Notebooks on Morphology and late prose 
piece Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre oder die Entsagenden, and the forms of life – worldly as 
well as other-worldly – in their mutual interactions that will be explored and examined. This entails 
an analysis of both the practices and methods underlying Goethe’s morphological studies – what 
I refer to in the first chapter as the “morphological” or “anamorphotic” gaze – as well as the related 
role of collection in Goethe’s work as a serial method of comparison and composition. Through 
this analysis, it will be shown how, on the one hand, Goethe’s theory of the experiment explodes 
the distinction between first and second order observation, and relatedly between subject and 
object, from within. This leads, in turn, to the proliferation of the materiality of the experimental 
system: traces, sketches, and drafts. On the other hand, it will be shown how contingency and death 
come to attain central significance in Goethe’s literary and scientific writings, reflected above all 
                                                
509 Adorno’s remarks from his astonishing yet largely overlooked essay from 1937 on Beethoven’s “late style” [Spät-
stil] are exemplary in this respect: “The power of subjectivity in the late works of art is the irascible gesture with 
which it takes leave of the works themselves. It breaks their bonds, not in order to express itself, but in order, expres-
sionless, to cast off the appearance of art. Of the works themselves it leaves only fragments behind, and communicates 
itself, like a cipher, only through the blank spaces from which it has disengaged itself. Touched by death, the hand of 
the master sets free the masses of material that he used to form; its tears and fissures, witnesses to the finite power-
lessness of the I confronted with Being, are its final work. Hence the overabundance of material in Faust II and in the 
Wanderjahre, hence the conventions that are no longer penetrated and mastered by subjectivity, but simply left to 
stand” (Theodor W. Adorno, “Late Style in Beethoven,” in: idem., Essays on Music, ed. Richard Leppert, trans. Susan 
H. Gillespie [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002], 564–68, here: 566). 
 
214 
in his shift away from the paradigm of Bildung toward the theory of the spiral tendency as a 
universal pathology of nature. 
 In the second chapter, it will be argued this intensification of contingency and seriality in 
Goethe’s practice of experimentation has significant repercussions for his conception of literary 
form. By using the example of Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, it will be shown how the 
morphological gaze, which brings form and inform into connection – in other words, the visual 
perspective of anamorphosis – and the medium of text interact in Goethe’s late novel. There the 
intermedial mediation of narration through what critics have termed its “archive fiction,” as well 
as the inclusion of the mysterious cosmological figure of Makarie in the novel’s second edition, 
which Goethe likens to the spiral tendency in plant life – all point in different ways to a 
fundamental rethinking of the novel as a form: a shift, that is, away from the model of the 
Bildungsroman toward something far more heterogeneous, open, and fragmentary, or what Goethe 
called an “aggregate.”510 With the novel as aggregate, authorship is transformed into the collective 
of editors, while the discursive unity of the book is dissolved into the collective form of the 
notebook, the Heft, into which all different kinds of text-material can be inserted. 
 As is well-known, it was Goethe’s announcement of the discovery of the intermaxillary 
bone in animals and humans in 1784 that paved the way for the lifelong endeavor to establish a 
“new science” [neue Wissenschaft] which he called morphology, “die Lehre von der Gestalt, der 
Bildung und Umbildung der organischen Körper.”511 Since their publication, his writings on 
morphology – collectively entitled Zur Naturwissenschaft überhaupt, besonders zur Morphologie, 
Erfahrung, Betrachtung, Folgerung, durch Lebensereignisse verbunden (1817–20) – have posed 
                                                
510 See Goethe’s letter to J. F. Rochlitz on July 28th, 1829, in: Goethes Briefe, ed. Karl Robert Mandelkow (Hamburg 
1967), vol. 4, 339. 
511 Goethe, “Betrachtung einer Morphologie überhaupt,” in: FA, I/24, 365. 
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extraordinary challenges to Goethe scholars as well as historians of science. The challenges lie not 
only in the difficulty of reconstructing the scientific theories and methods underlying Goethe’s 
science of morphology, but also in the extremely heterogeneous text-constellation in which they 
appear. Rather than ordering the formidable ensemble of essays, sketches, tables, illustrations, and 
reviews that comprise his morphological “notebooks” [Hefte] into a cohesive, unified whole, 
Goethe chose instead to publish them in the form of a “draft” [Entwurf], referring to his Notebooks 
on Morphology not as a “work” [Werk] but as a “fragmentary collection” [fragmentarische 
Sammlung] of non-chronologically ordered “sketches” [Skizzen].512 As Goethe later remarked in 
the paratextual “Interjection” [Zwischenrede] inserted into his morphological notebooks, here the 
parts do not add up to a whole – “konnten […] nimmermehr zur Einheit gediehen.”513 Because he 
published his notebooks in a more or less formless and unordered fashion, many of whose 
individual texts lack dates, Goethe’s Notebooks on Morphology have given rise over the years to 
numerous competing and conflicting editions, all of which attempt to ‘tame’ in various ways – 
either by imposing a thematic order or by attempting to determine the dates of composition of 
                                                
512 Goethe, “Das Unternehmen wird entschuldigt,” in: FA, I/24, 390. Here Goethe implicitly contrasts the concept of 
“work” with that of “fragment,” with the ostensible difference falling on that of closure and completion. For a broader 
clarification of Goethe’s conception of work, see Dorothea Kuhn’s commentary in the Leopoldina Edition  of his 
Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft in: Goethe, Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, Abt. II: Ergänzungen und Erläuter-
ungen, vol. 9, Part B: Zur Morphologie. Von 1796 bis 1815, ed. Dorothea Kuhn [Weimar 1986], 504f). See also: Safia 
Azzouni, Kunst als praktische Wissenschaft. Goethes Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre und die Hefte Zur Morphologie 
(Köln: Böhlau, 2005), in particular 27–33. 
513 The full passage reads: “Nachstehende Aufsätze sind ebensowenig als die vorhergehenden für Teile eines ganzen 
schriftstellerischen Werkes anzusehen. Nach abwechselnden Ansichten, unter dem Einflusse entgegengesetzter Ge-
mütsstimmungen verfaßt, zu verschiedenen Zeiten niedergeschrieben, konnte sie nimmermehr zur Einheit gediehen” 
(Goethe, FA, I/24, 441). He then goes on to explain why a chronological ordering of his texts would be impossible: 
“Die Jahrzahl läßt sich nicht hinzufügen, teils weil sie nicht immer bemerkt war, teils weil ich, gegen meine eigenen 
Papiere mich als Redakteur verhaltend, das Überflüssige und manches Unbehagliche daraus verbannen durfte. […] 
Und so können diese Hefte denn doch, als Teile eines menschlichen Lebens, für Zeugnisse gelten, durch wie vielerlei 
Zustände derjenige sich durchzuarbeiten hat” (ibid.). Despite the gaps and inconsistencies in the Notebooks on Mor-
phology, Goethe nevertheless insists that a certain interconnectedness persists through metonymic links. In her mon-
ograph on the Wanderjahre, entitled Kunst als praktische Wissenschaft, Safia Azzouni describes this inner principle 
as “morphological,” and goes on to show how the collective form of the “notebook” and the figure of the “redactor” 
in the Notebooks gain poetological and epistemological significance in relation to Goethe’s late novel (cf. Azzouni, 
Kunst als praktische Wissenschaft, esp. 106–29). 
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individual texts in order to bring them into chronological order – the disturbing heterogeneity in 
which Goethe originally released his writings to the public.514  Thus in stark contrast to Zur 
Farbenlehre (1810), which assumes a far more systematic form and for this reason may indeed be 
deemed a “work” in the sense of a closed, unified whole, the formlessness and contingency that 
characterize the Notebooks make them into one of Goethe’s most heterogeneous publications. 
 While literary critics and Goethe philologists have troubled themselves regarding the 
problematic form of the notebooks and their unclear relation to Goethe’s literary productivity, 
historians of science have tended to stress the importance of the discursive context of Goethe’s 
morphological project, pointing to the fact that its beginnings coincide with a major epistemic 
break in the natural sciences, namely with the decline of the older field of natural history and the 
subsequent emergence of the modern field of biology.515 In his role as a natural scientist, Goethe 
tends to be viewed from this perspective as a kind of threshold figure in the history of the sciences, 
representing a transitional moment between the ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ epistemé, and relatedly 
between the ‘romantic perspective’ in the sciences and the modern, empirical knowledge-regime 
of scientific observation, which placed greater emphasis on anonymity and objectivity in the 
                                                
514 Whereas the Leopoldina edition proceeds thematically, Dorothea Kuhn opted for chronology in both the Frankfurt 
and Hamburg editions in order to render more comprehensible to readers the scattered ideas and heterogenous order 
of texts presented in the original: “Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft im allgemeinen sind in chronologischer Folge 
gegeben. Auf diese Weise wird sowohl ihre Einheitlichkeit als auch die Befestigung und Erweiterung der Gedanken-
gänge deutlich” (Dorothea Kuhn, “Nachwort,” in: Goethe, Werke, HA [Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 
1981], Bd. 13: Naturwissenschaftliche Schriften I, ed. Dorothea Kuhn, 563). 
515 Cf. Wolf Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte. Wandel kultureller Selbstverständlichkeit in den Wissenschaf-
ten des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts (München: Hanser Verlag, 1976). For more on the broader philosophical significance 
of this epistemic break around 1800, see also: Timothy Lenoir, The Strategy of Life. Teleology and Mechanics in 
Nineteenth Century German Biology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), in particular 156–94; Robert J. 
Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life. Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002), in particular 407–502. For recent scholarship on the interactions between the fields of science 
and literature around 1800, see Armen Avanessian, Winfried Menninghaus, and Jan Völker (eds.), Vita aesthetica. 
Szenarien ästhetischer Lebendigkeit (Zürich/Berlin: diaphenes, 2009). 
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realms of scientific authorship and experimentation.516 These tensions and ambiguities arise in part 
from the fact that in his writings on natural science Goethe attempted to transcend the divide 
between the arts and sciences just at the time when they were beginning to considerably diverge 
from one another. Not only did he insert numerous elegies and other kinds of poems alongside his 
scientific treatises in order to stress their underlying continuity, but elsewhere in his Notebooks on 
Morphology he explicitly addresses the split between the arts and sciences by reflecting on the 
misunderstandings surrounding the publication and reception of his own scientific treatises by both 
the artistic and scientific communities.517 
 In addition, Goethe often refuses to stake out claims that would explicitly situate him within 
a specific scientific camp or school of thought. While he hardly abstains from polemical 
engagements with other scientists in his writings on natural science, he seldom took a 
                                                
516 As both Michel Foucault and Wolf Lepenies have argued, the epistemic break in the natural sciences from natural 
history to biology did not rest so much on the empirical validity of scientific claims as it did on changing paradigms 
of scientific authorship around 1800 (see Foucault, ‘‘What is an Author?,’’ in: Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: 
Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. Donald Bouchard [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981], 113–38, in par-
ticular 125–27; Lepenies, Das Ende der Naturgeschichte, 52–77). It is from the perspective of competing forms of 
authorship – scientific and literary – that Dorothea von Mücke reads Goethe’s Notebooks on Morphology, arguing that 
it “must be read in two respects: on the one hand, it can be understood as yet another attempt to communicate what he 
considered his essential insight, namely, his concept of metamorphosis as a model for understanding change in nature; 
on the other hand, it must also be understood as an investigation of, and commentary on, the production and dissemi-
nation of scientific knowledge, a reflection on scientific authorship in analogy with, and distinction from, literary 
authorship” (Dorothea von Mücke, “Goethe’s Metamorphosis: Changing Forms in Nature, the Life Sciences, and 
Authorship,” in: Representations 95:1 [2006], 27–53, here: 30). 
517 In addition to his inclusion of poems such as “Urworte. Orphisch” and “Howard’s Ehrengedächtnis,” Goethe also 
emphasizes the co-origination of the sciences and arts: “Man vergaß, daß Wissenschaft sich aus Poesie entwickelt 
habe, man bedachte nicht, daß nach einem Umschwung von Zeiten, beide sich wieder freundlich zu beiderseitigem 
Vorteil, auf höherer Stelle gar wohl wieder begegnen könnten” (Goethe, FA, I/24, 420). In that section of the meta-
morphosis essay, entitled ‘‘Fate of the Printed Text’’ [Schicksal der Druckschrift], he narrates his exclusion from the 
scientific debates on botany by established scientists who considered him a mere layperson on account of his poetic 
authorship. He goes on to relay an anecdote about how a friend of his, a fellow artist, found himself in the presence 
of a gathering of scientists who had convened to read and discuss Goethe’s essay on the metamorphosis of plants. 
Distressed at the expressions of skepticism and confusion from the scientists, and wanting to rescue Goethe from being 
misunderstood, the friend intervened to point out to the ignorant audience: “Der Verfasser, sagte derselbe, hat eine 
eigene, verborgene Absicht, die ich aber vollkommen deutlich einsehe, er will den Künstler lehren wie sprossende 
und rankende Blumenverzierungen zu erfinden sind, nach Art und Weise der Alten in fortschreitender Bewegung” 
(Goethe, “Schicksal der Druckschrift,” in: FA, I/24, 419). While this anecdote appears like a harmless aside, Goethe 




straightforward position in the most important debates of his time, as for example in the 
reproductive debates between the supporters of preformation and epigenesis, which were in many 
respects decisive for the “discourse network” around 1800.518 Quite to the contrary, he tends to 
oscillate between seemingly incompatible systems of thought, a fact which he did not attempt to 
hide from readers, referring to the often divergent theoretical positions and conflicting scientific 
claims which appear side by side in his writings as a “Schaukelsystem.”519 
 It thus remains an open question as to whether Goethe’s morphology, by taking up the 
inherent multitude and heterogeneity of nature and its objects without recourse to a speculative 
system, anticipates modern scientific forms of knowledge, or whether it harkens back instead to a 
premodern, “mythopoetic” or anthropocentric conception of nature, as Hans Blumenberg among 
others has argued.520 With his mystical metaphor of the “mind’s eye” [das geistige Auge] and 
insistence on the possibility of a “third kind of knowledge” – a so-called “intuiting judgment” 
                                                
518 See, for instance, Goethe’s remarks on preformation and epigenesis in his 1817/18 essay on Johann Friedrich Blu-
menbach’s concept of the Bildungstrieb in the Notebooks on Morphology. There Goethe expresses his dissatisfaction 
with both theories: preformation is “distasteful” to any “educated person,” while epigenesis cannot relinquish the need 
to conceive of an origin. “Kehren wir in das Feld der Philosophie zurück und betrachten Evolution und Epigenese 
nochmals, so scheinen dies Worte zu sein, mit denen wir uns nur hinhalten. Die Einschachtelungslehre wird freilich 
einem Höhengebildeten gar bald widerlich, aber bei der Lehre eines Auf- und Annehmend wird doch immer ein Auf-
nehmendes und Aufzunehmendes vorausgesetzt, und wenn wir keine Präformation denken mögen, so kommen wir 
auf eine Prädelineation, Prädetermination, auf ein Prästabilieren, und wie das allein heißen mag was vorausgehen 
müßte bis wir etwas gewahr werden könnten” (Goethe, MA, 12, 101). For more on the significance of the prefor-
mation-epigenesis debates for literature and philosophy in the nineteenth century, cf. Helmut Müller-Sievers, Self-
Generation. Biology, Philosophy, and Literature Around 1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); idem., 
Epigenesis. Naturphilosophie im Sprachdenken Wilhelm von Humboldts (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1993), in 
particular 89–115. See also: Jocelyn Holland, German Romanticism and Science: The Procreative Poetics of Goethe, 
Novalis, and Ritter (New York: Routledge, 2009); Timothy Lenoir, “Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in 
German Biology,” in: Isis 71, Nr. 256 (1980), 77–108. 
519 “Es ist z.B. die Frage: ob man eine gewisse Einheit an der die Mannigfaltigkeit sichtbar ist aus schon vorhandenem 
Mannigfaltigen Zusammengesetzen erklären oder aus einer produktiven Einheit entwickelt ansehen und annehmen 
wolle. […] [G]enau besehen aber findet sich immer daß der Mensch dasjenige voraussetzt was er gefunden hat, und 
dasjenige findet was er voraussetzt. Der Naturforscher als Philosoph darf sich nicht schämen sich in diesem Schaukel-
system hin und her zu bewegen und da wo die wissenschaftliche Welt sich nicht versteht sich selbst zu verständigen” 
(Goethe, “Nachträge zur Metamorphose der Pflanze,” in: FA, I/24, 700–14, here: 708). 
520 Cf. Hans Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos (Frankfurt a.M. 1979); idem., Die Lesbarkeit der Welt (Frankfurt a.M. 
1983), in particular 214–32. 
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[anschauende Urteilskraft] or scientia intuitiva,521 whereby one may be able to achieve an intuitive, 
that is, non-discursive, understanding of nature as a whole, the possibility of which Kant had raised 
in the third Critique only to reject522 – as well as his frequent recourse to the vocabulary of 
“primordial types” [Urtypen] and “primordial phenomena” [Urphänomenen], terms which appear 
to be dependent on a Platonic distinction between (supersensible) archetypes and (sensible) 
appearances,523 the task of assessing the “modernity” or “pre-modernity” of Goethe’s morphology 
remains an admittedly challenging one and has been a recurrent theme in Goethe scholarship ever 
since the publication of his Notebooks on Morphology.524 
                                                
521 Cf. Goethe, “Anschauende Urteilskraft,” in: FA, I/24, 447–48. For more on the philosophical significance of the 
trope of the “mind’s eye” in Goethe’s writings and the broader philosophical tradition, see Eckart Förster, “Goethe 
and the ‘Auge des Geistes,’” in: DVjs 75.1 (2001), 87–101. For Goethe’s theory of intuitive knowledge, see idem., 
Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie. Eine systematische Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt a. M. 2011); Frederick Amrine, “Goe-
thean Intuitions,” in: Goethe Yearbook 18 (2001), 35–50; David E. Wellbery, “Zur Methodologie des intuitiven 
Verstandes,” in: Übergange – diskursiv oder intuitiv? Essays zu Eckart Försters Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie, eds. 
Johannes Haag/Markus Wild (Frankfurt a.M. 2013), 259–74. For literary-theoretical approaches to this topic, cf. Jonas 
Maatsch (ed.), Morphologie und Moderne: Goethes ‘anschauliches Denken’ in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften 
seit 1800 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014); Sibylle Peters/Martin Jörg Schäfer (eds.), Intellektuelle Anschauung. Figurati-
onen von Evidenz zwischen Kunst und Wissen (Bielefeld: transcript, 2006). 
522 For more on this point, cf. Förster, “Die Bedeutung von §§ 76, 77 der Kritik der Urtheilskraft für die Entwicklung 
der nachkantischen Philosophie,” in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 56 (2002), 169–90. 
523 While Goethe rarely references Plato in his Notebooks on Morphology – in fact, the term “morphology” itself 
appears instead to draw explicitly on the Aristotelian term for matter, morphē – the quasi-Platonic rhetoric of “arche-
types” was widespread in eighteenth-century scientific discourse, and referred to the practice of collecting type spec-
imens, which represented an attempt to stabilize the heterogeneity and imperfection of empirical manifestations of 
individual species. According to Lorraine Daston, this is exactly what Goethe had in mind with his notion of “pure 
phenomena”: “What Goethe theorized, a myriad of less contemplative naturalists of the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries practiced; they sought to condense and integrate a legion of individual impressions into a ‘true’ rep-
resentation, in both words and images, of the natural kind in question” (Lorraine Daston, “Type Specimens and Sci-
entific Memory,” in: Critical Inquiry, 31.1 [2004], 153–82, here: 167). What Daston overlooks in her otherwise per-
suasive essay, however, is the tremendous gap which separates Goethe from Linnaeus, who had extraordinarily dif-
ferent views as to what constitutes an ‘ideal’ or ‘primordial’ type. Another reading of the re-emergence of neoplatonic 
rhetoric in the sciences during this period is suggested by Hans Blumenberg, who argues that the “appeal to Plato is 
also one of the rhetorical means employed by a kind of science that, by its own self-assessment, is no longer Aristo-
telian – that is, is post-Scholastic – and that credits itself with a different art of translating the language of nature than 
that of conceptual abstraction” (Hans Blumenberg, The Genesis of the Copernican World [Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1987], 410). Blumenberg then goes on to quote Goethe as an exemplar of this rhetorical strategy: “In order to escape 
into simplicity again from the boundless manifoldness, compartmentalization, and complexity of modern natural sci-
ence, one must always ask oneself the question: How would Plato have acted toward nature as it may now appear to 
us, in, with all of its fundamental unity, a greater multiplicity?” (ibid.). 
524 For more on the tension between the antiquity and modernity of Goethe's concept of “living nature” in his scientific 
writings, see Hartmut Böhme, “Lebendige Natur. Wissenschaftskritik, Naturforschung und allegorische Hermetik bei 
Goethe,” in: Natur und Subjekt (Frankfurt a.M. 1988), 145–78. 
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 Perhaps the most prominent reading in favor of the modernity of Goethe’s morphology can 
be found in the work of the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, who attempted to problematize anew and 
resolve this question in the context of the philosophical debates on form and life at the beginning 
of the twentieth century.525 In Goethe’s writings on natural science, Cassirer finds a distinctly 
modern – if still only implicit formulated – conception of “nature,” and of “life” more broadly.526 
For Cassirer, Goethe’s concern with living forms in nature is not to be understood as an exclusively 
scientific one, however, but rather as an expression of a more fundamental form-problematic. Thus 
in his essay “Der Naturforscher Goethe,” he stresses the profound continuity between Goethe’s 
“künstlerischen und wissenschaftlichen Tätigkeit.”527 As he argues, the central question which 
motivates Goethe’s morphology is how to comprehend nature as both a law-abiding unity and, at 
the same time, think the plurality and multiplicity of its forms together. From this perspective, 
Cassirer claims that for Goethe all form is said to be “nur als lebendige Form zu denken und zu 
verstehen.”528 Accordingly, Goethe’s morphological form-concept is not to be confused with the 
fixity and stasis of Gestalt, nor with the older “edeitic” conception of form as a principle of order, 
enclosure, and containment of “material.”529 Against the Scholastic and idealist traditions, which 
inherited the Aristotelian distinction between morphē (form, idea) and hylē (content, matter), 
                                                
525 Other prominent figures in these debates included Georg Simmel and Ludwig Wittgenstein, both of whom made 
use of Goethe’s concept of morphology for their own ends. For recent scholarship on the significance of Goethe’s 
morphology for twentieth-century considerations of form and life, see Eva Geulen, Aus dem Leben der Form. Goethe 
und die Nager: Auch eine Einführung in die Morphologie (Berlin: August Verlag, forthcoming 2016). 
526 Cf. Ernst Cassirer, “Goethe”, in: idem., Freiheit und Form. Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte, Gesammelte 
Werke, vol. 7, 216–67. See also: Cassirer, “Der Naturforscher Goethe,” in: idem., Aufsätze und kleine Schriften (1932–
1935), Gesammelte Werke, ed. Birgit Recki, vol. 18 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2009), 437–41. 
527 Cassirer, “Der Naturforscher Goethe,” 437. 
528 Ibid., 438. 
529 “Betrachten wir aber alle Gestalten, besonders die organischen, so finden wir, daß nirgend ein Bestehendes, nirgend 
ein Ruhendes, ein Abgeschlossenes vorkommt, sondern daß vielmehr alles in einer steten Bewegung schwanke. Daher 
unsere Sprache das Wort Bildung sowohl von dem Hervorgebrachten, als von dem Hervorgebrachtwerdenden gehörig 
genug zu brauchen pflegt. Wollen wir also eine Morphologie einleiten, so dürfen wir nicht von Gestalt sprechen […]” 
(Goethe, “Die Absicht eingeleitet,” in: FA, I/24, 391–95, here: 392). 
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Goethe seeks to describe natural phenomena in processual terms of change, transformation, and 
flux; hence he uses dynamic language such as “Bildung,” “Verwandlung,” and “Umwandlung” in 
order to reflect the inherent mutability, vitality, and plurality of the heterogeneous forms in nature: 
“Die Gestalt ist ein bewegliches, ein werdendes, ein vergehendes. Gestaltenlehre ist 
Verwandlungslehre.”530 As a result of his morphological insight, phenomena which the sciences 
of the time still viewed as too formless, contingent, and fleeting come to play a central role in 
Goethe’s morphology; for Goethe, such forms are no longer seen as formless or deformed 
deviations from the norm or ideal, and hence excluded from scientific inquiry, but come to be 
understood as moments of a more general form-process.531 
 While Goethe hardly speaks of the role of the scientific observer in his Notebooks on Mor-
phology, the conception of form which he presents in those texts would have been unthinkable – 
to paraphrase Walter Benjamin – without a corresponding transformation in the medium of per-
ception.532 As recent scholarship in the field of historical epistemology has demonstrated, what 
begins to take place around 1800 is a repositioning of the observer, outside of the fixed relations 
of interior and exterior presupposed by the camera obscura paradigm of vision, which sought to 
                                                
530 Goethe, “Morphologie,” in: FA, I/24, 349. 
531 For more on Goethe’s transformation of the relation of form to idea around 1800, cf. Wellbery, “Form und Idee. 
Skizze eines Begriffsfeldes um 1800.” According to Wellbery, “[n]icht bloß in einer klassizistischen Privilegierung 
der formalen Elemente liegt die ästhetische Relevanz des Morphologiekonzepts, sondern in einer epochalen Transfor-
mation des Formbegriffs selbst. Die Einführung des morphologischen Konzepts auf dem Gebiet der Kunsttheorie 
zeitigt einen semantischen Wandel und bringt ein neues Verständnis von ästhetischer Form hervor” (ibid., 18). Well-
bery then goes on to sketch out three different possible concepts of form around 1800 and 1900, which include an 
eidetic form-concept, an endogenes form-concept, and a constructivist form-concept, the second of which he ascribes 
to Goethe: “Endogenes Formkonzept: Form als Prozess des Sich-Herausbildens im Zusammenspiel von Varianz und 
Invarianz; das Verhältnis von Form und Materie wird nichts als Opposition, sondern als Durchdringung konzipiert; 
Gegensatzwerte sind nunmehr die verfestigte, tote, äußerliche Form sowie die Abstraktion; Reproduktion wird als 
Hervorbringung/Zeugung/Bildung begriffen” (ibid., 19). 
532 “Und wenn Veränderungen im Medium der Wahrnehmung […] sich als Verfall der Aura begreifen lassen, so kann 
man dessen gesellschaftliche Bedingungen aufzeigen” (Walter Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner techni-
schen Reproduzierbarkeit, in: idem., Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I [Frankfurt a.M. 1980], 479). 
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delimit nature from representation, object from experience.533 This reconfiguration between ob-
serving subject and observed phenomena is decisive for Goethe’s morphology. There observer and 
observed are no longer relegated to ontologically distinct spheres, but belong to one and the same 
undemarcated plane. Such a reorganization of perception and its objects demanded in turn an en-
tirely new semantics as well as new representational models in the field of natural science, for once 
objects of nature are located in time rather than in a timeless exterior world, the fixed and static 
taxonomies inherited from Newton in the field of optics and Linnaeus in botany are no longer 
adequate to the profusion of forms in nature, which are now perceived as being in a state of con-
stant transformation, transition, and change.534 
 Thus in the text entitled “Schicksal der Druckschrift,” which Goethe appended to his essay 
on the metamorphosis of plants, not only does he relate how he came up with his theory of meta-
morphosis, his own innovative approach to change in nature, but he also focuses on the difficulties 
he had in applying the classificatory system of Linnaeus. He introduces the narrative of how he 
was led to overhaul the Linnaean paradigm of cataloging existent nature with a reference to his 
                                                
533 For recent scholarship in the field of historical epistemology which sheds new light on changes in the techniques 
of scientific observation in the nineteenth-century, especially with respect to Goethe, see Lorraine Daston and Peter 
Galison, Objectivity (New York/London: Zone Books, 2010); as well as Jonathon Crary, Techniques of the Observer: 
On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990). As Crary argues, scientific 
and philosophical thought prior to the nineteenth century conceived of perception in a manner largely inherited from 
Descartes, for whom the absolute division between interiorized subject and exterior world, between res cogitans and 
res extensa, functioned as a “pre-given condition of knowledge of the latter” (Crary, Techniques of the Observer, 46). 
This older paradigm of perception – what Crary calls the “camera obscura model of vision,” an optical regime that 
delimited nature from representation, object from image – designates precisely the Cartesian quest to found human 
knowledge on a purely objective view of the world, which would in turn “allow[] the subject to guarantee and police 
the correspondence between exterior and interior representation and to exclude anything disorderly or unruly. Reflec-
tive introspection overlaps with a regime of self-discipline” (ibid., 48). 
534 According to Daston and Galison, Goethe’s approach to nature neither abides by modern science’s concept of 
mechanical objectivity nor thinks that the subject can ever be jettisoned from scientific inquiry altogether. As Daston 
and Galison argue, such a notion of objectivity which fully dispenses with the subject – what they refer to as “aper-
spectival objectivity” or the “ethos of interchangeable and therefore featureless observer” (Daston and Galison, Ob-
jectivity, 609) – would have been unthinkable in Goethe’s time and does not begin to emerge until the mid-nineteenth 
century. That concept of objectivity coincides instead with the emergence of German Realism. 
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own travels as well as his acquaintance with the botanist Karl Batsch, who had made him aware 
of the limitations of ‘‘books and gardens’’ when it came to the infinite variety of burgeoning life-
forms in the various environments of wild nature.535 His insistence – at least retrospectively in that 
text – on the irreducibly temporal character of the life-forms in nature, as well as his resistance to 
their conceptual fixation through abstract taxonomic systems, leads him to criticize in turn the 
naturalist doctrine of Linnaeus and his students and to characterize their classificatory enterprise 
as fundamentally misconceived. Thus he compares them to 
Gesetzgeber [...], die, weniger bekümmert um das was ist, als das was sein sollte, 
keineswegs die Natur und das Bedürfnis der Staatsbürger beachten, sondern viel-
mehr die schwere Aufgabe zu lösen bemüht sind: wie so viele unbändige, von 
heraus grenzenlose Wesen zusammen einigermaßen bestehen könnten. […] Da 
konnte mir denn ein ruhiger, bescheidener Blick sogleich die Einsicht gewähren, 
daß ein ganzes Leben erforderlich sei, um die unendlich freie Lebenstätigkeit eines 
einzigen Naturreichs zu überschauen und zu ordnen, gesetzt auch ein eingebornes 
Talent berechtige, begeistere hiezu. Dabei fühlte ich aber daß für mich noch ein 
anderer Weg sein möchte, analog meinem übrigen Lebensgange. Die Erscheinun-
gen des Wandelns und Umwandelns organischer Geschöpfe hatten mich mächtig 
ergriffen, Einbildungskraft und Natur schienen hier mit einander zu wetteifern, wer 
verwegner und konsequenter zu verfahren wisse.536 
 
In this passage, Goethe argues that Linnaeus and his students are more concerned with “what ought 
to be” [was sein sollte] than what is, preferring rather to govern and subdue nature’s heterogeneity 
according to pre-established laws and rules than to derive the latter from the former. For this rea-
son, he contrasts their overly hasty, normative approach with his own “calm, modest gaze” 
[ruhiger, bescheidener Blick], thereby self-legitimating his own opposing enterprise as one of care-
ful, studious observation.537 As he goes on to explain, the fundamental disagreement between him 
                                                
535 Cf. Goethe, “Geschichte meines botanischen Studiums” (1816–17), in: FA, I/24, 411–12. 
536 Goethe, FA, I/24, 413. 
537 In this way, Goethe attempts to portray himself as conforming to the new ideals of scientific authorship and 
knowledge-production around 1800, which coincided with the rise of the empirical sciences such as the modern field 
of biology. These new “epistemic virtues” consisted above all in abstaining from embellished rhetoric and expressions 
of authorial voice or individuality, which had been associated with natural history and came to be seen as a source of 
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and Linnaeus concerns not just his claim that the classificatory enterprise can never be successfully 
brought to an end because nature ceaselessly produces new forms; at bottom, it was the introduc-
tion of temporality as inescapable component of nature which made possible his break with Lin-
naeus, whom he criticizes for ignoring nature’s intrinsic creativity and vitality, what he refers to 
as “the appearances of transformation and metamorphosis” [die Erscheinungen des Wandelns und 
Umwandelns] in nature. In other words, whereas the Linnaean approach, Goethe argues, is 
grounded in an abstract, atemporal view of nature, time for Goethe is elevated to a productive force 
that renders once fixed and static objects of nature in a constant state of flux, transformation, and 
transition. 
 The following chapters thus aim to show how from the unsystematic collection of texts, 
reflections, and theoretical insights which Goethe presents in his Notebooks on Morphology there 
emerges both a radical reconceptualization of the concept of form as “living form” – in the sense 
of formation and transformation –, as well as an implicit theory and practice of a “morphological 
gaze,” whereby Goethe’s epistemological method of experimentation and the generative 
phenomena which it seeks to bring forth and represent in a “vital” or “living” manner, reciprocally 
unfold. Because such a “morphological gaze” establishes no fixed opposition between method and 
object of nature, but rather consists in their ceaseless and indissoluble mutual reciprocity, it entails 
a performance of perception, one which lies beyond any mimetic distinction between Urbild and 
Abbild or of “re-presentation” – in the sense of making present through repetition an identical, 
objective referent. Goethe’s morphology has little to do with an empirical claim of validity with 
respect to nature; it ceases to be constrained, either in its premises or conclusions, to this or that 
                                                
embarrassment for the scientific community; in turn they sought to privilege instead anonymity, objectivity, and dis-
interestedness in the writing of scientific texts. For more on Goethe’s discursive positioning vis-a-vis scientific au-
thorship as well as his disagreement with Linnaeus and his students, cf. Dorothea von Mücke, “Goethe’s Metamor-
phosis,” in particular 39–40. 
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organism or object of nature. Instead, it turns out to lay the groundwork for a general theory of 
form, one which goes to the heart of Goethe’s own morphological method as well as the 
heterogeneous and radically ‘differential’ representational forms which his Notebooks on 
Morphology present. The temporalized life-forms that present themselves in his morphological 
writings are, for this reason, no longer viewed as timeless “primordial” or ideal “types,” but as 
serial forms and heterogeneous aggregates whose parts do neither constitute a whole nor have any 
objective correlate in the exterior world; rather, they are irreducibly marked by contingency, 
materiality, and finitude – elements which, not without coincidence, come to play a central role in 
Goethe’s final novel, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre oder die Entsagenden.  
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2. “CONNECTED BY LIFE-EVENTS”: CONTINGENCY AND SERIALITY 
IN GOETHE’S NOTEBOOKS ON MORPHOLOGY 
 
There is no creation without experiment.538 
 
—Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? 
 
Since their intermittent publication between 1817 and 1824, neither Goethe nor anyone else has 
ever been willing to grant the Notebooks on Morphology the status of a “work,” be it scientific or 
poetic. Rather than referring to his Notebooks as a “work” [Werk], he called them a “fragmentary 
collection” [fragmentarische Sammlung] of non-chronologically ordered “sketches” [Skizzen].539 
The publication of those “sketches” – treatises, reviews, letters, poems, schemata, and anecdotes 
written not only by Goethe, but also by other authors – thus appears justifiable to readers only on 
historical grounds, that is, as a chronicle of the development of biology during Goethe’s own 
lifetime. On account of their implicit synchronization of the course of science and of Goethe’s life, 
his notebooks have traditionally been lumped together with his autobiographical writings, 
alongside the Italienische Reise and Dichtung und Wahrheit.540 The awkward subtitle of the 
notebooks – “Erfahrung, Betrachtung, Folgerung, durch Lebensereignisse verbunden” – suggests 
as much, despite the fact that the entries contained in the notebooks lack almost any chronological 
                                                
538 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (London/New York: Verso, 1994), 127. 
539 Goethe, “Das Unternehmen wird entschuldigt,” in: FA, I/24, 390. Here Goethe implicitly contrasts the concept of 
“work” with that of “fragment,” with the ostensible difference falling on that of closure and completion. For a broader 
clarification of Goethe’s conception of work, see Dorothea Kuhn’s commentary in the Leopoldina Edition  of his 
Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft in: Goethe, Die Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, Abt. II: Ergänzungen und Erläuter-
ungen, vol. 9, Part B: Zur Morphologie. Von 1796 bis 1815, ed. Dorothea Kuhn [Weimar 1986], 504f). See also: Safia 
Azzouni, Kunst als praktische Wissenschaft. Goethes Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre und die Hefte Zur Morphologie 
(Köln: Böhlau, 2005), in particular 27–33. 
540 Thus in a 1962 essay which in many ways came to define modern scholarship on the Notebooks on Morphology, 
Dorothea Kuhn presents the “starke Durchsetzung mit autobiographischen Äußerungen” as the “auffälligste 
Kennzeichen” of Goethe’s natural-scientific publications between 1817 and 1824, and contended that any serious 
engagement with these texts would therefore entail, “den Sinn des Autobiographischen zu begreifen” (Dorothea Kuhn, 
“Das Prinzip der autobiographischen Form in Goethes Schriftenreihe Zur Naturwissenschaft überhaupt, besonders 
zur Morphologie,” in: Neue Hefte zur Morphologie 4 (1962), 120–49, here: 130. 
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organization. What is perhaps most intriguing and irritating about this elusive subtitle, however, 
is not so much the autobiographical reading which it seems to demand, but rather the inherent 
ambiguity contained in the phrase “connected by life-events” [durch Lebensereignisse verbunden]. 
Here it is interesting to note the distinctly sequential or serial structure of the notebooks. This is a 
syntactical moment, in other words, which already in the subtitle of the notebooks links form to 
life – and vice versa – in a manner that is difficult to account for if one constrains oneself to a 
purely autobiographical reading of the word “life-events” [Lebensereignisse]. I want to suggest at 
the outset that we consider a broader understanding of this word in order to encompass not simply 
Goethe’s life-events, whatever these may be, but all different signs or “events” of life: that the 
manifestation of life, in other words, takes the form of an event, and that these events are ordered 
not in a chronological, but rather a syntactical, sequential order. Before proceeding further with 
this line of inquiry, however, it is first necessary to understanding the method of experimentation 
that Goethe developed in the course of his efforts to initiate a new science of morphology. Through 
a careful exposition of his method of experimentation, and a subsequent analysis of the “forms of 
life” that unexpectedly erupt within his field of observation, the contours of Goethe’s semantic and 
visual method of ordering, along with its epistemological significance, will become discernible. 
 While Goethe’s botanical research on the metamorphosis of plants arguably represents his 
most sustained and systematic engagement with the study and observation of processes of change 
in nature, it was not until his short essay on the experiment, entitled Der Versuch als Vermittler 
von Objekt und Subjekt 541  (1793), that he concerned himself for the first time with the 
methodological problem of how a scientist ought to conceive of the phenomena which she or he 
encounters in either nature or the laboratory, despite the fact that this method is decisive for both 
                                                
541 Goethe, Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt, in: FA, I/25, 26–36. 
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his morphological project as well as his Theory of Colors. “Weder Virtuosität noch Familiarität, 
weder Offenheit noch Zwang, sondern die Aufgabe des Wissenschaftlers beschäftigt Goethe, und 
damit bewegt er sich im Rahmen des ‘Aufschreibesystems 1800.’”542 In Versuch als Vermittler, 
Goethe presents nothing less than the method of scientific experimentation as such, and points in 
this context to his own optical and botanical experiments as examples of his method. 
 In that essay, Goethe warns of the dangers inherent in confirming hypotheses only through 
isolated and individual experiments. This is because, as he asserts in his short text “Erfahrung und 
Wissenschaft,” the scientific observer “nie das reine Phänomen mit Augen sieht, sondern vieles 
von seiner Geistesstimmung, von der Stimmung des Organs im Augenblick, von Licht, Luft, 
Witterung, Körpern, Behandlung und tausend andern Umständen abhängt.” Hence, if the scientist 
has “einer Hypothese zu lieb,” they might be erroneously inclined “ganze Zahlen in die 
[empirische] Brüche [zu schlagen].”543 In order to avoid confirmation bias and, more broadly, the 
intervention of the scientific observer in the process of experimentation, Goethe suggests the 
“Vermannigfaltigung eines jeden einzelnen Versuches” as the “eigentliche Pflichte eines 
Naturforschers.” 544  “Diversification” [Vermannigfaltigung] requires “eine fortwährende 
systematische Variation der Erkenntnisbedingungen, eine erneute Beobachtung und den erneuten 
Vergleich von Daten oder auch die nochmalige Durchführung von Experimenten unter veränderten 
Bedingungen.”545 By networking together countless experiments and placing them in proximity 
with one another, they constitute an experimental field, or what Goethe refers to as “complex” or 
“composite” [zusammengesetzte] forms of an experiment. These consist in a “series of 
                                                
542 Rheinberger, Experimentalsysteme, 20f. For more on the poetology of the experiment in the nineteenth century, 
see Marcus Krause, Nicolas Pethes (eds.), Literarische Experimentalkulturen. Poetologien des Experiments im 19. 
Jahrhundert (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2005). 
543 Goethe, “Erfahrung und Wissenschaft,” in: FA, I/25, 125. 
544 Goethe, FA, I/25, 33. 
545 Armin Schäfer, “Ordnung einer Idee: Goethes Morphologie,” in: Nicht Fisch – nicht Fleisch. Ordnungssysteme 
und ihre Störfälle (Zürich: diaphenes, 2011), 51–66, here: 59. 
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experiments” [Reihe von Versuchen] in which each experiment proceeds forth from the previous 
one and leads to the next in a more or less contiguous, metonymic fashion: “Haben wir also einen 
solchen Versuch gefaßt, eine solche Erfahrung gemacht, so können wir nicht sorgfältig genug 
untersuchen, was unmittelbar an ihn grenzt? was zunächst auf ihn folgt? Dieses ists, worauf wir 
mehr zu sehen haben, als auf das was sich auf ihn bezieht?”546 
 Goethe goes on to justify his method of serialized experimentation on the grounds that 
“nichts in der lebendigen Natur geschieht, was nicht in einer Verbindung mit dem Ganzen stehe, 
und wenn uns die Erfahrungen nur isoliert erscheinen, wenn wir die Versuche nur als isolierte 
Fakta anzusehen haben, so wird dadurch nicht gesagt, daß sie isoliert seien, es ist nur die Frage: 
wie finden wir die Verbindung dieser Phänomene, dieser Begebenheiten?”547 To be sure, he likens 
nature here to a kind of organic totality, in which every living part stands in connection with the 
“whole” [das Ganze]. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that his analogy between 
“living nature,” in the sense of an organic totality, and the kind of experimental arrangement he 
has in mind is directed above all against those scientific practices in which experiments are 
conducted individually and in isolation from one another. His remark that “die Versuche die 
Probleme der Natur zu lösen, eigentlich nur Konflikte der Denkkraft mit dem Anschauen 
[sind],”548 points to the problem of mediating between ideas and experiences in the context of 
scientific experimentation: for if the human mind is essentially incapable of escaping the circle of 
judgment between empirical observation and ideas – ideas which, while not capable of being 
immediately experienced in nature, may nonetheless be said to arise from the realm of the material 
                                                
546 Goethe, FA, I/25, 33. 
547 Goethe, FA, I/25, 33. 
548 Goethe, “Der Kammerberg bei Eiger,” in: FA, I/25, 399–410, here: 409. See also Ernst Cassirer, “Goethe und die 
mathematische Physik. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtung,” in: idem., Idee und Gestalt. Goethe, Schiller, Kleist, 
Hölderlin (Darmstadt 1971), 35–80, here: 41–43. 
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– then the only way out of this “hermeneutic circle” is through the constant serialization of 
experiments. As will be addressed later in this chapter, this has much to do with Goethe’s notion 
of “gegenständliches Denken.”549 For Goethe, as will be shown, such a notion of “objective 
thinking” entails the radical withdrawal of ideas from their immediate representation – that is, an 
initial hypothesis or “idea” which prevents the cognizing subject from being able to see how things 
actually are – and the provocation, in turn, of an aggregate or multiplied representation, which 
isolates and separates through continual processes of transformation. 
 “Consistency” or “sequentiality” [Folgerechtigkeit] thus constitute the essential 
methodological maxims which guide Goethe’s method of experimentation. This means excluding 
that to which an experiment is supposed to immediately refer or relate, as for instance an idea or 
hypothesis, in favor of what came before and what comes after – in a spatial rather than temporal 
sense – a given experience or experiment. This is because Goethe “proposes serialization not for 
the sake of connections but, on the contrary, to stave them off. The primary purpose of the series 
is not to link its components to each other but, conversely, to exacerbate, enforce, and radicalize 
the isolated nature of experiments by multiplying them and thus to reign in imagination’s hasty 
leaps of faith.”550 On these grounds he goes on to criticize approaches to the study of nature which 
he deems too teleological, contending that the “true botanist” ought to conduct experiments in a 
calm, consistent, and disinterested manner – that is, without recourse to the philosophical concepts 
of “beauty” [Schönheit] or “utility” [Nutzbarkeit].551 Only by withholding judgment for as long as 
possible and refusing to draw connections in an overly hasty manner between the various 
experiments or experiences which comprise an experimental field can an intuition or “idea” be 
                                                
549 Cf. Goethe, “Bedeutende Fördernis durch ein einziges hilfreiches Wort,” in: FA, I/24, 595. 
550 Geulen, “Serialization in Goethe’s Morphology,” 65. 
551 Goethe, FA, I/25, 26. 
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arrived at which is no longer a mere reflection of the interestedness or imaginative fancies of the 
scientific observer. 
 Hence, Goethe’s work technique is no longer based on the retroactivity of the experiment 
as a test or proof of a single hypothesis; rather, it aims at bringing forth new phenomena through 
the diversification and serialization of experiences or experiments. This process requires a 
continual comparison of data, an ongoing verification of the operations of comparison, and the 
testing of alternate representations which ought to demonstrate the validity (or falsity) of the “type” 
[Typus]. Only in this way can the scientist hope to achieve what Goethe calls an experiment or 
experience “of a higher sort” [von einer höhern Art]: “eine solche Erfahrung, die aus mehreren 
andern besteht, ist offenbar von einer höhern Art. Sie stellt die Formel vor, unter welcher unzählige 
einzelne Rechnungsexempel ausgedrückt werden.”552 In direct analogy with the concept of a 
mathematical series, Goethe’s serialization of experiments aims at discovering the underlying 
“formula” [Formel], in the sense of the principle of change and transformation in nature, on the 
basis of empirical examples. Thus in the case of his theory of the metamorphosis of plants, such a 
“formula” – namely, the principle which governs the transitions between the parts of the plant 
undergoing continual metamorphosis – can be intuited only when each part is viewed as the result 
of an adjacent part, and is thereby able to be brought into connection with the “whole” of 
appearances, or what Goethe calls the “Urpflanze.”553 
                                                
552 Goethe, FA, I/25, 34. 
553 As Eckart Förster argues in Die 25 Jahre der Philosophie, Goethe’s method, by mediating between Spinoza’s 
doctrine of a scientia intuitiva and Kant’s critical philosophy of the subject, aims at a systematic insight into the inner 
laws of nature which govern the transitions in the stages of development of various natural phenomena, and thereby 
at a certain independence from the cognizing subject. In addition to his novel systematic reconstruction of the debates 
which took place in the twenty-five years between the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Förster’s major breakthrough is his elevation of Goethe to the level of a genuine philosopher 
in his own right, situating him firmly within the tradition of Kantian and post-Kantian idealism (Fichte, Schelling, 
Hegel), from which he is traditionally excluded. While Förster makes a strong case for the reading of Goethe’s mor-
phology and theory of colors as putting forth a coherent, systematic method for achieving a “third kind of knowledge,” 
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 Because of the radically isolated nature of experiments, what Goethe calls “experiences of 
a higher sort” consist of nothing but the “materials” [Materielien] yielded by serialized 
experiments. These he advises the scientist merely to “collect” [sammeln] and arrange into “series” 
[Reihenfolgen], as for example into lists or tables, in order to arrive at a standard of comparison 
for the purposes of evidence-production. 554  The series is the representational form which 
corresponds to Goethe’s demand for the diversification of experiments, for only the form of the 
series, as a metonymic technique of juxtaposition and contiguity, is capable of uncoupling itself 
from the cognizing subject. In this way, to quote Lacan, “[t]he subject is, as it were, internally 
excluded from its object [en exclusion interne à son objet].”555 Goethe reiterates this point at the 
end of his essay on the experiment, in which he explicitly excludes the relating of serialized 
experiments to a specific claim or hypothesis: 
Aber diese Materialien müssen in Reihen geordnet und niedergelegt sein, nicht auf 
eine hypothetische Weise zusammengestellt, nicht zu einer systematischen Form 
verwendet. Es steht alsdenn einem jeden frei sie nach seiner Art zu verbinden und 
ein Ganzes daraus zu bilden, das der menschlichen Vorstellungsart überhaupt mehr 
oder weniger bequem und angenehm sei.556 
 
                                                
he leaves largely unaddressed the inherent ambiguity in Goethe’s essay on the experiment whether the form of the 
series refers exclusively to the method of experimentation or objects in nature themselves. 
554 Goethe made extensive use of lists in his morphological research: “Goethe zeigte mir Tabellen,” reports Eckermann 
in a conversation with Goethe from October 30, 1830, “woheinein er in lateinischer und deutscher Sprache viele 
Namen von Pflanzen geschrieben hatte, um sie auswendig zu lernen. Er sagte mir, daß er ein Zimmer gehabt, das ganz 
mit solchen Tabellen austapeziert gewesen, und worin er, an den Wänden umhergehend, studiert und gelernt habe. 
‘Es tut mir leid,’ fügte er hinzu, ‘das es später überweißt worden. Auch hatte ich ein anderes, das mit chronologischen 
Notizen wehrend einer langen Reihe von Jahren beschrieben war, und worauf ich das Neueste immer nachtrug. Auch 
dieses ist leider übertüncht worden, welches ich nicht wenig bedaure, indem es mir gerade jetzt herrliche Dienste tun 
könnte” (Johann Peter Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe in den letzten Jahren seines Lebens [1836/1848], ed. Fritz 
Bergemann [Frankfurt a.M. 1987], 699). For more on the rhetorical function of evidence-production by means of 
tables in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, cf. Campe, Spiel der Wahrscheinlichkeit. Literatur und Berechnung 
zwischen Pascal und Kleist (Göttingen 2002), in particular 224, 240f; for more on Goethe’s use of tables, cf. Ernst 
Osterkamp, Im Buchstabenbilde. Studien zum Verfahren Goethescher Bildbeschreibungen (Stuttgart 1991), esp. 100–
13. 
555 Cf. Jacques Lacan, “Science and Truth,” in: Écrits. The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink (New 
York/London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 726–45, here: 731. 
556 Goethe, FA, I/25, 35f. 
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By foregoing the application of a “systematic form” [systematischen Form] – that is, a teleological 
ordering principle or organic “whole” under which the manifold of observations would be 
subsumed – in favor of serial-forms and aggregates, Goethe opens up an entirely new semantics 
of the concept “experiment,” one which he presents in his essay as fundamentally open and 
productive. Because serialized experiments are based on isolation and separation, rather than on 
interconnection and transition, none can ever lead to a whole or totality. Accordingly, the parts of 
a series cannot be subordinated to a “whole” [ein Ganzes], since the elements of the series do not 
relate to each other as parts making up the whole; the whole as a whole thus remains “barred” – 
constitutively incomplete and forever out of reach. 
 By abandoning the hermeneutic relation of parts to wholes, Goethe comes to privilege 
distinctly collective forms of knowledge and representation.557 These are embodied by the figure 
of the archive. Although he undertook empirical observations throughout his life, after 1800 
Goethe’s morphological research increasingly took as its starting point the massive archive of 
material which he had amassed in Weimar.558 As a result, the focus of his morphological studies 
“verschob sich hierbei allmählich von empirischen Beobachtungen auf Beobachtungen der 
                                                
557 On the role of collectives, cf. Dorothea von Mücke, “Goethe’s Metamorphosis.” See also Azzouni, Kunst als prak-
tische Wissenschaft. There Azzouni argues that scientific collaboration, as a form of collective knowledge, is operative 
in Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre. 
558 In Weimar the data and objects of Goethe’s experiments were collected and managed in an archive. Their procure-
ment set into motion an extensive correspondence, including formal inquiries, gifts, and gifts in return. Goethe sys-
tematically pursued the procurement of objects for his collection. As he writes, for instance, in a letter to the daughter 
Georges Cuvier, whom he asked for the consignment of fossils: “Unterzeichneter besitzt eine Sammlung organischer 
Fossilien, welche, ohne sehr zahlreich zu seyn, von der frühsten Epoche, vom Übergangs-Thonschiefer an bis zu den 
letzten der aufgeschwemmten, ja der Torflager, von jeder Zeitstufe einige Beyspiele enthält. Nur fehlen durchaus 
Exemplare derjenigen uralten Thiergeschlechter, welche bey Paris in Gyps und Kalk gefunden werden und dern 
Entdeckung man ganz allein Herrn v. Cuvier schuldig ist. Nur wenige bedeutende Theile, als Zähne und dergleichen 
würden die Lücke genugsam ausfüllen. Könnte man von den eyerlegenden Vierfüßlern auch nur Ein Exemplar 
erhalten, so würde man solches mit großem Dank erkennen” (“Goethe an Clementine de Cuvier, Concept, Ende Au-
gust oder Anfang September 1826,” in: WA IV/41, 135–37, here: 137, cited in Schäfer, “Ordnung einer Idee,” 61. For 
more on Goethe’s collections, cf. Ernst P. Hamm, “Goethes Sammlungen auspacken. Das Öffentliche und das Private 
im naturgeschichtlichen Sammeln,” in: Sammeln als Wissen. Das Sammeln und seine wissenschaftsgeschichtliche 
Bedeutung, eds. Anke te Heesen and E. C. Spary (Göttingen 2001), 85–113. 
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Beobachtungen.” 559  This shift from empiricism to the archive, as the realm of second-order 
observations, corresponds to the increasing reflection in his Notebooks on Morphology on the 
forms of representation which would be adequate to his serialization of experiments. Goethe’s 
method of the experiment thereby relates itself to the diversity and plurality of phenomena. This 
is because his method does not seek to examine what lies behind phenomena but draws its doctrine 
from the phenomena themselves: “Man suche nur nichts hinter den Phänomenen; sie sind selbst 
die Lehre.”560 Hence, Goethe refers to the life-forms which he encounters in his studies not as 
organisms, which would imply that the parts relate to the whole according to a logic of 
“purposiveness” [Zweckmäßigkeit], but rather as “aggregates”561 or “Versammlung[en]”562 – just 
as he published his writings on morphology in the unsystematic form of a “collection” [Sammlung] 
as “notebooks” [Hefte]. Such serial or collective forms may no longer be said to comprise an ideal 
“whole” or correspond to a systematic form; nor do they follow the regulative development of the 
teleological principle “Bildung.” Instead, they are characterized by the serial dynamics of ceaseless 
accumulation, juxtaposition, and proliferation. 
 The reason for this ambiguity lies in the fact that Goethe leaves open the essential question 
in his essay on the experiment as to whether the concept of the series refers exclusively to the 
method of experimentation or, rather, to the very nature of change and transformation in nature 
itself. 563  From the perspective of his morphological method, this distinction turns out to be 
                                                
559 Schäfer, “Ordnung einer Idee,” 65. 
560 Goethe, FA, I/25, 114. 
561 “Ein ☐ ist ein Aggregat mehrerer ☐, welche alle nebeneinander existieren können wenn sie sich einander nicht 
aufheben. Wenn einige die andern aufheben wird das Aggregat zum Körper wenn sie einander noch ausschließlicher 
aufheben werden die Körper immer edler und es entstehen endlich die Individuen (vorher die Genera pp) das edelste 
Geschöpf ist wo sich die Teile am ausschließlichsten aufheben” (Goethe, “Über organische Naturen. Notizen aus 
Italien [1786–88]: Durchgewachsne Nelke. Handschriften aus Goethes Nachlaß,” in: idem., FA I/24, 81). 
562 “Jedes Individuum ist kein Einzelnes, sondern eine Mehrheit; selbst insofern es uns als Individuum erscheint, bleibt 
es doch eine Versammlung von lebendigen selbständigen Wesen” (Goethe, FA, I/24, 391).  
563 For more on this point, see Geulen, “Serialization in Goethe’s Morphology,” in particular 59, 65, and 68–70. 
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irrelevant, since at the level of representation, or Darstellung, the phenomena which Goethe’s 
serialized experiments seek to present are neither entirely products of the mind nor do they refer 
to pre-existing forms in nature. Rather, they are completely novel forms-of-life, which the 
experiment is first and foremost tasked with bringing forth anew. If seriality is thus in some sense 
inherent in both the object as well as mimetically reflected in the experiment, the epistemological 
implications of this for the concept of “Bildung,” which plays a central role in Goethe’s theory of 
plant metamorphosis, are difficult to underestimate. In his initial theory of the metamorphosis of 
plants, which he published in 1790, the concept of “Bildung” serves as the epistemological model 
which retroactively posits the “whole,” in the form of the Urpflanze, as the teleological end of the 
parts. However, as will be shown in the following pages, it is precisely this uncoupling of an end 
or telos from a regulative conception of nature, and life more broadly, in favor of the inherent 
heterogeneity and plurality of collective forms in nature which leads to the ineluctable introduction 
of contingency into Goethe’s morphological studies. 
 
2.1. “Alles ist Blatt”: Dynamic Orders in the Metamorphosis of Plants 
Already in the course of his first Italian journeys, which precede his essay on the metamorphosis 
of plants, entitled Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären (1790), by approximately 
five years, Goethe assumed the possibility of a universal archetype of plants which would 
correspond to a principle of change and transformation underlying all empirical species of plant. 
Thus in a journal entry from Palermo dated April 17, 1787, the question arises as to whether among 
the rich diversity of plants there is not also a “primordial plant” – what Goethe calls the 
“Urpflanze” – waiting to be discovered: 
Im Angesicht so vielerlei neuen und erneuten Gebildes fiel mir die alte Grille 
wieder ein, ob ich nicht unter dieser Schar die Urpflanze entdecken könnte. Eine 
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solche muß es denn doch geben! Woran würde ich sonst erkennen, daß dieses oder 
jenes Gebilde eine Pflanze sei, wenn sie nicht alle nach einem Muster gebildet 
wären?564 
 
A month later, he emphatically notes in the appendix to his Italienische Reise: “Die Urpflanze wird 
das wunderlichste Geschöpf von der Welt, um welches mich die Natur selbst beneiden soll. Mit 
diesem Modell und dem Schlüssel dazu, kann man alsdann noch Pflanzen in’s Unendliche 
erfinden, die konsequent sein müssen, das heißt: die, wenn sie auch nicht existieren, doch 
existieren könnten.”565 According to Goethe, what makes a plant a plant is precisely this ideal 
whole or “model” [Muster], which he took to be the universal law of organic productivity 
underlying the various manifestations of the parts of the plant. Several years later, in the 
introduction to his essay “Botanik als Wissenschaft” (1788–94), he likewise expresses the 
desideratum to trace back “alle Pflanzen auf einen Begriff,”566 contending that, “Alles ist Blatt, 
und durch diese Einfachheit wird die größte Mannigfaltigkeit möglich.”567 
 The concept of the Urpflanze thus made it possible for Goethe to conceive of the “greatest 
multiplicity” [größte Mannigfaltigkeit] in the development of individual plants according to the 
simplest principle, one from which all different kinds of plants could subsequently be invented. 
By examining growth and maturation processes in different plants, he reached the conclusion that 
the “leaf” [Blatt] constitutes the most basic and most versatile building block, capable of assuming 
                                                
564 Goethe, FA, I/15, 345 
565 Goethe, “Neapel, den 17. Mai 1787,” in: FA, I/40, 346. A similar description of the ‘primal scene’ of Goethe’s 
theory of metamorphosis can be found in an anecdote included in his Notebooks on Morphology, in which he recalls 
an encounter in a botanical garden in Padua, Italy in 1786 with the species of flower known as bignonia radicans: 
“Als ich im September 1786 in dem botanischen Garten von Padua eine hohe und breite Mauer durchaus mit Bignonia 
radicans überzogen und die Büschel hochgelbfarbiger kelchartiger Kronen-Blüten in unsäglichem Reichtum daran 
herunterhängen sah, machte dies einen solchen Eindruck auf mich, daß ich dieser Pflanze besonders gewogen blieb 
und sie, wo ich sie in botanischen Gärten antraf, in den Weinarischen Anlagen, wo sie mit Neigung gepflegt ward, 
auch im eigenen Garten immer mit besonderer Aufmerksamkeit betrachtete. Es ist eine rankende Pflanze, welche sich 
ins Unendliche fortsetzen die Neigung zu haben scheint, allein es gehen ihr die Organe ab, wodurch sie sich anschmie-
gen, anklammern, festhalten könnte” (Goethe, FA, I/24, 692). 
566 Goethe, “Botanik als Wissenschaft,” in: FA, I/24, 93. 
567 Goethe, FA, I/24, 84. 
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every shape and function essential to a plant, be it a petal, a stamen, or a sepal. These processes, 
however, do not mark a radical break in what constitutes the kingdom of plants, but happen in 
accordance with the basic blueprint or “type” to which Goethe assigns the status of a “law” that 
governs the range of possible change. 568  The underlying archetype or “model,” which is a 
composite of many different individuals, thus constitutes a reciprocal interplay between limitation 
and constraints and, at the same time, an infinite number of possible forms. Since the “type” 
defines the entirety of possible variations and innovations, no individual case, be it a class, a 
family, or a species, can therefore serve as its model: 
Hat man aber die Idee von diesem Typus gefaßt, so wird man erst recht einsehen, 
wie unmöglich es sei eine einzelne Gattung als Kanon aufzustellen. Das Einzelne 
kann kein Muster vom Ganzen sein, und so dürfen wir das Muster für alle nicht im 
Einzelnen suchen. Die Klassen, Gattungen, Arten und Individuen verhalten sich 
wie die Fälle zum Gesetz; sie sind darin enthalten, aber sie enthalten und geben es 
nicht.569 
 
Here Goethe claims that the archetype must not be construed as containing an implicit goal or 
telos. To be sure, his notion of an “idea” [Idee] implies a transcendental-philosophical connotation, 
and with it a Kantian notion of “purposiveness”; yet the platonic conception of eternal, 
transcendent ideas is decisively excluded. Rather, his morphological method aims for a “höheren 
Empirismus,” and in this respect it strictly adheres to experience in the sense of empirical 
observation.570 From this epistemological argument, he claims that higher degrees of complexity 
                                                
568 For more on the practice of gathering type specimens and its relation to scientific memory in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century scientific discourse, see again Daston, “Type Specimens and Scientific Memory.” 
569 Goethe, “Vorträge, über die ersten drei Kapitel des Entwurfs einer allgemeinen Einleitung in die vergleichende 
Anatomie, ausgehend von der Osteologie” (1796), in: FA, I/24, 270. 
570 Cf. Joseph Vogl, “Bemerkung über Goethes Empirismus,” in: Versuchsanordnungen 1800, eds. Sabine Schimma 
and Joseph Vogl (Zürich, Berlin 2009), 113–23. For more on Goethe’s concept of “idea” [Idee], see Dorothea Kuhn, 
Empirische und ideelle Wirklichkeit. Studien zur Goethes Kritik der französischen Akademiestreites (Graz, Wien, 
Köln 1967). As Goethe notes in his essay “Erfahrung und Wissenschaft, the value of empirical observation lies above 
all in amassing a legion of individual impressions which are to be subsequently condensed and integrated into a “true” 
representation, in both words and images, of the natural kind or “type specimen”: “Es gibt, wie ich besonders in dem 
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and differentiation are to be viewed as possessing greater value than simpler ones, since for him 
the goal of nature is not so much the achievement of perfection, but rather that of internal 
differentiation of the archetype through an ever increasing variety of species. Hence he privileges 
“composite” types and “aggregates,” or what he refers to elsewhere in his Notebooks on 
Morphology as atroismos, the Greek word for collection, aggregation, and accumulation.571 
 Yet in order for this “most magical creature in the world” [wunderlichste Geschöpf von 
der Welt], namely the Urpflanze, to let itself be seen, Goethe’s theory of metamorphosis depended 
upon a very specific conception of the observing subject, freed from the epistemic constraints of a 
referential paradigm of vision grounded in the separation of interior self and exterior world. By 
conceiving of the observer as an active, autonomous producer of his or her own visual experience, 
rather than as a passive, mechanical recipient of external sensations, Goethe’s conception of vision 
radically breaks with the Kantian opposition between idea and experience, concept and intuition. 
This goes to the very heart of his famous disagreement with Friedrich Schiller. In the text “Glück-
liches Ereignis,” he recounts his initial enthusiasm and subsequent disappointment in sharing with 
Schiller his discovery of the Urpflanze: 
[…] da trug ich die Metamorphose der Pflanzen lebhaft vor, und ließ, mit manchen 
charakteristischen Federstrichen, eine symbolische Pflanze vor einen Augen ent-
stehen. Er [Schiller] vernahm und schaute das alles mit großer Teilnahme, mit 
entschiedener Fassungskraft; als ich aber geendet, schüttelte er den Kopf und sagte: 
                                                
Fache, das ich bearbeite, oft bemerken kann, viele empirische Brüche, die man wegwerfen muß, um ein reines kon-
stantes Phänomen zu erhalten […] Um es darzustellen, bestimmt der menschliche Geist das empirisch Wankende, 
schließt das Zufällige aus, sondert das Unreine, entwickelt das Verworrene, ja entdeckt das Unbekannte” (Goethe, 
“Erfahrung und Wissenschaft,” in: FA, I/25, 125). 
571 Cf. Goethe, “ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΟΣ” (1798–99), in: FA, I/24, 474: “Freue dich höchstes Geschöpf der Natur, du fühlest 
dich fähig / Ihr den höchsten Gedanken, zu dem sie schaffend sich aufschwang, / Nachzudenken…” See also the 
section entitled “Genetische Behandlung” of Goethe, “Versuche einer Methodik der Wissenschaft von den Lebewe-
sen” (ca. 1798), in: FA, I/24, 352f. The commentary to the Frankfurt edition of this text reads: “[D]er Sinn des ur-
sprünglichen Titels ist noch nicht aufgehellt. Das Wort bedeutet etwa Sammlung, Versammlung, auch Anhäufung, 
Aggregat. Ist er auf die Form des Gedichtes zu beziehen (fragmentarische Gedanken-Anhäufung? Quintessenz?) oder 
auf den Gegenstand (das Tier als Aggregat)?” (FA, I/24, 1089). As has been argued thus far, it is precisely this ambi-
guity of reference point which impels Goethe’s practice of serializing forms. 
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das ist keine Erfahrung, das ist eine Idee. Ich stutzte, verdrießlich einigermaßen: 
denn der Punkt der uns trennte, war dadurch aufs strengste bezeichnet. Die 
Behauptung aus Anmut und Würde fiel mir wieder ein, der alte Groll wollte sich 
regen, ich nahm mich aber zusammen und versetzte: das kann mir sehr lieb sein 
daß ich Ideen habe ohne es zu wissen, und sie sogar mit Augen sehe.572 
 
Whereas Schiller is said to have claimed that the Urpflanze is “keine Erfahrung, sondern eine 
Idee,” Goethe insists on its visibility; for him, such a “symbolische Pflanze” is not merely a product 
of the mind, but something physical and real which one “mit Augen sehe.” This disagreement 
between Goethe and Schiller concerns not just conflicting viewpoints as to the veracity of the 
Urpflanze’s empirical existence, but also two fundamentally opposing epistemologies of percep-
tion. That is, while Schiller adheres to a more or less orthodox Kantian view that strictly opposes 
idea and experience, concept and intuition, for Goethe this distinction no longer abides. For him, 
“reality,” in the sense of Wirklichkeit, and perception are inextricably intertwined. In this respect, 
his ironic response to Schiller that he “Ideen ha[t] ohne es zu wissen, und sie sogar mit Augen 
s[ieht],” marks a decisive break with the Kantian conception of the subject as constitutively split 
between sense-perception and conceptual thinking. In his essay “Bedeutende Fördernis,” Goethe 
refers to this alternative conception of vision that rejects abstract thought as “objective thinking” 
[gegenständliches Denken], whereby “mein Anschauen selbst ein Denken, mein Denken ein An-
schauen sei,” and which he furthermore conceived of as directly analogous to a form of “objective 
poetry” [gegenständliche Dichtung].573 
 Goethe’s insight into the processes of change and transformation in nature made it possible 
for him to think the inherent interrelation between all the individual parts of an organism in their 
development and, in this way, to perceive them as outward manifestations of an ideal whole. From 
                                                
572 Goethe, “Glückliches Ereignis,” FA, I/24, 434–38, here: 437. 
573 Goethe, FA, I/24, 595. 
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this morphological perspective, he arrives at the theory of “metamorphosis,”574 a term which he 
uses to capture nature’s ability to generate new forms. In his numerous botanical writings, in par-
ticular his essay Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären, it becomes the key term for 
conceiving of change as an open-ended process. As such it entails a powerful critique of teleolog-
ical thinking, be it the traditional teleology of “preformationist” theories or the more contemporary 
philosophical concept of teleology as progress toward a given goal. Like his morphological 
method, his theory of metamorphosis is grounded in a comparative method: it entails nothing less 
than how to think together the lawful unity of nature as a whole and its infinitely varied appear-
ances, diachronically as the succession of one part of an organism to the next, and synchronically 
as the simultaneous manifestation of one and the same underlying organ. Thus as Goethe remarks 
in the opening paragraph of his essay on plant metamorphosis, a careful observation of plant life 
reveals, “daß gewisse äußere Teile derselben, sich manchmal verwandeln und in die Gestalt der 
nächstliegenden Teile bald ganz, bald mehr oder weniger übergehen.”575 By viewing the parts of 
the plant in proximity to one another, a continuity between the parts emerges such that each part 
appears as the sequential result of a transition from the immediately adjacent part. This is what he 
calls the “primordial plant,” or Urpflanze. 
 However, in order to think simultaneity and succession as united in a single intuition – an 
effort which he likens to “a kind of madness”576 [eine Art Wahnsinn] – Goethe eventually came to 
realize that his recourse to the language of primordial types and “pure phenomena” was still too 
                                                
574 While the term ‘‘metamorphosis’’ had been traditionally used primarily to describe the developmental stages of an 
insect, in the eighteenth century it became a more general term for models of change. For more on this point, cf. 
Dorothea von Mücke, “Goethe’s Metamorphosis,” in particular 31–33. 
575 Goethe, FA, 1/24, 109, Nr. 1. 
576 Goethe, FA, I/24, 449. 
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grounded in a pre-Kantian, quasi-platonic conception of nature, which separates the world of ap-
pearances from that of eternal essences and archetypes. He therefore abandoned his search for a 
“universal word” [allgemeines Wort] with which to signify the “so verschiedene Gestalten meta-
morphosierte Organ,”577 such as “Blatt,” “Urpflanze,” “Modell,” as well as “Typus,” and in their 
place undertook instead to observe the transitions that occur between the parts of the plant and to 
describe their heterogeneous processes of transformation.578 This entails 
die Erscheinungen vorwärts und rückwärts gegen einander zu halten. Denn wir kön-
nen eben so gut sagen: ein Staubwerkzeug sei ein zusammengezogenes Blumen-
blatt, als wir von dem Blumenblatte sagen können, es sei ein Staubgefäß im Zu-
stande der Ausdehnung; ein Kelchblatt sei ein zusammengezogenes, einem gewis-
sen Grad der Verfeinerung sich näherndes Stengelblatt, als wir von einem Stengel-
blatt sagen können es sei ein, durch Zudringen roherer Säfte ausgedehntes Kelch-
blatt.579 
 
In the place of a universal word, Goethe opts for the dynamic description of nature and its myriad 
forms. These he views not as fixed and static products of nature, or natura naturata, but rather as 
natural processes, natura naturans, which are in a constant state of change, transformation, and 
flux. Hence, he seeks to describe them according to their chiastic movement, in their transition 
between the adjacent parts, that is, simultaneously in a state of prolepsis and analepsis, moving 
“backwards” and “forwards.” In order to reflect the “höchst mannigfaltige” and “verschiedensten 
Gestalten durch Modifikation eines einzigen Organs,”580 he draws on the rhetorical technique of 
metonymy in his essay on plant metamorphosis, which comes to displace, in turn, the conventional 
names of plant organs in favor of a description of their processes of transformation from one part 
to the next; hence, as Goethe writes in the above passage, “we could just as well say that a pollen-
                                                
577 Goethe, Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären, FA, I/24, 150. 
578 For more on the epistemological significance of Goethe’s morphology for eighteenth-century taxonomic enter-
prises and natural-scientific nomenclature, cf. Chad Wellmon, “Goethe’s Morphology of Knowledge, or the Over-
growth of Nomenclature,” in: Goethe Yearbook 17 (2010), 153–77. 
579 Goethe, FA, I/24, 150f. 
580 Goethe, FA, I/24, 151. 
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mechanism is a contracted petal, as we could say of a petal that it is a stamen in the condition of 
extension; or that a sepal is a filament which is contracted and approximates a certain degree of 
refinement, as we could say of the filament that it is a sepal which extends through the excretion 
of its raw juices.” 
 By conceiving of such temporized life-forms in the absence of a determinate referent in the 
external world, Goethe’s theory of metamorphosis does not so much seek to re-present, in the 
sense of mimetically reproducing a pre-given object, as to bring forth new phenomena. Precisely 
for this reason, the “höchst mannigfaltige” and “verschiedensten” forms of nature that he seeks to 
elicit cannot be reduced to so-called “pure phenomena” or universal “archetypes.” Instead, they 
attain a productivity of their own, here in the double sense as both discursive and vital. This pro-
ductive, even “creative” moment in nature is what Goethe repeatedly refers to in his essay on plant 
metamorphosis as “anastomosis” [Anastomose], the standard botanical term that is usually used to 
designate the (for Goethe, mysterious and revealing) process whereby the separate parts of the 
vascular system of the plant steadily grow towards each other and eventually come to join together, 
that is, to inosculate. More broadly, it is the insertion of one organ or vessel within another, or their 
interconnection by a channel or tube; etymologically, it refers to the process of the opening of (one 
or more) “mouths” [stoma].581 In Goethe’s text, it comes to possess a distinctly sexual and procre-
ative connotation with respect to the growth and development processes of plant life. For him, 
plant procreation presages a decisive shift in the uniformity of the plant’s growth, where the linear 
succession that captures the manifestation of the metamorphosing “leaf” [Blatt] or “organ” [Organ] 
                                                
581 “Anastomosis,” which derives from the Greek word “mouth” [stoma], refers to the union of an organism’s parts so 
as to “intercommunicate” to create a network. In the section of the essay on the metamorphosis of plants titled “Rep-
etition” [Wiederholung], Goethe returns to the notion of anastomosis and groups it with what are in his view the most 
important concepts in the essay. He also elaborates that this particular process is not limited to plant production, but 




gradually gives way to a simultaneous appearance of the sexual organs, the stamen and pistil. At 
the moment when the plant divides into its respective reproductive organs, which for Goethe con-
stitutes a higher, more complex, that is, aggregate, form of the plant, he integrates the concept of 
anastomosis into his narration of the plant’s metamorphosis: “[S]o sind wir abgeneigt, die 
Verbindung der beiden Geschlechter eine geistige Anastomose zu nennen, und glauben wenigstens 
einen Augenblick die Begriffe von Wachstum und Zeugung einander näher gerückt zu haben.”582 
By uniting the concepts of “growth” [Wachstum] and “reproduction” [Zeugung], the successive 
and the simultaneous, the concept of anastomosis not only anchors Goethe’s theory that each stage 
of plant development entails the formation and transformation of a single organ, but also conforms 
to his criteria for the observation of living, metamorphosizing organisms.583 
 At the same time, the progressive growth and reproduction of plants that Goethe calls 
“anastomosis” culminates in an uncanny moment of hybrid communication, which momentarily 
suspends the steady processes of growth and development. It is hardly coincidental that the term 
“anastomosis” designates the rhetorical terminus technicus for the interpolation of a graft, the in-
sertion of one word within another. From this perspective, the process of transformation and met-
amorphosis described by Goethe should not be understood as a process of organic development, 
but one of aggregation and agglomeration, in the sense of grafting, as when the part of a plant is 
grafted onto the rootstock on which it grows and from which it draws its life, while nonetheless 
                                                
582 Goethe, FA, I/24, 129f. Goethe’s reference to procreation as a “spiritual anastomosis” [geistige Anastomose] sim-
ultaneously reveals and veils the ‘secret’ of procreation, insofar as it does not seek to explain the mechanism by which 
the male and female organs of the plant lead to the generation of offspring, but merely ascribes to it a “miraculous” 
dynamic, one which hovers between the physical and the metaphysical. 
583 Several paragraphs later, Goethe goes on to reaffirm his decision to name the act of “copulation” [Begattung] 
“anastomosis,” insofar as it describes the act of growing together once the plant achieves a higher degree of complexity 
with the development of sexual organs: “und wenn die genaue Verwandtschaft desselben mit dem männlichen uns 
durch diese Betrachtung recht anschaulich wird, so finden wir jenen Gedanken, die Begattung eine Anastomose zu 
nennen, passender und einleuchtender” (Goethe, FA, I/24, 131). 
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preserving its difference from the original.584 Anastomosis presents itself here, then, as an act of 
translation, transfer, and enfolding, which continually distorts and displaces the original onto 
which it is grafted.585 It is not an organic concept, but rather “eine Kultivierungstechnik, die der 
künstlichen – nicht-sexuellen – Fortpflanzung dient – eine Technik, die seit alters her bekannt ist 
und im 18. Jahrhundert zu neuer Blüte gelangt, nämlich als Wissensfigur für einen aufgeklärten 
Umgang mit der Natur.”586 
 As both a rhetorical as well as horticultural technique of hybridization, Goethe’s use of the 
term “anastomosis” implicitly links his conception of plant development to the oral sphere of com-
munication, which for Goethe is the privileged site of change.587 Simultaneously evoking the im-
age of plant leaf’s sprawling veins and that of a communicative network, anastomosis thus con-
forms to the criteria of the double of sense of form to which Goethe ascribes the structure of se-
cond-order seriality: as both an object of nature and as a form of presentation. Insofar as Goethe’s 
                                                
584 For a cultural-historical and media-theoretical approach to the terms “grafting” [pfropfen] and “engraftment” 
[Aufpfropfung], cf. Uwe Wirth (ed.), Pfropfen, Impfen, Transplantieren (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2011), as well 
as idem., “Aufpfropfung als Figur des Wissens in der Kultur- und Mediengeschichte,” in: Kulturgeschichte als Me-
diengeschichte (oder vice versa?), eds. Lorenz Engell, Bernhard Siegert, and Joseph Vogl (Weimar: Universitätsver-
lag Weimar, 2006), 87–110. 
585 For a literary-theoretical and narratological approach to Goethe’s concept of anastomosis, see J. Hillis Miller, “In-
terlude as Anastomosis in Die Wahlverwandtschaften,” in: Goethe Yearbook 6 (1992), 115–42; idem., “Anastomosis,” 
in: Ariadne’s Thread: Story Lines (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 144–222. As Miller points out, the 
root in anastomosis contains a double contradictory possibility, insofar as it simultaneously refers to the intercommu-
nication both of two vessels as well as two channels. “In one case the anastomosis is an external line linking one 
enclosed vessel, the self, to another or to others. In the other case, the self becomes itself by actual entry into the other 
or by being entered into in an anastomosis of the other sort. In this case the self is the line, not something joined 
externally to another self by a communicating channel. Taken together, the two forms of anastomosis in their multi-
tudinous proliferating from generation to generation make an image of all men and women joined in an immense 
network of navel cords and sexual couplings” (ibid., 157). 
586 Uwe Wirth, “Aufpfropfung als Figur des Wissens in der Kultur- und Mediengeschichte,” in: Kulturgeschichte als 
Mediengeschichte (oder vice versa?), eds. Lorenz Engell, Bernhard Siegert, and Joseph Vogl (Weimar: Univer-
sitätsverlag Weimar, 2006), 111–22, here: 111. 
587 “As a site of exchange the oral realm is also a privileged site of change. According to Goethe, within the constraints 
of nature’s supposed budget […] the interaction of the organism with the conditions of its environment is the main 
reason for the disturbing versatility that constantly threatens his quest for lawful metamorphosis and led him to call 
metamorphosis ‘a gift from above which leads into the formless and destroys knowledge’” (Geulen, “Serialization,” 
69). Geulen goes on to point out the various ways in which Goethe simulates the effect of oral conversation and 
spontaneous orality in the Notebooks on Morphology, characterizing his “tendency to interrupt himself and gesture 
toward something not yet or never said” according to the rhetorical term anaphosis (ibid., 69f). 
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essay on plant metamorphosis does not merely seek to prove the empirical validity of his theory 
of metamorphosis, but also stages the very attempt to “translate” the plurality of forms in nature 
into linguistic and representational forms that would be commensurate with nature’s unlimited 
vitality and multitudinous proliferation, anastomosis, as a double formative principle, may perhaps 
be understood then as both a “real” property of plants as well as a performance of their description, 
in the sense of the serialization of the parts of the plant. Such a process of grafting, translating, and 
transitioning – embodied in Goethe’s efforts to represent simultaneity and succession within a 
single intuition – never quite congeals into an organic whole or totality, but instead makes palpable 
and perceptible its graft-like character. 
 The perspective which Goethe’s morphology opens up – the perspective of impossibility, 
which he likens to “a kind of madness” – may therefore be likened to the principle of anamorpho-
sis, in at least two respects. The term anamorphosis, which in fact has a specifically botanical 
connotation that refers to abnormal change in the form of a plant that falsely gives it the appearance 
of an entirely different species of plant, is more proximately drawn here from Jacques Lacan’s 
well-known interpretation of Hans Holbein’s 1533 painting The Ambassadors in his 1964 seminar 
on vision, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. According to Lacan, the gaze is 
what eludes representation as much as it escapes vision: “In our relation to things, in so far as this 
relation is constituted by the way of vision [or path of vision: ‘la voie de la vision’], and ordered 
in the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from stage to stage, and is 
always to some degree eluded in it – that is what we call the gaze.” 588For this reason, the object 
of the gaze – what Lacan terms the objet petit a, and which he furthermore identifies with the gaze 
in his seminar on vision – is always, by definition, perceived in a distorted way: it is an irreducible 
                                                
588 Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire, Livre XI, 1964: Les Quatre Concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse (Paris: Édi-
tions du Seuil, 1973), 73. 
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residue of an indecipherable knowledge, whose contours can only be discerned by looking awry. 
Only through a change in perspective can the observing subject encounter the object, which ap-
pears within the visual field a special kind of memento mori: in the case of Holbein’s painting, it 
is the hidden image of the skull, which prior to the change in perspective appeared as a kind of 
meaningless stain within the frame of the canvas. In the case of Goethe’s morphology, as will be 
argued, the attempt to comprehend the seemingly meaningless empirical deviations from the norm 
of the ideal genesis of plant life – what Goethe refers to as “contingent formations” – ultimately 
leads him to develop a theory of the “spiral tendency,” a nearly universal pathology in nature that 
paradoxically encompasses both infinite proliferation as well as death and finitude. 
 
2.2. “In the Vortex of the Spiral-Tendency”: Contingency and Death in Nature 
In spite of his occasional recourse to the rhetoric of natural laws, one finds throughout Goethe’s 
essay on plant metamorphosis an irreducible element of contingency at work in the development 
of plants, which is intimately intertwined with the temporality of finitude. The most prominent 
manifestation of such contingency can be found in what Goethe refers to near the beginning of his 
essay on plant metamorphosis as “contingent formations,” or zufällige Bildungen, in the 
metamorphosis of plants. In addition to “regular” [regelmäßig] and “irregular” [unregelmäßig] 
formations, contingent formations constitute one of the three primary modes of plant 
metamorphoses.589 In the case of regular and irregular formations, Goethe conceives of these in 
terms of a chiastic relation, such that the “progressive” [fortschreitend] tendency in regular 
formations as well as the “regressive” [rückschreitend] tendency in irregular formations in plants 
                                                




come to mutually reinforce one another.590 Hence, through the careful observation of irregular 
formations, “welche wir an dieser Metamorphose zu machen Gelegenheit haben, werden wir 
dasjenige enthüllen können was uns die regelmäßige verheimlicht, deutlich sehen, was wir dort 
nur schließen dürfen; und auf diese Weise steht es zu hoffen, daß wir unsere Absicht am sichersten 
erreichen.”591 From this perspective, the role of contingency is largely relegated to the periphery 
of his theory of plant metamorphosis. In this sense, they obey the logic of supplementarity;592 for 
in contrast to both regular and irregular formations, which occupy the center of his theory, 
contingent formations are constitutively necessary for the organization of the conceptual schema, 
yet cannot be explained or accounted for within the very epistemological framework of Bildung 
except as mere empirical deviations from the norm. Hence, if one pays too close attention to such 
contingent formations, which he likens to “monstrosities” [monströsen], it would threaten, as 
Goethe warns, “unsern Zweck [zu] verrücken.”593 
 By likening contingent formations in plants to monstrosities, Goethe points to the way in 
which they participate in a teratological discourse which threatens to disturb at every turn the 
regulative, lawful model of Bildung; as monsters, they “disrupt totalizing conceptions of nature 
and destroy taxonomic logics, at once defining and challenging the limits of the natural.”594 In this 
sense, they are not just monstrosities, but also develop monstrous potentialities. This would not be 
fully realized until nearly forty years after the publication of his initial theory of the metamorphosis 
of plants. Only then did Goethe come to elevate the role of contingency from a marginal aspect of 
his theory of plant development to a near universal pathology of nature. In two of his last writings 
                                                
590 Goethe, FA, I/24, 110–11, §§ 6, 7. 
591 Goethe, FA, I/24, 111, § 7. 
592 For more on the logic of supplementarity, cf. Derrida, Of Grammatology, in particular 141–316. 
593 Goethe, FA, I/24, 111, § 8. 
594 Colin Milburn, “Monsters in Eden: Darwin and Derrida,” in: MLN 118.3 (2003), 603–21, here: 604. 
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on the metamorphosis of plants, entitled “Über die Spiraltendenz” and “Zur Spiraltendenz der 
Vegetation” (1829–31), the element of contingency comes to play a central role with respect to his 
theory of a universal “spiral tendency” [Spiraltendenz] in vegetation. Goethe’s new theory of plant 
metamorphosis is largely based on the findings of Carl Friedrich von Martius, a professor of botany 
and curator of the royal botanical gardens in Munich, who revealed his observations of a universal 
spiral tendency in plants in lectures held in Berlin and Munich for the Isis Society, whose minutes 
were published as a two-part article in 1828 and 1829. A letter from Goethe to Martius dating from 
March 28, 1829, marks the earliest reference to Martius’ discovery. The flurry of correspondence, 
notes, and journal entries, as well as the publication of the essay “Zur Spiraltendenz,” in the three 
years which followed, up until the week before his death in 1832, all attest to Goethe’s continued 
fascination with the theory of the spiral tendency. This theory centers around the spiral vessels, or 
“Spiralgefäße,” of plants, which had long been known and recognized by botanists, yet which 
according to Goethe were nevertheless “eigentlich nur als einzelne der ganzen Spiraltendenz 
subordinierte Organe anzusehen, man hat sie überall aufgesucht und fast durchaus besonders im 
Splint gefunden, wo sie sogar ein gewisses Lebenszeichen von sich geben und nichts ist der Natur 
gemäßer als daß sie das was sie im ganzen intentioniert durch das Einzelnste in Wirksamkeit 
setzt.”595 
                                                
595 Goethe, “Zur Spiraltendenz,” in: FA, I/24, 788. A similar formula for the theory of spiral formations in plants can 
also be found in an even earlier text by Goethe, namely his “Notizen aus Italien,” which date back to 1787–88 and 
which he subsequently included in his Notebooks on Morphology. There his nascent hypothesis of a universal arche-
type of plants, “Alles ist Blatt,” which he puts forth there for the first time, is accompanied by a graphic representation 
of two intertwining lines, or spirals. He describes these as follows: “Das Blatt hat Gefäße die in sich verschlungen 
wieder ein Blatt hervorbringen wo man ein krudes Bild durch Verschlingungen zweier Linien sich formieren kann” 
(Goethe, “Notizen aus Italien,” in: FA, I/24, 84). 
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 In his essay on the spiral tendency in plants, Goethe draws on Martius’ insights, which 
were themselves intended to conform to Goethe’s own theory of metamorphosis,596 to now assert 
that these spiral vessels belong to a larger tendency which induces the various organs of a plant to 
develop in a spiral around a vertical axis. In that essay, he conceives of the spiral tendency as the 
real basis of all plant life, its “eigentlich produzierende Lebensprinzip,”597 and contrasts it with a 
reciprocal tendency which he calls the “vertical tendency” [Vertikaltendenz]. Whereas the vertical 
tendency mechanically pursues sunlight, and in doing so continuously lifts the plant’s organs up-
wards,598 the spiral tendency is said to possess a true “Selbstleben,” which Goethe characterizes 
with the reproductive rhetoric of “creative” or “fertile” processes [herausschöpfen], calling it “das 
Fortbildende,” “das Vermehrende,” “das Vorübergehende,” and “das im Übermaß fortwirkend.”599 
In this way, his theory of the spiral tendency doubtlessly relates to the virulent discourse of pro-
creation around 1800.600 At the same time, he appears to link the autonomous vitality and procre-
ative power of the spiral tendency, which he explicitly codes as feminine,601 to a centrifugal dy-
                                                
596 “Vor allem […] bemerke ich, daß die Grundansicht, welche ich hier vorzulegen mir die Ehre gebe, nicht etwa bloß 
das Resultat meiner Forschungen ist, sondern daß sie theilweise wenigstens von vielen bereits angenommen worden 
und überhaupt das Resultat jener morphologischen Ansicht von der Blume ist, die wir unserem großen Dichter Goethe 
danken” (Carl Friedrich von Martius, “Über die Architektonik der Blüten,” in: Isis, vol. XXI, 522–29, column 334). 
597 Goethe, “Über die Spiraltendenz,” in: FA, I/24, 777f. 
598 “Die Vertikaltendenz äußert sich von den ersten Anfängen des Keimens an, sie ist es wodurch die Pflanze in der 
Erde wurzelt und zugleich sich in die Höhe hebt” (Goethe, FA, I/24, 778). Goethe also associates the vertical tendency 
with a conception of the “whole” which permeates “climbing” and “crawling” plants: “Auch ist es dieselbe Naturkraft, 
welche unaufhaltsam von Knoten zu Knoten in die Höhe oder sonst fortschiebt, die einzelnen Spiralgefäße mit sich 
fortreißt und so, indem sie Leben nach Leben fördert und steigert, eine Kontinuität des Ganzen sogar in rankenden 
und kriegenden Gewächsen folgerecht hervorbringt” (ibid). 
599 Goethe, FA, I/24, 777. 
600 Cf. Holland, German Romanticism and Science, in particular 53–54. 
601 “Der Aufsatz über die Spiral-Tendenz beschreibt nämlich das Weibliche unter dem Aspekt, welcher dem des ver-
meintlich weiblichen Efeu in Amyntas genau entgegengesetzt ist: ‘Da das Spiralsystem eigentlich das Nährende ist,’ 
kann es nicht dasselbe wie dies sein, was Nahrung umgekehrt gerade von ‘ihm’ nimmt. Der Versuch, ‘das Weibliche’ 
unter seinen verschiedenen möglichen Aspekten zu denken – als das zugleich ‘Bedürftige’ und das ‘Nährende’ – und 
dabei gleichwohl an seiner polaren Bestimmung festzuhalten, verschlingt sich in sich selbst” (Robert Stockhammer, 
“Spiraltendenzen der Sprache: Goethes Amyntas und seine Theorie des Symbols,” in: Poetica. Zeitschrift für Sprach- 
und Literaturwissenschaft 25 [1993], 129–54, here: 144). 
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namic of de-centering, proliferation, and dispersion, such that its “organic circulations” [organ-
ische Umläufe] are said to be continually “entwining” [umschlingend], turning from inside-out, 
from the center to the periphery: 
[…] es ist mit jenem innigst verwandt, aber vorzugsweise auf die Peripherie 
angewiesen […] Wie aber auch in dem Fortschritt des Pflanzenwachstums die 
Spiraltendenz sich verbergen, oder irgend merklich hervordringen mag, so herrscht 
sie doch zuletzt bei aller Blüten- und Fruchtstellung, wo sie ihren Mittelpunkt 
tausendfältig umschlingend, das Wunder bewirkt, daß eine einzelne Pflanze zuletzt 
befähigt wird, eine unendliche Vermehrung aus sich selbst herauszuschöpfen.602 
 
In this passage, the relation of center to periphery no longer conforms to the paradigm of Bildung. 
Here one finds neither regular nor irregular formations, no fixed end-goal or telos, but instead only 
“monstrosities” 603  [Monstrositäten], as well as an equally monstrous dynamic of “infinite 
proliferation” [unendliche Vermehrung]. From this perspective, the two opposing tendencies, 
vertical and spiral, which Goethe posits to be at work in the development of plants, are in no way 
polar forces, as in the mechanical ebb-and-flow of extension and contraction in his earlier essay 
on metamorphosis. “Denn ‘natürlich’ ist in der Spiraltendenz die vertikale bereits aufgehoben 
(sonst wäre sie eine bloß kreisförmige) und kann derart nicht deren genaues Gegenteil sein; für die 
in ganz ähnlichen Kategorien prozedierende Hegelsche Dialektik entspräche dies der absurden 
Gegenüberstellung von These und Synthese ohne Antithese.”604 
 For Goethe, the constitutive asymmetry between the spiral and vertical tendencies, and the 
suspension, in turn, of an absolute synthesis, leads him to a radical conclusion, namely the 
possibility of finitude, closure, and even death in nature. Compared with his earlier descriptions of 
the metamorphosis of plants, perhaps the most striking change in terminology which characterizes 
                                                
602 Goethe, FA, I/24, 778f. 
603 Goethe, FA, I/24, 788. 
604 Stockhammer, “Spiraltendenzen der Sprache,” 144. 
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his description of the spiral tendency is his repeated insistence on an “ending” [Abschluß].605 Thus 
Goethe writes that “das Spiralsystem ist abschließend, den Abschluß befördernd; Und zwar auf 
gesetzliche, vollendende Weise. Sodann aber auch auf ungesetzliche, voreilende vernichtende 
Weise.”606 One possibility is that Goethe might mean this in an empirical sense, as in the literal 
“death” of an individual plant, or perhaps simply as the imagined end of the plant’s growth cycle, 
“und Goethes Sprachgebrauch bewahrt eben diese Zweideutigkeit. Er definiert die Spiraltendenz 
als den ‘Abschluß des Blütenstandes,’ und weist an anderer Stelle darauf hin, dass sie sich ‘am 
auffallendsten bei Endigungen und Abschlüssen’ enthüllt.”607 With this concluding or terminal 
moment in the development of plant life, Goethe reintroduces the problem of contingency into his 
theory of plant metamorphosis, such that the end of the life cycle – as opposed to an endless growth 
cycle – is no longer ruled out. Thus a remark in the paralipomena which accompanies Goethe’s 
essay on the spiral tendency refers to “Beyspiele der pathologischen Manifestationen der Spiral-
Tendenz. Alter, Absterben, Vollendung seines organischen Laufes.”608 The potential of the spiral 
tendency to manifest itself as a pathology recalls Goethe’s earlier description of a “third” or 
“contingent” metamorphosis in his essay from 1790, in which he first articulated the element of 
contingency with respect to his theory of plant metamorphosis. The “pathological” potential of the 
spiral tendency, as an empirical rather than intuitable phenomenon, thus stands in marked contrast 
to his description of it as “producing,” “continuing,” and “passing by,” just as his intuition of the 
                                                
605 Fore more on this point, as well as Goethe's theory of the spiral tendency more broadly, see Holland, “‘Eine Art 
Wahnsinn.’ Intellektuelle Anschauung und Goethes Schriften zur Metamorphose,” in: Intellektuelle Anschauung – 
unmögliche Evidenz, eds. Sibylle Peters and Martin Schäfer (Bielefeld: transcript, 2006), 79–92. 
606 Goethe, FA, I/24, 799. 
607 Holland, “Intellektuelle Anschauung und Goethes Schriften zur Metamorphose,” 90. Holland’s citation of Goethe’s 
remark can be found in Goethe, FA, I/24, 778. 
608 Goethe, Goethes Werke. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Großherzogin Sophie von Sachsen (= WA), Abtlg. I–IV, 
133 Bände in 143 Teilen (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1887–1919 [1999]), II/13, 94. 
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spiral tendency as a transitional moment in the development of a plant’s organs simultaneously 
coexists and contrasts with the reality of the spiral tendency as an end-point. 
 This paradoxical coexistence of a procreative as well as a mortifying capacity with respect 
to the spiral tendency may be said to mark a decisive shift in the conception of nature, and of “life” 
more broadly, in Goethe’s thought. For in his first essay on the metamorphosis of plants, he still 
posited a more or less mechanical interaction between force and counterforce – what he termed, 
drawing on mechanistic terminology deployed in a variety of scientific disciplines and discourses 
at the turn of the nineteenth century, the forces of “expansion” [Ausdehnung] and “contraction” 
[Zusammenziehung] – which are said to govern the formation and development of plants. In doing 
so, he came to situate contingency at the margin of his theory of plant metamorphosis, that is, as a 
supplement to the regulative “polarity” of the two prevailing forces which govern regular and 
irregular formations. In his final 1831 essay on the spiral tendency, however, the element of 
contingency now suddenly comes starkly to the fore, and in a far more radical manner than in his 
earliest text. With its ceaseless proliferation and drive forth, as well as its pathological, deviating, 
and mortifying potential, Goethe’s theory of the spiral tendency presents a fundamentally modern, 
de-naturalized conception of nature as “monstrosity,” in which the distinction between the realms 
of the organic and the inorganic, as well as between life and death, are now suspended. 
 Crucial in this regard is that Goethe’s theory of spiral tendency cannot be constrained to 
his botanical research alone. In Goethe’s writings alone, it has a considerable pre-history beyond 
the field of botany, connoting more broadly a centrifugal dynamic as well as a kind of cyclical 
motion that one might characterize as that of a vortex. In inorganic realms, for example, it can 
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function as a mechanical explanation and describe the formation of minerals.609 Goethe even 
describes the motion of the earth as a “living spiral” and an “animated screw without end,”610 and 
several years earlier, following the publication of his West-östlicher Divan, justified his fascination 
in oriental poetry on the basis of its resemblance to the spiral motions of the earth.611 The figure 
of the spiral might thus be said to leap out from the frame of purely natural-scientific or botanical 
inquiry, and thereby emerge as a figure of thought for modernity as such. 
 To be sure, the figure of the spiral has a long history that far predates Goethe’s use, and 
can be traced all the way back to pre-Socratic thought, perhaps most prominently embodied by 
Lucretius’s atomistic conception of the clinamen or “swerve” in the didactic poem De rerum 
natura. Recent scholarship has also suggested that Goethe’s concept of the spiral tendency may 
have even anticipated certain modernist aesthetic practices in the twentieth century, from Ezra 
Pound and Wyndham Lewis to Marcel Duchamp and James Joyce.612 Yet the question as to 
                                                
609 See also Goethe’s journal entry from November 6, 1830, on vertical and spiral tendencies in the mineral realm: 
“[…] Kam die Sendung meines Sohns von Florenz an. Wurde ausgepackt, gesondert und beurtheilt. Der: böhmische 
Mineralienhändler packte seine Stufen aus. Manches war in Bezug auf Vertical- und Spiraltendenz notirt worden. 
Mittag Hofrath Vogel und Dr. Weller. Gegen Abend Hofrath Meyer. Wir besahen und beurtheilten das von August 
Gesendete. Derselbe las die Fortsetzung der Kunstgeschichte von Augustus Zeiten an. Vorher den politischen und 
kriegerischen Zustand des römischen Reichs im ersten Jahrhundert. Kam Frau von Wolzogen. Wir besprachen die 
Jenaischen Angelegenheiten. Sodann einiges über Schiller und Wilhelm von Humboldt” (Goethe, WA, III, 12:327, 
cited in Holland, German Romanticism and Science, 50). 
610 Goethe himself even suggested the broader significance of the spiral form beyond the realm of botanics in his 1825 
treatise on meteorology, entitled “Versuch einer Witterungslehre”: “wir versinnlichen sie [die Bewegung der Welt] 
uns als lebendige Spirale, als belebte Schraube ohne Ende” (Goethe, FA, I/25, 294f). See also: Helmut Müller-Sievers, 
“‘Belebte Schraube ohne Ende.’ Zur Vorgeschichte der Doppelhelix,” in: Trajekte 16 (April 2008), 25–28. Müller-
Sievers discusses the figures of the spiral, helix, and screw as they relate to the work of Kant, Goethe, and subsequent 
theories of mechanics. With respect to Goethe, Müller-Sievers reads a direct connection between the spiral tendency 
of the earth and the spiral tendency of vegetation (ibid., 27). 
611 In a letter to Zelter from May 11, 1820, Goethe claims he encountered in Persian poetry “heiterer Überblick des 
beweglichen, immer kreis- und spiralartig wiederkehrenden Erde-Treibens” (Goethe, MA, 20.1, 601, cited in Dieter 
Borchmeyer, “‘Lebensfluten – Tatensturm.’ Goethe – der bewegte Beweger,” in: Goethe-Jahrbuch 129 [2012], 49–
63, here: 50). What is peculiar is that he brings not only the circle, but also the spiral into play here, ostensibly in order 
to convey that rotation does not mean an ‘eternal recur of the same,’ but rather consists in “immerstrebendem Auf-
steigen,” in ever new “Steigerung,” in which he saw with “Polarität” the “zwei großen Triebräder aller Natur” (Goethe, 
MA, 18.2, 359). For more on the significance of Goethe’s conception of motion for his middle and late works of 
literature, see Borchmeyer, “‘Lebensfluten – Tatensturm.’ Goethe – der bewegte Beweger.” 
612 For more on the significance of the spiral in twentieth-century literature and art, see Nico Israel, Spirals: The 
Whirled Image in Twentieth-Century Literature and Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). While his 
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whether Goethe’s theory of the spiral tendency owes its epistemic weight to pre-Socratic thought, 
or whether it in fact gains significance in light of later modernist and avant-garde aesthetic 
practices is not at stake in this analysis. Rather, whereas the concept of anastomosis, which, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, features prominently in Goethe’s first essay on the theory of plant 
metamorphosis, represents a radical spatial as well as syntactic ordering principle that 
encompasses at once both material as well as rhetorical techniques of hybridization – of grafting, 
enfolding, and translating – it is his later theory of the spiral tendency that reflects a distinctly 
temporal conception of life and form. The simultaneous affirmation of two seemingly mutually 
contradictory phenomena embodied by the spiral tendency – that of infinite proliferation and the 
possibility of an end, of death – reflect the way in which, for the late Goethe, life appears in the 
form of an infinite deferral – namely the deferral of death. 
 The temporality of deferral in Goethe’s theory of the spiral tendency thus comes into 
surprisingly close proximity to Sigmund Freud’s model of delay, or postponement, in the 
movement of life protecting itself through the deferral of death: “Dabei kommt das Paradoxe 
zustande, daß der lebende Organismus sich auf das energischeste gegen Einwirkungen (Gefahren) 
sträubt, die ihm dazu verhelfen könnten, sein Lebensziel auf kurzem Wege (durch Kurzschluß 
sozusagen) zu erreichen, aber dies Verhalten charakterisiert eben ein rein triebhaftes im Gegensatz 
zu einem intelligenten Streben.” From this perspective, his resultant theory of the death drive does 
not so much anticipate Goethe’s notion of the spiral tendency as it appears as its modern 
                                                
monograph focuses on the heterogeneous manifestations of the spiral figure in the aesthetic practices of early and high 
modernism, Israel does briefly take note of Goethe’s contribution to this tradition in the first chapter, which sketches 
out the ‘prehistory’ of its twentieth-century incarnation(s): “[S]pecial consideration must be given to the nineteenth 
[century], as perhaps nowhere did the notion of the spiral as an expression of nature, or ‘life,’ receive more attention 
than in Romanticism and its aftermaths. In his essay ‘Über die Spiraltendenz der Vegetation’ (On the Spiral Tendency 
of Plant Life), Johann Wolfgang von Goethe […] addresses two ‘tendencies’ in plant life, the vertical and the spiral, 
the merging of which accounts for what he called ‘metamorphosis’” (ibid., 31). Israel then goes on, if somewhat 
problematically, to connect the spiral tendency in Goethe’s writings on plant metamorphosis to a narratological prin-
ciple employed in his late works, such as his novella Novelle (1828). 
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incarnation. For just as Freud’s theory of the death drive was conceived as a revision of an 
emphatic conception of life – in thinking “beyond the pleasure principle,” he conceived of a 
paradoxical dynamic in living organisms, namely the “compulsion to repeat” 
[Wiederholungszwang], that potentially overrides the pleasure principle by seeking to derive 
pleasure from pain and even death – so too does Goethe’s theory of the spiral tendency completely 
eclipse any symmetrical polarity between the forces of life and death. For Goethe as for Freud, 
then, the introduction of the problem of an end – the possibility of death and finitude – does not 
mark a shift from life to death, but rather seek to show how infinite proliferation and morbidity 
paradoxically coexist in one and the same dynamic. Whereas for Goethe this phenomenon goes 
under the name “spiral tendency,” for Freud it is embodied in the primordial living organism of 
the gamete [Keimzelle]: “So arbeiten diese Keimzellen dem Sterben der lebenden Substanz 
entgegen und wissen für sie zu erringen, was uns als potentielle Unsterblichkeit erscheinen muß, 
wenngleich es vielleicht nur eine Verlängerung des Todesweges bedeutet.”613  For Freud, the 
gamete’s (self-)preservation of an earlier stage of organic development that precedes the higher 
forms of plant and animal life reflects the dynamics of the drives writ large to the extent that it 
seeks to infinitely defer death: 
Die Triebe, welche die Schicksale dieser das Einzelwesen überlebenden 
Elementarorganismen in acht nehmen, für ihre sichere Unterbringung sorgen, 
solange sie wehrlos gegen die Reize der Außenwelt sind, ihr Zusammentreffen mit 
den anderen Keimzellen herbeiführen usw., bilden die Gruppe der Sexualtriebe. Sie 
sind in demselben Sinne konservativ wie die anderen, indem sie frühere Zustände 
der lebenden Substanz wiederbringen, aber sie sind es in stärkerem Maße, indem 
sie sich als besonders resistent gegen äußere Einwirkungen erweisen, und dann 
noch in einem weiteren Sinne, da sie das Leben selbst für längere Zeiten erhalten. 
Sie sind die eigentlichen Lebenstriebe; dadurch, daß sie der Absicht der anderen 
Triebe, welche durch die Funktion zum Tode führt, entgegenwirken, deutet sich ein 
Gegensatz zwischen ihnen und den übrigen an, den die Neurosenlehre frühzeitig 
als bedeutungsvoll erkannt hat. Es ist wie ein Zauderrhythmus im Leben der 
Organismen; die eine Triebgruppe stürmt nach vorwärts, um das Endziel des 
                                                
613 Freud, GW XIII, 42. 
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Lebens möglichst bald zu erreichen, die andere schnellt an einer gewissen Stelle 
dieses Weges zurück, um ihn von einem bestimmten Punkt an nochmals zu machen 
und so die Dauer des Weges zu verlängern.614 
 
According to Freud, the temporal rhythm of “hesitating” or “tarrying” [zaudern] characterizes the 
life of organisms. This is because, as Freud argues in the above passage, the drives contained in 
living organisms are not uni-directional – they are not, to paraphrase Goethe, a mere “vertical 
tendency” or “system” – but counteract each other insofar as one group of drives propels life as 
fast as possible toward its end, namely death, while the other drives seek to retard this movement 
in order to thereby “extend the duration of the path” [die Dauer des Weges zu verlängern] toward 
death for as long as possible. In this sense, life for Freud, as for Goethe, is nothing but the deferral 
of death – an eccentric movement of counteracting forces which simultaneously proliferates in 
“excess” [Übermaß] and seeks to hasten its inevitable “conclusion” [Abschluß]. 
 As biographical information, the fact that Goethe’s fascination with the monstrous, 
mortifying power of the spiral tendency coincided with an increasing awareness of his own 
mortality, up until the very week of his death, is perhaps merely interesting. However, just as critics 
and colleagues of Freud dismissed his own theory of the death drive as merely a symptom of the 
prevailing mood of cultural pessimism at the time, one detects a similar uneasiness with respect to 
Goethe’s literary and scientific output near the end of his life, treating them as symptoms of 
senility, especially with respect to his final novel, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre. This tension 
between, on the one hand, the attempts to more narrowly inscribe such disturbing theories, as by 
way of recourse to biographicism or to cultural context, and, on the other hand, to take them 
seriously, as cogent and coherent reflections and not simply self-reflections, is perhaps 
symptomatic of the difficulty, perhaps even the impossibility, that lies at the heart of Goethe’s 
                                                
614 Ibid., 42ff. 
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morphological project, namely that of disentangling his “morphological gaze” from the objects of 
nature which his method seeks to bring forth. Goethe himself seems to have been aware of this 
dual aspect when he remarks just before his death: “Das ich nahe am End meiner Laufbahn noch 
von dem Strudel der Spiraltendenz ergriffen werden sollte, war auch ein wunderlich Geschick.”615 
As a monstrous figure of infinite repetition, the spiral designates the centrifugal dynamic that lures 
the gaze of the observer, sucking it into its “whirlpool” or “vortex” [Strudel]. From this 
perspective, its epistemology is no longer one of infinite (self-)reflection, but points instead to the 
elements of contingency, materiality, and even death, those de-subjectifying forces which put into 
question the very status of the subject. One could thus wager that, insofar as the spiral tendency 
comes to possess a de-centering, disruptive, and dispersing power, it thereby announces the very 
impossibility of any systematic or transcendental “order of things,”616 as well as any stable relation 
of the subject to knowledge. 
 In the chapter which follows, it will be argued that the figure of the spiral emerges as an 
epistemological as well as poetological problem whenever the question of the end, in the broadest 
sense of the gesture of closure – a gesture which does not, in fact, come to an end in itself – presents 
itself. If the spiral tendency, as has been argued above, is precisely that form which concerns, at 
bottom, a monstrous conception of form and life that implicates the elements of contingency, 
materiality, and death, then the question remains as to how this reconfiguration of form-to-life and 
life-to-form relates to the theory of the novel. Symptomatic in this regard is Goethe’s decision late 
                                                
615 Goethe, LA, I/4, 251 
616 “At the foundation of all the empirical positivities, and of everything that can indicate itself as a concrete limitation 
of man’s existence, we discover a finitude – which is in a sense the same: it is marked by the spatiality of the body, 
the yawning of desire, and the time of language […] It is within this vast but narrow space, opened up by the repetition 
of the positive within the fundamental, that the whole of this analytic of finitude – so closely linked to the future of 
modern thought—will be deployed; it is there that we shall see in succession the transcendental repeat the empirical, 
the cogito repeat the unthought, the return of the origin repeat its retreat […].” Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: 
An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 315f. 
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in life to serialize Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre in the form of a sequel, entitled Wilhelm Meisters 
Wanderjahre oder die Entsagenden. With his novel, which, similar to the Notebooks on 
Morphology, presents itself as a disturbingly heterogeneous collection of textual material, Goethe 
surpasses the epistemological and medial constraints of the closed form of the book. In fact, the 
final words of the novel, “(To be continued.)” [(Ist fortzusetzen.)], programmatically stage the 
very impossibility of a fixed conclusion or end while simultaneously instantiating a (paratextual) 
gesture of closure. Goethe’s Wanderjahre, which consists of a collection of aphorisms, letters, and 
novellas – among other kinds of texts – is no longer able to be designated as a Bildungsroman – in 
fact, the genre designation “novel” [Roman] was stricken at Goethe’s request from the title page 
of the novel’s second edition. Instead, the Wanderjahre demands a new theory of novel, which is 
organized rather as a kind of “network,” as an archive or aggregate of different texts.617 In this 
sense, it constitutes an open experimental arrangement of heterogeneously interwoven texts. It thus 
marks a drastic departure not only from the literary institution of the Bildungsroman, which the 
Lehrjahre virtually founded, but also from the reflexive epistemology of “Bildung” upon which it 
is premised. If indeed for Goethe “Alles ist Blatt” – in the double sense of “everything is leaf” and 
“everything is paper” – then the spiral tendency announces an alternative of epistemology, one 
which foregrounds the centrifugal dynamic of the post-hermeneutic text. While more work will be 
required to make this claim, it suffices to wager that the spiral tendency figures as a new paradigm 
of textuality, one which no longer corresponds to hermeneutic relation of part to whole. 
 As will be seen, the forms of knowledge, as well as their representation, which correspond 
to this new paradigm of textuality are inextricably intertwined, in turn, with the novel’s virulent 
                                                
617 Cf. Andrew Piper, Dreaming in Books. The Making of the Bibliographic Imagination in the Romantic Age (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); see also: Martin Bez, “Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre”: Aggregat, Archiv, 
Archivroman (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013). 
 
259 
motif of “renunciation” [Entsagung], which can be understood from this perspective as Goethe’s 
term for the very process of de-subjectivization as well as for the de-centering of the subject. In 
the Wanderjahre, renunciation is not so much a morality or an ethics as it is a process of uncoupling 
the subject from description, and hence relates in the text to the proliferation of numerous uncanny 
figures, none more so arguably than the astonishing figure of Makarie. Neither purely mythopoetic 
nor cosmological, neither really a figure nor a character in the traditional sense, Makarie comes to 
embody a distinctly spiral dynamic of infinite dissemination and proliferation, which moves from 
center to periphery. Moreover, she is closely linked in the Wanderjahre to the mysterious function 
of the archive, and for this reason can be read as a textual, even technical, principle, which in 
connection with both the oral motif of “renunciation” and the broader reconfiguration of form and 
life in the novel may be said to concern the very unbinding of the novel from the boundaries of the 




3. “(IST FORTZUSETZEN.).” THE MATERIALITY OF THE ARCHIVE IN 
WILHELM MEISTERS WANDERJAHRE 
 
Mit solchem Büchlein aber ist es wie mit dem Leben selbst: es findet sich in dem Complex 
des Ganzen Nothwendiges und Zufälliges, Vorgesetztes und Angeschlossenes, bald gelun-
gen, bald vereitelt, wodurch es eine Art von Unendlichkeit erhält, die sich in verständige 
und vernünftige Worte nicht durchaus fassen noch einschließen läßt.618 
 
—Goethe to J. F. Rochlitz, November 23, 1829 
 
Seit der Zeit hab’ ich fortgefahren, den Epitomator mein selbst zu machen: denn es ist 
gewissermaßen noch lustiger, ein vorliegendes Leben als ein vorliegendes Buch auszuzie-
hen […].619 
 
—Goethe to S. Boisserée, January 27, 1823). 
 
After 1800, Goethe’s morphological research increasingly took as its point of departure the mas-
sive archive of material in Weimar. This marked a shift in his approach from the direct observation 
of nature and its objects to the observation of observations – in other words, to the archive as the 
site of second-order observation. Yet while this archive was initially intended to house only the 
objects and data that he had amassed in the course of his morphological studies, it soon came to 
serve a far different purpose: that of a private literary archive. Prior to his decision in 1822 to begin 
work on the final collected edition of his works – the Ausgabe letzter Hand – a literary archive 
emerged as its constitutive presupposition and foundational moment.620 In the weeks and months 
                                                
618 Goethe, Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche, 1828–1832, in: FA, I/38, 199. 
619 Goethe, WA, IV/36, 284. 
620 On May 1, 1822, Goethe notes for the first time in his Tagebuch his plan for a new edition of his works: “Nach 
Tische Gedanken an eine neue Ausgabe meiner Werke” (Goethe, WA, III/8, 191). Already in April, 1822, Goethe 
began to prepare himself for such an undertaking. Thus in a letter dated April 19, 1822, to Johann Friedrich Cotta, 
who was already aware of Goethe’s plans and work on the new edition, Goethe writes: “Zugleich vermelde daß ich 
so eben beschäftigt bin, meine sämmtlichen poetischen, literarischen und wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten, sowohl 
gedruckte als ungedruckte, übersichtlich aufzustellen, sodann aber das Ganze meinem Sohne und einem geprüften 
gelehrten Freunde in die Hände zu legen, damit der weitläufige und in manchen Sinne bedenkliche Nachlaß in’s Klare 
kommen und auch von dieser Seite mein Haus bestellt sey” (Goethe, WA, IV/36, 20f). 
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that followed his decision to undertake this monumental project, Goethe, with the help of a collec-
tive of scribes, assistants, and editors,621 systematically collected, sorted, catalogued, and invento-
ried everything which he had ever written, all of which he sought to put under the autobiographical 
frame of “Bruchstücke einer großen Konfession.”622 Not only all the accumulated files and papers, 
all the drafts of complete and incomplete works, but also all the journals and letters were to be 
rigorously sorted and indexed, so that in the end “Gedrucktes und Ungedrucktes, Gesammeltes 
und Zerstreutes vollkommen geordnet beysammen steht” and “in einem Archiv beschlossen [ist] 
[…], worüber nicht weniger ein Verzeichniß, nach allgemeinen und besondern Rubriken, 
Buchstaben und Nummern aller Art gefertigt” can be exhibited.623 By the time of his death in 1832, 
Goethe left behind manuscripts that now fill 341 boxes, a collection of 17,800 rocks, more than 
9,000 pages of illustrations, approximately 4,500 casts of gems, 8,000 books, countless paintings, 
sculptures, natural-scientific collections and more.624 His ceaseless drive, especially near the end 
of his life, toward self-archiving and self-editing, recounted in his above-cited essay “Archiv des 
                                                
621 Specifically, Goethe was able to manage his literary archive with the aid of the library secretary of Weimar, Fried-
rich Kräuter (1790–1856), who since 1818 also served as Goethe’s private secretary. On May 7, 1822, he notes, for 
instance, in his Tagebuch: “Kräuter arbeitete seit gestern, alle Acten und Documente auf mich meinen Wirkungskreis 
bezüglich aufzustellen und in Ordnung zu bringen” (Goethe, WA, III/8, 193). In addition to Kräuter, this collective of 
scribes and secretaries surrounding Goethe consisted of Johann John, Johann Schuchardt, the philologists Friedrich 
Reimer and Karl Göttling, the art historian Johann Meyer, Goethe’s faithful secretary Eckermann, as well as Wilhelm 
Reichel, Cotta’s corrector in his Augsburg print shop. 
622 Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit, in: idem., FA, I/14, 310. Apropos this remark, Andrew Piper writes: “No previous 
author had been as instrumental in framing the authorial life as the key to understanding the literary corpus. […] 
According to Goethe, the poet was the message. Goethe worked assiduously to preserve and order the written traces 
of the life that would serve as the basis of the works. He produced eleven volumes of autobiographical writings in the 
final two decades of his life and oversaw the creation of a personal archive […]. Goethe’s relentless activity as a 
collector, which only increased during his late period, had turned inward” (Piper, Dreaming in Books, 21). 
623 Goethe, “Archiv des Dichters und Schriftstellers,” in: FA, I/21, 398. There he writes: “Mehr als einmal wehrend 
meiner Lebenszeit stellte ich mir die dreißig niedlichen Bände der Lessingschen Werke vor Augen […]. In solchem 
Falle ist dem Menschen wohl erlaubt, der einer ähnlichen Lage sich bewußt ist, auf sich selbst zurückzukehren und 
eine Vergleichung anzustellen, was ihm gelungen oder mißlungen sey; was von ihm und für ihn geschehen und was 
ihm allenfalls zu thun noch obliege” (Goethe, “Archiv des Dichters und Schriftstellers,” in: FA, I/21, 366f). 
624 For more on Goethe’s collections, cf. Hamm, “Goethes Sammlungen auspacken.” See also: Erich Trunz, “Goethe 
als Sammler,” in: idem., Ein Tag aus Goethes Leben (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 2006), 72–100, here: 72. There 
Trunz presents the motifs of collection in Goethe’s work and designates them as Goethe’s “kunsthistorisches Institut,” 
as his “geologisch-mineralogisches Institut” and “botanisches und zoologisches Institut” (ibid.). 
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Dichters und Schriftstellers” (1823), thus introduced the possibility of a consistent order into the 
complete representation of the scattered documents and miscellaneous objects that he had accu-
mulated over the course of his life. 
 The complete preservation of written material, together with its organization in the literary 
archive, attests to more than simply Goethe’s growing awareness of his own historical distance 
from the time in which he lived and of the transience of the past. Rather, it documents a method 
of inscribing order into the contingency and heterogeneity of one’s own ‘life’s work,’ a method 
which is in fact of the exact same kind as Goethe had already developed many years earlier in his 
approach to the observation and collection of natural objects. That which scholars have rightly 
identified with the autobiographical orientation of Goethe’s late period – his conception of himself 
as having become “historical”625 – suggests nothings less than the fact that “Goethe” makes him-
self discernible and describable as his own object of study: “er rückt unter die Phänomene, die 
Farben, Mineralien, Pflanzen, Knochen und Wolken, erhält wie diese im Verlauf innerer Analyse 
eine Geschichte, offenbart auch Gesetztmäßiagkeiten und wird zuletzt faß- und deutbar in den 
Formeln und Wendungen Goethischer Sinngebung.”626 While the unusual title given to his Notes 
on Morphology thereby invited their reading as in part an autobiographical testimony – “durch 
Lebensereignisse verbunden” –, a glance into Goethe’s archive in Weimar opens up an alternative 
perspective onto his late work: namely that with the undertaking of a final completed edition, 
Goethe’s own life attained the status of a morphological specimen, one which was to be collected, 
                                                
625 That during his late period Goethe viewed himself as having become “historical” and increasingly came to observe 
his own life as if from the perspective of a third-person person – as if his life itself had become an object of study and 
observation – Goethe himself emphasizes at multiple points in letters and journal entries. Thus, for instance, in a letter 
to Wilhelm von Humboldt dated December 1, 1831, he writes: “Darf ich mich, mein Verehrtester, in altem Zutrauen 
ausdrücken, so gesteh ich gern daß in meinen hohen Jahren mir alles mehr und mehr historisch wird: ob etwas in der 
vergangenen Zeit, in fernen Reichen oder mir ganz nah räumlich im Augenblicke vorgeht, ist ganz eins, ja ich 
erschiene mir selbst immer mehr und mehr geschichtlich […]” (Goethe, WA, IV/49, 165). 
626 Christina Salmen, “Die ganze merkwürdige Verlassenschaft”: Goethes Entsagungspoetik in Wilhelm Meisters 
Wanderjahren (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003), 50. 
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sorted, and brought to completion in Weimar, upon whose sedimentary layers his monumental 
editorial enterprise – the Ausgabe letzter Hand – came to be founded and from whose organiza-
tional schema it drew its method and rubric. 
 It is from the perspective of Goethe’s repurposing of his morphological archive in Weimar 
into a ‘literary institution’ that the centrality of the archive motif to his later novelistic works will 
be approached. As is well-known, the motif of the archive plays an especially prominent role in 
two of Goethe’s later works, both of which were in fact originally conceived as one and the same 
project: namely Die Wahlverwandtschaften (1809) as well as his final major prose work, Wilhelm 
Meisters Wanderjahre oder die Entsagenden (1821/29), which occupies the primary focus of this 
chapter.627  In Die Wahlverwandtschaften, Ottilie’s Tagebuch, which Goethe grafted onto the 
novel, presents itself as a kind of “commonplace book,”628 in which she jots down her own 
thoughts and observations, as well as copies the aphorisms and maxims of others from a book 
someone has given her. By abandoning conventional citational practices – throughout Ottilie’s 
Tagebuch, the absence of quotation marks makes it nearly impossible to distinguish between when 
                                                
627 As is well-known, Goethe originally conceived Die Wahlverwandtschaften as an inset novella in Wilhelm Meisters 
Wanderjahre, only to later unfold it out of that novel and turn it into a new novel itself. For comparative analyses of 
Die Wahlverwandtschaften and Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, cf. Christian Mittermüller, Sprachskepsis und Poetol-
ogie. Goethes Romane ‘Die Wahlverwandtschaften’ und ‘Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre’ (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
2008); idem., “‘Das schiebt sich und verschiebt sich’ – poetologische Reflexionen in Goethes Romanen ‘Die Wahl-
verwandtschaften’ und ‘Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre,’” in: Goethe-Jahrbuch 121 (2004), 53–65; as well as Judith 
Ryan, “‘Pfeile mit Widerhaken’: On the Aphorisms in Goethe’s Wahlverwandtschaften and Wanderjahre,” in: Goethe 
Yearbook 16 (2009), 1–10. 
628 For more on the discursive tradition of commonplace books, see Earle Havens, “‘Of Common Places, Or Memorial 
Books,’” as well as Ann Blair, Too Much to Know. For the reading of Ottilie’s Tagebuch as a commonplace book, see 
Ryan, “‘Pfeile mit Widerhaken,’” esp. 2–3. There Ryan situates Ottilie’s writing within the discursive-historical con-
text of eighteenth-century bookkeeping practices, and explicitly cites Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s Sudelbücher as 
a model of this epistemic practice. She goes on to approach the Tagebuch as a hybrid between an older tradition of 
bookkeeping and an emerging tradition of psychological reflection. For an opposite approach, see Andrew Piper, 
“Paraphrasis: Goethe, the Novella, and Forms of Transitional Knowledge,” in: Goethe Yearbook 17 (2010), 179–201. 
There Piper argues that Ottilie’s Tagebuch, and crucial details such as the erasure of dates, suggests the way this 




Ottilie speaks directly and when she is rather being spoken for –, the text presents Ottilie as a kind 
of “chemical thinker,” who engrafts her own idiosyncratic thoughts and ideas onto other’s without 
clearly demarcating the difference.629 Eduard, her counterpart in the novel, by contrast, expresses 
the desideratum to reorganize his own travel diaries to assemble “aus diesen unschätzbaren, aber 
verworrenen Heften und Blättern ein für uns und andre erfreuliches Ganze.”630 This he never ac-
complishes, but leaves the task instead to his friend, the Hauptmann, to create an archive where 
his papers are to be arranged in various cabinets, slip boxes, and containers according to different 
criteria. 
 In Die Wahlverwandtschaften, the motif of the archive thus serves to contrast two diamet-
rically opposing practices of bookkeeping and citationality; in doing so, not only does it reveal the 
inabilities of the respective figures to understand themselves, but it also attests to a more profound 
crisis of communication with respect to the ability to incorporate foreign speech into one’s own.631 
In Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, by contrast, the principle of formal symmetry in Die Wahlver-
wandtschaften is abandoned. In its place the text presents a conception of the archive as an uncanny 
                                                
629 Thus Andrew Piper reads Ottilie’s Tagebuch as a substitute for the Hauptmann’s cartographic project. If the latter 
still reflected the possibility of an ‘overview’ or ‘total’ perspective in the form of a single, unified image, the former 
suggests its impossibility, substituting in its place the sequentiality of peripatetic knowledge. Piper goes on to link this 
to the increasing ambiguity of direct speech and citation in the Tagebuch, which he reads as a technology of writing 
premised on “decitationalizing the citation” (Piper, “Paraphrasis,” 193), which – like Maria Wutz in Jean Paul’s Schul-
meisterlein Wutz – effaces and disperses any stable point of origin with respect to the citation: “Far from delimiting 
citational property, the quotation marks in the Wahlverwandschaften stand as signifiers of an acute undecidability of 
the attribution of speech to speaker. They mark the exact reversal of the very point of such typographic signs, a point 
that Marjorie Garber has argued is a function of the hollowing out of intentionality in any act of citation, of having 
someone else speak for you […]. Words in quotation marks are traces of probable conversations that are no longer 
literally transcribed or cited. The speech of others is enfolded into the speech of another, even as its externality or 
objectivity is preserved in some fashion” (ibid.). 
630 Goethe, Die Wahlverwandtschaften, in: idem., FA, I/8, 276. 
631 Cf. Piper, “Paraphrasis,” 186–88. See also: Heinz Schlaffer, “Namen und Buchstaben in Goethes Wahlverwand-
schaften,” in: Goethes Wahlverwandschaften. Kritische Modelle und Diskursanalysen zum Mythos Literatur, ed. 
Norbert W. Bolz (Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1981), 211–29. 
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narrative and epistemic space – as the “primal scene” of the emergence of a disorienting, de-sub-
jectifying perspective – where the relation of subject to object, of narration to narrated content, 
becomes destabilized and suspended. This archival dynamic – what the secondary literature has 
termed, with respect to the elaborate paratextual fiction in the novel, an “archive fiction”632 – man-
ifests itself at numerous superimposing levels in the text: it encompasses various caskets, chests, 
drawers, and boxes, as well as the respective documents which they contain, all of which circulate 
in the novel in a disorienting yet calculated manner. It also takes the form of reproductions of 
epistolary correspondence between various characters; of a travel diary which – just like Ottilie’s 
Tagebuch – Goethe grafted onto his novel; and of collections of aphorisms located at the end of 
the second and third books – respectively entitled “Betrachtungen im Sinne der Wanderer” and 
“Aus Makariens Archiv” – which are said to have come from a fictional archive. In the course of 
the narrative it is revealed that this archive belongs to a mysterious and uncanny figure by the 
name of Makarie, who has setup an even more elaborate archive of a similar kind as Eduard’s, 
located in a separate room where everything is carefully arranged in boxes with identifying labels: 
“Rubriken mancher Art deuteten auf den verschiedensten Inhalt, Einsicht und Ordnung leuchtete 
hervor.”633 
 While much has been written on forms of mediated communication in the Wanderjahre, 
few attempts have been made to connect the motif of the archive to the organic – as well as inor-
ganic – forms of life that Goethe came to associate with it.634 Neither merely a narrative device 
                                                
632 Cf. Volker Neuhaus, “Die Archivfiktion in Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre,” in: Euphorion 62.1 (1968), 13–27; 
Ehrhard Bahr, The Novel as Archive: The Genesis, Reception, and Criticism of Goethe’s “Wilhelm Meisters Wander-
jahre (Camden: Camden House, 1998); and most recently Martin Bez, “Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre”: Aggregat, 
Archiv, Archivroman (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013). 
633 Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre oder die Entsagenden, in: idem., FA, I/10, 388. 
634 See, for instance, Manfred Karnick, “Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre”: oder, Die Kunst des Mittelbaren; Studien 
zum Problem der Verständigung in Goethes Altersepoche (Munich 1968), as well as Piper, Dreaming in Books, in 
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nor a poetic figure, it will be argued that the archive constitutes, in fact, a vital self-dynamic, which 
unfolds according to a serial logic: it articulates an interstitial space in which form and life – here 
understood in the double sense of form as “living form” and the form that life takes through its 
textualization – intersect and intertwine. For this reason, the archive ought to be read neither as a 
principle of organic narration – Bildung – nor as the site of a well-ordered loci communes, as in 
the tradition of inventio. Rather, the forms-of-life that Goethe associates with the motif of the 
archive – among them mercury and the spiral tendency – are themselves conceived in textual and 
mediological terms, embodying a dynamic of aggregation and dispersion, juxtaposition and pro-
liferation, whose parts never add up to a whole. This repurposing of the archive from a site of 
knowledge organization into a modern epistemic figure of dispersion plays a decisive role in Goe-
the’s reorganization of the novel. By unbinding the pages of the book, the archive embodies a 
dynamic that continually threatens to overstep its medial closure. In doing so, not only does it 
undermine the literary institution of the Bildungsroman, particularly with respect to its claims to 
represent an overview or totality, but it also dissolves the “aesthetic unity” of the work into a serial 
form. If the novel was once synonymous with the principle of aesthetic unity and, relatedly, a 
unified author-function, then the Wanderjahre opens up an interstitial perspective unto the medium 
that radically puts into question any semblance of such unity – one for which “Alles ist Blatt.”635 
 
3.1. Serial Experiments in Literary Form: Collective, Aggregate, Aperçu 
Goethe’s effort to prepare a final edition of his works – one that would bring everything he had 
ever written to completion and closure – inscribed within itself a paradoxical double-movement: 
                                                
particular 19–52. A thorough examination of the novel’s communicative poetics can also be found in Gerhard Neu-
mann’s commentary to the Frankfurter Ausgabe, where he focuses on the novel’s media-theoretical interest in the 
idea of the “proper distance.” 
635 Goethe, FA, I/24, 84. 
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for to the extent that the Ausgabe letzter Hand aimed at the monumental presentation of its author 
by unifying life and work in an exemplary fashion, both Goethe’s late novelistic works as well as 
the self-commentaries that emerged alongside them attest to an irreducible element of dispersion 
and fragmentation, which displaces and distances itself from every operation of closure and com-
pletion. That Goethe’s ostensible abandonment of the classical ideal of aesthetic unity during his 
later phase of writing coincided with a growing shift in his own working conditions from a more 
or less unified authorship to an increasingly collective one – nowhere more so than with respect to 
his close collaboration with Eckermann, a relationship which has been characterized as an exem-
plary case of “literary parasitism”636 – is far from coincidental: for if one closely examines the 
letters and memos produced during this period, one repeatedly stumbles across a central concept 
around which everything seems to revolve: that of the “collective,” under which Goethe came to 
treat “sein vergangenes Wesen und Treiben historisch als das Schicksal eines Drittens”637 and, 
ultimately, situate his entire collected works. 
 During the period of writing that coincided with his work on the Ausgabe letzter Hand, 
Goethe thus came to perceive his literary efforts as an increasingly collective undertaking, viewing 
himself, in turn, from the uncanny perspective of “a third” [eines Drittens]. In doing so, he situated 
himself not so much in the position of sovereign author as that of the redactor and secondary editor 
of his own texts. In 1823, the year marked by the caesura of the Ausgabe letzter Hand, he sugges-
tively refers to himself as the “Epitomator mein selbst.”638 Whereas self-abridgment and self-re-
daction ascended to hallmarks of Goethe’s later period of text-production and authorship, it was 
                                                
636 Avital Ronell, Dictations: On Haunted Writing (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 65. 
637 Goethe to Schiller, May 22, 1803, in: Der Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, ed. Emil Staiger (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Insel Verlag, 1977), 991. 
638 Goethe, Werke, IV/36, 284. 
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the outsourcing of numerous redactional tasks to his coterie of scribes and secretaries that intro-
duced an insuperable alterity – a literal “foreign body” – into his literary corpus. Approximately a 
decade later in 1832, the year of his death, Goethe gave voice to this dramatic shift in his working 
conditions when he famously remarked to his friend Frédéric Soret, “mein Werk ist das eines 
Kollektivwesens, das den Namen Goethe trägt.”639 
 On the one hand, Goethe’s self-assessment of his oeuvre near the end of his life as a “col-
lective entity” concerns, to be sure, an awareness of the change in the discursive conditions of text 
production under which he sought to produce a definitive edition of his life’s works. On the other 
hand, his repeated invocations in letters and memos of the concept of the “collective” cannot be 
strictly confined to the multi-auctorial enterprise of the Ausgabe letzter Hand. Rather, in connec-
tion with the increasingly archival and redactional orientation of his later phase of writing, the 
concept of the collective marks a decisive shift in Goethe’s approach to authorship and literary 
                                                
639 Goethe, Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche, 1823–1828, in: idem., FA, I/37, ed. Horst Fleig, 522. Frédéric Soret’s 
own account of his conversation with Goethe contains a discussion of Mirabeau’s character, which subtly and implic-
itly turns out to be self-portrait of Goethe himself: “Les Français veulent que Mirabeau soit leur Hercule et ils ont 
raison. Mais encore faut-il qu’un Hercule se nourrisse amplement. Ils oublient, les bonnes gens, que c’est un colosse 
composé de pièce, que ce demi-dieu est un être collectif! Le plus grand génie ne deviendra jamais grand’chose, s’il 
prétend tout tirer de son propre fonds. Qu’est-ce que le génie, si ce n’est la facilité de saisir et d’utiliser tout ce qui 
nous frappe, de coordonner et de jeter de la vie sur tous les matériaux qui s’offrent à nous […] Qu’ai-je fait? J’ai 
recueilli et mis à profit tout ce que j’ai vu, entendu, observé, j’ai mis en œuvre les productions de la nature et celles 
des hommes. Tout mes écrits m’ont été fournis par mille individus et mille objets divers […]; souvent ils ont semé la 
moisson que j’ai recueilli. Mon œuvre est celle d’une agrégation d’êtres qui ont été pris dans la nature, elle porte le 
nom de Goethe […]” (Frédéric Soret, Notice sur Goethe, cited in Goethes Gespräche, ed. Wolfgang Herweg [Zü-
rich/Stuttgart 1965], III/3, 841f). With respect to this passage, Christina Salmen notes that while the young Goethe 
admired Hercules as an heroic figure, during his later period he no longer associated it with power or strength. In a 
subsequent conversation with Soret, Goethe speaks of Hercules as a “Koloß aus Teilen.” Salmen argues that this 
reformulation indicates the transformation of Goethe’s own self-conception: “Goethe, dessen Daseinskonzeption 
sicherlich auf der Selbstsetzung und -mächtigkeit des Individuums gründete, begriff sich, als er sich im Rahmen seiner 
autobiographischen und seiner redaktionellen Arbeiten an der Ausgabe letzter Hand zunehmend selbst historisch und 
literarisch wurde, nur mehr als ‘Kollektivwesen’ – als eine Versammlung, ein Aggregat von Einflüssen, Bewegungen, 
Kräften und Anlagen, schwankend in steter Bewegung, Veränderung, Neuformulierung” (Salmen, “Die ganze merk-
würdige Verlassenschaft,” 54). Furthermore, in his study of Goethe in Arbeit am Mythos, Hans Blumenberg suggests 
that Goethe’s later description of himself as a “collective entity” concerns his development of a different myth, namely 
that of Prometheus, “zu einer zentralen Konfiguration seines Selbst- und Weltverständnisses” (Blumenberg, Arbeit 
am Mythos, 467). 
 
269 
production, one which encompasses nothing less than the abandonment of authorial unity and the 
possibility narrative closure, and relatedly a turn toward a communicative paradigm that is increas-
ingly characterized by the withdrawal of a unified narrative and authorial voice in favor of a de-
subjectifying passivity, or what Goethe termed “renunciation” [Entsagung]. 
 The primary site of this transformation is Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, whose prepara-
tion was in fact coextensive with the continuation of the Ausgabe letzter Hand – an interconnection 
that Goethe himself identified in an 1826 letter to Boisserée.640 First published in serial install-
ments in 1808 with the appearance of one of the work’s novellas in Johann Cotta’s Ladies’ Pocket-
Book, it was not until 1821 that the first completed edition of the Wanderjahre would be released 
to the public. Goethe subsequently revised and republished the work in 1829, at which point the 
subtitle “A Novel” [Ein Roman] was dropped from the title page.641 In that same year, he wrote in 
a letter to J. F. Rochlitz that the Wanderjahre “sich selbst als kollektiv ankündigt, indem sie 
gewissermaßen nur zum Verband der disparatesten Einzelheiten unternommen zu seyn scheint.”642 
                                                
640 “Übrigens werde ich im nächsten Vierteljahr vorerst alles, was an der ersten Sendung [i.e., the first delivery of the 
Ausgabe letzter Hand – B. K.] noch zu thun wäre, beseitigen und dann an einer zwar angenehmen, aber doch bedenkli-
chen Arbeit fortfahren, d.h. an der Sonderung, Reconstruction, Ausarbeitung und Abrundung der zwey Bände Wan-
derjahre. Es gibt ein wunderliches Opus, muß es aber auch werden nach den Schicksalen, die es erdulden müssen. 
Und so geht es denn immer weiter fort, damit die zwar wohlgeordnete und in Einem Schranke aufbewahrte Sammlung 
der 40 Bände noch durch mich in allen ihren einzelnen Theilen möge zurecht gestellt werden. Dieses ist meine größte 
ja einzige Angelegenheit, um eine testamentarische Verordnung darüber möglichst zu erleichtern” (Goethe, WA, 
IV/41, 263). 
641 For studies on the publication history of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, see Ehrhard Bahr, The Novel as 
Archive, as well as Hans Reiss, “Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre: Der Weg von der ersten zur zweiten Fassung,” in: 
DVjs 39 (1965), 34–57. 
642 Cf. Goethe’s letter to J. F. Rochlitz on July 28th, 1829: “Eine Arbeit  wie diese, die sich selbst als kollektiv ankün-
digt, indem sie gewissermaßen nur zum Verband der disparatesten Einzelheiten unternommen zu seyn scheint, erlaubt, 
ja fordert mehr als eine andere, daß jeder sich zueigne, was ihm gemäß ist” (Goethe to J. F. Rochlitz, Goethes Briefe, 
ed. Karl Robert Mandelkow [Hamburg 1967], vol. 4, 339). The word “zueignen” has a special status in Goethe’s 
vocabulary. Not only is it the title of the poem that introduces his collected works, but in his Notes on Morphology he 
ascribes the work of “Zueignung” to the intermaxillary bone, or os incisivum: “Sein vorderster breitester und stärkster 
Teil, dem ich den Namen des Körpers gegeben, ist nach der Art des Futters eingerichtet, das die Natur dem Tiere 
bestimmt hat; denn es muß seine Speise mit diesem Teile zuerst anfassen, ergreifen, abrupfen, abnagen, zerschneiden, 
sie auf eine oder andere Weise sich zueignen” (Goethe, FA, I/24, 17). Andrew Piper notes that “[u]nlike his contem-
poraries who saw in the particular structure of the human jaw the preconditions of speech – of something going out – 
the function of this skeletal piece for Goethe is identified as the act of ‘Zueignung,’ of regulating the incorporation of 
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Several months later, in a conversation with Kanzler von Müller, he insisted against Rochlitz’s 
“alberne Idee […], das Ganze systematisch konstruieren zu wollen” that the book “gebe sich nur 
für ein Aggregat aus.”643 With his disclosure of its form principle as a “collective” and an “aggre-
gate,” Goethe expressed his view of the Wanderjahre above all a work of collective authorship, 
whose parts consist of the most heterogeneous material and whose innumerable gaps and lacunae 
ought to be “palpable”644 [fühlbar]. 
 For this reason, it is perhaps not entirely surprising that in spite of Goethe’s instructions to 
Eckermann – to whom he had delegated much of the editing of the Wanderjahre after 1822 – “alle 
die Lücken auszufüllen,”645 his reworking of the Wanderjahre was not premised on the closure 
and completion of gaps. Rather, his method of text production – in his diary entries from the time 
he repeatedly speaks of “continuing” [fortsetzen], “transposing" [umstellen], and “editing” 
[bearbeiten] – already hints at a new manner of representation: instead of the aesthetic synthesis 
of the “disparate” [Disparaten], he presents his work as an aggregate, as a collective, whose parts 
do not add up to a whole. Not only does the Wanderjahre forego connecting links between the 
                                                
material from the outside in” (Piper, “Paraphrasis,” 187). Piper goes on to show how Goethe’s later works are marked 
by a crisis of Zueignung as a communicative paradigm of enfolding foreign voices. 
643 Cf. Goethe’s conversation with Kanzler von Müller on February 18th, 1830: “Bestimmte einzelne Mitteilung der 
durch die Wanderjahre empfangenen Eindrücke habe Rochlitz verweigert, statt dessen die alberne Idee gefaßt, das 
Ganze systematisch konstruieren und analysieren zu wollen. Das sei rein unmöglich, das Buch gebe sich nur für ein 
Aggregat aus” (Goethe, Goethes Gespräche, ed. Wolfgang Herweig, vol. 3, 571). 
644 According to a letter sent to his fiancée, Johanne Bertram, dated March 1, 1828, Eckermann writes that he “war 
glücklich das ich ihm [Goethe] wieder beystehen wolle und daß er seine Arbeiten mit mir besprechen könne, viele 
große Sachen würden zu Stande gebracht werden, die, allein, trüb und schwer auf ihm lasten würden. ‘Vor allen, sagte 
er, liegen mir meine Wanderjahre am Herzen, woran, wie Sie wissen ich voriges Jahr anhaltend arbeitete, und die nun 
in drey Bänden im Manuskript vorliegen, unvollendet und mit manchen Lücken. […] Nun ist meine Absicht Ihnen 
diese Bände zu geben. Sie werden sie studiren, die Composition wird Ihnen klar werden, Sie werden sehen, wo ich 
hinauswollte und mir sagen was und wo ich noch daran zu thun habe. Wir werden die Sache mit einander 
durchsprechen, die Gegenstände werden wieder in mir lebendig werden, und so werde ich denn leicht und frisch in 
wenig Monaten alle die Lücken ausfüllen, die Ihnen jetzt an diesen Bänden fühlbar seyn werden” (Eckermann to 
Johanne Bertram, March 1, 1828, cited in Waltraud Hagen, ed., Quellen und Zeugnisse zur Druckgeschichte von 
Goethes Werken [Berlin: Akademie, 1966, 1982], 540f). 
645 Hagen, ed., Quellen und Zeugnisse, 541. 
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various parts of the text, but it also lacks a clear narrative center, with the story of Wilhelm and 
Felix now counting as only one among numerous loosely interconnected narratives.646 “Mit sol-
chem Büchlein,” remarks Goethe in a letter to Rochlitz, 
ist es wie mit dem Leben selbst: es findet sich in dem Complex des Ganzen Not-
wendiges und Zufälliges, Vorgesetztes und Angeschlossenes, bald gelungen, bald 
vereitelt, wodurch es eine Art von Unendlichkeit erhält, die sich in verständige und 
vernünftige Worte nicht daraus fassen noch einschließen läßt. Wohin ich aber die 
Aufmerksamkeit meiner Freunde gerne lenke […], sind die verschiedenen, sich von 
einander absondernden Einzelnheiten, die doch, besonders in gegenwärtigen Falle, 
den Werth des Buches entscheiden. […] Das Buch verläugnet seinen collectiven 
Ursprung nicht, erlaubt und fordert mehr als jedes andere die Theilnahme an 
hervortretenden Einzelnheiten.647 
 
Goethe’s analogy here between book and life concerns nothing less than a fundamental reconcep-
tualization of the form of the novel. At least since Blanckenburg’s Versuch über den Roman 
(1774), the ontological foundations of the modern novel – based on his extensive explication of 
Wieland’s Agathon – were understood to consist in the lively evocation of a whole through the 
                                                
646 In the reception history of the Wanderjahre, the fact that the ostensible “main narrative” dealing with the story of 
Wilhelm and Felix counts as only one among many different stories eventually gave rise to the theory of the “Novel-
lenkranz,” which by situating Goethe’s novel in the tradition of Bocaccio’s Decameron and Scheherazade’s One 
Thousand and One Nights sought to tame its disturbing formal heterogeneity. As Volker Neuhaus writes, “Die 
Beschreibung der Form von Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahren geht meist vom Begriff des Novellenkranzes aus: Eine 
Rahmenhandlung um Wilhelm verbindet ‘schlecht und recht’ einzelne Novellen. Bei dieser Betrachtungsweise ist es 
[…] durchaus eine Möglichkeit, nur die Novellen für sich zu behandeln und ihre Verbindung als nebensächlich und 
ungekonnt beiseite zu lassen” (Neuhaus, “Die Archivfiktion in Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre,” 14). Neuhaus goes 
on to show how both Emil Staiger’s and Erich Trunz’s approaches to the Wanderjahre depend on the problematic 
distinction between “Rahmenerzählung” and “Novellen” which lies at the foundation of the “Novellenkranz” theory. 
As an alternative to this approach, he proposes the theory of the novel as an “archive fiction,” a reading which has 
since become decisive for much of the secondary literature on the Wanderjahre. 
647 Goethe to Rochlitz, November 23, 1829, in: Goethe, WA, IV/46, 166f. In Gespräche mit Goethe, Eckermann de-
scribes the reworking of the Wanderjahre as follows: “Die fünfte Lieferung seiner Werke, welche auch die Wander-
jahre enthalten soll, muß auf Weihnachten zum Druck abgeliefert werden. Diesen früher in Einem Band erschienenen 
Roman hat Goethe gänzlich umzuarbeiten angefangen, und das Alte mit so viel Neuem verschmolzen, daß es als ein 
Werk in drei Bänden in der neuen Ausgabe hervorgehen soll. Hieran ist nun zwar bereits viel getan, aber noch sehr 
viel zu tun. Das Manuskript hat überall weiße Papierlücken, die noch ausgefüllt sein wollen. Hier fehlt etwas in der 
Exposition, hier ist ein geschickter Übergang zu finden, damit dem Leser weniger fühlbar werde, daß es ein kollektives 
Werk sei; hier sind Fragmente von großer Bedeutung, denen der Anfang, andere, denen das Ende mangelt, und so ist 
an allen drei Bänden noch sehr viel nachzuhelfen […]” (Goethe, MA, 19, 250f). 
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causal interconnection of the individual parts.648 Goethe’s designation of the Wanderjahre as an 
“aggregate,” by contrast, transforms the novel from a unified space of representation “zum Ver-
band der disparatesten Einzelheiten,”649 which decomposes every whole, every totality, into a se-
rialization of the parts – into a serial Nebeneinander of other aggregates, as Goethe had defined 
the concept “aggregate” some thirty years earlier in the course of his first Italian journeys.650 
 In applying the term “aggregate” now to the form of the novel, he attributes to it a degree 
of mobility and flexibility that reflects not only its collective, composite-like structure, but also the 
decomposing potential of its “disparate singularities” according to a serial logic of enfolding, an 
adding-in of a potentially limitless number of unrelated elements, which “verläugnet seinen coll-
ectiven Ursprung nicht.”651 If the model of Bildung implied an organic continuity of the parts with 
respect to an autotelic process of narration, and even the narrative principle of chemical synthesis 
underlying Die Wahlverwandtschaften – arguably Goethe’s first attempt to move away from a 
subject-centered poetology of organic narration – was grounded in a Romantic epistemology of 
genre poetics that still implicitly retained the novel’s claims to totality, the term “aggregate,” by 
contrast, is neither biological nor chemical, but physical: it designates a form-of-life – be it organic, 
                                                
648 “Der Dichter hat in seinem Werke Charaktere und Begebenheiten unter einander zu ordnen und zu verknüpfen. 
Diese müssen nun, nach den obigen Voraussetzungen, so unter einander verbunden sein, daß sie gegenseitig Ursache 
und Wirkung sind, woraus ein Ganzes entsteht, in dem alle einzelne Theile unter sich, und mit diesem Ganzen in 
Verbindung stehen” (Blanckenburg, Versuch über den Roman, 313f). For more on the significance of Blanckenburg’s 
theory of the novel for the concepts of form and life in the eighteenth century, see Campe, “Form und Leben in der 
Theorie des Romans,” in particular 200–06. 
649 Goethe, Goethes Briefe, vol. 4, 339. 
650 The use of the term “aggregate” in Goethe’s vocabulary vastly predates his letter to Kanzler von Müller; references 
to it can already be found in his “Notes in Italy” between 1768 and 1788, in which he writes: “Ein ☐ ist ein Aggregat 
mehrerer ☐, welche alle nebeneinander existieren können wenn sie sich einander nicht aufheben. Wenn einige die 
andern aufheben wird das Aggregat zum Körper wenn sie einander noch ausschließlicher aufheben werden die Körper 
immer edler und es entstehen endlich die Individuen (vorher die Genera pp) das edelste Geschöpf ist wo sich die Teile 
am ausschließlichsten aufheben” (Goethe, Über organische Naturen. Notizen aus Italien [1786–88]: Durchgewachsne 
Nelke. Handschriften aus Goethes Nachlaß, in: idem., FA I/24, 81). Here Goethe explicitly thematizes the inherently 
serial logic of the aggregate: aggregates obey a logic of contiguity and juxtaposition; as soon as they “sublate” [auf-
heben] one another, they are no longer aggregates, but (organic) “bodies” [Körper]. 
651 Goethe, WA, IV/46, 166f. 
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be it inorganic – capable of dramatic transformations in physical state based on a change in rela-
tions between the loosely interconnected parts, or what in natural-scientific discourse are referred 
to as “states of aggregation” [Aggregatzustände], i.e., liquid, solid, gas. 
 The concept of the aggregate thus bears a close affinity to what Goethe, in his Notes on 
Morphology, refers to as atroismos: collection, aggregation, accumulation.652 In the Wanderjahre, 
texts are no longer situated in a closed narrative context, but rather composed into “Aggre-
gatzustände,” that is, into series, into mutable configurations. As argued in the previous chapter on 
Goethe’s morphology, Goethe describes this process of serial formation in his essay on the exper-
iment, Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt (1793), when he writes: 
Diese Materialien müssen in Reihen geordnet und niedergelegt sein, nicht auf eine 
hypothetische Weise zusammengestellt, nicht zu einer systematischen Form ver-
wendet. Es steht alsdenn einem jeden frei, sie nach seiner Art zu verbinden und 
eines Ganzes daraus zu bilden, das der menschlichen Vorstellungsart überhaupt 
mehr oder weniger bequem und angenehm sei653 
 
Both the complex formation history of Goethe’s Wanderjahre – prior to the publication of “part 
one” of the novel in 1821, six separate novellas or “excerpts” [Abschnitte] of novellas from the 
novel were published separately – as well as its startling formal heterogeneity thus dispel any 
notions of continuity, organicity, and recursiveness that might be implied by its status as a sequel 
to the Lehrjahre. Although Goethe had developed the idea of a sequel to Wilhelm Meisters Lehr-
jahre (1795/96) early on, its execution marks a decisive departure from the model of organic sto-
rytelling that he had developed in the Lehrjahre. There the story of Wilhelm and his ill-fated love 
for the theater is told as a quest for coherent development – Bildung – in which every episode bears 
                                                
652 The commentary to the Frankfurt edition of Geothe’s poem “ΑΘΡΟΙΣΜΟΣ” (1798–99) reads: “[D]er Sinn des 
ursprünglichen Titels ist noch nicht aufgehellt. Das Wort bedeutet etwa Sammlung, Versammlung, auch Anhäufung, 
Aggregat. Ist er auf die Form des Gedichtes zu beziehen (fragmentarische Gedanken-Anhäufung? Quintessenz?) oder 
auf den Gegenstand (das Tier als Aggregat)?” (Goethe, FA, I/24, 1089). 
653 Goethe, FA, I/25, 35f. 
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a meaningful relation to the entirety of the protagonists life. The relentless forward-motion of the 
narrative subsequently gives way to a recursive movement, such that the significance of the indi-
vidual episodes simultaneously points backwards and forwards.654 At the intersection of sequential 
narration and specular reflection emerges a conception of life which – in direct analogy with the 
biological theory of the organism – designates a form process tasked with taking up every individ-
ual part and bringing it into purposive relation with a ‘living’ whole.655 The claims of the modern 
novel, and specifically those of the Bildungsroman, to totality and transformation lie at the heart 
of Friedrich Schlegel’s review of the Lehrjahre: “Durch jene Fortbildung ist der Zusammenhang, 
durch diese Einfassung ist die Verschiedenheit der einzelnen Massen gesichert und bestätigt; und 
so wird jeder notwendige Teil des einen und unteilbaren Romans ein System für sich.”656 In the 
course of the following pages it will soon become apparent, however, just how extensively the 
Wanderjahre experiments with – and ultimately transgresses – Schlegel’s insistence on the indi-
visibility of the novel. 
 To be sure, the wild proliferation of genres (poems, aphorisms, diary entries, letters, as well 
as a variety of short narrative forms) as well as the extraordinary proliferation of different dis-
courses in the Wanderjahre (myth, history, religion, art, commerce, medicine, geology, pedagogy, 
                                                
654 See Franco Moretti, The Way of the World. The Bildungsroman in European Culture (London: Verso, 2000), esp. 
18–22, as well as David E. Wellbery, “Die Enden des Menschen: Anthropologie und Einbildungskraft im Bildungs-
roman (Wieland, Goethe, Novalis),” in: Das Ende. Poetik und Hermeneutik, vol. 16, ed. Karlheinz Stierle and Rainer 
Warning (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1996), 600–39. 
655 In his recent ‘kinematic’ study of Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, Helmut Müller-Sievers argues that “[t]he prob-
lem that Goethe, and the modern novel more generally, confront can be articulated as the problem of life and form. 
The novel, bereft of generic parameters, claimed to have as its raison d’être the recounting of the Life of …, or at least 
of meaningful parts of it. Lacking form other than other than successivity, ‘bare’ life in its recounting has to be given 
meaning, and meaning can only be established by leaving the pure succession of events behind and narratively reach-
ing backward and forward” (Müller-Sievers, “The Moment of Narration: Outlines for a Kinematic Study of Goethe’s 
Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre,” in: The Science of Literature: Essays on an Incalculable Difference [Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2015], 209–26, here: 210). For an approach to the theory of the novel that relates questions of form, life, and 
narrativity, see Campe, “Form und Leben in der Theorie des Romans.” 
656 Friedrich Schlegel, “Über Goethes Meister,” in: KA, I/2, 135. 
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cosmology, and politics) recall Schlegel’s theory of a progressive Universalpoesie.657 Yet what 
distinguishes Goethe’s work from Schlegel’s Romantic genre poetics is precisely the way in which 
it engages with the format of the novel from a mediological perspective. Hence Goethe’s paradox-
ical description of the Wanderjahre – a voluminous work that comprises no less than three vol-
umes, each of which stretches hundreds of pages – as both a “kind of infinity” [Art der Unendlich-
keit] and a “little book” [Büchlein], that is, as a small form. Not only is there a tremendous semantic 
investment in the Wanderjahre in the use of diminutive forms – through words like Kästchen, 
Kügelchen, Fläschchen, Täfelchen, and Buchlein – but as will be discussed in the following sec-
tion, both Goethe’s rejection of the systematic reading of the novel as well as his unusual prepub-
lication strategy of printing parts of it in Pocket-Books (a small format literary miscellany around 
1800) points in the direction of a transformation of the book as a discursive format, breaking down 
its boundaries through the serialization of its parts. While at the narrative level this reorganization 
of the novel into an “aggregate” entails a trajectory away from the representational possibility of 
an “overview” or “totality” and the dominance of the perspectival, at the level of Goethe’s way of 
writing it concerns the central mediological tension between “aperçu” and “system” – between 
seriality and totality, between aphoristic condensation and the representation of the whole.658 As 
Goethe himself would write on this relationship in his Notes on Morphology: “Alles wahre Aperçu 
                                                
657 “Die romantische Poesie ist eine progressive Universalpoesie. Ihre Bestimmung ist nicht bloß, alle getrennten Gat-
tungen der Poesie wieder zu vereinigen und die Poesie mit der Philosophie und Rhetorik in Berührung zu setzen. Sie 
will und soll auch Poesie und Prosa, Genialität und Kritik, Kunstpoesie und Naturpoesie bald mischen, bald ver-
schmelzen, die Poesie lebendig und gesellig und das Leben und die Gesellschaft poetisch machen, den Witz poetisie-
ren und die Formen der Kunst mit gediegnem Bildungsstoff jeder Art anfüllen und sättigen und durch die Schwingun-
gen des Humors beseelen. Sie umfaßt alles, was nur poetisch ist, vom größten wieder mehrere Systeme in sich enthal-
tenden Systeme der Kunst bis zu dem Seufzer, dem Kuß, den das dichtende Kind aushaucht in kunstlosem Gesang” 
(Friedrich Schlegel, Athenäums-Fragment Nr. 116, in: KA, I/2, 182f). 
658 For more on the relation of aperçu to system in Goethe’s writings, cf. Neumann, Ideenparadiese, 726. See also 
Friedemann Spicker, Der Aphorismus: Begriff und Gattung von der Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts bis 1912. Quellen und 
Forschungen zur Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte, ed. Ernst Osterkamp and Werner Röcke (Berlin, New York: De 
Gruyter, 1997), in particular 329–48. For the history of the rhetorical terminus “aperçu,” cf. Hartmut Köhler, 
“Aperçu,” in: Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, vol. 1, ed. Gert Unding (Niemeyer, Tübingen 1992), 760–67. 
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kömmt aus einer Folge und bringt Folge. Es ist ein Mittelglied einer großen produktiv aufsteigen-
den Kette.”659 Whether it is the material Nebeneinander of the novel’s “disparate” parts or the 
narrative Nacheinander of the “communicated” [mitgeteilte] letters, papers, aphorisms, and docu-
ments, such serial forms of textuality come to manifest themselves at numerous superimposing 
levels in the Wanderjahre – nowhere more so, perhaps, than with respect to its introduction of the 
pervasive archive motif. 
 
3.2. Goethe’s “Sammelsurium”: From Bildungsroman to Archive Fiction 
Contributing to the impression of the novel as an aggregate is Goethe’s practice of incorporating 
foreign speech into the Wanderjahre through “poetic paraphrase” [poetische Umschreibung], 
which presents the texts as products of collective authorship or of polyphonous exchange.660 This 
is evident not only in the formation history of various chapters, none more so arguably than “Le-
nardos Tagebuch,” which was initially based on Johann Heinrich Meyer’s objective description of 
the textile industry – a text which has been likened to “ein Fremdkörper im Romantext”661 – but 
                                                
659 Goethe, FA, I/24, 568 
660 Goethe, FA, I/10, 465. For more on paraphrastic speech in Goethe’s writings, see Piper, “Paraphrasis.” 
661 Ehrhard Bahr, “Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre oder die Entsagenden (1821/1829),” in: Goethes Erzählwerk. In-
terpretationen, ed. Paul Michael Lützeler and James E. McLeod [Stuttgart 1985], 363–95, here: 370. For an opposite 
approach, see Klaus Detlef-Müller, “Lenardos Tagebuch.” There Detlef-Müller reads “Lenardos Tagebuch” as a 
“Sachbericht und Bestandteil romanhafter Personengestaltung zugleich” (See also Klaus-Detlef Müller, “Lenardos 
Tagebuch. Zum Romanbegriff in Goethes Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre,” in: Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift 53.2 
[1979], 275–99, here: 293). On the basis of this text, he argues that the Wanderjahre, far from constituting an “open 
work” or a loosely interconnected whole, represents the totality of forms of written communication – a text whose 
component parts function as methodically-structured means of integrating the Wanderjahre into its purported “pre-
text,” Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre. Regardless of whether one is persuaded by this argument, the secondary literature 
has long established that “Lenardos Tagebuch” arose from a travel report composed by Johann Heinrich Meyer in 
1810. Goethe requested Meyer to record his impressions of the female spinners and weavers in the cotton mills of the 
Swiss alps. In a letter dated April 13, 1810, Goethe praised Meyer “für die fortgesetzte technische Beschreibung,” 
adding that he “brenne vor Ungeduld sich damit bekannt zu machen, und das was ich mir dabey vorgesetzt, auszufüh-
ren” (Goethe, Briefe, WA, IV/21, 228). In a subsequent letter from May 3, 1810, Goethe reported to Meyer his intent 
“den hinlänglichen realen Zettel zu einem poetischen Einschlag vorzubereiten” (ibid., 272). Goethe’s description of 
his process of translating Meyer’s report into a work of ‘poetic’ fiction is suggestive for its paronomastic linkage 
between the technical language of weaving and a mode of communication, likening Meyer’s text to a “realen Zettel,” 
meaning both an index card as well as a warp – the set of lengthwise yarns that are held in tension on a frame or loom 
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also in the novel’s staging of the practice of collective or collaborative writing, such as Flavio and 
Hersilie’s poetic exchange in the chapter “Der Mann von funfzig Jahren.”662 Just as “Lenardos 
Tagebuch” is grounded in the practice of incorporating foreign speech – a foreignness that will 
eventually be registered at a narratological level as the diary gradually shifts to a heterodiegetic 
narrator at its close, transforming itself back into a novella, “Das nußbraune Mädchen”663 –, in 
“Der Mann von funfzig Jahren” the traditional model of the Wechselgedicht, where the poet speaks 
                                                
– and to his own text as a “poetischen Einschlag,” which according to Grimm’s Wörterbuch can refer to either the 
enfolding of a letter into another in order to cut costs on delivery (cf. “Einschlag,” in: Deutsches Wörterbuch von 
Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, 16 Bde. in 32 Teilbänden, vol. 3, [Leipzig 1971], 272–76), or to the cross-weaving of 
threads, i.e. the weft (ibid.). In a series of aphorisms under the title “Einzelnes” from Kunst und Altertum (Goethe, 
FA, V/1), a similar analogy between “Zettel” and “Einschlag” can be found: “Indem ich mich zeither mit der Lebens-
geschichte wenig und viel bedeutender Menschen anhaltender beschäftigte, kam ich auf den Gedanken: es möchten 
sich wohl die einen in dem Weltgewebe als Zettel, die andern als Einschlag betrachten lassen; jene gäben eigentlich 
die Breite des Gewebes an, diese dessen Halt, Festigkeit, vielleicht auch mit Zutat irgend eines Gebildes. Die Schere 
der Parze hingegen bestimmt die Länge, dem sich denn das übrige alles zusammen unter- werfen muß. Weiter wollen 
wir das Gleichnis nicht verfolgen” (H 230). According to Gerhard Neumann, “[d]as Gleichnis von Zettel und Ein-
schlag […] vergegenwärtigt exemplarisch die Struktur Goetheschen Erkenntnisverhaltens, das Gewebeartige gegen-
läufiger Kräfte, aus denen nicht die Starre eines Paradoxes resultiert, sondern das „Gebilde" – die gewebten Muster – 
eines echten, produktiven, gegenwirkende Kräfte nicht paralysierenden, sondern zur Gestaltung nützenden ‘Wir-
kungs’(!)-Zusammenhangs. In ihm deutet sich eine Denkstruktur an, für die es kein echtes logisches Modell gibt: 
Gegenkräfte, die zusammenwirken, ohne sich ‘aufzuheben,’ Verflechtungen, die innerhalb eines nicht überschreit-
baren Rahmens sich vollziehen, Dichte und Weitläufigkeit, strenge Grund‘textur’ des Gewebes und weitgehende Frei-
heit im eingewebten Muster: Es ist ein Ordnungsmodell von Sprache als ‘Text,’ Verstehenszusammenhang als das In- 
und Gegeneinander von Worten, Wortverbindungen und Satzkonstruktionen” (Neumann, Ideenparadiese, 625). 
662 Adding to the complex formation history of the Wanderjahre is the additional text-genetic circumstance that 
whereas Die Wahlverwandtschaften, as noted above, was originally intended to be enfolded into the Wanderjahre, 
only to be published as a standalone novella, the chapter “Der Mann von funfzig Jahren” was originally conceived as 
a standalone novella which Goethe eventually enfolded into the Wanderjahre. 
663 While Goethe initially planned to integrate Meyer’s report into the novel as a continuation of the story of “Das 
nußbraune Mädchen” (Goethe, FA, I/10, 717), it was not until 1824 that he finally brought his “poetic” revisions of 
Meyer’s report to a close, noting in his diary on May 26, 1824: “Fortsetzung des nußbraunen Mädchens” (Goethe, 
Tagebücher, WA, III/9, 222). From the perspective of his exchange with Meyer, the thematic focus of the chapter on 
the textile industry and its machinery is far from coincidental, for it draws attention to the complex, collage-like 
structure of the novel as a whole, whose palimpsestic “texture” – the weaving together of radically heterogeneous 
text-material – is poetologically reflected in the twisting together of left- and right-handed yarns, as in the following 
description of textile production in “Lenardos Tagebuch”: “Rechts gedreht Garn gehen 25 bis 30 auf ein Pfund, links 
gedreht 60 bis 80, vielleicht auch 90. Der Umgang des Haspels wird ungefähr sieben Viertel Ellen oder 'twas mehr 
betragen, und die schlanke, fleißige Spinnerin behauptete, 4, auch 5 Schneller, das wären 5000 Umgänge, also 8 bis 
9000 Ellen Garn, täglich am Rad zu spinnen” (Goethe, FA, I/10, 622). Astonishingly, while this passage – taken 
almost word-for-word from Meyer’s original report (cf. Neumann, FA, I/10, 881) – reads like an objective description 
of weaving, its foreignness with respect to the rest of the novel can be read as a performance of the editorial process 
of translating the heterogeneous “Zettelwirtschaft” – or more precisely, the so-called “Zettelrahmen” (Goethe, FA, 
I/10, 625) of the spinners and weavers – into a work of poetic fiction. 
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for another, is abandoned; instead, the text enfolds the voice of a third party into the place of 
another speaker. Thus in the narrator’s words: “Man hatte einen Dritten im Sinne.”664 
 In addition to his practice of enfolding foreign voices into the novel, Goethe translated the 
heterogeneity and fragmentariness of the work directly into the disunity of the textual body. This 
manifests itself not only in the numerous interlinear line breaks which, like creases and folds in 
fabric, transverse the entirety of the novel – simultaneously breaking it apart and stringing its 
pieces together665 – but also in the very “typographische Einrichtung”666 of the Wanderjahre. That 
Goethe presented the fragmentariness of his work as constitutive – as intertwined with the literal 
materiality of the text – is indicated by the abrupt shift in typography between Fraktur and Anti-
qua.667 For while the prose text of the Wanderjahre was printed in Fraktur, as was typical for the 
time, the inserted poems “Vermächtnis” and “Im ernsten Beinhaus war’s” appear in Antiqua. Such 
discontinuous typesetting presents the poems as foreign bodies, as magazine inserts, and contrib-
utes to a specific media-effect: namely that of presenting the book like a serial format of a maga-
zine or miscellany. The text’s fragmentary materiality and lack of medial – not to mention narrative 
– closure are made even more explicit in the final line of the text. At the end of the novel, as a 
“Postskript,”668 Goethe appended – in Antiqua – the parenthetical line “(To be continued.)” [(Ist 
fortzusetzen.)], despite the fact that the end of the book already appeared to have been reached 
                                                
664 Goethe, FA, I/10, 471. 
665 In the Wanderjahre, such interlinear line breaks, notably at the beginning and end of the collections of aphorisms 
at the end of books two and three (“Betrachtungen im Sinne der Wanderer. Kunst, Ethisches, Natur” and “Aus Ma-
kariens Archiv”), mark caesuras in the text as “Spalten und Risse” (Goethe, FA, I/10, 292). In the Munich edition, 
which visually reproduces the original line breaks, their presence in the text is characterized as paratextual elements 
of the novel’s archive fiction: “Die Zwischenstriche können als optische Segmentierungssignale aufgefaßt werden 
[…]. Sie erscheinen als typographischer Reflex der dem Roman zugrundeliegenden Archivfiktion und müssen deshalb 
als paratextuelles Aussageelement ernstgenommen werden” (MA 17, 1052f). 
666 Goethe, FA, I/10, 515. 
667 For more on the use of Fraktur and Antiqua in the history of the book starting in the eighteenth century, see Han-
nelore Schlaffer, “Die Optik des Buches,” in: Epochen der deutschen Literatur in Bildern. Klassik und Romantik 
1770–1830 (Stuttgart 1986), 71–77. 
668 Goethe, FA, I/10, 398. 
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with the end of the eighteenth chapter of the third book, either with the collection of aphorisms 
“Aus Makariens Archiv” or the poem “Im ersten Beinhaus war’s.”669 This gesture of closure 
thereby poses numerous difficulties for the reading of the novel: was it intended to refer, for in-
stance, to the inserted poem “Im ersten Beinhaus war’s,”670 to the collection of aphorisms con-
tained in “Aus Makariens Archiv,” to the chapter of the book in which both (para)texts were in-
serted, or to the novel as whole? Furthermore, is the final line meant to be read as a parergic 
extension of the novel – that is, as an utterance of the “real author” Goethe – or does it belong, 
rather, to its pervasive archive fiction? Given the myriad of interpretative possibilities, the final 
line proves symptomatic with respect to the broader serial logic of the Wanderjahre. In effect, the 
closing line stumbles into a moment of undecidability with respect to the novel, making possible 
a reading of it as an open, unfinished, and highly fragmentary work. 
 In the years since its publication, both the fragmentary seriality of the Wanderjahre as well 
as its disturbing heterogeneity have proven to be lasting sources of irritation for readers and critics. 
Thomas Mann, for instance, once derided Goethe’s work as a “hochmüdes, würdevoll sklero-
tisches Sammelsurium,”671 whereas Walter Benjamin criticized the Wanderjahre as a “Roman, der 
                                                
669 Goethe composed the poem “Im ernsten Beinhaus war’s” on September 25–26, 1826, during which time he was in 
position of Schiller’s skull. The poem forms – without a printed title – the end of the second edition of Wilhelm 
Meisters Wanderjahre (1829); in “Goethe’s nachgelassene Gedichte,” it was posthumously published in 1833 under 
the title “Bei Betrachtung von Schillers Schädel.” Curiously, the Hamburg Edition of the Wanderjahre leaves out not 
only the poem, but also the final line “(Ist fortzusetzen.).” In doing so, it creates the impression of the novel as pos-
sessing a greater degree of internal cohesion and unity than Goethe himself seems to have intended. 
670 The final line’s reference to “continuation” [Fortsetzen] situates itself precisely at the site at which “zierlich-tät’ge 
Glieder, / […] zerstreut aus Lebensfugen” (Goethe, FA, I/10, 774) lie and death is made visible as the “gottgedachte 
Spur” (ibid.): “Im ernsten Beinhaus war’s […].” (In the paratext appended to his essay on the metamorphosis of plants, 
entitled “Schicksal der Handschrift,” Goethe speaks similarly of the font Antiqua, “mit lateinischen Lettern zierlich 
gedruckt” [Goethe, “Schicksal der Handschrift,” in: idem., FA, I/24, 417].) The expression “(Ist fortzusetzen.),” as 
the signifier of something which is incomplete and broken off, explicitly disturbs the rhythm and flow of the final 
verse of the poem by bringing movement into the versified eulogy. “Als ob ein Lebensquelle dem Tod entspränge” 
(ibid.), the phrase leaps out of the poetic apparatus and stumbles into a relentless turmoil. 
671 Thomas Mann, letter from April 8, 1945 to Hermann Hesse, in: idem., Briefe 1937–1947, ed. Erika Mann (Frankfurt 
a.M. 1963), 424. 
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lange liegen blieb, schließlich überstürzt beendet wurde, reich an Unstimmigkeiten und Wid-
ersprüchen ist, wurde zuletzt vom Dichter als Magazin behandelt, in den er den Inhalt seiner No-
tizhefte durch Eckermann einreihen ließ.”672 Underlying both critiques is the view that Goethe’s 
Wanderjahre does not constitute a novel in the traditional sense of a unified whole, but rather a 
kind of miscellaneous collage-work – a “Sammelsurium,” as Mann wrote. Benjamin’s allusions to 
the commercial format of the magazine as well as to Eckermann’s co-editorship arguably go one 
step further in casting doubt on the aesthetic worth of the Wanderjahre, not only suggesting that 
Goethe is not its sole author, but also that its form is largely the result of external and contingent 
factors, namely the commercial exigencies of the book market. Not until Hermann Broch’s initial 
modernist reassessment of the Wanderjahre – what he termed its “Stilagglomeration” – did the 
novel come to be viewed not as the eclectic work of an old man, but as the key precursor to James 
Joyce’s Ulysses.673 In addition to a vast network of objects that circulate in the novel, including 
maps, inscriptions, tablets, notebooks, files, letters, and a variety of fictional texts, one also en-
counters all different kinds of texts, including novellas, travel diaries, epistolary correspondence, 
and aphorisms, many of which Goethe inserted into the novel more or less without transitions. 
Such a radical experiment in form, which threatens at every point to overstep the medial constraints 
of the book, makes the Wanderjahre into one of Goethe’s most heterogeneous publications, far 
more reminiscent in many respects to the unsystematic arrangement of fragmentary texts collected 
in his Notes on Morphology than any prior literary work.674 With its gaps and lacunae left open 
                                                
672 Walter Benjamin, Goethe. Enzyklopädieartikel, in: idem., Gesammelte Schriften, II/2 (Frankfurt a.M. 1980), 705–
39, here: 733f. 
673 Cf. Hermann Broch, “James Joyce und die Gegenwart,” in: idem., Schriften zur Literatur, 2 vols. (Frankfurt a.M., 
Suhrkamp, 1975), vol. 1, 63–94, here: 71. 
674 From this perspective Safia Azzouni reads the “unharmonisches, uneinheitliches, offenes” form of the Wanderjahre 
in direct connection with Goethe’s Notes on Morphology, seeing in both a more fundamental epistemological problem 
that Goethe confronted near the end of his life. As she argues, after 1800, especially in the context of his Notes on 
Morphology, Goethe developed a “collective” method – one of gathering and collecting a multitude of heterogeneous, 
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and exposed as a serial ensemble of heterogeneous fragments, it arguably constitutes one of the 
first post-classical conceptions of the novel as an “open work of art”675 or, alternatively, as the first 
“network novel.”676 
 The network-like character of the Wanderjahre is reflected not only in the way Goethe 
explored different arrangements of various chapters and novellas – many of which had not been 
written exclusively with the novel in mind – as well as their serialization, but also in the way that 
the extra-diegetic mobility of the novel’s format extends to the circulation of letters, aphorisms, 
diaries, and stories in the text, which are sent and received by various fictional figures. Yet not all 
of these letters and stories are read as soon as they are sent: at various points they are presented – 
often first only elliptically, only to then be displaced and deferred until a later point – as source 
material drawn from an elaborate archive. This archive opens up a radically exterior perspective 
onto the texts that comprise the novel; for, as it turns out, only that which is contained in the archive 
can be “communicated” [mitgeteilt]. It defines, as Foucault writes, not the “library of all libraries, 
outside of time and space,” but is a practice that causes a multiplicity of statements to emerge as 
events, embodying the “general system of the formation and transformation of statements.”677 The 
introduction of this intermedial mediation, as it were – between bodies and texts, between orality 
and its archival inscription – reveals everything which is presented in the Wanderjahre to be dis-
cursive formations from an archive: it is that which has already been written, that which has at 
                                                
often loosely interconnected insights into natural phenomena, including contributions by other natural scientists – in 
order to achieve an objective knowledge that could overcome the limits of subjective perception. For Azzouni, the 
principle of the “collective” is, for this reason, not only decisive for the understanding of Goethe’s concept of mor-
phology, but also is said to inform a collective process at work in the Wanderjahre. She thus goes on to read the 
polyphonous, “dialogic” character of the novel as reflective of the epistemological problem of (scientific) knowledge 
production and authorship around 1800. Cf. Azzouni, Kunst als praktische Wissenschaft. 
675 Mittermüller, Sprachskepsis und Poetologie, 5. 
676 Piper, Dreaming in Books, 24. 
677 Cf. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1972), esp. 126–134, here: 130. 
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another point been jotted down, that which has been transcribed, as well as the reading of that 
which has already been read. Hence, nothing remains for the narration of the story than “zu über-
liefern was wir besitzen, mitzuteilen was sich erhalten hat,”678 and to present “was uns bekannt 
geworden auch unvollständig wie es vorliegt.”679 
 Goethe’s Wanderjahre thus situates itself at the point where the archival work begins. It is 
written in constitutive relation to that which has already been written and read, and in doing so it 
presents itself as a text in which everything is framed by the reading and writing of other texts. 
This intermedial perspectivization is accompanied by at times irritating, at other times humorous, 
reflections on the inner motivations of the novel itself, such as the paratextual supplement that 
prefaces the novella “Der Mann von funfzig Jahren,” in which ostensibly the “real author” Goethe 
declares: “Der Angewöhnung des werten Publikums zu schmeicheln, welches seit geraumer Zeit 
Gefallen findet, sich stückweise unterhalten zu lassen, gedachten wir erst nachstehende Erzählung 
in mehreren Abteilungen vorzulegen. Der innere Zusammenhang jedoch, nach Gesinnungen, 
Empfindungen und Ereignissen betrachtet, veranlaßte einen fortlaufenden Vortrag.”680 However, 
these extra-diegetic statements are neither the voice of the author nor of the narrator, who would 
be able to lend the text an ‘organic’ unity, but belong to a pervasive yet nameless redactor figure, 
who takes over the position of the narrator in the text. In the place of the narrator’s voice, only the 
paper work of the redactor is to be encountered, who produces, sorts through, rearranges, and edits 
single texts from the mass of papers, and – at a distance from any notion of ‘originary’ speech – 
no longer records speech itself, but rather the text which recorded speech. With the procedures of 
                                                
678 Goethe, FA, I/10, 128. 
679 Goethe, FA, I/10, 738. 
680 Goethe, FA, I/10, 398. Instead of telling the story without interruptions, however, the narrator later re-inserts the 
tale into the novel’s frame story, causing the frame structure to implode. 
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this fictional redactor, who steps in between reading and writing, laid bare, Goethe’s text shows 
itself to operate entirely within the space of the “Geschriebenüberlieferten”681 – in other words, of 
the “discourse network” around 1800: it is the already-recorded phrases, the already-read texts, the 
copies, transcriptions, translations, excepts, miscellany, collectanea, and reproductions of repro-
ductions which form the material of retroactively compiled editions of the letters and papers that 
circulate in the novel. 
 The texts of the Wanderjahre thereby appear as the result of a multifaceted, ‘palimpsestic’ 
technique of perspectivization, which leads to the pluralization of narrative voices. In the place a 
unified narrative voice, the text begins to fold in on itself, narrating its own “aggregation” of text 
material from the standpoint of an Other, that of an uncanny “third” – the so-called “redactor” – 
who repeatedly disrupts and destabilizes any ostensible ‘aesthetic unity’ of the work. Neither a 
figure nor a subject, the redactor introduces an unassimilable alterity into the novel in the form of 
an uncanny, impersonal voice, one which manifests itself explicitly at those points in the text where 
the chronological organization of texts breaks down, where the narrative cannot be reconstructed 
on the basis of the source material, and where an absence in the text cannot be mediated by tran-
sition. From this perspective, the redactor’s function in the novel, it turns out, is not that of guiding 
or orienting the reader toward the ‘meaning’ of the texts; rather, it is to make palpable the absences 
in the text as well as the gaps and lacunae in the original source material. 
 The presence of the redactor figure thus foregrounds the radical contingency of the texts 
and the materiality of writing; for whenever the archive is introduced and becomes reflected as a 
representational matrix of text production, this occurs only ever with reference to the incomplete-
                                                
681 Goethe, FA, I/10, 568. 
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ness and deferral of representation: in the Wanderjahre, the fictional redactor knows – like Anan-
ette, the maid in the inserted novella “Der Mann von funfzig Jahren” – how “überall da noch eine 
Lücke anschaulich zu machen, wo man eben so gut den schönsten Zusammenhang hätte finden 
können.”682 The redactor also knows when “das Fehlende zur Sprache zu bringen.”683 Thus in the 
“Interjection” [Zwischenrede] in the first edition of the novel, the redactor not only presents het-
erogeneous material that he has collected “aus den mannigfaltigsten Papieren,” but also reflects on 
the possibility and limits of their representation: 
Daß eine gewisse Lücke […] im Ganzen hie und da bemerklich und doch nicht zu 
vermeiden sein werde, sprechen wir lieber aus […] Bei der gegenwärtigen […] 
Redaktion stoßen wir doch auf alle die Unbequemlichkeiten, welche die 
Herausgabe dieser Bändchen […] verspäteten. […] Wir sehen uns noch immer auf 
mehr als eine Weise gehindert und, an dieser oder jener Stelle, mit irgend einer 
Stockung bedroht. Denn wir haben die bedenkliche Aufgabe zu lösen, aus den man-
nigfaltigsten Papieren das Werteste und Wichtigste auszusuchen […] Und so geben 
wir daher einige Kapitel, deren Ausführung wohl wünschenswert gewesen, nur in 
vorübereilender Gestalt, damit der Leser nicht nur fühle, daß hier etwas ermangelt, 
sondern daß er von dem Mangelnden näher unterrichtet sei und sich dasjenige selbst 
ausbilde, was […] nicht vollkommen ausgebildet oder mit allen Belegen gekräftigt 
ihm entgegentreten kann.684 
 
Here the redactor abruptly interrupts the narrative continuity of the novel, appearing precisely at 
the moment when a transition is necessary, yet suddenly drops out. The gaps and lacunae to which 
the text repeatedly refers suddenly encroach upon the materiality of writing and the order of tex-
tuality: as text begins to approximate itself, the novel stages not so much an absence as a material 
fold or perforation within the order of the book itself.685 Not only does the redactor’s intrusion into 
                                                
682 Goethe, FA, I/10, 470. 
683 Goethe, FA, I/10, 470. 
684 Goethe, FA, I/10, 206f. 
685 In The Fold, Deleuze suggestively likens the operative function of folding–unfolding to the concept of the aggre-
gate: “A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. The unit of matter, the smallest element of the 
labyrinth, is the fold, not the point which is never a part, but a simple extremity of the line. That is why parts of matter 
are masses or aggregates, as a correlative to elastic compressive force. Unfolding is thus not the contrary of folding, 
but follows the fold up to the following fold. Particles are ‘turned into folds,’ that a ‘contrary effort changes over and 
again’” (Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley [London: Athlone Press, 1993], 6). Later in 
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the novel serve to cover up a gap in the text through the plenitude of “paratextual enumeration,”686 
such that ellipsis gives way to accumulatio – he speaks in this passage, for instance, of present 
“Tagebücher,” of “Heften, der wirklichen Welt gewidmet, statistischen, technischen, und sonst 
realen Inhalts,” of “Entwürfe, mit guter Einsicht und zu herrlichen Zwecken geschrieben,” of 
“kleinen Anekdoten ohne Zusammenhang, schwer unter Rubriken zu bringen,” as well as of 
“Gedichten,” of which there is likewise “kein Mangel”687 – but it also stages a fictional scene of 
writing that hints at Goethe’s own method of text production as one of continuous folding and 
unfolding, which turns the space of the book into a kind of material aggregate: as if everything 
which is disclosed in the novel would have to reveal its own form at the level of content, the text 
turns its folds and perforations – via the parenthetical asides and paratextual insertions of the re-
dactor – outward. It thus behaves in a comparable way to the “künstlichen Schreibtisch von Rönt-
gen,” whereby – as one learns in the chapter “Die Neue Melusine” – “mit einem Zug viele Federn 
und Ressorts in Bewegung kommen, Pult und Schreibzeug, Brief- und Geldfächer sich auf einmal 
oder kurz nacheinander entwickeln.”688 
 The Wanderjahre forms material gaps and fragments, inscribes them into its texture, and 
in doing so it yields its own productivity: the deferral of narrative resolution and the serial “con-
tinuation” [Fortsetzung] of the disparate parts. In the absence of transitions, the redactor dynamizes 
the empty spaces in the text by setting into motion the mass of text-material which the book itself 
comprises. Thus at the beginning of the eighth chapter of the third book, where the redactor’s voice 
                                                
the same text, Deleuze speaks more extensively of aggregates as material collectives, whose “matter” possesses not 
only structures but also textures (ibid., 113–15). 
686 Cf. Mainberger, Die Kunst des Aufzählens, in particular 119–42. 
687 Goethe, FA, I/10, 207. 
688 Goethe, FA, I/10, 652. 
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prefaces the inserted story “Die gefährliche Wette,” the employment of editorial terminology (“Pa-
pieren,” “Redaktion,” “einschalten”) makes explicit both the unmediated transition between the 
narrative sequences in the text as well as the radical contingency of their order at the material level: 
“Unter den Papieren, die uns zur Redaktion vorliegen, finden wir einen Schwank, den wir ohne 
weitere Vorbereitung hier einschalten, weil unsre Angelegenheiten immer ernsthafter werden und 
wir für dergleichen Unregelmäßigkeiten fernerhin keine Stelle finden möchten.”689 Here the re-
dactor describes the story “Die gefährliche Wette” itself as a “Schwank” – as a farce, but also as a 
swerve, fluctuation, or oscillation in the text, where material is simply “inserted” [eingeschaltet]. 
“Swerving” [schwanken] characterizes the rhythm of unmediated transition, of editorial intrusion 
into the diegetic space of the novel. For this reason, it may be brought into relation with the broader 
medial strategy of the Wanderjahre of opening up a radically exterior perspective onto the mate-
riality of the book by exposing the mobility and flexibility of its arrangement as well as its multi-
auctorial, “collective” character. 
 
3.3. Monstrous Dynamics: Makarie and the Spiral-Tendencies of Writing 
While references to the archive fiction are dispersed across the Wanderjahre, they appear most 
prominently in the tenth chapter of the first book. In the course of Wilhelm’s visit to Makarie’s 
home, it is revealed that Makarie is not only the aunt of Lenardo and Hersilie, but also the owner 
of “a significant archive”690 [ein bedeutendes Archiv]. The ambivalences of this archive (while on 
the one hand it seems to open up a synoptic perspective onto the whole of the novel by mediating 
the communication of source material, on the other hand it also appears to undermine the whole 
                                                
689 Goethe, FA, I/10, 659. 
690 Goethe, FA, I/10, 124. 
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by deferring at various points the representation of this material, breaking in turn the novel’s nar-
rative continuity) manifest themselves in connection with the figure of Makarie, whom Goethe 
considered to be one of the “bedeutendsten Hinzufügungen”691 to the second edition of the Wan-
derjahre from 1829. In the first first edition from 1821, Makarie appears nameless, merely as an 
anonymous “aunt” [Tante] in epistolary correspondence with her family. Only several years after 
the publication of the first edition did Goethe for the first time exhaustively concern himself with 
this figure, which around 1825 first attained the name “Makarie.”692 
 In the Wanderjahre, information about Makarie is not concentrated in any single place, but 
is dispersed across numerous chapters of the novel. In fact, she manifests herself directly only 
twice, the first time during Wilhelm’s visit in the tenth chapter of the first book and the second 
time at the departure of the emigrants in the fourteenth chapter of the third book. In both of these 
chapters, Makarie is presented not only as an ideal conception of the feminine, but also as a cos-
mological being who bears distinctly pre-modern features: as Angela, Makarie’s caretaker and the 
keeper of the archive, reports to Wilhelm in Book 1, Chapter 10, “Makarien [sind] die Verhältnisse 
unsres Sonnensystem […] gründlich eingeboren.”693 Makarie’s uncanny ability to intimately intuit 
the relations of the solar system is characterized by a constitutive interweaving of man and cosmos, 
of heaven and earth, and even of spirit and letter, which as Harmut Böhme argues is based on the 
alchemistic notion of analogia entis.694 Furthermore, her capacity to psychically penetrate “die 
                                                
691 Hans Reiss, “Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre. Der Weg von der ersten zur zweiten Fassung,” in: Deutsche Viertel-
jahrsschrift 39 (1965), 34–57, here: 47. 
692 Cf. the various pre-publications and earlier editions to the later version of Book I, Chapter 10: FA, I/10, 812f, as 
well as WA, I/25, Nr. XVIII, 221, cited in Azzouni, Kunst als praktische Wissenschaft, 194. 
693 Goethe, FA, I/10, 358. 
694 For a reading of Makarie as an esoteric figure of Goethean natural science, cf. Hartmut Böhme, “Lebendige Natur 
– Wissenschaftskritik, Naturforschung und allegorische Hermetik bei Goethe,” in: Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift 60 
(1986), 249–72, here: 264–71. There Böhme argues that the Wanderjahre harkens back to a pre-modern, alchemical 
form of knowledge, which the novel presents through the constellation of Wilhelm, Montan, Makarie. According to 
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innere Natur eines jeden durch die ihn umgebende Maske,”695 as we learn from Wilhelm’s con-
versation with an astronomer who lives alongside Makarie, seems to defy any typical notion of 
figuration, resembling far more the perspectival position of the author himself. Finally, at the level 
of text-organization, Makarie appears to assume an integrating function – in a later passage, she is 
reported not to bear the celestial bodies within her, but rather to move “als ein integrierender Teil 
darin”696 –  especially toward the end of the novel, whereby countless figures present themselves 
in her company and seemingly disparate storylines are thereby united within a single chapter. At 
numerous levels, Makarie may thus be said to embody the paradigm of totality in the Wanderjahre, 
whose figuration as a cosmic entity around which various disparate figures of the novel orbit seems 
to continually reinforce the novel’s traditional cosmological claims to totality in spite of its over-
whelming seriality. 
 Nevertheless, the profound ambivalence and polysemy of Makarie’s figure – at times she 
is and is not an aunt, is divine and mortal, as well as potentially both at the same time – have led 
others to conclude that she is in fact a highly ironic figure in the novel, whose significance lies 
precisely in her symbolic overdetermination and thus puts into question her integrating function.697 
Perhaps it is not so much on account of the aura of secrecy and absence of direct speech surround-
                                                
Böhme, these three figures embody a different branch of alchemical knowledge, namely medicine, the knowledge of 
the mountains (“Montanwissen”), and astronomy, which their constellation in the novel unifies. 
695 Goethe, FA, 1/10, 348. 
696 Goethe, FA, I/10, 126. 
697 Ehrhard Bahr, who enumerates the ironic features of Makarie’s figure, thus argues: “Die Ironie macht jegliche 
Fest- und Zurechtlegung in der einen oder der anderen Seite unmöglich. Makarie ist und ist nicht die Tante, Heilige 
und nicht Heilige, und Tante und Heilige zugleich” (Bahr, Die Ironie im Spätwerk Goethes. “diese sehr ernsten 
Scherze…” Studien zum ‘West-östlichen Divan,’ zu den ‘Wanderjahren’ und zu ‘Faust II’ [Berlin: Erich Schmidt 
Verlag, 1972], 127). For more on this point, see also Barbara Hunfeld, who summarizes the results of her detailed 
interpretation of Makarie as follows: “Makarie bietet sich universalen Deutungen an […]. So verspricht sie höchste 
Bedeutsamkeit, verweigert aber Vereindeutigung” (Barbara Hunfeld, Der Blick ins All. Reflexionen des Kosmos der 
Zeichen bei Brockes, Jean Paul, Goethe und Stifter [Tübingen 2004], 181). 
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ing Makarie than of her ostensibly overdetermined totality that the text compels the reader to ap-
proach her less as a fully-formed human life-form – in stark contrast to Wilhelm or Hersilie – and 
more as an aggregate of heterogeneous attributes: as an “entelechy,”698 according to the narrator. 
Neither a human figure nor a planet, neither an organism nor a machine, Makarie is in fact too 
transitory and fleeting to constitute a “figure” in any meaningful sense. Rather, she embodies a 
dynamic – one which at first glance seems intended to unite the novel’s disparate figures, story 
lines, and motifs, but which upon closer examination serves instead as a disfiguring force in the 
novel. Makarie embodies a centrifugal dynamic of aggregation and dispersion, juxtaposition and 
proliferation, which disperses closure and meaning. Furthermore, from the perspective of her com-
plex relation to textuality and the order of writing, namely the “significant archive” said to be in 
her possession, Makarie’s inclusion in and subsequent dominance of the novel’s second edition 
suggests the extent to which Goethe came to revise his earlier theory of entelechy as a principle of 
self-enfolding.699 Instead of incorporating foreign voices into one’s own, as Goethe had accorded 
to the notion of Zueignung, the literal breakdown or Versagen of narration and fictional energy 
around Makarie opens up a radically exterior perspective – an “anamorphotic gaze,” as it were – 
onto the texts of the Wanderjahre, such that no overview or cosmological totality is possible any 
longer. Instead, the proliferation of texts and writing around Makarie establishes ever new (“or-
                                                
698 “Daraus wurde geschlossen, daß sie [den Mond] von der Seite sehe und wirklich im Begriff sei, über dessen Bahn 
hinauszuschreien und in dem unendlichen Raum dem Saturn entgegenzustreben. Dorthin folgt ihr keine Einbild-
ungskraft, aber wir hoffen, daß eine solche Entelechie sich nicht ganz aus unserm Sonnensystem entfernen, sondern, 
wenn sie an die Grenze desselben gelangt ist, sich wieder zurücksehnen werde […]” (Goethe, FA, I/10, 541f). 
699 See, for instance, Goethe’s conversation with Eckermann on September 1, 1829, in which he is reported to have 
spoken of the concept of entelechy: “Ich zweifle nicht an unserer Fortdauer, denn die Natur kann die Entelechie nicht 
entbehren; aber wir sind nicht auf gleiche Weise unsterblich, und um sich künftig als große Entelechie zu manifestiren, 
muß man auch eine sein” (Eckermann, Gespräche mit Goethe, 389). 
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bital”) paths that depend upon the principle of Entsagung (literally “not-saying”): her transfor-
mation from a textually-grounded aggregate into a visually synoptic being in the form of a disori-
enting spiral image. 
 In the opening scene of Book I, Chapter 10, Wilhelm and his son, Felix, are shown to 
proceed by foot into a house whose parts appear to be uncannily self-acting, as if they were limbs 
of an organism. Already in the first few lines of the passage, which are characterized by a series 
of unusual passive voice constructions, the text signals a radical shift in narrative technique away 
from any form of subjective perspectivization: “Sie zogen die Glocke, das Tor eröffnete sich, ohne 
daß eine Menschengestalt sichtbar geworden wäre, und sie gingen auf ein altes Gebäude los, das 
zwischen uralten Stämmen von Buchen und Eichen ihnen entgegenschimmerte.”700 In this scene, 
the text stages an impossible spatial and temporal field, in which impersonal objects affixed to the 
house – namely the bell [die Glocke] and the door [das Tor] – appear to be endowed with their 
own autonomous mobility and life-force, drawing Wilhelm and Felix ever closer into the orbit of 
Makarie’s castle. The marked absence of any noticeable human figures who would be responsible 
for their motion and movement finds its pendant in the paratactical quality of the description of 
these passive, inhuman forces, such that the perspective from which the scene itself is narrated and 
observed depends upon a passive past-conditional construction: “ohne daß eine Menschengestalt 
sichtbar geworden wäre.” The abrupt sequentiality and peripatetic rhythm of movement, the casual 
mention of a “Reihenfolge historischer Schilderungen”701 found hanging in Makarie’s home, ex-
tensive conversations on mathematics between Wilhelm and the astronomer, and even the imper-
missibility of Wilhelm’s horse (“weil kein Pferd in diesen Kreis eingelassen würde”702) – the horse 
                                                
700 Goethe, FA, I/10, 378. 
701 Goethe, FA, I/10, 378. 
702 Goethe, FA, I/10, 378. 
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being for Goethe “das Sinnbild der natürlich wilden und rohen, mit tierhaftem Instinkt begabten 
[…] Lebenskraft”703 – all point on the one hand to the overall serial logic underlying the scene’s 
narration, and with it to the dominance of the perspectival, and on other hand to the de-naturaliza-
tion of “life” in the broadest possible sense: with the proliferation of autonomous, self-acting ob-
jects, the text presents a scene of perception that becomes completely uncoupled from any indi-
vidual observer or subject – a perspectival dis-figuration whereby “no human figure would have 
become visible.” 
 As it turns out, this uncanny spectral site is the realm of Makarie, who is first introduced 
in person being wheeled into the room from behind a green curtain, which mysteriously draws 
itself open as if by its own accord (“ein grüner Vorhang zog sich auf”704). Soon it is revealed to 
Wilhelm that the other-worldly Makarie does not simply have visions of the solar system, but she 
herself quite literally is a planet. According to Angela, the keeper of the archive, 
Makarien [sind] die Verhältnisse unsres Sonnensystem […] gründlich eingeboren. 
Erst litt sie an diesen Erscheinungen, dann vergnügte sie sich daran, und mit den 
Jahren wuchs das Entzücken. […] Die Familie selbst weiß nichts Näheres hievon, 
diese geheimen Anschauungen, die entzückenden Gesichte sind es, die bei den 
Ihrigen als Krankheit gelten, wodurch sie augenblicklich gehindert sei, an der Welt 
und ihren Interessen teilzunehmen.705 
 
Angela’s characterization of Makarie establishes two crucial facts: first, that Makarie suffers from 
a mysterious, unspecified illness – earlier, in the sixth chapter of the first book, a letter exchange 
of Makarie’s with her nieces is reproduced in which there is talk of her “headache”706 [Kopfweh], 
which hinders her ability to write –; and second, that her paradoxical relation to the cosmos as well 
                                                
703 André Gilg, “Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre” und ihre Symbole (Zürich: Atlantis Verlag, 1954), 53, cited in Neu-
mann, FA, I/10, 1076. 
704 Goethe, FA, I/10, 379. 
705 Goethe, FA, I/10, 358. 
706 Goethe, FA, I/10, 325. 
 
292 
as her “secret intuitions” of the solar system cannot be explained or accounted for within the die-
getic framework of the novel’s narrative. Contributing to both the continuity of the cosmological 
motif of the tenth chapter as well as to the secretive aura surrounding Makarie there is the presence 
of an astronomer who has scientifically investigated her celestial existence and who mans the ob-
servatory on which Wilhelm will soon have a crucial vision. 
 Curiously, Makarie’s cosmic intuitions, to which Angela alluded in her conversation with 
Wilhelm, are not presented in the kind of coherent, totalizing manner that one might expect. 
Rather, the perspectival disfiguration and fragmentation which are connected with the archive fic-
tion and redactor also emerge directly in connection with the textual mediation of Makarie’s figure: 
the phantasm of an all-encompassing, cosmic whole is only ever realized within a narrative order 
of dispersion and proliferation, of fragmentation and disruption. Especially striking in this regard 
is the strategy of narrative deferral whereby the disclosure of information about Makarie’s secret 
is continually alluded to, yet never ever actually divulged – at least until the very “end” of the 
novel, and then only in a mediated manner. Thus already in the first longer passage concerning 
Makarie, the reader anticipates an immediate revelation of her secret, but instead this is (momen-
tarily, at least) foreclosed from explicit representation. For just before the astronomer launches 
into a lengthy discussion of mathematics, the redactor intervenes: 
Unsere Freunde haben einen Roman in die Hand genommen, und wenn dieser hie 
und da schon mehr als billig didaktisch geworden, so finden wir doch geraten, die 
Geduld unserer Wohlwollenden nicht noch weiter auf die Probe zu stellen. Die Pa-
piere, die uns vorliegen, gedenken wir an einem anderen Ort abdrucken zu lassen 
und fahren diesmal im Geschichtlichen ohne weiteres fort […].707 
 
Here the deferral and displacement of archival material – “die Papiere, die uns vorliegen” – to “an 
other place” [einem anderen Ort], which remains unspecified and which in fact will not resurface 
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until the final chapter of the last book, already hint at the way in which Makarie serves as a disfi-
guring force in the novel, if not directly then by the restriction of the reader’s access to information 
about her, which fragments the linear sequentiality of the narrative. In her presence, the novel’s 
frame story begins to erode, exposing the gaps and lacunae in the text, whose palpable absence of 
transitions at the very center of one of the novel’s most pivotal scenes contributes as well to the 
effect of suspense – a crucial element of serialized narration. 
 Hence, just as Makarie’s cosmic existence is characterized by an ‘over-proximity’ to both 
the macrocosmos (her quasi-divine relation to the solar system) and the microcosmos (her author-
like ability to intuit the “inner nature” of the novel’s various figures), her textual existence is cha-
racterized by an ‘under-proximity’ with respect to the reader’s knowledge: what the reader learns 
of Makarie is never divulged by Makarie herself; she is “die schweigsamste aller Frauen,”708 and 
in fact speaks only three times in the novel in direct speech, at which points her brief utterances 
are not related to herself, but rather set in motion conversation with the astronomer and Wilhelm. 
This conversation, like all other conversations with Makarie, is reproduced as a second-hand sum-
mary. Indeed, Makarie’s life, her activities, perspectives and so-called “idiosyncrasies”709 [Eigen-
heiten] “teilen Dritte mit […]. Makarie wird geschildert aus der Perspektive ihrer Nichten Juliette 
und Hersilie, vom Astronomen, von Angela, von Wilhelm in seiner Traumerzählung und von der 
schönen Witwe im Mann von funfzig Jahren.”710 The collection of aphorisms at the end of the 
novel, entitled “Aus Makariens Archiv,” likewise contribute to her highly perspectivized charac-
terization. The report about her relation to the solar system, coincidentally the only coherent bio-
graphy of Makarie that is to be found in the entire novel, are reported to have originated – like the 
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collection of aphorisms which ostensibly belong to her and even bear her name – from an unnamed 
source and is even “erste lange Zeit, nachdem der Inhalt mitgeteilt worden, aus dem Gedächtnis 
geschrieben und nicht, wie es in einem so merkwürdigen Fall wünschenswert wäre, für ganz au-
thentisch anzusehen.”711 
 The tenth chapter of the first book thus not only introduces and explores the mysterious 
nature of Makarie’s celestial existence, but also reflects on the relation of bodies to text. As 
Gerhard Neumann notes in his extensive commentary to the second edition of the Wanderjahre, a 
close examination of this relation reveals a deeper medial and epistemological problematic in the 
novel, namely how to achieve the “proper distance” [richtigen Distanz].712 During the first con-
versation between Wilhelm and the astronomer, which deals with the topic of mathematics, it is 
reported (in a text that is not shared to readers) that the astronomer lectures on the inner laws of 
man and his capacity for establishing lawful order; soon thereafter, the problematic of the “gaze” 
– already alluded to as a central thematic of the chapter by the opening passage – becomes expli-
citly thematized. As Wilhelm, accompanied by the astronomer, is guided to the astronomical ob-
servatory at the top floor of Makarie’s home to observe the night sky, he finds himself suddenly 
confronted by an overwhelming, traumatic vision: 
Ergriffen und erstaunt hielt er sich beide Augen zu. Das Ungeheure hört auf, erha-
ben zu sein, es überreicht unsre Fassungskraft, es droht, uns zu vernichten. »Was 
bin ich denn gegen das All?« sprach er zu seinem Geiste; »wie kann ich ihm ge-
genüber, wie kann ich in seiner Mitte stehen?« Nach einem kurzen Überdenken 
jedoch fuhr er fort: »Das Resultat unsres heutigen Abends löst ja auch das Rätsel 
des gegenwärtigen Augenblicks. Wie kann sich der Mensch gegen das Unendliche 
stellen, als wenn er alle geistigen Kräfte, die nach vielen Seiten hingezogen werden, 
in seinem Innersten, Tiefsten versammelt, wenn er sich fragt: ›Darfst du dich in der 
Mitte dieser ewig lebendigen Ordnung auch nur denken, sobald sich nicht gleich-
falls in dir ein beharrlich Bewegtes, um einen reinen Mittelpunkt kreisend, hervor-
tut? Und selbst wenn es dir schwer würde, diesen Mittelpunkt in deinem Busen 
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aufzufinden, so würdest du ihn daran erkennen, daß eine wohlwollende, wohltätige 
Wirkung von ihm ausgeht und von ihm Zeugnis gibt.‹713 
 
Here the text stages an event of perception which is completely uncoupled from plot or action. As 
Wilhelm comes into contact with an inhuman motion outside of himself and in relation to which 
he finds himself ever more thrust from center to periphery, thinking himself encircling the “middle 
of this eternally living order,” his vision of a threatening, potentially annihilating monstrosity can-
not be conclusively situated either inwardly or outwardly, either in the dream-world or the external 
world. This procedure or “event” of perception, which is at once outwardly negating (“es droht, 
uns zu vernichten”), yet itself never directly observable or localizable (“[er] hielt […] sich beide 
Augen zu”), is what Lacan refers to as “anamorphosis”: it designates an aporia within the field of 
perception, appearing as a monstrous, distorted image, which challenges the subject’s fixed rela-
tion to the observed object, since it is only as the subject withdraws – renounces the claim to 
knowledge – that the object proper comes into view.714 
 Thus while the first line of the above passage (“Ergriffen und erstaunt […]”) appears to 
implicitly reference Kant’s statement in the Critique of Practical Reason that the experience of the 
sublime fills the observer with “admiration and awe” for the “starry heavens above me and the 
moral law within me,”715 the crucial turning point of the passage occurs when the monstrous image 
suddenly ceases to be sublime (“das Ungeheure hört auf, erhaben zu sein […]”) and threatens to 
annihilate Wilhelm (“es droht, uns zu vernichten”). In contrast to Kant’s description of the sublime 
experience of observing the night sky, which still retains the centeredness of the observing subject 
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296 
in its corporeal confrontation with the overwhelming forces of nature and the divine through the 
analogy between the starry heavens and the inner moral law, this scene of astronomical observation 
disorients above and below, intimate and external, by setting into motion the very subject-position 
of the observer: “‘Darfst du dich in der Mitte dieser ewig lebendigen Ordnung auch nur denken, 
sobald sich nicht gleichfalls in dir ein beharrlich Bewegtes, um einen reinen Mittelpunkt kreisend, 
hervortut?’” This disorienting, de-subjectifying bodily experience which is coupled to the cosmic 
gaze – an experience which Wilhelm perceives as being at once intimate and external – may be 
described as “extimate” [extime]; for “c’est en tant qu’il est ici une place que nous pouvons desi-
gner du terme conjoignant l’intime à la radicale extériorité, c’est en tant que l’object a est ex-
time.”716 
 Immediately following the narration of this corporeal limit-experience, Wilhelm relates a 
dream he had of Makarie that night to the astronomer who accompanied him to the observatory. 
In that moment, the problematic of the gaze becomes visible once more as Wilhelm awakens from 
sleep and rediscovers Makarie, as he perceived her in his dream, as part of the galaxy. Here the 
most intimate is simultaneously conceived as the most external, and the limit between sleep and 
wake, between dream and reality, is realized. In strikingly similar language as the opening passage 
of the tenth chapter of the first book, Wilhelm has recourse in his dream narrative to many of the 
same passive-voice constructions previously used by the narrator: 
Der grüne Vorhang ging auf, Makariens Sessel bewegte sich hervor, von selbst wie 
ein belebtes Wesen; er glänzte golden, ihre Kleider schienen priesterlich, ihr An-
blick leuchtete sanft; ich war im Begriff, mich niederzuwerfen. Wolken entwickel-
ten sich um ihre Füße, steigend hoben sie flügelartig die heilige Gestalt empor, an 
der Stelle ihres herrlichen Angesichtes sah ich zuletzt, zwischen sich teilendem Ge-
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wölk, einen Stern blinken, der immer aufwärts getragen wurde und durch das er-
öffnete Deckengewölbe sich mit dem ganzen Sternhimmel vereinigte, der sich im-
mer zu verbreiten und alles zu umschließen schien.717 
 
In this oneiric scene (“schlaftrunken taumle ich nach dem Fenster […]”), not only do objects such 
as the curtain and the chair appear to move autonomously, as if they were living beings, but the 
semantics of appearance – of semblance [Schein], perspective [Anblick], and the presence of a 
“green curtain” [grüne Vorhang] – hint at the theatrical character of Makarie’s realm. Yet Makarie 
herself, both in this dream sequence as well as in the novel more broadly, embodies an impossible 
“figure” who cannot possibly be brought onto the figurative “stage” of Wilhelm’s dream: this un-
earthly, Raffaelian image of an ideal woman, veiled by clouds surrounding her feet, whose “maje-
stic countenance” [herrlichen Angesichtes] transforms into the image of a twinkling star that 
ascends ever further upward to unite with the “starry sky” [Sternhimmel] – all of these things 
indicate the ways in which Makarie, far from being a human subject or a stable figure, embodies 
instead a fluctuating dynamic of transformation, change, and metamorphosis – of ceaseless “dis-
semination” [sich verbreiten] and “envelopment” [umschließen]. 
 The same problematic of proper distance is illuminated again in the same chapter, but this 
time from a different perspective. While in the first case (Wilhelm’s being granted the utmost of 
possible human experiences) it thematized the relationship between body and soul as a regulative 
force, and in the second case (starting with Wilhelm’s remark, “Was bin ich denn gegen das All? 
[…] wie kann ich ihm gegenüber, wie kann ich in seiner Mitte stehen?”) the distance between 
body and cosmos was measured, the question regarding man’s position in the cosmos “wird nun 
auf zweierlei Weise vergegenwärtigt: situativ verkörpert im Problem des ‘Blickes,’ systematisch 
verzeichnet im Medium der ‘Schrift.’”718 While Wilhelm’s corporeal experience remains tied to 
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the gaze, its spiritual mastery is documented through writing. Whereas the first realm was under 
the supervision of the astronomer, it is Angela who is in charge of the second realm. She manages 
the archive in which conversations and papers are condensed, thoughts are archived, and essential 
results of speeches conducted in Makarie’s realm are preserved. Angela points Wilhelm to “ein 
abgesonderte, verschlossene Fach” in the archive which bears the title “Makariens Eigenheiten,”719 
and which discursively unfolds precisely the context which Wilhelm, in the previous scene of 
astronomical observation, momentarily experienced at the level of his own corporeality; however, 
this “sheet” [Blatt] drawn from the archive is not shared with the reader until later, and even then 
not literally, but rather from the memory of the redactor, as the novel once again returns to Maka-
rie’s realm (Book III, Chapter 15). 
 While at first glance Makarie would naturally seem to be the preeminent figure in the novel 
who simultaneously embodies the both the order of writing and cosmological knowledge – for all 
intents and purposes, she serves as the veritable “relais that attracts and distributes texts that cir-
culate among the renunciants and that motivate and coordinate the movements of characters in the 
novel,”720 and thereby unites both archival and cosmic forces –, her relation to textuality in the 
novel is in fact far more complex and ambiguous than the reader might initially assume. In one of 
Makarie’s brief letters to Juliette (her niece as well as Hersilie’s older sister) she remarks that she 
would gladly write to Lenardo (her cousin), “wenn sich mein Kopfweh nicht anmeldete, das mich 
gegenwärtiges Blatt kaum zu Ende schreiben läßt.”721 As it is later revealed, this headache con-
cerns one of Makarie’s occasional withdrawals into a state of celestial rapture. Yet the fact that her 
mysterious gift is said to hinder in particular her ability to write, and furthermore that this special 
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capacity of hers does not seem to affect her ability to speak – for her next letter to her nieces ends 
with the parenthetical note “Diktiert”722 – hints at the mode of inscription of oral utterances as 
Makarie’s privileged discursive domain. 
 This process of transformation, or metamorphosis, from the oral into the written is explici-
tly thematized in Makarie’s realm. Soon after Wilhelm’s confrontation with an extreme bodily 
experience of the cosmic gaze and subsequent dream narrative, the birth of the subject from dis-
course becomes an object of mediological reflection in the Wanderjahre: as the oscillation between 
individual statement and speech context, between vibrant conversation and laconic paraphrase – 
or what Goethe refers to as the tension between “aperçu” and “system.” The relation of the poly-
phonous exchange of voices and their textual recording in the archive comes to play a central role 
in this part of the tenth chapter. Thus as Angela says of Makarie: 
Meine Herrin […] ist von der Wichtigkeit des augenblicklichen Gesprächs höchlich 
überzeugt; dabei gehe vorüber, sagte sie, was kein Buch enthält, und doch wieder 
das Beste, was Bücher jemals enthalten haben. Deshalb machte sie mir’s zur Pflicht, 
einzelne gute Gedanken, wie Samenkörner aus einer vielästigen Pflanze, hervor-
springen. Ist man treu, sagte sie, das Gegenwärtige festzuhalten, so wird man erst 
Freude an der Überlieferung haben, indem wir den besten Gedanken schon 
ausgesprochen, das liebenswürdigste Gefühl schon ausgedrückt finden. Hiedurch 
kommen wir zum Anschauen jener Übereinstimmung, wozu der Mensch berufen 
ist, wozu er sich oft wider seinen Willen finden muß, da er sich gar zu gern 
einbildet, die Welt fange mit ihm von vorne an.723 
 
Here the origin and cause of the archive is attributed by Angela to the “momentary conversation” 
[augenblicklichen Gesprächs] – to the immediate, situationally-specific oral expression – whose 
recording through writing is merely a surrogate for registering and transmitting spoken words. 
Writing, like the archivist Angela, possesses here a decidedly ancillary, rather than autotelic, func-
tion: through Angela’s archival activity – namely the co-writing or transcription of conversations 
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and relatedly the collection of various papers – “ein bedeutendes Archiv entstanden sei, woraus 
sie in schlaflosen Nachten manchmal ein Blatt Makarien vorlese […].”724 
 Thus it is not Makarie who discursively inscribes conversations. Nor does she read the 
written recordings which have been collected in the archive. Rather, whereas Makarie is associated 
in the novel with the paradigm of orality – as already implied by the medial circumstance of her 
“headaches” mentioned in her letter to Juliette – it is in fact Angela who stands in closest proximity 
to the order of textuality in the novel.725 Not coincidentally, even her name – in addition to having 
the biblical connotation of the word “angel” (analogous to Makarie’s name as an allusion to the 
Mother Mary) – serves as an anagram for the archival term Anlage, meaning “attachment,” “en-
closure,” or “annex.”726 In very similar language as that found in the famous opening line of Die 
Wahlverwandtschaften,727 Angela is introduced first with the proper name and then with the un-
dermining of this name – that this is not exactly her name or it could be anyone’s name: “Angela, 
so nannte man die durch Gestalt und Betragen einnehmende Schöne, verkündigte sodann die 
Ankunft Makariens […].”728 While the semiotic contingency of the name “Angela,” like that of 
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“Eduard” in Die Wahlverwandtschaften, likewise gives way to parenthetical interjection, it does 
so in a subtly yet crucially different way in the Wanderjahre. Whereas in Die Wahlverwandtschaf-
ten the narrator’s parenthetical interjection addresses a timeless linguistic situation between author, 
book, and reader (“so nennen wir […]”), here the obliteration of reference through the summari-
zation of a missing narrative – the missing “weil” – goes one step further by inscribing a discursive 
and historical distance into the interjection (“so nannte man […]”), which places the accent of the 
utterance’s semiotic contingency on the impossibility of assured knowledge of the past as well as 
on the anonymous, unknown subject responsible for the act of naming. Now, it is not the collective 
“we” [wir] of author and reader who “name” the figure in question, but rather an unknown and 
indifferent “one” [man] (“so nannte man […]”). One could argue that the entire difference between 
the two novels is condensed in these two seemingly innocuous lines: here it concerns the introduc-
tion of the perspective of the archive, which in the Wanderjahre is both “the law of what can be 
said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events” as well as “that which, 
at the very root of the statement-event, and in that which embodies it, defines at the outset the 
system of its enunciability.”729 
 According to Angela, spoken words are precisely that which “kein Buch enthält”: they are, 
as her comparison with “einer vielästigen Pflanze” shows, natural in the most literal sense. Oral 
expression is “das Beste, was Bücher jemals enthalten haben,” as Makarie ostensibly assumes, to 
the extent that “gute Gedanken” exist naturally as “Samenkörner” in a more or less ‘primordial 
form’ beyond oral or written representation, such that a greater proximity to the primordial form 
of thoughts is attributed their utterance than to their written fixation. From Angela’s reflections on 
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the function of the archive arises in turn a linguistic structure which balances the “vibrant,” “natu-
ral” context of conversation, as it is experienced in its direct immediacy, and the mediacy of the 
“sheet of paper” [Blatt] pulled from the archive, “bei welcher Gelegenheit denn wieder auf eine 
merkwürdige Weise tausend Einzelheiten hervorspringen, eben als wenn eine Masse Quecksilber 
fällt und sich nach allen Seiten hin in die vielfachsten unzähligen Kügelchen zerteilt.”730 Here 
Angela suddenly moves away from an organic metaphor for “good thoughts” as “Samenkörner 
aus einer vielästigen Pflanze” toward an inorganic one. Underlying both organic and inorganic 
metaphors is the lively relationship between aphorism and novel, between laconic statement or 
“aperçu” and narrative order, which characterizes not only the linguistic structure of Makarie’s 
realm, but also the entire principle of the novel’s construction.731 
 Although Eckermann once claimed that the aphorisms in the Wanderjahre were only in-
cluded in order to meet the page count required for the second and third books of the Ausgabe 
letzter Hand (1829),732 Goethe himself argued two years after the novel’s publication that the two 
aphorism collections constitute in fact a “Vehikel […] um eine Masse sehr bedeutender Dinge 
schicklich in die Welt zu bringen.”733 One should not take this to mean that the aphorisms are 
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intended to reflect the wisdom of the “real author” Goethe. Rather, they stage a proliferating dy-
namic – the dispersion of a “mass” [Masse] of collected “things” [Dinge], writes Goethe – which 
intertwines with the whole of the novel while still remaining below the threshold of its narrative 
organization. Angela’s analogy between the thoughts contained in the archive and the mass of 
mercury which spills forth once one begins to pick apart the “good thoughts” featured on the sheets 
of paper can be read both in relation to the mediology of the archive itself – that is, as spilt ink that 
transforms the vibrant immediacy of spoken conversation into the mobility of the textual – as well 
as at the semiotic level, which relates the elusive nature of mercury – its mobility and flexibility 
thanks to its peculiar “aggregate state” [Aggregatzustände], for it is both a metal and a liquid – to 
the radical contingency and elusiveness of meaning through the perspectivization of individual 
sentences.734 The text thereby stages here the way in which the collection and recording of text 
becomes uncoupled from an originary referent – the spoken word –, giving way to the dispersion 
and proliferation of ‘small forms,’ of “Kügelchen,” which cannot be synthesized or brought into a 
fixed, solid state. For this reason, the only representational form adequate to their inherent plurality 
and heterogeneous aggregate condition are two ambiguous signifiers – ones which play a central 
                                                
734 A similar dynamic can be observed as Angela guides Wilhelm into a room in which he sees cabinets “all around” 
[ringsum] filled with “wohlgeordnete Papiere.” As Wilhelm gazes at the documents, he feels compelled to undertake 
the archival work of sorting through the many “notebooks” [Hefte] and “barely coherent sentences” [kaum zusam-
menhängender Sätze]: “Hier nun mußte der Freund bescheiden zu Werke gehen, denn es fand sich nur allzuviel An-
ziehendes und Wünschenswertes; besonders achtete er die Hefte kurzer, kaum zusammenhängender Sätze höchst 
schätzenswert. Resultate waren es, die, wenn wir nicht ihre Veranlassung wissen, als paradox erscheinen, uns aber 
nötigen, vermittelst eines umgekehrten Findens und Erfindens rückwärts zugehen und die Filiation solcher Gedanken 
von weit her, von unten herauf womöglich zu vergegenwärtigen.” While the passage can be read as a poetological 
reflection on the tension between “aperçu” and “system” underlying the novel’s principle of construction, it also re-
lates to the movement of thought with respect to the poetics of the aphorism, which depends upon a chiasmus – the 
filiation of thoughts – and a corresponding reflection on how literary small forms are capable of continually de-con-
textualizing and re-contextualizing themselves. 
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role in Goethe’s lexicon – that are used respectively in relation to Makarie’s archive and to An-
gela’s mercury metaphor: the “significant” [bedeutend] and the “remarkable” [merkwürdig].735 
Not coincidentally, these are synoptic signifiers which, analogous to Goethe’s use of the word 
“enough” [genug],736 serves a paraphrastic function, namely that of gesturing toward a deeper pro-
fundity or significance while at the same time leaving the extended explanation of this meaning 
itself more or less absent and open. 
 A similar dispersal of meaning presents itself in connection with at least two other “her-
meneutic” moments in the Wanderjahre: first, with the exegesis of gnomic inscriptions that Wil-
helm encounters in the company of the unnamed uncle, who is simply referred to in the novel as 
“Der Oheim,” and his nieces, Hersilie and Juliette; and second, with the hermeneutic metaphors 
                                                
735 Goethe serialized the terms “significant” [bedeutend] and “remarkable” [merkwürdig] in much the same way as he 
did the signifiers “experience” and “experiment” in his essay Versuch als Vermittler (1793). In the Wanderjahre, one 
might say that whereas the “remarkable” outlines the contours of an intuitional procedure that rests on the identity of 
“kaltem Sehen” and “alles Aufschreiben,” as he spoke of in letters dating from August 9 and 16/17, 1792 – not coin-
cidentally composed during the time in which he worked on his essay on the experiment – the term “significant” 
attains significance at the semiotic level (hence Goethe also speaks of “ein bedeutendes Kästchen” in the Wanderjahre, 
which is associated with the hermeneutic motif of casket and key) through the processing of notations according to a 
statistical model: through the condensation of “peculiarities” [Merkwürdigkeiten] into a tableau, which makes their 
significance evident. For more on this distinction and its significance for Goethe’s semiotics, cf. Campe, “Merk-
würdig/Bedeutend. Zu einer Stelle über das Symbolische bei Goethe,” in: Umwege des Lesens. Aus dem Labor phi-
lologischer Neugierde, eds. Christoph Hoffmann and Caroline Welsh (Berlin: Parerga, 2006), 245–58. As Campe 
argues in that essay with reference to a 1797 letter of Goethe’s to Schiller on the concept of the symbolic, “Merkwürdig 
ist ein Term der Notationstechnik. Das Bedeutende empfinge demnach seine Bedeutung nicht durch psychologische 
Auferlegung oder ästhetische Reflexion, sondern durch die Verarbeitungsschritte der Notations nach Art der 
Apodemik und Statistik. Diese Art von Bedeutung emergiert für Goethe also offenbar wie beim Erstellen der Reise-, 
Landes- und Staatsbeschreibung durch Zusammenziehen der Merkwürdigkeiten in das Tableau, das am Ende wörtlich 
– als Zahlenwerk – oder übertragen – als Summe des Kompilierten – wie die Statistiker sagten: vor Augen stehen 
sollte. Die Herstellung dieses Quasi-Bildes ist für Goethe offenbar weder rein konstruktiv (sentimentalisch), noch 
bloßer Rückgriff ins vorkonstruktive (naiv) Auffassen. Sie ist primär Verfahren – das Sicheinspielen einer Regel des 
zeichnend-schreibenden Notierend in Versuchen, die ihr vorausgehen” (ibid., 254). 
736 For more on the medial significance of the word “genug” in Goethe, see Piper, “Paraphrasis,” esp. 183–88. Ac-
cording to Piper’s close reading of the novella Der Mann von funfzig Jahren, “‘Genug’ here signifies a crucial bound-
ary moment, one in which some narrative portion has come to an end (the act of sending the poem) and a new one is 
about to begin (the act of receiving the poem). But this very boundary is marked by its transgression in a double sense 
– it repeats, at the level of synopsis, what the narrative has previously tried to explain (‘das Jagdgedicht selbst war 
abgesendet’) just as it fails to continue forward, with the narrative substituting instead more synopsis (‘von welchem 
wir jedoch einige Worte nachzubringen haben’). In place of either the reception or citation of the poem we are offered 
its paraphrase. ‘Enough’ is the sign of a communicative interstice” (ibid., 183). 
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of casket and key, which circulate in a puzzling and seemingly impossible manner through the 
various chapters of the novel. Before Wilhelm becomes acquainted with the uncle and his nieces 
during his involuntary entry intro their sphere, he encounters a number of “inscriptions”737 [In-
schriften] which adorn a prison-like space. These inscriptions consist of various maxims which 
concern universal world-views, and appear just as much to the reader as to Wilhelm himself as in 
need of explanation.738 Yet the answers to Wilhelm’s repeated questions as to the meaning of these 
maxims are far from unambiguous: Wilhelm’s conversation partner in this circle, Juliette, de-
scribes more the character than the content of the inscriptions: “Umschreiben sie die wenigen 
Worte, so wird der Sinn bald hervorleuchten.”739 Her sister, Hersilie, whose skepticism of “Max-
imen der Männer”740 is evident, claims: “ich aber finde, daß man sie alle umkehren kann und daß 
sie alsdann ebenso wahr sind, und vielleicht noch mehr.”741 While the meaning of the inscriptions 
themselves remains opaque, what substitutes for the mediation of understanding between text and 
reader is the procedure of “paraphrase” [Umschreiben]. By contrasting two different procedures 
of reading – the text diametrically opposes here the unsuccessful hermeneutic efforts of “exegesis” 
[auslegen] to those of “inverting” [umkehren],742 Wilhelm’s experiences with the decipherment of 
the gnomic inscriptions in the uncle’s sphere suggest a decisive shift away from the hermeneutic 
paradigm of reading around 1800 in favor of the serial logic of paraphrastic writing and speech. 
As Andrew Piper argues, this paraphrastic stance in Goethe’s late works is no longer based on a 
subject-centered poetology of mediating the reader’s understanding, but on a model transformation 
                                                
737 Goethe, FA, I/10, 47. 
738 The three examples reproduced in the novel read as follows: “Dem Unschuldigen Befreiung und Ersatz, dem Ver-
führten Mitleiden, dem Schuldigen ahnende Gerechtigkeit” (Goethe, FA, I/10, 47); “Vom Nützlichen durchs Wahre 
zum Schönen” (Goethe, FA, I/10, 65); and “Besitz und Gemeingut” (Goethe, FA, I/10, 68). 
739 Goethe, FA, I/10, 47. 
740 Goethe, FA, I/10, 66. 
741 Goethe, FA, I/10, 68. 
742 Goethe, FA, I/10, 68. 
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– the transformation of foreign speech into one’s own, and of the immediacy of oral speech into 
writing, which connects Goethe’s paraphrastic poetics with the introduction of the pervasive me-
dial fiction of the archive in the Wanderjahre.743 
 To the extent that such paraphrastic poetics dramatically diverged from the conditions of 
the technical system between reading and writing around 1800, it was also not without significance 
for the medium of the book. This becomes an object of mediological reflection in connection with 
the casket and key metaphors in the Wanderjahre. The centrality of these metaphors to the novel 
was made explicit by Goethe with his decision to include an illustration of the key near the end of 
the novel. In the Wanderjahre, casket and key constitute heterochronic objects: they seem to obey 
no coherent temporal or spatial field with respect to the novel’s narrative order. Rather, they float 
more or less freely between the various threads of stories and narratives that are themselves at 
times only tangentially interconnected. On the one hand, the elusiveness of their meaning can be 
understood as an “allegory of reading,” which demands the hermeneutic exegesis of their obscu-
rity. On the other hand, they foreclose the possibility of any fixed meaning through the strategy of 
narrative deferral and displacement. Thus in an earlier passage that recalls both Angela’s descrip-
tion of Makarie’s aphorisms as well as her own skeptical attitude toward the aphoristic inscriptions, 
Hersilie describes the key that does not seem to open the casket as something that continually 
                                                
743 As Andrew Piper argues, Goethe’s turn toward paraphrase marked a departure from both the older form of com-
monplacing, as a technique of memoria, and the hermeneutic paradigm of reading around 1800: “Goethe’s own para-
phrastic turn was in many ways a means of addressing a larger historical shift surrounding practices of citation at the 
turn of the nineteenth century. In place of an early-modern practice of common placing – of excerpting quotations 
from books and inscribing them in still other books – the hermeneutic paradigm that was fast emerging around 1800 
depended upon an altogether different nexus of readerly citation, dissection, and inscription. There was a profound 
shift underway in how individuals related to the texts that they read and how those texts came to matter in their lives, 
but this shift still depended in crucial ways on a form of citationality, only now in a different vein. Goethe’s para-
phrastic turn, by contrast, was aligned with neither the nascent hermeneutics of reading nor an older cultural practice 
of commonplacing. It was put forth, I want suggest, as an alternative model to both of these cultures of literalism. In 
place of either of the paradigms of citation and interpretation, which mutually reinforced one another, Goethe’s para-
phrastic stance argued for a model of transformation” (Piper, “Paraphrasis,” 181). 
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escapes one’s grasp: “Und was das wieder für Umstände sind! Das schiebt sich und verschiebt 
sich.”744 In one of her subsequent letters to Wilhelm, she declares that the chest displays “weder 
Buchstaben noch Ziffer, weder Jahrzahl noch sonst Andeutung, woraus man den frühern Besitzer 
oder Künstler erraten könne, es sei ihm also völlig unnütz und ohne Interesse.”745 The most “re-
markable” feature of this “significant” chest is that it bears no features that would allow for her-
meneutic access from any potential “reader” into whose hands it might contingently fall; for as 
Hersilie notes, there are “neither letters nor numbers, neither year nor any indication, of how to 
guess who its previous owner or artist was.” As Hersilie continues in her letter to Wilhelm apropos 
the chest and key: 
Ich sage nichts weiter, beschreibe nicht, entschuldige nicht; genug, hier liegt das 
Kästchen vor mir in meiner Schatulle, der Schlüssel daneben, und wenn Sie eine 
Art von Herz und Gemüt haben, so denken Sie, wie mir zumute ist, wie viele Lei-
denschaften sich in mir herumkämpfen, wie ich Sie herwünsche, auch wohl Felix 
dazu, daß es ein Ende werde, wenigstens daß eine Deutung vorgehe, was damit 
gemeint sei, mit diesem Wunderbaren Finden, Wiederfinden, Trennen und Ver-
einigen; und sollte ich auch nicht aus aller Verlegenheit gerettet werden, so wün-
sche ich wenigstens sehnlichst, daß diese sich aufkläre, sich endige, wenn mir auch, 
wie ich fürchte, etwas Schlimmeres begegnen sollte.746 
 
In contrast to Makarie’s earlier letter to her other niece, Juliette, in which “das [sich] gegenwärtiges 
Blatt kaum zu Ende schreiben läßt,”747 Hersilie’s punctual use of the word “enough” [genug], as 
well as her talk of the need to come to an “end” [Ende] or “at the very least that an explanation 
proceeds” [wenigstens daß eine Deutung vorgehe], point to the principle of Entsagung – literally 
of “not-saying” – which comes to dominate the latter portion of the novel. If in the earlier scene 
concerning the exegesis of inscriptions the paraphrastic inversion of syntactical order made possi-
ble the potentially endless proliferation of different meanings, here paraphrase encounters its limit, 
                                                
744 Goethe, FA, I/10, 599. 
745 Goethe, FA, I/10, 657. 
746 Goethe, FA, I/10, 658. 
747 Goethe, FA, I/10, 74. 
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namely the necessity of reaching an arbitrary end-point, when speaking and writing must ulti-
mately come to an end (“Ich sage nichts mehr, beschreibe nicht, entschuldige nicht”). Thus while 
the heterochronic circulation of casket and key on the one hand stimulate a hermeneutic endeavor 
– namely the desire to know – in the novel, the shift away from the search for their secret meaning 
in favor of the renunciation of the claim to know at the end of the Wanderjahre foreshadows the 
ways in which the novel will not come to a definitive or conclusive end, but will instead make use 
of techniques of serialization. In contrast with the route of romantic reflexivity taken by the Lehr-
jahre, this makes the Wanderjahre into a decisively post-hermeneutic work, which cannot even be 
called a “novel” any longer.748 
 Only at this point in the novel, in the final chapters of the third and final book – not coin-
cidentally, right before the search for the casket and key is abandoned – does the text divulge the 
contents of the long-postponed letter from the archive detailing the secrets of Makarie’s celestial 
nature, which was first alluded to in the tenth chapter of the first book. In Book III, Chapter 15, 
the text presents Makarie as a paradoxical cosmic figure, and it does so by explicitly drawing on 
the language of plant metamorphosis – specifically, the theory of the spiral tendency – from Goe-
the’s Notes on Morphology. The archival source material that was held back and deferred until a 
later point in is now presented to readers for the first time, for as the redactor announces at the end 
of the previous chapter: 
Zu diesem Punkte aber gelangt, können wir der Versuchung nicht widerstehen, ein 
Blatt aus unsern Archiven mitzuteilen, welches Makarien betrifft und die besondere 
Eigenschaft, die ihrem Geiste erteilt ward. Leider ist dieser Aufsatz erst lange Zeit 
nachdem der Inhalt mitgeteilt worden, aus dem Gedächtnis geschrieben und nicht, 
wie es in einem so merkwürdigen Fall wünschenswert wäre, für ganz authentisch 
anzusehen.749 
 
                                                
748 For more on this point, cf. Mittermüller. “‘Das schiebt sich und verschiebt sich.’” 
749 Goethe, FA, I/10, 481 
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In this mysterious “essay” [Aufsatz], whose contents are reproduced in full, comprising the entirety 
of the fifteenth chapter, yet whose veracity is simultaneously put into question by the redactor on 
the basis of its dubious provenance – namely its transcription from the redactor’s memory, rather 
than on the basis of oral utterances from Makarie – it is revealed that Makarie does not merely 
observe the solar system, but is rather paradoxically a part of it: 
Makarie befindet sich zu unserm Sonnensystem in einem Verhältnis, welches man 
auszusprechen kaum wagen darf. Im Geiste, der Seele, der Einbildungskraft hegt 
sie, schaut sie es nicht nur, sondern sie macht gleichsam einen Teil desselben; sie 
sieht sich in jenen himmlischen Kreisen mit fortgezogen, aber auf eine ganz eigene 
Art; sie wandelt seit ihrer Kindheit um die Sonne, und zwar, wie nun entdeckt ist, 
in einer Spirale, sich immer mehr vom Mittelpunkt entfernend und nach den äuße-
ren Regionen hinkreisend.750 
 
According to the “ethereal poetry”751 [ätherische Dichtung] of the Makarie myth, it is claimed that 
she “moves around the sun […] in a spiral,” and indeed – like Wilhelm during his extreme bodily 
experience of the cosmic gaze – “distancing herself ever more from the midpoint and circling 
toward the outer regions, […] striving toward the periphery.” 
 To be sure, the peculiar tension in Makarie between, on the one hand, her highly mechan-
ical movements and, on the other hand, her mysterious celestial existence, as well as that between 
her fragmentary textuality and her depiction as the very source of lively conversation, suggests in 
part a certain pre-modern conception of nature as a harmonious totality – on which has ostensibly 
been lost in the modern era, yet which is still nonetheless able to being evoked and represented as 
a whole. Yet at the same time the explicit analogy in the above passage between Makarie’s cos-
mological existence and Goethe’s theory of the spiral tendency also radically puts into question 
the reading of Makarie as harkening back to a pre-modern “mythpoetic” ideal. Rather, just as the 
                                                
750 Goethe, FA, I/10, 484. 
751 Goethe, FA, I/10, 737. 
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spiral tendency reflects two contradictory dynamics – that is, both the capacity for infinite prolif-
eration and that of a universal pathology in nature, namely death and finitude – so too does Makarie 
embody a profound ambivalence with respect to the representation of life and, relatedly, the am-
bitions of the novel in the age of its mechanical reproducibility. 
 In this regard, the analogy between the spiral tendency need not be restricted to the literal 
language of spiral figures used, for example, in the various cosmological scenes that reveal Ma-
karie’s “secret.” Rather, the comparison reveals the deeper ambivalences that she embodies as 
soon as one recalls that Makarie experiences her own peculiar pathology, namely that of frequent 
headaches while writing letters. Despite her close proximity to the archive which bears her name, 
the text suggests that Makarie suffers in particular from the materiality of the letter, and throughout 
the novel she is correspondingly characterized by a noticeable dearth of text production and, relat-
edly, by an over-abundance of orality, the utterances of which are themselves rarely if ever directly 
reproduced in the novel, but rather communicated from the perspective of others – from foreign 
voices or textual transcriptions which have been archived. Makarie thus appears in the novel as 
the unrepresentable absent center – “the real” of orality – around which the symbolic – the mass 
of letters, papers, and recorded conversations preserved in the archive which bears her name – 
rotates and circulates in the novel. 
 On the other hand, the correspondence between her cosmic existence and the dynamics of 
the spiral tendency simultaneously reveals her to be a “form-of-life” distinct from that of (other) 
human figures in the novel – a suggestion which is already alluded to in part by the noteworthy 
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preponderance of various kinds of machines and other uncannily self-acting objects in her pres-
ence.752 In fact, Makarie herself is even likened to a “lebendige Armillarsphäre.”753 Furthermore, 
in relation to Wilhelm’s traumatic visions of the night sky and his dream narrative of Makarie, she 
is presented as both a potentially monstrous figure, as well as an ideal conception of the feminine, 
yet one which is far too transitory and fleeting – in a constant state of transformation, flux, and 
metamorphosis – to be representable as a figure. At the mediological level, one might say that 
around Makarie intertwine three different medial aspects: text, image, and voice, which may be 
said to correspond to the Lacanian triad of the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. In the novel, 
these map respectively on to the archive, the cosmic gaze, and the immediacy of lively conversa-
tion – the latter of which can only ever be simulated and never directly represented in the novel – 
all of which are directly concerned with the status of Makarie. 
 Makarie thus comes to paradoxically embody both a centrifugal dynamic that attracts the 
various figures of the novel into her orbit, thereby integrating at one level the novel’s disparate 
story lines into single, serialized moments, as well as a pure effect of the collective, for rarely does 
she communicate in direct speech, but is instead always mediated by the perspective of an other, 
a “third.” In both cases, however, she resolutely eludes any and all figuration or subjectivity; for 
the motions and movements which the text attributes to her, and upon which its narrative motion 
is founded, are ones which – in contrast to the activities of traveling and migration that characterize 
                                                
752 Perhaps one of the most suggestive images of machinery appears in the middle of the novel, in an otherwise unre-
markable passage: “Und so standen hier, in gehörigen Entfernungen zusammengeordnet, das große Schaukelrad, wo 
die Auf- und Absteigenden immer gleich horizontal ruhig sitzenbleiben, andere Schaukeleien, Schwungseile, 
Lusthebel, Kegel- und Zellenbahnen und was nur alles erdacht werden kann, um auf einem großen Triftraum eine 
Menge Menschen verschiedentlichst und gleichmäßig zu beschäftigen und zu erlustigen (Goethe, FA, I/10, 108f). The 
image of the Schaukelrad, a kind of ferris wheel, alludes to the mobility and flexibility of the serialized novel – its 
capacity for perpetual continuation –, in much the same way as Goethe’s earlier paronomastic references to wheels of 
the spinners and weavers, of “warp” [Einschlag] and “weft” [Zettel] in “Lenardos Tagebuch” reflect on the collage-
like method of text production that characterizes the novel’s production process. 
753 Goethe, FA, I/10, 451. 
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the stories of Wilhelm and Lenardo – have no origin whatsoever in human subjectivity. Rather, 
these are the vibrant dynamics of the impersonal, inhuman archive, and of the machinery of text-
production, which the text exposes at the fictional level as the principle of its own composition. 
Makarie is no longer a figure at all, but rather a dynamic of dispersion and proliferation – a disfig-
uring force – in which perception and textuality, gaze and writing, become blurred together in her 
disorienting spectral image, which “[sich] kaum zu Ende schreiben läßt.”754 Her relation to the 
archive thus reveals her to be a form-of-life which is entirely en-framed by discursive acts of writ-
ten communication. 
 Through Makarie’s transformation from an aggregate of archival documents, which inces-
santly circulate around her orbit, into a visually synoptic being in the form of a distorted, disori-
enting image, as in Wilhelm’s dream, she also plays a central role with respect to the principle of 
“renunciation” [Entsagung] in the novel. Goethe’s emphasis on renunciation in the Wanderjahre 
is not to be thought strictly in psychoanalytic terms, along the lines of Freud’s discontent [Un-
behagen] in civilization – that is, as the renunciation of the drives. Rather, in light of Makarie’s 
approximation to the spiral tendency, she reveals the deeper tensions between order and excess, 
between renunciation and the infinite “drive” of the spiral tendency – in other words, the problem-
atic of the proper distance. Just as the breakdown –  the literal Versagen, as in the breakdown of a 
machine – of representation surrounding Makarie leads to a corresponding shift at the semiotic 
level away from hypotaxis – from the possibility of an overview or perspective of coherent devel-
opment, Bildung – toward the preponderance of the serial and the paratactic, so too does her em-
bodiment of the archive point to her status as a disfiguring force whose withdrawal from direct 
speech more broadly underlies the alienating communicative effect of the archive fiction, which 
                                                
754 Goethe, FA, I/10, 74. 
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de-subjectifies the figures of the novel. Perhaps more than any other figure in the novel, it is Ma-
karie who reveals the uncanny dimension of the voice, in its radical absence or “not-saying” 
[entsagen], first and foremost as a media effect: “What remains of people is what media can store 
and communicate. What counts are not the messages or information technologies with which they 
equip so-called souls for the duration of a technological era, but rather (and in strict accordance to 
McLuhan) their circuits, the very schematism of perceptibility.”755 
 Goethe’s decision to incorporate Makarie into the second edition of the novel, at which 
point the genre designation “novel” was – perhaps not without coincidence – dropped from the 
title page, thus suggests the degree to which Makarie, as the embodiment of the spiral tendency, 
corresponds to a shift away from the genre conventions of the Bildungsroman, with its medial and 
narrative closure, toward the aggregate and collective form of the serialized novel. For whereas 
the “life” of the Lehrjahre originated in the principle autotelic narration – of Bildung – “life” in 
the Wanderjahre is not that of the individual, human subject, but that of writing in its uncanny 
alienating effect and contingent materiality: it is, in other words, the “life” of the archive, which 
attains its own productivity – both vital and mortifying, as Nachlaß. Hence, just as Goethe gradu-
ally shifted away from the paradigm of Bildung in his Notes on Morphology toward the contin-
gency and monstrosity of the spiral tendency, his analogy between Makarie and the spiral form 
likewise suggests that, in the context of the serial logic of the Wanderjahre, no cosmological to-
tality or overview is possible any longer, but only the possibility of an end – of death and finitude, 
for Makarie, as the reader is informed, is quite old and nearing death – as well as its potentially 
endless continuation, or as the last line of the book reads: “(Ist fortzusetzen.)” 
  
                                                
755 Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stan-






CONCLUSION: FROM AGGREGATES TO CONSTELLATIONS 
 
Throughout the preceding pages of the dissertation, I have tried to show how relation of the con-
tingency and materiality of writing to the finitude of corporeal, creaturely existence around 1800 
connected to a form-principle of aggregation, whose techniques of engrafting, enfolding, and col-
lecting are neither wholly organic nor inorganic. To borrow Goethe’s term, such literary forms 
may be likened to “serial aggregates,” whose parts no longer relate to each other as parts to a 
whole, but rather as raw material that can be recombined and rearranged according to the will of 
the bricoleur – the writer, that is, in the role of secondary editor and collector. To conclude, I want 
to suggest that, although the paradigm of “serial aggregates” was virulent from the late 18th to 
early 19th century, there is a sudden shift away from this model in the late-19 century. Around 
1900, it is not so much the problem of the organic (biological-corporeal) and the inorganic (me-
chanic-technical) that underlies the relation of life and form, but rather that of system of environ-
ment, of actor and network, which foregrounds the contingency and differential character of form. 
From the early-19th century to the early-20th century, one could say that there is a pronounced 
shift, in other words, from the conception of form as aggregates to constellations – a term which 
advances in the 20th century to a fundamental concept in aesthetics and philosophy. 
 Although the cosmological implications of this term imply a somewhat counterintuitive 
claim, given that cosmology as a discourse is traditionally assumed to have waned in the 20th 
century after having been associated with a decidedly pre-modern ontology, the tentative claim 
put forth in this conclusion is that, in fact, 20th-century literary and cultural phenomena bear wit-
ness to an astonishing resurgence of cosmological discourse, which the term “constellations” – as 
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both a form-theoretical principle as well as a cosmic figure of thought – embodies and reflects.756 
Building off of my research in the dissertation, this next project, tentatively entitled Eccentric 
Orbits: Cosmology and Contingency from Alexander von Humboldt to Classical Modernism, pro-
poses to examine the cultural history and form-theoretical presuppositions of the emergence of 
cosmological discourse and poetics in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century German litera-
ture and culture. The starting point for this interdisciplinary project the reception of Alexander von 
Humboldt’s five-volume treatise Kosmos. Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung (1845–
62).757 While Humboldt is typically viewed as one of the last prominent exponents of the “romantic 
perspective” in the sciences – an anthropocentric worldview that is arguably implicit in his choice 
of title for the work, which harkens back to a distinctly pre-modern conception of nature as an 
immediately intuitable whole – I will argue that in fact a close reading of Humboldt’s Kosmos 
reveals a relativizing of the Romantic ideal of an unmediated “intuitive knowledge” by inscribing 
contingency and unpredictability not only into his cartographic representation of the world, but 
also into the work itself, whose “open form” has been likened to “das letzte Mega-Fragment der 
europäischen Sattelzeit.”758 
 In Kosmos, Humboldt undertakes the artistic as well as scientific representation of the en-
tire world – all of nature in its totality –, which in this context is not limited to the earth, but 
encompasses even the heavens. Furthermore, he seeks in this work not only to examine the con-
temporary condition of this vast realm, but also considers its historical development, which is in-
tended to be neither too general nor too concrete. This approach – this form – ought neither elevate 
                                                
756 For more on the concept of constellations as a representational and form-theoretical principle, cf. Andrea Krauß, 
Lenz unter anderem. Aspekte einer Theorie der Konstellation (Zürich/Berlin: diaphenes, 2011). 
757 Alexander von Humboldt, Kosmos. Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung, ed. Ottmar Ette und Oliver Ul-
brich (Frankfurt a. M.: Eichborn Verlag, 2004). 
758 Jürgen Osterhammel, “Alexander von Humboldt: Historiker der Gesellschaft, Historiker der Natur,” in: Archiv für 
Kulturgeschichte 81 (1999), 108. 
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itself to the level of pure theoretical speculation, nor to lose itself in the myriad of technical details, 
but rather represent the totality of the “world” in its manifold interconnectedness, drawing on the 
knowledge and methods derived from all extant disciplines, and to give it a form that would be 
adequate to this aesthetic purpose. Alexander von Humboldt conceived this “mad idea” [tollen 
Einfall], as he likened it in a letter to a friend, as an imaginary journey through the universe, which 
– from the most distant nebulae of the galaxy to the stones, moss, animals and humans on earth – 
would traverse the most heterogeneous spaces of knowledge.759 
 More broadly, this second project contends that Alexander von Humboldt’s Kosmos – and 
especially its popular reception stretching from roughly 1870 to 1913 – was decisive for the re-
emergence of a pervasive, yet still largely overlooked, discourse of cosmology in the 20th cen-
tury.760 In the project’s subsequent chapters, I plan to examine forms of cosmological representa-
tion and cosmic knowledge in the wake of Humboldt’s treatise, showing how around 1900 writers 
                                                
759 On October 27, 1835, Humboldt writes to Varnhagen von Ense: “Ich habe den tollen Einfall, die ganze materielle 
Welt, alles, was wir heute von den Erscheinungen der Himmelsräume und des Erdenlebens, von den Nebelsternen biz 
zur Geographie der Moose auf den Granitfelsen wissen, alles in einem Werk darzustellen, und in einem Werk, das 
zugleich in lebendiger Sprache anregt und das Gemüt ergötzt” (Alexander von Humboldt, Briefe von Alexander von 
Humboldt und Varnhagen von Ense aus den Jahren 1827 bis 1858 [Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1860], 20). 
760 Although literature related to this topic of research is limited, there are several monographs and edited volumes 
that are worth mentioning in this context. For more on the relation of the discourse of cosmology to literature and 
media from the early modern period to the 20th century, see Sonja A. J. Neef, Henri Sussman, and Dietrich Boschung 
(eds.), Astroculture. Figurations of Cosmology in Media and Arts (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2014), as well as 
Reto Rössler, Tim Sparenberg, and Philipp Weber (eds.), Kosmos und Kontingenz (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 
forthcoming 2016). For more on Alexander von Humboldt and his importance for modernity, see Ottmar Ette, Ute 
Hermanns, Bernd M. Scherer, and Christian Suckow (eds.), Alexander von Humboldt. Aufbruch in die Moderne (Ber-
lin: De Gruyter, 2001); Hartmut Böhme, “Alexander von Humboldts Entwurf einer neuen Wissenschaft,” in: 
Prägnanter Moment. Studien zur deutschen Literatur der Aufklärung und Klassik: Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen 
Schings, eds. Peter-André Alt, Alexander Košenina, Hartmut Reinhardt, and Wolfgang Riedel (Würzburg: Königs-
hausen & Neumann, 2002), 495–512; Lars Friedrich, “Stardust Memories. Alexander von Humboldts Rhetorik kos-
mischer Kräfte,” in: Die Realität der Idealisten. Friedrich Schiller, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Alexander von Humboldt, 
eds. Hans Feger and Hans Richard Brittnacher (Köln/Weimar/Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2008), 69–94; Gerhard Hard, 
“‘Kosmos’ und ‘Leidenschaft.’ Kosmologische und landschaftsphysiognomische Denkmotive bei Alexander von 
Humboldt und in der geographischen Humboldt-Auslegung des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in: Alexander von Humboldt. Werk 
und Weltgeltung, ed. Heinrich Pfeiffer (Munich 1969), 133–79; Peter J. Brenner, “Gefühl und Sachlichkeit. Humboldts 
Reisewerk zwischen Naturwissenschaft und Naturphilosophie,” in: Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 73 (1991), 135–68; 
as well as Karlheinz Barck, “‘Umwandlung des Ohrs zum Auge.’ Teleskopisches Sehen und ästhetische Beschreibung 
bei Alexander von Humboldt,” in: Wahrnehmung und Geschichte. Markierungen zur Aisthesis materialis, eds. Bern-
hard J. Dotzler and Ernst Müller (Berlin 1995), 29–42. 
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as seemingly disparate as Oswald Spengler, Gottfried Benn, and those of the Kosmikerkreis (Al-
fred Schuler, Ludwig Klages, Stefan George), “philosophers of life” around 1900 (Georg Simmel, 
Klages, Edmund Husserl), as well as avant-garde literature, philosophy, theater and poetry (Walter 
Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, Bertolt Brecht) all implicitly drew in different ways on cosmo-
logical figures of thought. By situating these strikingly different writes and texts within a broader 
cultural history of cosmology in modernity, their reflections on and reactions to the contingency 
and materiality of the modern world shed new light on natural-scientific, anthropological, as well 
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Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, June 2014. 
Respondent, Workshop Material Emotionality. Program for the Study of Women, Gender 




The Life of Form: Goethe, Science, Literature (Spring 2017) 
Weimar on the Pacific: German Exile Culture in Los Angeles (Spring 2017) 
To Be Continued: The Serial Impulse in Literature & Other Media (Fall 2016) 




Johns Hopkins University 
Advanced German II (Spring 2016) 
Advanced German I (Fall 2015) 
Introduction to New German Cinema (Winter 2015) 
Panorama of German Thought (Teaching Assistant, Fall 2014) 
Intermediate German II (Spring 2013) 
Love and Death in Wagner (Winter 2013) 
Intermediate German I (Fall 2012) 
German Elements II (Spring 2012) 
German Elements I (Fall 2011) 
 
Service 
2014–15 President, Philological Society, Johns Hopkins University 
2012–15 Graduate Representative, Philological Society, Johns Hopkins University 
2010–11 Graduate Representative, German Program, Department of German and Ro-
mance Languages and Literatures, Johns Hopkins University 




English: Native speaker 
German: Fluent in speaking, reading, and writing 




German Studies Association 
Modern Language Association 


































+1 (323) 259-2807 
 
Deborah McGee Mifflin 
Associate Teaching Professor and Director of German Language	
Johns Hopkins University	
469B Gilman Hall	
Baltimore, MD 21218	
mifflind@jhu.edu	
+1 (410) 516-7592	
